Morality
as Virtue: Aristotle
Virtue Ethics is a category of ethical
theories which she actions as right or wrong depending on whether
or not they flow from or are conducive to the formation of a good
character. Central questions to any virtue ethics theory would be:
·
What is the good
person?
·
What is the ideal
person?
·
How do I achieve
the Ideal?
·
What is “the good
life” for a human being?
Summary
of Aristotle’s Ethical Theory
Aristotle's Ethics is a systematic
naturalistically justified version of ancient Greek ethical thinking. Ancient Greek ethics stresses being virtuous- virtue ethics, as opposed to
merely following moral rules (deontological ethics) or the consequences of
actions (consequentialist ethics).
Aristotle’s ethics is based on his definition
of a “human[1]” as “The Rational Animal” and his
teleological understanding of excellence (Functional
Account of Good). Since the ability to reason (deliberate over courses of
action and choose on the basis of those deliberations)
is the one capacity or function which separates humans from other animals,
being rational is our defining quality, our "final cause," our "telos." The excellent human is the one who in actuality does reason well and choose
his or her actions on the basis of reason.
(This is seen in my “Functional Account of Good” portion of these
notes.)
Further, as creatures of habit, it is
prudent (rational) to develop those good habits (Virtues) that contribute to successful living (eudemonia) evidenced
in the lives lived by successful, thriving fellow humans (Virtuous Humans) through
rationally enlightened practice. (I
cover this In my eudaimonia portion of these notes.)
The Ancient Greek Notion of: αρετη
Transliteration: arete or areté
Definition: Virtue, excellence, moral excellence
Pronunciation: ah-reh-'tay αρετη
Explanation
No
English word or phrase captures the exact meaning of arete. The nearest
equivalents are 'excellence' and 'virtue'. But there is something more to arete
which cannot be expressed in words. There is something of the Divine in it.
Perhaps the only true way to understand arete is to consider two or more
examples of excellence and to contemplate what it is they share.
What
does it mean when we say of an action, an artistic work, or some flawless
athletic maneuver, that it is excellent? To behold what is excellent, in
whatever form, brings us the same joy. We perform an action with excellence and
say, "perfect!". In the moment of excellence, something transcends
the mundane and touches the Ideal.
For
Plato, arete is mainly associated with moral excellence. It is superordinate to
specific moral virtues of Courage, Temperance, Justice, etc.; something they
all share, a special, unnamed quality, their essence. It is clearly related to
Goodness, but not the same thing.
For
Aristotle, something is excellent when it manifests its unique purpose or
telos. The unique, defining quality of human beings, for Aristotle, what makes
them distinct from other creatures, is the capacity for rational thought. Human
excellence, then, involves the correct use of reason, principally in connection
with moral choice.[2]
Two Approaches to Aristotle: Telos
1. The Functional Account of Good
Aristotle tries to explain what “good”
means in terms of function:
Functional
Account of "Good"
An
account of good which claims that to say a thing is good is simply to say that
it does what it is supposed to do and does it well (efficiently). (Therefore a "good knife" is one
which does what knives are supposed to do and does it well.)
X is good = X does what X's are supposed to do and does it well.
A thing is said to be good if it does what
things of its kind are supposed to do.
This refocuses question of evaluation on questions of “proper function.”
Note: This is verifiable so long as one
knows what X is supposed to do and this function can be specified and verified. (As opposed to the function of a “phlogiston
detector” for instance.).
Note: That means that if one does not know
what something is supposed to do then one cannot evaluate it.
Note: There are two
curious, though perhaps reasonable, presumptions here.
u That the world does, in part at least,
break itself into “natural kinds” (contra Nominalism)
u And that these natural kinds
distinguish themselves one from another in terms of function.
The Functional Account of Good works
well and easily for human-created things because they are (most often) made for
a specific purpose and we who made them (usually) know what that purpose is.
Note: When it comes to the products of human creations, for the most part this account of good seems perfectly reasonable (e.g. Consumer Reports can tell about good and poor toaster ovens or blow-dryers.), but we run into trouble in the case of art. Aristotle would locate the source of our current difficulty in evaluating art NOT in the fact that we don’t know what “good” means, but rather in the fact that we do not have a clear universally agreed upon idea of what art is supposed to do. He would explain our difficulty by claiming not that we are confused about the word “good,” but rather because we are confused about the word “art.” We do not know the “final cause” or telos of art.
Aristotle had a teleological
worldview. This means that for
Aristotle, to truly know what a thing is one must know is function or
purpose.
