In Latin America, as in other regions of developing countries, the armed forces have historically played a decisive role in the political process. Since 1945, every Latin American country except Mexico has had at least one military coup d'etat. Despite interludes of civilian rule, military dictatorships have governed much of Latin America much of the time. For many people in the U.S., Latin America is synonymous with military intervention in politics.

However, beginning in 1979, military regimes were replaced by elected civilian governments, even in Central America. For the first time in modern history, there are no military governments in Latin America. In Haiti and Panama, following U.S. interventions, civilian leaders decided to abolish the military. Still it is obvious that the absence of military government does not mean the elimination of the military’s role in politics. In 2000, a military coup overthrew the elected president of Ecuador; junior officers attempted unsuccessfully to install a civil-military “Junta of National Salvation.” In 2009, the president of Honduras was forced into exile by the army with the support of the opposition-controlled Congress. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez first came to public attention in the 1990s as the leader of a failed coup against the incumbent president; after being overwhelmingly elected in 1998, he himself was briefly overthrown in 2002 by a coalition of retired officers and businessmen. Chavez has vastly expanded the missions of the armed forces and his personal control over those forces. In contrast, a handful of countries have established a substantial degree of civilian control over the armed forces. In others, the military remains a significant political force with a high degree of institutional autonomy, despite a nominally civilian regime. Political scientists have debated whether or not these hybrid regimes should be called democracies. If not democracies, what are they?

Most of this course will be devoted to an examination of the political behavior of the Latin American militaries in order to understand the problems and prospects facing these regimes in their attempt to devise more democratic patterns of civil-military relations. Although the principal focus is Latin America, the conceptual framework developed in the class can be used to analyze other Third World countries who face similar issues about the political role of the armed forces. Note that this is not a course about war or military operations. It is a course about the politics of the armed forces.

The course addresses a wide range of questions about civil-military relations in Latin America: How and why do military officers decide to stage a coup? Why have some countries had many coups and others none? How are military governments different from civilian governments? Why and how are they different from each other? Why do military regimes fall? Is the current democratic era different from earlier periods of civilian government? What can be done to avoid a new round of coups? What political roles does the military play in the new democracies? How do the military’s missions affect their political power (or lack thereof)? How can we explain the differences between countries with relatively democratic civil-military relations and those that are only paper democracies? What can civilian governments do to achieve democratic control of the military? What, if anything, can the U.S. do to assist that process?
This course draws heavily on my own research on civil-military relations in Latin America. We will discuss various controversies in the academic literature on the Latin American military in order to sharpen our understanding of the factors that affect the attitudes and behavior of the military in politics. Although these issues may at times seem unconnected to contemporary events, understanding the current policy debates requires a basic knowledge of the military as a political actor. For Latin America, that basic knowledge has been derived from the history of civil-military relations, including military coups and military governments that happened a long time ago. In part because things always change, both domestically and internationally, our knowledge is still evolving, still debated, and certainly incomplete. So there are no simple solutions to the policy question of how to construct more democratic civil-military relations in the Latin American context, given the radically different economic, political, and historical conditions prevailing in those countries.

The course begins and concludes with a discussion of civil-military relations in the United States, including controversies over the military budget, “the military-industrial complex,” and the “civil-military culture gap.” However, we will also raise broader questions: Is the U.S. really an exception to the axiom that "power flows out of the barrel of a gun"? If so, why? How do we preserve civilian control of the armed forces, given post-Cold war changes in the U.S. military and its political environment? Will that effort be easier or more difficult in the context of a new global “war on terrorism”? Is there a significant political divide between civilian and military leaders in the United States? Is that gap growing? What are the consequences for civilian control in the United States? Could American civil-military relations ever end up like Latin American civil-military relations?

The course has three principal objectives:

1. To provide a better understanding of the military's political behavior in both Latin America and the United States;

2. To enhance your ability to act as an informed citizen on issues relating to U.S. relations with the Latin American militaries and to the preservation of the special pattern of civil-military relations prevailing in the United States; and

3. To practice critical thinking and analytical reasoning: asking "why," constructing explanations for complex patterns of behavior, testing generalizations against factual evidence, relating known behavior to new situations, and relating knowledge about past behavior to current policy controversies and choices.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The course grade will be based on two quizzes (each counting 10% of the final grade), a mid-term (20%), a (short) term paper (20%), a final examination (30%), and class participation (10%). The mid-term and the final will include essay questions distributed at the end of the class prior to the exam. **The essay questions will test your understanding of the concepts and arguments by posing questions for which "the answer" has not been provided by the instructor. Exams will be graded on understanding of concepts, factual knowledge, and analysis.** Unless you have three exams on
the same day, no early exams will be permitted. No makeups will be given for the quizzes, except for serious hardship cases resulting from circumstances beyond your control. The class schedule below will most likely vary somewhat, because it is not possible to predict when additional time will be needed to cover particular topics. So, plan your vacation trips with sufficient leeway that you don’t miss a quiz/exam.

