Third  Meeting of MSC Spring 2022 What Do Colleges and Universities Owe Democracy?

 

Copyright © 2022 Bruce W. Hauptli

I had intended to talk more about the connection between "rights" and "responsibilities" in the second class, but did not get to flesh this out then, and I find that I both want to get directly to Daniels for this class and that I need more time to say more clearly what I want on this topic. 

A. Oveview of Daniels:

 

pp. 9-10: But this book is about more than the self-interest of universities; it also makes a broader claim about the role of universities in advancing the public good.  Liberal democracy is the system of government best equipped to mediate among the different, competing, and often irreconcilable conceptions of the good and to ensure appropriate care for individual autonomy and dignity.  The values of the university, in particular, are aligned with this system, given the premium each places on freedom of speech and thought, tolerance for dissent and heterodoxy, the free flow of information and ideas, and shared and distributed authority.  Universities are places of such influence that they will, either through action or inaction, shape the society around them, and it would be a scandal for them to sit passively by as the political structures aligned with their mission degrade around them.  They cannot be complacent: they must look hard at who they admit, how they teach, how they explore and share knowledge, and how they connect their discoveries with the teeming, diverse world beyond their walls.  In this light, the relevant question is not, How do we shape society to nourish the university? but rather, How does the university best foster democracy in our society? 

 

p. 240: “Throughout this book, I have sought to develop a holistic mapping of the role that the university plays in liberal democracy by focusing on four key functions: promoting social mobility, educating for citizenship, checking power with facts and knowledge, and modeling and promoting pluralism.  In each of these functional areas, I showed how universities in the United States evolved to take on these responsibilities and how well (or poorly) they are requiting them today.” 

 

p. 98: “Colleges and universities are uniquely positioned for leadership on civic education.  Most undergraduates are between the ages of 17 and 24, a period of development often referred to as the “impressionable years,” in which young adults develop the civic skills, political convictions, and habits that will persist into adulthood.  As these take shape, they can be given depth and nuance in a classroom or campus setting.  In fact, studies have consistently shown that well-designed courses and educational programs with a focus on political engagement can help college students develop greater political knowledge and motivation to participate in democratic life.  This is particularly true for students who enter college with little political interest or socialization.” 

 

p. 98: “The young republic in its earliest days looked to its universities as bearers of an education in democracy.  Episodically, and particularly at moments of democratic threat, the country and its universities have returned to this endeavor.  But now, more than two centuries later, we are still without a concrete and enduring program in democratic citizenship in our colleges and universities.  Why have these efforts repeatedly faltered?  And how can universities answer the latest call to civic purpose, without meeting the fate of those that came before?  For that, we will need to peer back and track the ebb and flow of the history of universities as places of unending promise and repeated disappointment for civic education.” 

 

Is Daniels right here—in the beginnings of the Republic were extant college focused on civic education?  Did Jefferson believe this? 

 

B. Daniels’ Chapter One: Universities and Access, Mobility, and Fairness:

 

Chapter Overview: pp. 23-24: at this moment, the liberal democratic dream of equal opportunity is more elusive than ever for many in contemporary America.  For most of their history, colleges and universities gradually expanded access to college for people of all socioeconomic backgrounds, a feat achieved through the creation of public university systems and community colleges, through visionary legislation like the G.I. Bill and the Higher Education Act, and through massive investments in financial aid.  But in the past thirty to forty years, states have scaled back financial support for higher education, federal funding has stagnated and lost focus, and universities have embraced admissions practices that too often advantage wealthy students and disadvantage poor ones.  These trends have accelerated the stratification of higher education.  The solution for addressing this dire problem will need to be far-ranging, including robust financial aid initiatives to mitigate the burdens of student debt.  To start, I call for the reinvestment in financial aid by governments and for the elimination of legacy preferences in college admissions. 

 

p. 35 still, one of the more striking facts of American economic life in the past century is that even when actual mobility has faltered, faith in mobility has endured.  The American Dream, in other words, has held strong.  Social scientists have long marveled that Americans managed to remain far more optimistic about their ability to get ahead than citizens in other countries, even as those countries begin to catch or even surpass the United States in rates of actual mobility.

 

p. 36 a college degree makes it 3.8% more likely that someone in the lowest income quartile might move to the highest quartile, and the annual fiscal return on a bachelor’s degree is about 14%. 

 

p. 37 highly ranked schools were effective in moving poorer students’ in this manner, but they serve very few such students, lower ranked schools can have a greater effect

 

p. 39 The National Center for Education Statistics, meanwhile, reported that among a cohort of young people who were high school sophomores in 2002, only 14 percent of those from the bottom quarter of incomes had earned a four-year college degree (or higher) in 2012, compared to 60 percent for students from the top quarter.  Add to this the fact that 59 percent of children whose parents hold postgraduate degrees graduate from a four-year college, while only 17 percent of children of parents who never went to college do so.  By some measures, then, educational immobility exerts an even firmer grip on American society than socioeconomic immobility, as highly educated parents pass their education on to their children at a greater rate than the rich pass on their socioeconomic status. 

