DIVINE COMMAND THEORY AND THE EUTHYPHRO ARGUMENT

 

Morality and Western Religion

 

Some religions are not as closely tied to morality as are Western monotheistic religions.  Religious obligations, say to worship the god(s) appropriately, are one thing, and moral obligations are something else again.  However Western monotheistic religions tend to see God as the source of moral guidance and knowledge.  Further, the obligation to be moral is a religious obligation as well.[1]  For these religious traditions, one’s duty to be moral and a sacred obligation to do the will of God.  Saint Augustine talks about morality in this way.

 

"... Unless you turn to Him and repay the existence that He gave you, you won't be `nothing'; you will be wretched.  All things owe to God, first of all, what they are insofar as they are natures.  Then, those who have received a will owe to Him whatever better thing they can will to be, and whatever they ought to be.  No man is ever blamed for what he has not been given, but he is justly blamed if he has not done what he should have done; and if he has received free will and suffi­cient power, he stands under obligation.  When a man does not do what he ought, God the Creator is not at fault.  It is to His glory that a man suffers justly; and by blaming a man for not doing what he should have done, you are praising what he ought to do.[2]

 

And St. Thomas Aquinas:

 

 "... It is apparent that things prescribed by divine law are right, not only because they are put forth by law, but also because they are in accord with nature."  Or, "Therefore, by divine law, precepts had to be given, so that each man would give his neighbor his due and would abstain from doing injuries to him."[3]

 

And in the Bible:

 

"When thou shalt harken- to the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep all His commandments, which I command thee this day, to do that which is right in the Eyes of the Lord thy God."[4]

 

But, as previously mentioned, even assuming that there is a God, we need a way of determining what His moral commandants must be.  One might say that He has given these commandants to various individuals, but the fact is that different people seem to have very different ideas about the morality that God has given them.  Some, for example, would say that it explicitly rules out abortion and infan­ticide.  Others would argue that God does not rule these out, but makes clear that they are, like other forms of killing (as in a "just war" for example), justifiable under certain cir­cumstances. 

 

Now this would be the case even if our entire community believed in God.  But as we live in a democratic religious pluralism, along with diverse positions on the nature and existence of God, we cannot simply appeal to God when making moral judgments, establishing moral rights and public policy, but must define our morality by reasons accessible to anyone that we can formulate and defend. 

 

Inherent Problems with Appeals to God to Explain Morality and Moral Obligation

 

In an effort to ground morality in something objective and universal, some have sought to appeal to God as, not only an arbiter of right and wrong in the sense of a wise/perfect judge, but as the very source of right and wrong.  But appeals to God to solve matters of morality have two main problems:

 

1.       Not everyone believes in God.

2.       Even among believers, there is disagreement about how God wants us to behave.

 

Deists, for instance, believe in God, but think God doesn’t care how we behave.  Devotees of various religions have markedly different notions of what God commands and what God forbids.  So appeals to God to solve matters of morality present problems for theists, atheists and agnostics alike.

 

But even if we did all agreed that there was a God, and we agreed about how God wanted us to behave, there would remain another philosophical question.  While God might be an excellent source of moral guidance and knowledge, and all of his commandments are good and just, does God’s commanding something make it just, or does God command something because it is just?  This is the issue we are about to consider: The Divine Command Theory.

 

The Divine Command Theory:

 

This further question has often been debated: whether we should follow God's laws because they are His laws or rather, whether God is good because His laws are good.  Plato takes this very issue up in the Dialogue Euthyphro.

 

http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html

 

The Divine Command theory is the view which claims that what makes something morally correct is nothing other than the fact that God commands it.  Some find this view appealing because it assures objectivity to ethics (thus avoiding Ethical Relativism, Ethical Emotivism and Ethical Subjectivism).   Given God’s eternal nature, what is “right” is always right, all times, places, and situations.  This gives ethics a stability, clarity and universality that many find attractive.  Also there may be theological reasons why one might wish to advocate this position, namely it is consistent with the view that nothing acts as a constraint on God, not even morality.  However, the question from the point of view of philosophy is what reason do we have for thinking it is true or do we have reason to think that it is false.

