Aristotle (348-322
B.C.)
·
Plato's student.
·
Credited with being a “practical man of
earth.” (Largely due to his metaphysics)
·
A biologist, physicist- Championed Observation as a means to knowledge
(Contra Plato-this makes him an Empiricist)
·
Tutor to Alexander the Great (Got him
into some political trouble in Athens after the death of Alexander)
Rationalism |
Empiricism |
There are Innate Ideas |
There are no innate ideas |
The Senses are a poor, unreliable means to knowledge |
The senses are a reliable, indeed the only means to
knowledge. |
The most reliable means to gain knowledge and truth is via
a priori reason and introspection |
A priori reasoning is fine as far as it goes, but it is
very limited as to what is can provide us in the way of knowledge. The most reliable way to useful knowledge
is through observation and experience. |
Representative Philosophers: |
Representative Philosophers: |
|
|
Disagrees with
Plato on the following:
Agrees with Plato
on the following:
That damn change
things again:
The problem of change persisted despite Plato’s best efforts
to resolve the dilemma. In fact, he did
not so much resolve the dilemma an he did entrench the dilemma. Aristotle’s resolution required being much
more careful about what it means to say that something “is.”
Change and Being
in actuality and potentiality
I do not speak French.
However I do possess the ability to speak French. So there is a sense in which I “am” a French
speaker. I am a French speaker in
potentiality, though not in actuality. That
is, I AM (be) the sort of thing (human) whose nature permits him to learn and
speak French. Thus Aristotle would say I
have the ability to speak French in potentiality, but not in actuality. An apple tree possesses the potentiality to
speak French NEITHER in potentiality nor in actuality. Apple trees are not even the sort of thing
that could speak French[1]. And even French speakers possess the ability
to speak French in potentiality only when they are sitting quietly doing a
water color painting or knitting etc. (that is when not ACTUALLY speaking
French).
So a change did not require a substance moving from being to
being (which would not really be a change) nor moving from non-being to being (which
is impossible) but rather when a substance moves from potential being to actual
being. Any change in a substance is the
“actualization” of a pre-existing potentiality.
What actual and potential characteristics a thing has are determined by
the thing’s nature or “form.” Note
further the only thing that could “move” a thing from potential to actual is a
mover (impetus) outside the moved thing.[2]
There are several senses in which a thing can be said to
'be' That is, there are several correct
answers to the question “What is that?”
You might see me walking down the hall, point and ask “what
is it?” Were someone to respond, “That’s
a human being.” he or she would have answered correctly. But that would not be the ONLY correct answer
since that is not the only thing that I “be.”
One might also correctly respond, that’s an FIU professor, or, less
kindly, that an overweight middle-aged consumer.
You might see a certain red bird landing on a tree branch,
point and ask “What is it?” Were someone
to answer, “That’s a cardinal,” he or she would have answered correctly. But that would not be the ONLY correct answer
since that is not the only way the thing can be said to “be.” A person might truly reply, That’s red.” Now “redness’ DOES exists, to be sure, but
redness only exists as a property of things that can exist on their own. Since
“redness” cannot exist on its own Aristotle classified it as a “secondary
substance” but since individual cardinals can exist on their own, Aristotle called
them “primary substances.” . Aristotle would say that “redness” is a
secondary substance, while the (actual, particular) cardinal is a primary
substance. Further, while being a
cardinal is essential to that primary substance’s nature, being red is
accidental. We could spray-paint it blue,
not that I would ever, and the thing would still be a cardinal. (Being human is essential to my nature; being
185 pounds is accidental… let’s hope.)
So primary substances have natures/forms (formal causes or essences)
which determine why they are the way they are and why the develop/ move change
as they do (potential and actual properties).
Some of these properties are accidental and others are essential.
The primary sense
of "to be" is to be a substance.
e.g. To Be a human
The secondary sense
of “to be” to is be an instance of a quality or quantities.
e.g. To Be a Tall (secondary) human.
So note that I am essentially a human; I am only
accidentally a 185 pound philosophy professor.
I could lose weight (undergo an quantitative change) or get another job
(undergo a qualitative change) but I would still be a human. When I die, I undergo a substantial change. I am no longer a human; in fact “I” no longer
“am” at all. In my place in a new
substance: an human corpse.
Doctrine of the Four Causes:
Aristotelian Doctrine which holds that
to truly know what a thing is, one must know four things about it. That is, to explain what a thing is as it is
and behaves as it does one must know four things about it:
1. Material Cause: (What's it made of?)
2. Efficient
Cause: (Who or what brought generated it.)
3. Formal Cause:
(To what species and genus does it belong?)
4. Final
Cause: (What is it supposed to do?)
Imagine a thousand years from now
someone is digging around in his backyard and comes across a curious object
that he can see is very old, but he does not know what it is. And he wants to find out. So he takes it to his chemist friend. “What is this?” he asks. And his chemist friend replies, “Why I can
tell you what it is: it is steel with some iron and chrome. There is also a bit of rubber here.”