Telos: Greek word for “end” or “purpose”.
Teleology: A system of ends and purposes./ The
study of a system of ends or purposes.
Doctrine
of the Four Causes:
Aristotelian Doctrine which holds that
to truly know what a thing is, one must know four things about it. That is, to explain what a thing is, why it
is and behaves as it does one must know four things about it:
1. Material Cause: (What's it made of?)
2. Efficient
Cause: (Who or what brought generated it.)
3. Formal Cause:
(To what species and genus does it belong?)
4. Final
Cause: (What is it supposed to do?)
Imagine a thousand years from now
someone is digging around in his backyard and comes across a curious object
that he can see is very old, but he does not know what it is. And he wants to find out. So he takes it to
his chemist friend. “What is this?” he
asks. And his chemist friend replies,
“Why I can tell you what it is: it is steel with some iron and chrome. There is also a bit of rubber here.”
Despite the fact
that what the chemist
has said is true, our discoverer is not satisfied. “Yes, that’s fine, he says to himself, but
what is
it?” So he
takes it so another friend of his, this time an Economic Historian. “What is it?” he asks. “Oh my, that’s an artifact, that is.” she
says. “It was designed by Franz Wagner. It was produced in Underwood factories in New
York sometime in the very early 1900s.”
Ok, so now this guy knows how it came
to be and who made it, but still, “What is it?” He sees a third friend, an archeologist this
time. “Yes I’m certain I can help you. I know precisely what it is. It is an Underwood
number 5. It is very similar to the Densmore, but differs from that kind in that it is a 4-bank frontstrike version.
It differs from the Daugherty in that it was less likely to have its keys
jam. Well now our discoverer understands
the object’s type, that is, he can recognize another one of the same type when he sees it and he can distinguish it from things
of a different type. He knows that class
of things it belongs to in that he knows its form, but there is a sense in
which he still does not know what the thing is.
Finally he takes it to an expert on Religion
and Culture from the early 20th Century. “I understand your difficulty,” she says. “You know what it is made of (Material Cause)
and how it came to be (Efficient Cause) and the class of things it belongs to
(Formal Cause), but what you what to know is ‘What is it supposed to do; what’s
it for?’ (Final Cause). Well I can help you
there. This was called a Typewriter. This was a machine by which people in the
early 20th Century communicated with their gods. They would sit in front of it all day and use
the keyboard to type messages of praise or petitions for help to the deities.“
Now another friend is walking by and
overhears this and says, “What? Don’t be
ridiculous! That was not the telos of
this thing. The telos of this machine
was to make music. It was a percussive
instrument and people would use it to play all sorts of complicated rhythms throughout
the day, Note the little bell on the
side.”
Figure 1 What is it?
Well. if our discoverer believed
either one of these stories he would be wrong, of
course, and there is a sense in which he would still not know what this thing is. He would still not know what the telos of a
typewriter was and thus his knowledge of the typewriter would consequently be
incomplete, this despite the fact that he knew the
material cause, the efficient cause, and the formal cause. He would still not know the final cause of
the object. And of course, eh still
could not tell a good one from a bad one.
The
Function of Natural Living Things:
For
The Functional Account of Good to be applied to natural objects (and ultimately
to humans too), it will be necessary to know what the function of these objects
are first. Now the question becomes “what are
these Natural Objects ‘supposed to do’?’” What is the “Final Cause” of an apple
tree, for example?
Aristotle believed
that natural objects do have purposes or functions and that these are
discoverable to humans by observation.
Two
ways Aristotle could have responded, but did not:
1. To Serve Human Interests: Apple trees are here to serve humans and
those that serve human interests well are good apple trees and those that do
not serve human interests are bad apple trees.
But Aristotle did not go this way because it is unjustifiably anthropocentric. He thought apple trees could be excellent
completely apart from their relationship to humans. Further, this is not fine-grained enough to
distinguish a good apple tree from, say, a good pear tree. Though distinct species,
they would have the same function according to this view.
2. To Serve God: One might claim that God
created apple trees and those that do what God created them to do are good and
those that don't are bad, but he did not go this route because he did not
believe in a creating God. (Aristotle thought that the Universe always existed in
pretty much the same way as it does now.)
The
Function of Natural Living Things:
Aristotle claims that the only things
that apple trees are supposed to do is BE APPLE TREES. – Presumably be the BEST DARN APPLE TREES
they can be. But that just means, do all
and only the “apple tree things” (i.e. fulfill apple
tree nature). Thus, for natural organisms, the nature of
the organism’s species, that is, the thing’s formal cause, is also the goal of
the thing, its final cause.