 

As with so many things, this dispute is anticipated by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato.  In the Platonic dialogue The Euthyphro the characters of Socrates and the priest Euthyphro take up the issue of piety and goodness.  In response to Socrates’s question “What is goodness?” Euthyphro responds (eventually) with something like “Goodness is whatever God loves.”  ( I am paraphrasing a bit here.)  Socrates AGREES with that statement.  It important to note that Socrates agrees and takes this to be a true and significant claim, but he pushes a bit further.  This claim, even if true, is ambiguous and does not actually answer Socrates’s question.  It only raises the following one:

 

Is something is good because God loves it, or does God love it because it is good?

 

If one affirms the first of the disjuncts, one is affirming the “Divine Command Theory.”

 

The Divine Command Theory:  Thing are good because  God commands them and things are bad because God forbids them.

 

Despite the attractions I mentioned above, there are also some uncomfortable implications to this.

 

1.       Philosophical Ethics becomes impossible.  The only way to know what is good or bad is to ask God. 

Notice you have no way of knowing what flavor of ice cream I love without asking me.  You could not reason it out on your own since there is no feature of the ice cream that makes it preferred by me; it is rather a fact about me and my preferences that determines what I love.  You might find out that I like peanut butter (I do, by the way) and then reason, well, if he likes peanut butter, he must like peanut butter ice-cream.  But you’d be wrong.  I hate peanut butter ice-cream.  I think it’s vile.  “Why?” you might ask?  I don’t know; I just don’t like it.  Similarly, you cannot know what is good in the world by looking at the world, since no feature about the world makes things good or bad; it is instead a feature about God.  (This is because of the next implication.)  But if no amount of reasoning about the world or actions in the world can reveal to us the way humans ought to behave, Philosophical Ethics is impossible and we must rely instead on revelation.

 

2.       This makes Ethics (and God for that matter) capricious and arbitrary.

Since something is right because God commands it, then it follows that the opposite would be just as right if God commanded that instead.  This trivializes all the commands of God rendering them completely arbitrary and shows God not to act from reason and morality, but from caprice.  Now you might think, well, there are certainly certain things (like child abuse) that God would NEVER sanction.  But this presumes there is something inherently wrong with such actions, and that God, with infinite goodness and wisdom would KNOW this and for that reason never sanction such behavior.  But that is precisely what the Divine Command Theory denies (i.e. that certain actions are inherently wrong or right).  God has no (moral) reason to prefer certain actions to others since actions are moral or immoral as a result of God’s preference.  Thus the morality or immorality of an action cannot account in any way for why God prefers or forbids it. 

 

3.       We cannot praise God for being moral or just.

Further still is seem to rob us of the ability to praise God for his morality and justice.  If “good” equals “God-loved.” then to say that “God is Good.” merely equals “God is God-loved.”  If “justice” just means “whatever God decrees” than to say “God acts justly.” amount only to saying “God does whatever he does.”  But this says nothing about the degree to which God merits God’s love, or ours for that matter.

 

4.       Finally, this account of morality leaves entirely mysterious what atheists mean when they claim that something is good or that something is bad.

Clearly atheists and agnostics do NOT mean by “good” whatever God commands or decrees or loves, since they are, at most, unsure whether there exists a God or not.  But most atheists and agnostics do NOT have similar doubts as to whether or not anything is moral or good.

 

So far none of these demonstrate DCT to be false, just uncomfortable.  However there is a logical problem with this view.

 

5.       The sentence “Whatever God loves is good.”  is an interesting, informative and perhaps even a controversial claim.  (Socrates and Euthyphro agree on this much.)  But if “good” means “God-loved” then the sentence ceases to be interesting and informative, but is rather a trivial tautology.  Look what happens is we treat “good” as synonymous with “God-loved” (which we would be entitled to do is they really mean the same thing).