The term paper assignment is a 10 page analysis of some aspect of 2000-2010 civil-military relations in a country outside of Latin America or the United States. Detailed instructions and suggested topics are available in the “Term Paper Guidance” document on the D2L course website.

To the maximum extent possible, the class will use an interactive discussion format, rather than the "lecture and questions" format. To work effectively, this format requires every student to be an active participant in his/her learning and that requires consistent attendance, reading each assignment prior to class, and active participation in the class. Accordingly, class participation will count for 10% of the final grade. Attendance will count for 3 of the 10 participation points. Questions submitted via the “last minute quiz” at the end of each class period will count for 2 participation points. Taking an active and constructive role in class discussions will count for 5 of the 10 participation points. At the end of the semester, the participation scores will be graded on a curve, i.e. in relation to other members of the class.

You are expected to read each assignment prior to that class. Use the study questions to help identify the important issues in each reading. There is no commonly accepted conceptual framework for the study of the military in politics, so deciphering the approaches of different authors is part of the assignment.

There is no fixed curve for the course but the usual grade distribution is approximately 25% A/A-, 35% B+/B/B-, 35% C+/C/C-. Grades of less than a C typically result from failure to do the readings/assignments or failure to take advantage of the extra help offered during the semester to those who have difficulty with the initial quiz or the mid-term. Students who need extra help and those who desire more discussion and personal contact are encouraged to meet with me during regular office hours or to call 492-2954 for an appointment.

Office Hours:
Monday: 10-11 am and 1-4 pm
Friday: 10-12 am
or by appointment.

Readings:
*There are no textbooks for this course. All of the readings will be posted on the DesireToLearn website.* In the assignments below, readings listed as Fitch, AFD, are chapters from J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (1998), which is no longer in print. The Johns Hopkins University Press has graciously consented to let us use these readings without charge.

COURSE OUTLINE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 18</td>
<td>Syllabus distribution and course objectives</td>
<td>Read syllabus carefully and Fitch AFD, “Introduction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 20</td>
<td>Civilian Control: Huntington's Thesis</td>
<td>Huntington, &quot;Civilian Control&quot;; Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activities”</td>
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</table>

Study Questions: What does Huntington mean by "objective" civilian control? How is that different from "subjective" civilian control? What historical examples exist of each type of civilian control? How is the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” control reflected in contemporary policy issues, such as the all-volunteer military?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan 23</th>
<th>The Truman-MacArthur Crisis</th>
<th>Flint, &quot;The Truman-MacArthur Conflict”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Come prepared to reenact the Truman-MacArthur debate as one of the participants (including the general public) in this confrontation.</td>
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Study Questions: How was Truman able to maintain civilian control of the military in the face of a strong challenge by a politically powerful and popular general? To what extent does the Truman/MacArthur crisis support Huntington's theoretical argument for "objective" civilian control? To what extent did the successful assertion of civilian control rest on "subjective" factors?

**Latin American Military in Politics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan 25</th>
<th>Latin America: Evolution of the Armed Forces</th>
<th>Fitch AFD, ch. 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Study questions: Over time, the evolution of the Ecuadorian military paralleled that of other South American militaries, from nonprofessional forces in the 19th century to a small, but moderately professionalized military by the 1960s. As the South American militaries became larger and more professionalized, what difference did that make in their political behavior? Does the general Latin American experience confirm Huntington's thesis about "objective" civilian control? Why not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan 27</th>
<th>Ecuador: Military Coups in the 1960s</th>
<th>Fitch, “Fall of Velasco”</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Study Questions: In these two Ecuadorian coups, what factors entered into the military decision to overthrow the government? What role did civilians play in encouraging and/or provoking these coups? In what respects do these two coups differ from your preconceptions about military coups based on newspaper and television?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan 30</th>
<th>Ecuador: Military Role Beliefs</th>
<th>Fitch, “Changing Role Beliefs,”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Come prepared to role play the responses of different officers to the question &quot;What is the political responsibility of the armed forces in Latin America (in the 1960s-70s)?&quot;</td>
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</table>
Study Questions: In what ways did the "new professionalism," which emerged in the Ecuadorian and other militaries in the 1960s, differ from the "old (classic) professionalism"? How would an advocate of the "security and development" approach define the political role of the armed forces in Latin America? How would he/she defend and legitimate military intervention in politics? What would the advocates of other role beliefs say about this position? What factors explain the shift over time to more interventionist role beliefs in Ecuador?