In order to know what apple trees are supposed to do, (what the “apple tree
things” are- apple tree nature- the apple tree telos) one must engage in an
empirical study of the species and see what they do do.
Through careful observation one will be able to distinguish the healthy,
thriving apple tress from the sick, diseased, withering apple trees. Studying the characteristic behavior of the
healthy ones will reveal the “nature” and thus the function of the
species. (Thus
the normative force is provided by health vs. disease: i.e. one ought to be
healthy/ excellent, one ought not be sick/ pathetic.)
Suppose you, a native Floridian, move
up to my hometown in Pennsylvania and you buy a house, in part, because of the
big apple tree in the front yard.
However, in the middle of September, you notice that all the leaves are
turning funny colors and start falling off.
“Oh no!” you think, “There’s something terribly wrong with my apple
tree.” You call me up in a panic and
tell me what’s going on. “Calm
yourself.” I would reassure you. That’s how apple trees are supposed to
behave. It is natural for apple trees
to lose their leaves in the autumn.”
However, if all the leaves start turning funny colors and falling off
your tree in the middle of May, when then, yah, you got a problem.
Note: This makes Aristotle a Naturalist with
regard to ethics- one who argues that normative claims can be reduced to
empirically verifiable claims.
Note :He is not contrasting good and evil;
he is contrasting good and bad, healthy and
pathological, vigorous thriving and pathetic withering.
What
is the Human Telos?
He applies exactly
the same reasoning to human beings.
He locates what he believes to be our unique and defining function.[3]
1. NOT the vegetative functions (eat
and grow/reproduce) These are the minimal function for living nature. As such these are part of our nature, but not
unique to humans. They are rather
functions we share with all living reality.
This is how he divides living (organic) reality and non‑living (inorganic)
reality.
2. NOT basic animal functions
(locomotion or sensitive capacities) These divide the living world between “two
kingdoms.” Plants eat and grow and
reproduce, but animals have these additional functions. As such these are not
unique to humans, but rather functions we share with all living animal reality.
3. NOT our capacity for emotions.
(Aristotle does not address this explicitly, but I believe he would recognize
that other animals have emotions.) Emotional functions we share with other
higher animals. This being so, these are not unique to humans, but rather
functions we share with all living higher animal reality.
The Human Telos
The unique function of Humans is that
we can reason. Thus, reason is at once our defining trait
and our telos. Being a "good human
being" or being good as a human
requires that we reason and reason well.
But Aristotle is not talking about the
mere Theoretical Reason-Sophia (our
exercise of reason for itself or to come to know truth), but rather Practical Reason- Phronesis, the use of reason to govern and guide our
actions. He means reason to be the ability to deliberate over choices and to
choose on the basis of those deliberations; we have
the ability to consider two courses of action in the abstract and choose
between the two based on rational appraisal.
n Note:
Here we see some of the significance of Aristotle’s famous definition of Man
as:
“The Rational Animal”
Only
three words but note their significance:
1. THE:
(definite article)
2. RATIONAL:
(Human Telos/ Segregating Trait)
3. ANIMAL:
(Unlike the Platonic notion of a spirit imprisoned
only for a time in a body, Aristotle claims we are essentially animals with
animal natures, just not merely animal natures.)[4]
“The
Rational Animal”
Non-human animals act on the basis on
instincts or emotional responses. Thus, their choices are not motivated or
guided by rational deliberation over abstract choices. We could (and sometimes do) live our lives
the same way, but this would be living the excellent life of a pig, NOT the
excellent life of a human. Acting virtuously (as one is supposed to) for humans is acting
rationally, activity in accord with a rational principle.
Two Approaches to
Aristotle: Virtues
2. Eudemonia
and Moral Virtues
Aristotle arrives at his conception of
the “good life” for a human (as a rational being) by asking, “What is the
natural good for man?" that is, what all humans desire "for its own
sake" and not "for the sake of anything else."[5]
Here it is helpful to distinguish two
kinds of “value.”
Intrinsic Value: Something has intrinsic value if it
is valuable for itself and not merely for some other reason.
Instrumental Value: Something has instrumental value if
it is valuable as a means to some other end (ex.
money).[6]
Aristotle points out that some things
we value because they are means to other ends.