 

A: “Whatever God Loves is Good.”  =  B: “Whatever is God loves is God-loved.”

 

The reason the original sentence (A) is NOT as trivial as the second (B) can only be explained by the fact that “good” does NOT mean “God -loved.”

 

To resist the Divine Command Theory then would be to assert to alternative disjunct: God loves something because it is good.  Here it is still true that “Whatever God loves is good.” That is because what is good is obvious to Him in His infinite wisdom, and because of His perfect morality He only loves the things He knows to be good.  This view avoids the arbitrariness of the previous option. 

 

On this view:

 

1.       God/ ethics are not capricious.

2.       Allows us to praise God.

3.       The atheists/ agnostics  mean that same as everyone else.

4.       Philosophical Ethics is possible.

 

Still, it not without its own problems.  It really takes us to where Euthyphro and Socrates were at the beginning of the dialog.  “What does it mean to say that something is “good?  Once we abandon a theological explanation of concepts of good and bad and must return to the search for a philosophical one.  This is not to say that God is not a VERY good source of moral truth, and if we can get His expert advice as to whether this or that practice was moral or not, that would settle the issue.  But if we do not access have His judgement, or if His spokespersons disagree with one another, it gives us another way to go (i.e. try to see what God sees which makes things right and wrong).

 

All this is to say that, if the Divine Command Theory is not true, Philosophical Ethics might be possible after all and that we might, like God Himself, come to recognize what is good and bad, albeit imperfectly.  (Was this what the serpent was talking about?  Who knows.)

 

Epilogue:

 

I usually use this story when I lecture on the Divine Command theory, so I figured I should put it into my lecture notes as well.  I have a friend Andy who is a physician.  In fact, he is a very good physician.  He is so good in fact that I might say of him,   “Whatever Andy recommends is healthy.”  Now, does Andy recommending something MAKE it healthy or does he recommend something because it is healthy?  I suspect you would agree that Andy recommending something does not/ cannot make it healthy .  Otherwise I would ask him to make Fettuccini Alfredo  healthy.  The truth is that Andy recommends things because they ARE healthy.  He looks at the world and uses his superior knowledge to determine what is and what is not healthy and therefore what he will and will not recommend.  So if I have a question about whether something is healthy or not, I could call him up and ask him.  He is, after all, an excellent source of information on this subject.  However, if he is not available, I might be able to look at the world, try to see what he sees, and figure it out myself.  But that will require getting a clearer understanding of just what is it that makes healthy things healthy.  (And likewise what is it that makes just acts just.)

 

Epilogue to the Epilogue:

 

This is a first treatment of this issue and as such somewhat superficial.  Were this a course where the entire semester  was devoted to morality’s connection to God, we would see that there is a good deal more to sat on this subject.   For instance, defenders of classical theism have suggested that Socrates’ very question presupposes an impossible division between Goodness and God’s nature.[5]  If you are interested in pursuing this topic further, you may wish to start by looking at the Stanford Encyclopedia. 

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=Divine+Command+Theory

 



[1]Note however, that not every religious obligation is a moral obligation.  For instance, the religious obligation of Roman Catholics to refrain from eating meat on Fridays during Lent is not a moral obligation, and Catholics do not judged non-Catholics who eat meat on Fridays during Lent to have done something immoral.

[2]St. Augustine, On Freedom (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).To fully understand what Augustine is saying there, we would have to unpack his notion of natural kinds, teleology and the potentiality/ actuality distinction, but that is not our focus here.

[3]St. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, Bk III (New York: Doubleday, 1955). Ditto my comment for Augustine, but also Thomas’s notion of Natural Law.

[4] Deuteronomy, 13:18

[5] Consider:  Does the valley have its shape because of the shape of the mountain, or does the mountain have its shape because of the shape of the valley?