Despite the fact that what the chemist
has said is true, our discoverer is not satisfied. “Yes, that’s fine, he says to himself, but
what is
it?” So he takes it so another friend of
his, this time an Economic Historian.
“What is it?” he asks. “Oh my,
that’s an artifact, that is.” she says.
“It was designed by Franz Wagner.
It was produced in Underwood factories in New York sometime in the very
early 1900s.”
Ok, so now this guy knows how it came
to be and who made it, but still, “What is it?” He sees a third friend, an archeologist this
time. “Yes I’m certain I can help you. I
know precisely what it is. It is an Underwood number 5. It is very similar to the Densmore,
but differs from that kind in that it is a 4-bank frontstrike
version. It differs from the Daugherty
in that it was less likely to have its keys jam. Well now our discoverer understands the
object’s type, that is, he can recognize another one of the same type
when he sees it and he can distinguish it from things of a different type. He knows that class of things it belongs to
in that he knows its form, but there is a sense in which he still
does not know what the thing is.
Finally he takes it to an expert on
Religion and Culture from the early 20th Century. “I understand your difficulty,” she
says. “You know what it is made of
(Material Cause) and how it came to be (Efficient Cause) and the class of
things it belongs to (Formal Cause), but what you what to know is ‘What is it
supposed to do; what’s it for?’ (Final
Cause). Well I can help you there. This was called a Typewriter. This was a machine by which people in the
early 20th Century communicated with their gods. They would sit in front of it all day and use
the keyboard to type messages of praise or petitions for help to the deities.“
Now another friend is walking by and
overhears this and says, “What? Don’t be
ridiculous! That was not the telos[3]
of this thing. The telos
of this machine was to make music. It
was a percussive instrument and people would use it to play all sorts of
complicated rhythms throughout the day,
Note the little bell on the side.”
Well. if our discoverer believed
either one of these stories he would be wrong, of course, and there is a sense
in which he would still not know what this thing is. He would still not know what the telos of a typewriter was and thus his knowledge of the
typewriter would consequently be incomplete, this despite the fact that he knew
the material cause, the efficient cause, and the formal cause. He would still not know the final cause of the
object. And of course, eh still could
not tell a good one from a bad one Thus
knowing what a things is for, what it’s supposed to do, to what end it is directed,
is part of any adequate understanding of what a thing is.
Primary Substances can stand alone. (ontologically
independent e.g. The Cardinal).
Secondary substances cannot. (ontologically dependent e.g.
The Redness of the Cardinal)[4]
A Primary Substance is a combination of Form and Matter.
Note: For Aristotle Form does not/ cannot exist apart from
matter, though separable in thought- We can imagine
Michelangelo’s "David" for instance apart from the marble that
actually constitutes it- (done instead in cheese, say).
Primary Substances are individually existing objects with
inherent essential natures.
Humans, Cardinals, Lumps of Gold
Secondary substances are those “objects” constituted by
particular individual primary substances.
Philosophy Teachers, Blonds, wedding rings.
A change of the Primary Substance is a Substantial Change.
It destroys the thing in question and replaces it with a new thing.
·
If I cut a Sphere in half, the sphere
no longer exists; instead two hemisphere exist.
·
If I separate water into oxygen and
hydrogen, water (along with its water nature/form) no longer exists. The new substances (oxygen and hydrogen) have
quite different potentialities and actualities (i.e. different nature/ form)
than does water.
·
Accidental properties are those
properties of things which are not essential. The individual could gain or lose
those properties but remain the same unique individual (i.e.. wart).
·
Death is a substantial change; the
human is destroyed and the corpse come into existence.)
·
Forms themselves can never (do not)
change, nor can the matter, but they combine in different ways.
Human-made products cannot be considered to be true
substances because they do not have their
own immutable nature. They are not “natural kinds.”
Therefore they cannot be identified with an immutable nature. (Ex: table,
chair, or bed.)[5]
Note: For Aristotle, a “Nature” is what a substance is supposed
to do, what it will do if nothing stops it. (Think “Natural Tendency” or
Activity)
In
order to know what apple trees are supposed
to do, (what the “apple tree things” are- apple tree nature- the apple tree
telos) one must engage in an empirical study of the
species and see what they do do. Through
careful observation one will be able to distinguish the healthy, thriving apple
trees from the sick, diseased, withering apple trees. Studying the characteristic behavior of the
healthy ones will reveal the “nature” and thus the function of the
species. Hence there is an inherent normative
quality to these judgments, at least when applied to human kind; the normative force
is provided by health vs. disease (i.e. one ought to be healthy/
excellent, one ought not be sick/ pathetic.)
Suppose
you, a native Floridian, move up to my hometown in Pennsylvania and you buy a
house, in part, because of the big apple tree in the front yard. However, in the middle of September, you notice
that all the leaves are turning funny colors and start falling off. “Oh no!” you think, “There’s something
terribly wrong with my apple tree.” You
call me up in a panic and tell me what’s going on. “Calm yourself.” I would reassure you. That how apple trees are supposed to
behave. It is natural for apple trees
to lose their leaves in the autumn.”