But it cannot be that everything is valued (or have value)
for some other reason for that would lead to an infinite regress.[7] Thus, if we value anything at all there must
be something we value intrinsically. And
this thing (or things) of intrinsic value is what motivates all our
actions. This is a teleological view of
human action. The idea is that
thoughtful, deliberate action is goal oriented. But this system of goals cannot be an infinite
series (infinite regress). There must be
a Summa Bonum,
a Final End of human action(s).
Three qualities of the Ultimate Good (Summa Bonum)[8]
1. Intrinsically valuable
2. Proper to our nature/ unique human
good
3. Realizable; Can be acquired largely
independently of being given from outside
Our
final good? Happiness.
Eudemonia: Aristotle's
term for happiness in the sense of a state a thriving, health, actualized
well-ness and full human development.
Aristotle's special notion of
happiness is not our conception of "feeling happy" or euphoria. These are only unsustainable sensations. Rather Aristotle is thinking of a stable
state, like that of being healthy.
Aristotle’s term Eudemonia
means something closer to "living well" or “thriving.” And it includes all the natural human
capacities (social, political, economic, creative, familial) and virtuous acts
as well as good feelings. No matter how
good one feels (about oneself, life
etc.) one would not be happy in Aristotle's sense unless one were living a life
fit for a human being, actively fulfilling your human potential, being fully
human.[9]
Imagine the new father that tells you
he has a wonderful life planned for his newly born son. He has amassed a huge stock of illegal drugs an he plans on keeping his son
high for his entire life. The child will
only experience pleasure (no difficulty, no strife, no challenge) his entire
life. Would you approve of such a
father? Of such a life plan? Would you wish that life for your own
child? For yourself? Certainly not, Aristotle thinks. Even though a life of unending pleasure may
seem appealing at first, we quickly realize there is far more to being
fulfilled as a human being (eudemonia) than experiencing pleasure.
Further, happiness as with all
judgments of virtuous functioning generally, is not a matter of black and
white. Few people are perfectly happy
(excellent) and few people are perfectly unhappy
(having NO human excellences of any kind to any degree).
Close observation of the species
reveals that some are thriving more than others. Further, there are certain kinds of
characteristic behaviors (character traits) that are necessary for or
contribute to being happy (or at least, as happy as one can be given life's ups
and downs). These character traits taken
in sum are what Aristotle refers to as The Virtuous Character. He recommends we
attempt to develop it in ourselves and others as much as possible.[10]
(Moral)
Virtue:
Aristotle's
term for a good habit which is necessary for or contributes to successful
living.
So what ARE these good habits and how do
we acquire them?
Doctrine
of the Golden Mean:
The
Aristotelian doctrine which holds that a moral virtue is always the middle ground
between two vicious extremes.[11]
Examples of Virtues[12]
·
Courage (midway between Cowardice and
Rashness)
·
Temperance (knowing when to say when. midway
between lasciviousness and asceticism)
·
Pride (Midway between hubris and lack or
self-respect; made him unattractive to Christians.)
·
Friendliness (social skills necessary for eudemonia)
o I like to point out this is not unlike
our modern notion of “EQ” a cognitive skill/ability in which some people are
pathologically deficient. Midway between obsequiousness and belligerence)
|
|
Vice of Deficiency |
Virtuous Mean |
Vice of Excess |
|
|
Cowardice |
Courage |
Rashness |
|
|
Intemperance/ Lasciviousness |
Temperance |
Insensibility/ Asceticism |
|
|
Illiberality |
Liberality |
Prodigality |
|
|
Pettiness |
Munificence |
Vulgarity |
|
|
Humble-mindedness |
High-mindedness |
Vaingloriness |
|
|
Want of Ambition |
Ambition |
Over-ambition |
|
|
Spiritlessness |
Good Temper |
Irascibility |
|
|
Surliness |
Friendliness |
Obsequiousness |
|
|
Ironical Depreciation |
Sincerity |
Boastfulness |
|
|
Boorishness |
Wittiness |
Buffoonery |
|
|
Shamelessness |
Modesty |
Bashfulness |
|
|
Callousness |
Just Resentment |
Spitefulness |
So how do we acquire the
“virtues?” (Same way you get to Carnegie
Hall. Practice. :-) )[13]
According to Aristotle, being an
excellent human being is just like being an excellent golfer. One becomes that by practice. And keep in mind that practice, if it is
useful, is a rational affair. First you
need reason to identify the virtuous humans to serve as your models. Second you must use reason to analyze their
example and discern the virtues. Finally,
you need reason to develop the good habits yourself, requiring constant
performance assessment and reassessment. Education should be structured so that
it develops the bodily and mental faculties.[14]
Four
Levels of Moral Development:
Virtuous
Person
The top
level of moral development according to Aristotle. Has already developed the "Good
Habits." This person is living
the good life. Because his or her
behavior is shaped largely by good habits, actions do not require rational
deliberation on an action to action basis.