 

p. 39: far from being the incubators of democratic mobility across generations, universities have come to represent, in the words of The Economist, a new “hereditary meritocracy.”  Daniel’s mentions Michael Sandel, The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020) on p. 38. 

 

On pp. 41-44 he traces the history of higher education in America from the first scholarship [1643] through the training of ministers and careers in law engineering and banking, to the establishment of more scholarship opportunities at the time of the Civil War.  There the Morrill Act began “…audacious investment in the future of American education at a moment when the future of America itself was in severe doubt” (p. 44).  By 1890 the second Morrill Act tried to extend the admission of black students though “…States could sidestep this stipulation, however, if they established separate institutions specifically designed for African American students.  Southern states uniformly chose this latter option….” p. 47 

 

pp. 48-49 by 1900, Black colleges and universities—in one count—had graduated nearly two thousand students.  More than half of these graduates were teachers who played an essential role in expanding the educational attainment of young African Americans across the South.  The racial gap in school attendance between whites and Blacks halved, and African American illiteracy rates sharply declined.  This, in turn, helped to expand professional opportunities and create the conditions for higher-level collegiate work for the generations served by these teachers.  It was in this sense that W. E. B. Du Bois observed in a 1907 letter that Black colleges represented “the foundation of the school system and not its cap-stone.”  Black land-grant colleges were indispensable in giving credence to assessments like Du Bois’s and, like the institutions established by the 1862 act, in helping to set the stage for the next massive expansion of access to higher education that would occur in the early decades of the twentieth century. 

 

p. 49 the number of students enrolled in colleges and universities skyrocketed from 63,000 in 1870 to more than 1,150,000 in 1944, the year the G.I. Bill became law.  As a share of the college-age population, enrollment grew fivefold in this period.  Central to this shift was the spread of public K–12 schooling as a mainstay of American life, which generated a pipeline of students ready for a college education.  And thanks to an economy increasingly reliant upon specialized knowledge and a higher education sector ever more defined by growth and differentiation (aided by the rise of technical schools for engineers, normal schools for teachers, and full-scale research universities capable of training students in applied science), the economic returns to a college education began to far outpace those of a high school degree. 

 

On pp. 49-52 he traces the development of State Universities from the 1890s through the development of Junior Colleges in the 1900s (by the start of WWII here were more than 200).  The extensive broadening of the number of state universities and junior colleges (and of students receiving higher education) led to a transformation for private colleges:

 

pp. 51-52 as Dartmouth President Ernest Hopkins told undergraduates in 1922, “Too many men are going to college!”  What was needed, Hopkins said, was for elite private colleges to begin recruiting students of the highest intellectual merit, thereby cultivating “an aristocracy of brains, made up of men intellectually alert and intellectually eager.”  Such an attitude was a stark change from the private college admissions scene a few decades prior.  For most of the nineteenth century, college had been a buyer’s market, and admissions processes at elite private colleges were designed to let in as many students as possible.  Harvard, for instance, publicly advertised in 1870 that 88 percent of that year’s applicants had been admitted.  The process was simple: applicants took a series of entrance exams catered to the curricula of elite regional preparatory schools that served as feeders.  Those who passed the exams were admitted—and most passed.  Even those who didn’t could still be admitted conditionally.  But this traditional system was quickly becoming outmoded.  The expansion of public secondary schooling in the United States had sparked an explosion in college applications.  Academic leaders eager to form a “natural aristocracy of talent” by identifying meritorious students from all parts of the country welcomed this surge of new prospects.  But determining who should be admitted and why required retooling decades-old policies and procedures.”  This led to the birth of standardized testing.  However admission via testing alone didn’t produce quite the “aristocracy that the private colleges wanted and so

 

p. 53 throughout the 1920s, these colleges abandoned exam-dependent admissions processes in favor of a holistic, character-based one that considered test scores as one factor among many, with applicants judged on their personal qualities and achievements (assessed through written materials, in-person interviews, and detailed family backgrounds) as well as their academic ability.  The introduction of this new, more open-ended approach gave admissions offices tremendous latitude in shaping the character of a student body.

 

This also led to the phenomenon of “legacy admissions.” 

 

On pp. 55-60 he discusses the more “modern history of higher education form the G.I. Bill [1944] and Roosevelt’s hope “…to develop new social programs that would extend the promises of the New Deal into the postwar era, especially in higher education, a field in which he had long searched for an “entering wedge” that would allow him to amplify the federal role” p. 55).  He also draws attention to the efforts of the State of California to develop a more democratic Higher Educational System. 

 

Of course, the G.I. Bill was a boon to mobility for many, but it did not extend such mobility to all Americans.  But in 1965 President Johnson “…the HEA into law…at Southwest Texas State Teachers College, his alma mater.  In his remarks that day, Johnson retold his own rags-to-riches story, but he also spoke movingly of his experience teaching impoverished youth in rural Texas, for too many of whom the American Dream had remained only a dream.  “I remember even yet,” he intoned, “the pain of realizing and knowing then that college was closed to practically every one of those children because they were too poor” p. 57). 