Feb 1 Ecuador: Structural Causes Fitch, “General Framework and the Ecuadorian Case”

Study questions: If military coups are largely responses to crisis situations, what causes those crises? Why were the 1960s in Ecuador much more unstable than the 1950s? What does the Ecuadorian case suggest about why some Third World countries have many more coups than others?

Feb 3 Argentina: The 1976 Coup Wynia, "Argentina"

Study questions: In terms of decision criteria (situational causes), how was the 1976 crisis in Argentina similar/different from the crises of the early 60s in Ecuador? To what extent were the underlying structural causes of the crisis similar or different? How did the Argentine military perceive that crisis? How did they respond?

Feb 6 The Central American/Caribbean Militaries Millett, "Central American Militaries",

Study questions: How do the Central American and Caribbean militaries differ from the military in Argentina or Ecuador? What effect do these differences have on the military's political behavior?

Sign up for term paper country. Only one student per country, so have 1 or 2 backup countries.

Feb 8 Military Government: Argentina and Chile Loveman, “Antipolitics in Chile,“

Study questions: Apart from repressing political movements sympathetic to the ousted government of Allende, what were the key policies of the Pinochet government? Who benefitted and who lost as a result of those policies? What was Pinochet's political strategy for maintaining his military government in power? Hint: Although repression was an integral part of his regime, Pinochet did not last 17 years just on the basis of intimidation. From 1982-1989, the opposition was quite active, eventually defeating Pinochet in the plebiscite which would have given him another eight years as President.


Study questions: In what ways was the military government in Peru different from Chile or Argentina, especially during the term of General Velasco? What were the key reforms undertaken by the military government? Why was the military government which took power in 1968 relatively autonomous from civilian interests and pressures? Why did the military's autonomy decline over time? How does McClintock characterize the political style of the Peruvian regime? What were the strengths and weaknesses of Velasco's style of governing?
Study questions: While the economic record of military governments is generally mixed, most analysts agree that in Latin America military governments have consistently been political failures. Why is this so? What factors contribute to that lack of political success? Are these political liabilities curable? Why did some military governments last for relatively long periods—Pinochet for 17 years, the Brazilian military regime for 21 years, some personalist military dictatorships for 30 or more years—while others were relatively short-lived, e.g., Argentina, with a total of 7 different military presidents/juntas in a 14 year period?

Feb 15

**FIRST QUIZ**

Civil-Military Relations After the Transition to “Democracy”

Feb 17 Patterns of Post-Transition Civil-Military Relations Fitch AFD, ch. 2

Study questions: The transitions to civilian regimes have given rise to substantial diversity in current patterns of civil-military relations. What are the principal patterns to date? Why does the military have a greater political role in countries like Brazil than in Argentina? Why is the level of civil-military conflict higher in some countries than others? How have these patterns changed over time? What forces lead to changes in post-transition patterns of civil-military interaction?

Feb 20 Post-transition Role Beliefs in Argentina and Ecuador Fitch AFD, ch. 3.

**Come prepared to role play a debate about role beliefs in Ecuador**

Preliminary Bibliography for Term Paper Due

Study questions: To what extent have role beliefs in Argentina and Ecuador changed compared to earlier decades? How does Fitch explain the differences between the two cases? Why do role beliefs vary within the two countries? What is the "internal debate" model? What kinds of role beliefs are likely to succeed in that "debate"? What are the policy implications of Fitch's analysis?

Feb 22 Military Policy and Civil-Military Conflict Fitch AFD, ch. 5.

**Come prepared to role play debate over the trials of military officers in Argentina.**

Study questions: Who were the "carapintadas"? What were the causes of the Semana Santa revolt? What were the origins of the split between junior and senior officers in the Argentine army? How does Fitch account for the difference in the outcomes of the first revolt, in which the government was forced to make major concessions, and the last revolt where President Menem ordered the revolt suppressed without negotiations or concessions? How did Menem's policy toward the military differ from Alfonsín's policy?