Continent
Person
The second best level of moral development according to
Aristotle. This person can usually do
the right thing, but for him or her it is still a struggle requiring both
reason and will-power.
Incontinent
Person
The
level of moral development according to Aristotle that is characterized by the
fact that the person knows what the wise/right thing to do is,
but lacks the will-power and self-control to do it. Has the theoretical knowledge, but not the
practical skill.
Wretched
Person
The
level of moral development according to Aristotle where the agent not only
lacks the good habits necessary for successful living, but even the awareness
that his own bad habits are the cause for his misery.
Three types of Lives
1.
life of enjoyment
2.
life of the
statesman
3.
the contemplative
life[15]
Many suppose the
life of pleasure is “the good life.” But
Aristotle rejects this as insufficient and not proper to our nature, being only
proper to brute beasts. (Previously noted
here.)
As for the life
devoted to the attainment of honor or glory, Aristotle claims that this is not
the true, proper end of a virtuous life either.
He criticizes it as “too superficial.” For one thing, it depends upon those who give honor
rather than the individual himself or herself.
One can be virtuous, but be despised by his
community. Conversely one can be a despicable
human being, but somehow be honored by his community. But our true “good” is something that is
peculiarly a person’s own which cannot be taken away. Further, he believes that many who pursue
honor do so to be assured of their own excellence. But that only shows that virtue or excellence
is better than honor; and for these individuals at least, excellence is if fact
the true end at which they aim.
The third kind of
life is the life of contemplation. This
is the highest kind of life for a human.
Romantic
Critique
Now one might accept the functional
account of good (i.e. “X is good.” = “X does what Xs are supposed to do and does it well.”),
but reject Aristotle's notion of the human telos is or purpose he towards
which he thinks all humanity is directed. For instance
if one thinks of Romanticism and romantic heroes we find that they pursue
values very different from those that Aristotle’s “Virtuous Human:
pursues. The Romantic hero typically is
not motivated by reason but rather is motivated by Passion. The point of life
is not “activity within the bounds of rational principle,” but rather
experiential: to love the greatest love,
to feel the greatest patriotism, to burn with the greatest desire. This is the purpose of human life. One thinks
of Thoreau “I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life,”[16] (I've always found that rather disgusting
image myself.), but nevertheless the encouragement to “live life to its
fullest” seems to be an essential part of Romanticism and the Romantic Hero.
Now if this is the purpose of life, if
this is “the good” we should pursue then we have different virtues to develop,
far different from the cardinal virtues of Aristotle and different persons will
populate our Pantheon of Heroes. So one might say the
good human being is one who does what human beings are supposed to do (functional
account of “good”), but come up with a completely different ethical system.
Thomas
Aquinas’s Critique
Similarly one can see
Aquinas as adopting Aristotle's functional account of good but rejecting
Aristotle's notion of what our true end or telos is. Aquinas agrees with much
of this, but believes that Aristotle was aiming too
low as to what it is that humans desire for its own sake (the true summa bonum). Aquinas is critical of Aristotle on this point.
1.
What we really
seek is not finite happiness, but rather infinite,
indefinite happiness Aquinas maintains. (It's not like I want to be happy for
the next five years and after that I don't care anymore.) Close attention reveals that what we truly
want is unending, unlimited ongoing happiness and fulfillment. So Aristotle's
worldly eudaimonia is not the true end we seek, nor can his (worldly/ cardinal)
virtues tell us how to achieve that genuine end we desire, that is, our true
Summa Bonum.
2.
Further, Aquinas
thought he could prove the existence of an all-powerful and all loving God
philosophically. So
belief in such a being need not merely rely on faith but on certain proof. (For those who do not come to believe this as
a matter of philosophy there is also revelation.) Thus both philosophy
and faith direct us to seek and even expect the happiness commensurate to God’s
power and love. (That is to say,
Infinite- just what we wanted.)
3.
Thus for Aquinas, our true end (telos) is in the
knowledge, service and love of God and to be united with Him in the afterlife.