 

On pp. 60-62 he discusses how some private colleges began to redress their “aristocratic character” by reducing “legacies,” developing “need-blind” admissions policies, and generous financial aid packages:

 

p. 63 from 1992 to 2010, the percentage of public research universities’ budgets attributable to state funding was slashed nearly in half, starving the very schools that had been built to be “democracy’s colleges.”  These cuts were the product of a medley of forces: the fiscal pressures on state governments, the priority that states accord health care over educational funding (not surprising, in light of the relatively high rates of voter turnout by seniors in comparison to young adults), and the growing perception that a college education is primarily a private—as opposed to a public—good (and therefore its costs should be borne by its beneficiaries rather than society at large). 

 

However the 1980’s saw a substantial retreat in Federal funding for Higher Education, and many private colleges found their new policies were too costly.  Concurrently States began to decrease finding for their systems. 

 

Concurrently the rise of “College Rankings” such as the U.S. News & World Report annual ranking begun in 1983 led to significant changes as higher educational institutions modified admissions criteria in light of such report’s (changing) criteria.  Such criteria ranges from average GPAs and standardized test scores to the 2018 U.S. News & World Report adoption of “altered its formula in an explicit effort to reward schools that promote social mobility by adding indicators for how many Pell-eligible students a school enrolls and how many graduate” (p. 68). 

 

While Daniels thinks it is too early to tell whether such “social mobility indicators” may enhance access, mobility, or fairness he does say

 

pp. 68-69: this shift has lent tangible support to the decisions we have made at Johns Hopkins—especially in the wake of an extraordinary $1.8 billion gift that was earmarked for student-based financial aid from alumnus and former mayor of New York City Michael R. Bloomberg—to commit to enrolling at least 20 percent of our class from Pell-eligible families.  Moreover, these changes have had a notable impact on the rankings themselves.  In a single year, the new mobility indicators moved schools like the University of California, Riverside, and Howard University up thirty-nine and twenty-one spots, respectively, while causing a number of formerly top-ranked institutions to drop.  On p. 77: Daniels notes that Bloomberg’s gift made it possible for Johns Hopkins’ to have an admissions policy which is need-blind and no-loan! 

 

 

He points out (p. 70) that now roughly 48% of endowment income goes to financial aid, and this is important for the enhancement of access, mobility, and fairness.  But the following section on “Inequality Machines” contends the current situation is dire.  He contends that to address this situation:

 

p, 73: there must be increased efforts to provide direct funding in the Pell Grant tradition (including direct federal funds to cash-strapped state universities)

 

Of course Daniels’ school has an undergraduate student body which is about 6,300 students.  A State University with 20,000 undergraduate students could require an endowment of roughly ten times the unprecedented Bloomberg gift.  Thus we need to talk about whether his advocacy here is really feasible. 

 

If Daniels is on target with his recommendations for providing more equitable access to undergraduate education, h=should his program be expanded to graduate education? 

 

pp. 73-75: there must be increased efforts to ensure timely graduation for such students

 

pp 75-76: “means testing” for free tuition proposals

 

pp. 76-78: in the absence of increased government tuition funding, there must be increased funding from “other organizations.” 

 

pp. 78-84: he offers an indictment of legacy admissions. 

 

p. 80: at most top-ranked national universities with legacy preferences, legacy students comprise anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of incoming classes.  With numbers like these, legacy students can significantly influence the racial and socioeconomic composition of a class. 

 

pp. 82-84: many top ranked schools are ending legacy consideration for admissions. 

 

pp. 84-85 I began this chapter by arguing for the essential role social mobility plays in the liberal democratic project and how vital the collective belief in the prospect of mobility is to sustaining it.  Democracies draw their credibility and their resilience from an implicit covenant that anyone with enough grit and talent can move beyond the confines of the circumstances into which they were born.  As income inequality and stratification have grown more acute and intergenerational mobility has stalled, this central tenet of the American Dream has become increasingly fragile.  Legacy preferences exacerbate this problem by eroding the credibility of colleges and universities and irreparably damaging the meritocratic ideal that is a centerpiece of democratic faith and that institutions of higher education ought to embody.  They are, in a word, corrosive of the faith in mobility and therefore of the spirit that lights democracy itself.  No matter how many first-generation and low-income students they admit, how many scholarships they award, or how many more urban and rural high schools they engage, my view is that universities cannot truly stand for equal opportunity until they muster the courage to eliminate the most conspicuous vestiges of caste that still cling to them.  Only then can they lay claim to their heritage as carriers of the American Dream…. 

 

Question for Next Class:

 

    Could one contend that mandatory civic education might be “indoctrination?” 

Return to my webpage for the course. 

Midcoast Senior College Website

Bruce Hauptli Home Page

Email: hauptli@fiu.edu 

Last revised: 03/23/22