Education, Indoctrination, and Academic Freedom
Copyright © 2023
Bruce W. Hauptli
The importance of academic freedom is most easily
recognized when it is called into question—when inquiry proceeds unhindered, its
preconditions go largely unnoticed.
Whenever individuals or groups call out for the banning of certain books or
teachings; when calls go out for the censure of educators for their provocative,
unconventional, or dangerous beliefs; or when individuals would restrict
researchers from pursuing certain lines of inquiry; then the issue of academic
freedom surfaces.
Academic freedom is essential to the educational enterprise.
If the goal of education were the instilling of various “approved”
dogmas, then academic freedom would not only be unnecessary, it would be
counterproductive.
Dogmas are best absorbed and taught
uncritically. Education and
indoctrination are polar opposites however.
Education is centrally concerned with producing reasonableness.
It transforms individuals by developing
their capacity for self-sufficiency and autonomy; by enhancing their
intellectual powers; by cultivating their character and tastes; and by enabling
them to seek, test, and hopefully discover knowledge and truth.
Such an enterprise requires a critical orientation.
Unfortunately, human fallibility and the elusiveness of knowledge and
truth conspire to ensure that these goals are difficult to attain.
If we are to have any reasonable assurance of progressing toward these
goals, we must become critical thinkers—individuals who seek, and are motivated
by, rational justifications and reasons as they develop their beliefs and plan
their actions. Such individuals
must be willing to question accepted beliefs and theories, willing to critically
examine the facts and theories which they uncover in their pursuit of knowledge
and truth, willing to present their findings publicly, and willing to await and
welcome the critical scrutiny of others also engaged in the pursuit of knowledge
and truth. This sort of critical
orientation is possible only if there is full-fledged “academic” freedom—the
freedom of the learner, educator, or researcher to engage in the unhindered
pursuit of truth and knowledge.
This sort of freedom has ancient roots and comes to us from the classical
Greeks via the Medieval universities, the renaissance, the age of reason,
and the American Bill of Rights.
While it has been variously interpreted during different historical periods,
‘academic freedom’ refers centrally to a freedom on behalf of the learner,
teacher, or researcher to pursue a course of studies unhindered by external
pressures, and the freedom to discuss and publish the results of the inquiry
process. While academic freedom is
usually associated with colleges and universities, its roots in Athens before
the founding of the Academy should serve to indicate that what is fundamentally
at issue is freedom of inquiry generally speaking.
“Academic” freedom should be seen as applying to “self-educated”
individuals pursuing their inquiries on their own, as well as to students,
educators, or researchers who pursue their studies at recognized educational
institutions.
Academic freedom is not a license to engage in utterly unrestricted
behavior. Students may not appeal
to it as they physically abuse other students or shout down the educators they
encounter, educators may not appeal to it as they seek to indoctrinate their
students, administrators or other authorities may not appeal to it as they seek
to restrict certain lines of teaching or inquiry, and researchers may not appeal
to it as they engage in morally reprehensible research activities.
Those who claim the protection afforded by academic freedom must accept a
correlative responsibility—the responsibility of critically
discussing and justifying their behavior and procedures when these are
questioned. If their behavior or
procedures are indefensible, academic freedom should not offer the protection
sought. Thus biology instructors
who would dissect their students, or students who would shout down their
instructors may not appropriately appeal to academic freedom to justify their
activities.
Whatever the motivations of the individual inquirer, student, educator,
or researcher, the pursuit of knowledge and truth is not one which is of mere
individual utility. Society and
humanity at large benefit from the pursuit of these goals since knowledge and
truth empower us by enabling us to engage in effective action in a largely
indifferent environment. Moreover,
these pursuits engender a particular sort of human happiness—they activate those
pleasures which result from the successful exercise of our rational capacities.
These pleasures are unknown to non-rational creatures and few of us would
wish to divest ourselves of these pleasures once we have experienced them.
Indeed it is only by pursuing knowledge and truth that we can quench the
thirst which is manifested by our inherent curiosity.
Only the most dogmatic cultures and “learning” environments succeed in
deadening this basic human trait, and few believe such environments are happy
ones.