Feb 24 Post-transition Chile Fuentes, “After Pinochet”

Study questions: What is a prerogative? What military prerogatives were built into the 1980 Constitution and subsequent legislation in Chile? To what extent have the civilian governments representing the main opposition to the Pinochet regime been successful in reducing those prerogatives? How did civilians try to minimize the power and autonomy of the military since 1990? How did Pinochet resist those attempts?
Study questions: What was the political role of the Brazilian military under the first civilian government of President Sarney? How have the military’s prerogatives changed over time? According to Hunter, what is the principal cause of the loss of military influence? Based on Zirker’s description, how would you classify Brazil in terms of the different types of civil-military relations discussed in Fitch ch. 2?

Feb 29 Post-transition Peru: Fujimori and the Military

Obando, "Power of Peru’s Armed Forces"
Faison, “Democracy Derailed,”

Study questions: What is the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)? How did internal war affect civil-military relations in Peru? What strategies have different Peruvian presidents used to try to avoid the threat of a military coup against the government? What effects have these strategies had? Why was Fujimori relatively more successful than his predecessors in controlling the military? Is this form of civilian control consistent with democratic norms for civil-military relations? If not, why not?

Mar 2 Internal War and Military Prerogatives
Aviles, “Despite Insurgency”
Economist, “Military Mutters”

Study Questions: Aviles argues that the privileges and political power of the military have been reduced by civilian governments in Colombia and Peru, despite the fact that both countries faced major guerrilla insurgencies. What strategies did civilian government employ to reduce prerogatives? According to Aviles, why did those strategies work?

Mar 5 Post-transition Central America
Ruhl, “Curbing Central America’s Militaries”
Ruhl, “The Guatemalan Military”

Study questions: In what ways is the postwar history of the Central American militaries not conducive to democratic control? Historically the Central American militaries were conservative, if not ultra-right wing, and closely allied with the U.S. Why did that relationship change in the 1990s? How have the military's relations with the economic elites changed in recent years? What factors have weakened the Guatemalan military in recent years? Why is civilian control still weak and incomplete?

Bring Bluebooks. Get Essay Question for Mid-Term Exam

Mar 7 Mid-term Exam

Review

Mar 9 Ecuador 2000: Post-Transition Coups
Fitch, “Post Transition Coups”

Study Questions: According to Fitch, what was similar and what was different in the Ecuadorian coup in 2000. What does the Ecuadorian case suggest about what would need to be done to encourage more democratic civil-military relations? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of civil-military relations? What’s the basis for your optimism or pessimism?

Mar 12 Post-Transition Military Conceptions of Politics and Democracy
Fitch AFD, ch. 4, and "Conceptual Gap”
Study Questions: What military officers think about politics under civilian governments is partly a function of their varying experiences with military and civilian rule, but their evaluation of civilian regimes is also heavily influenced by what they think government policymaking and democracy ought to be. What is the military view of “good government?” Where do these conceptions of politics come from? Think about your own views of what politics is and what it should be? What is your definition of democracy? How do you evaluate whether the U.S. is (or isn’t) a democracy? What distinguishes a “politician” from a good political leader?

Mar 14 After the Cold War: Missions and Models Fitch AFD, ch. 6

Come prepared to debate Latin American military missions for the year 2011.

Mar 16 Military Missions (continued) Jaskowski, “Battalions for Hire”

Study questions: According to Fitch, it is no longer clear who the enemies are for the Latin American militaries. What has happened to traditional external enemies? What has happened to the internal enemy? What is the military's response to the U.S. pressure to declare a "war on drugs," making "narco-terrorists" the new enemy? What other candidates are there? If there are not any clear enemies, do Latin American countries need military forces? Remember that there are major differences among Latin American countries, despite the frequent generalizations about "Latin America." According to Jaskowski, what are the actual missions of the military in Ecuador and Peru? Why these missions and not others?

Mar 19 The Armed Forces and Society in Latin America: Fitch, “Armed Forces and Society”

Changing Patterns of Recruitment

Study Questions: How are the social bases of officer recruitment changing? (Think about what forces affect the decision to choose a military career.) What are the possible/probable political consequences of those changes.

Mar 21 The Armed Forces and Society in Latin America: Work on your term paper.

Variations in Public Opinion

Study Questions: What Latin American countries have the most negative views of the military? What countries have the most “confidence” in the armed forces? How would you explain those differences?

Mar 23 Military Budgets and Military Reforms Work on your term paper.

Study Questions: What militaries have done relatively well in protecting their budgets? What militaries have done poorly? How would you explain those differences?