However, if all the leaves start turning funny colors and falling off
your tree in the middle of May, when then, yah, you got a problem.
A. Telos the Greek word For
"purpose' or 'goal.'
B. Teleology explains an event or object in terms of its
purpose, goal, or end. (She skipped dessert because she is trying to lose
weight. The heart contracts in order to
pump blood.) A Teleological
investigation is one in which one is looking for the goal, function or purpose
of a thing. A teleological world view is one which contends that reality itself
has (or items is reality have) goals, functions or purposes.
C. Aristotle's Science/Philosophy seeks to explain why (for
what purpose) something came about,
while Modern science seeks to explaining how (causal).
(Biology/Ecology may have a problem here.)
D. Causal explanation Vs. teleological explanation (theory
of falling objects).
Matter
1. Everything which is moved (changed) is moved by some
other thing.
2. That which moves a thing is itself moved or it is not.
3. A system, even infinite system, comprised only of moved
movers is impossible. (infinite regress).
Therefore
There must be a mover which is not itself moved.
Unmoved Mover (Ultimate Final Cause)
Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover has some of the characteristics of
the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God;
but According to Aristotle:
Epistemological
Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:
Forms are learned through experience. We see particulars and our minds “abstract” the forms.
(No need to posit an immortal soul to explain knowledge of
abstract forms.) But you must not
imagine that we “generalize” to the “essence.”
Locke would say something like that, but not Aristotle.
Aristotle advocated what today we would call direct realism.
(Also known as naive realism). In On the Soul he claims that a seer is
informed of the object itself by way of the “hylomorphic
form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is
impressed.” Hylomorphism
refers to Aristotle’s theory that being (ousia) is
always a composite “matter” and “form.”
Experience is the source of any real knowledge of Ultimate
Reality. (This makes him an Empiricist)
Note: Aristotle directs attention to observation of the physical
world.
Intellect (Nous,
Active intellect, and Passive intellect)
So how does the mid get to the Forms of things if NOT
through a process of generalization?
Aristotle says that the intellect (nous), the ability to apprehend the
forms directly. This active function of
the intellect has no bodily organ (in contrast with other psychological
abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination). Indeed, Nous is not mixed with the body. Note if the mind/soul took on the form of the
cat directly but the mid/soul was itself matter, well.. matter plus cat from
equals CAT. The mind would become a
cat. Since that doesn’t happen, the mind
must take on the From without the mind itself being matter.
Now the idea that the mind/soul is one thing and the body is
something else, seems to contradict Aristotle's claim that the soul is nothing
other than the form pf the body.
Scholars disagree on how best to resolve this apparent
contradiction in Aristotle.
This would amount to a form of dualism.
But if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the
body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of
the soul?
Philosophical/
Dialectical Project:
Philosophical argument must be informed by details observations
and will take the form of reflections and abstractions from these.
Ethical
Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:
The attainment of knowledge of eternal forms is only PART of
human nature. It is a worthy life activity, but only part of a full human life.
(Man is the Rational Animal.)
What are the most real and attainable goals, worthy of our
attention and service is the fulfillment of
our own (human) nature.
As Rational Animals, the excellent human is the one who most
fully expresses Unique Human
Nature, that is, who lives a life guided by reason which
culminates in the fulfillment of one's natural
human capacities (i.e. social, familial, political,
creative, etc.- in short, a functional human life).
It is not clear whether Aristotle believed in some sort of
afterlife, but probably the most consistent position with everything else he
said would be “No.”
[1] Modern philosophy treats possibility and impossibility differently than the ancients and the medieval. For moderns, if something is “conceivable without logical contradiction: as Hume might put it, it is thought to be “possible. On this view, a married bachelor is impossible, but an apple tree speaking French is not. But for Aristotle, since Apple Tree Nature is a timeless and eternal immutable essence that does not possess the potentiality to speak French, a French speaking apple trees is as impossible (metaphysically impossible) as is a married bachelor. How we come to KNOW the impossibility of the former may differ in who we come to know the impossibility of the latter, but they are equally impossible nonetheless.
[2] Could it be that every actualizing agent derives is actualizing ability from some other actualizing agent? That is, can every case of moving a thing from potentially X to actually X be brought about by some other prior thing which itself was moved from potential Y to actual Y? No. Why not? Short answer: infinite regress. Long answer, read Aristotle’s unmoved mover argument and/or Aquinas.
[3] Telos is the Greek word for end or purpose.
[4] Note the difference with Plato here. While for Plato, the more abstract the reality the more “real” it was, for Aristotle, the particulars are more real than the secondary abstractions.
[5] Now, if a human artifact is a necessary byproduct of human nature, say, like politics, then it would have a nature as immutable as human nature.