Where independent inquirers, students, educators, or researchers find
their freedom of inquiry illegitimately restrained, we all suffer.
Whether the inquirer is questioning current beliefs and mores or is
engaged in scholarly or empirical researches aimed at expanding the frontiers of
human understanding and knowledge, it is society at large which benefits.
When the researcher strikes out on the wrong path, academic freedom
ensures that others will be able to expose the errors and learn from the
mistakes. Where the researcher
strikes out on a promising path, academic freedom ensures that valuable
corrections may be provided by others and ensures that others may become aware
of the promising direction.
Academic freedom ensures that the inquirers may choose the path and it is
valuable whether the path is promising or not because we learn from our mistakes
as well as from our successes—the discovery of error is part of the process of
uncovering truth and arriving at knowledge—especially for fallible creatures
such as ourselves.
Those who would restrict an individual’s inquiries must accept a heavy
burden of proof. Whenever one
wishes to silence an independent inquirer or student, to deter an educator from
teaching certain views, or to stop a researcher from pursuing a line of inquiry,
one must present a convincing argument which clearly establishes that the
proposed restrictions are appropriate.
Such arguments are difficult to sustain given the value of a
maximally-free inquiry process.
Unfortunately, it is usually fear and ignorance which motivate the calls
for censure. Those who feel that
certain books, teachings, or inquiries threaten the fabric of society or culture
actually evince little faith in the strength of this fabric.
Such individuals might consider the words of President Thomas Jefferson in his
Inaugural Address in 1801: “if there be any among us who would wish to dissolve
this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as
monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where
reason is left free to combat it.”1
The true strength or value of a belief is not measured by how many hold
to it or by how long it holds sway.
Instead, a belief’s strength or value is measured by its ability to withstand
unhindered critical scrutiny. Those
views which stand in mortal danger because no one will subscribe to them once
alternatives are available are beliefs which individuals should not subscribe
to—not views to be protected at all costs.
As I noted, academic freedom is usually considered to apply to
institutions of “higher learning.”
This is only natural since these institutions are dedicated to the pursuit of
truth, knowledge and understanding.
Those outside often feel that there is too little restriction within
universities or colleges—they advocate a more restricted environment wherein
certain beliefs or theories are not studied or taught.
If their efforts lead to such restrictions, these individuals actually
destroy the university or college.
Where these efforts are undertaken to protect some favored dogma, the
individuals who champion the restrictions would force their particular ideology
upon the university or college.
Their success undercuts the search for knowledge and truth and, thus, harms not
only the university or college, but the society as well.
Academic freedom is not limited to institutions of “higher” education
however. When students and
educators in the primary and secondary schools are not granted a full measure of
academic freedom, these institutions cease to be educational institutions and
instead become instruments of indoctrination.
Similarly, where public libraries and librarians find their academic
freedom restrained they become mere storage depots for certain “preferred”
volumes, and self-education is rendered difficult (if not nearly impossible).
A society which has universities, colleges, secondary schools, primary
schools, and libraries without academic freedom is one dedicated to the
uncritical preservation and inculcation of particular dogmas.
Lacking a dedication to the pursuit of knowledge and truth, such a
society can not prosper since it actively precludes one form of human happiness
(the pleasures associated with knowledge and inquiry).
Indeed, it will survive only if it is fantastically lucky (since an
unhindered inquiry process is requisite for knowledge and truth).
We are fortunate we do not live in such a blighted community; but without
vigilance, we may find ourselves inhabiting such a society.
Those who would restrict academic freedom should find comfort in the very
academic freedom they would fight.
If the views which they would restrict are wrong, then the very academic freedom
they rebel against will serve to expose such error.
Note: (click on note number to return to the text
for the note)
1 Cited by Fritz
Machlup in his “On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom,” which is
“Appendix B” of Academic Freedom and Tenure: A Handbook of the American
Association of University Professors, ed. L. Joughin (Madison: Wisconsin,
1969), p. 197. Originally the essay
appeared in: AAUP Bulletin v. 41 (1955), pp. 753-784.
Machlup indicates that the citation is from Thomas Jefferson’s Inaugural
Address March 4, 1801, and it is reprinted in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903) v. III, p. 319.
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File last revised on 02/15/23.
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