I like to point out how influential Aquinas and for
that matter Aristotle continue to be in terms of our thinking on ethics and
specifically on the claims of Roman Catholicism. As some of you might know, Catholic
grade school children are catechized before receiving first Holy Communion,
learning some of the teachings of the Catholic faith. A much
used resource though, I believe it has been replaced these days, in the
catechizing of these young Catholic children was a book called the Baltimore
catechism. The catechism is arranged as a series of questions and answers and
children are taught to memorize both the question and the answer.
Baltimore Catechism No. 1
LESSON FIRST: ON THE END OF MAN
(Emphasis added.)
1. Q. Who
made the world?
A. God made
the world.
2. Q. Who is
God?
A. God is
the Creator of heaven and earth, and of all things.
3. Q. What
is man?
A. Man is a
creature composed of body and soul, and made to the
image and likeness of God.
6. Q. Why
did God make you?
A. God made me
to know Him, to love Him, and to serve Him in this world, and to be happy with
Him for ever in heaven.
Question #6 is
particularly interesting I believe.
While this is a question that a grade schooler could understand (and
that is the target audience of the Baltimore Catechism), it is profound in its
depth. This is asking “for what reason
do I exist?” “What is my purpose or telos?” By extension it is asking “What is the good
for humans?” To what end are they
directed and how are they to fully realize their latent, potential human
nature?” This is the fundamental
questions driving Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics and the catechism provides
Aquinas’ answer, an answer not too far from the thinking of both
of these ancient Greek philosophers.
It is also worth
mentioning that Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s definition of human (i.e. Man is the Rational Animal) Thus the only kind of eternal life and
eternal happiness a human can have is as an animal/ body. Ah! But that is precisely the eternal life
the Christianity promises. And precisely
what Christians are right to hope for, with God's help. The eternal life promised by Christianity is
NOT one as a disembodied spirit (Plotinus’ assent of the soul), but rather
human existence as resurrected bodies, the same sort of existence Christians
understand Christ to enjoy now. Aquinas says “Anima mea non est ego.” And that this was anticipated, in a way, by
the Pagan philosopher Aristotle.[17] Hence Philosophy shows the
necessity of the resurrection of the body, just as promised by the Christian
faith, for everlasting human life.
I answer that,
Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to
happiness, as was explained above (Question 5, Article 7). Now man's happiness
is twofold, as was also stated above (Question 5, Article 5). One is
proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by
means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's
nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of
participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1:4) that by
Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such
happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles
which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to
direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive
from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his
natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles
are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God,
inasmuch as they direct us aright
to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because
these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in
Holy Writ.[18]
We seek not only happiness, but unending
and indefinite happiness. Further, since
we can prove philosophically the existence of a good and loving all-powerful
God (or so he thought) the kind of happiness we should expect him to bestow in
happiness proportional to his power and love, that is, infinite bliss. Thirdly, note that Aquinas also incorporate Aristotle’s
notion that happiness is to be achieved by developing virtues. The theological
virtues are three: hope, love and charity.[19]
And the greatest of these is charity.
Existentialist
Critique
Finally, we might consider Existentialism
which simply rejects any notion of a fixed human nature. We'll have more to say
on existentialism later, but let's at this point acknowledge that
existentialists would claim that the phrase “what human beings are supposed to
be” has no reference. One of the central claims of existentialism is that there
is not human nature and thus each of us must choose what “Being Human” means
for ourselves. Your choice or anyone else's about what it means to be human has
absolutely no claim on me. Rather I must
choose for myself what it means to be this humanity. While we
think in terms of common nouns (human/ cat/ apple tree) we must live our lives
as individuals.
It's somewhat paradoxical in exactly
the way that Plato suggested. We think in common nouns
but we experience the world as individual moments, individuals encountering
other individuals. So what we think (common noun like
“cat” or “cat form”) we cannot see (since we only see individuals) and what we
see (individual, particular cats) we cannot think (the generic concept of or
abstract concept of “cat form”). But
where is Plato thought the forms have a greater degree of reality,
existentialist assure us that the really real is the
individual confronting the world individually on individual terms. So what
matters is not what human nature is but what I choose to be for myself. Consequently,
since there is no human nature, one cannot apply the functional account of good
to evaluate humans. This is not to
suggest that the existentialist claims there are no criteria by which to assess
our lives. The criterion is to honestly look at our lives and embrace what we
see. One must take a sober and unvarnished look at one’s life, and making to
excuses, ask oneself am I living up to my own values? While this is indeed a
subjective test, to ask and answer this question honestly and authentically can
be very convicting.