Mar 26-Mar 30 SPRING BREAK

April 2 Hugo Chavez and Civil-Military Relations in Venezuela Trinkunas, “Transformation of the Venezuelan Armed Forces”

Study Questions: The presidency of former coup leader Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement have transformed what was once thought to be most stable system of “democratic control” in Latin America. Based on Trinkunas’ account, how would you characterize the current pattern of civil-military
relations in Venezuela? How are the role beliefs of Chávez’s military supporters different from those of his opponents? What is the likely outcome of this experiment in military populism? Come prepared to discuss the assumptions on your answer to that question is based.

April 4 The New Military Populism?? Fitch, “USIP findings”

Study Questions: The rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, the junior officers movement in Ecuador, and rumblings of military unrest in Peru and elsewhere worried many U.S. policymakers concerned about a possible new wave of “military populism” in Latin America. Over the last decade, that wave has not materialized. Why not?

April 6 Cross-Regional Similarities and Differences in Civil-Military Relations in Non-Latin American countries. Come prepared to discuss ONE major similarity or ONE difference between the Latin American cases we have studies and the country you are working on for your term paper.

April 9 Second Quiz Review

The American Military in Politics

April 11 Trends in U.S. Civil Military Relations Ricks, “On American Soil”
Weigley, “A Historical Perspective”


Study questions: According to Blechman, the military generally does pretty well in the political battle for budgetary resources, but the results have varied in different periods. Why were military budgets going up in the 1950s and 1960s? What were the sources of the military's influence in Congress? Why did military spending start to decline in real terms? What changed? In the 1980s, spending went up with Reagan, but then stabilized again. What were the effects of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the military budget. What are the prospects for the decade ahead? What factors do you think will tend to push spending down? What factors will keep military spending high?

April 16 The Military Industrial Complex Fallows, “Uncle Sam Buys an Airplane”

Study Questions: What is the "military-industrial complex"? How does it work? What are the political consequences of the "military-industrial complex"? What was Eisenhower worried about?


Come prepared to debate the restrictions on the press and media in conflicts like the Gulf War.

Study Questions: Since Vietnam, one of the repeated points of contention in civil-military relations has been when the use of military force is warranted. The first Gulf War was relatively clear cut, at least from the military's perspective, but in fact the congressional vote under the War Powers Act was fairly close. In most
other cases--Lebanon, Panama, Central America, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq--there have been intense debates and deep divisions among civilian and military leaders about sending in American troops. When we do send in troops, press coverage of military operations has also been a source of controversy. How has the Pentagon tried to deal with the problem? In situations like the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, what degree of control over press/media coverage should the Pentagon have?

April 20 Military Missions in the US

Dickey, “Personal Statement,”
Hersh, “The Coming Wars”
Avant, “Post Cold War Missions” (skip the statistics)

Study questions: In the early 1970s, a junior American officer (later General Dickey) wrote a critical analysis of the expansion of the roles of the military into a number of non-military areas. Since this time, what new roles have emerged for the military? What are the key steps in the process of role expansion, described by Dickey? What, if any, are the political consequences of the military's many non-military functions?

April 23 The “Civil-Military Culture Gap”: Officers

Term Papers Due

Holsti “Of Chasms and Convergences”
Tyson, “A Perilous Time”

April 25 The “Civil-Military Culture Gap”: Soldiers

Dempsey, “Conservatism”;
Recommended: Dempsey, “Social & Political Issues”

April 27 Civil-Military Relations in the Bush Administration: Crisis Over?

Get Final Exam Questions

Owens, “Control of the Military”;
Graham “Decline and Fall”, Woodward, “It’s Hell Mr. President”

April 30 Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations (continued)


May 2 Controversies in U.S. Civil-Military Relations

ROTC Visit


Study questions: What do the readings and clippings suggest as the key points of conflict and debate in civil-military relations in the last decade? Is next decade likely to be more or less conflictual than the recent past? What is Moskos' thesis about the nature of the military at the end of the 20th century? What evidence does he present that the military should be considered an occupation, rather than a unique profession (the usual American military view) or a vital state institution led by military professionals (the usual Latin American view)? What difference does it make in civil-military relations? Come prepared with questions about current issues in US civil-military relations for our ROTC visitor.

PSCI 4122

Spring 2012
Study questions: "Watergate" was arguably the most serious political crisis in the U.S. in the last fifty years. Did the circle of advisors around Nixon carry out a de facto coup, depriving him of his powers as Commander-in-Chief during his last days as President? Was Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's order necessary? Why did this crisis not result in military intervention as it probably would have in Latin America?

May 5      Final Exam   4:30-7 pm

Dunlap, “American Coup of 2012”
Kohn,"Crisis in Civ-Mil Relations"
Bacevich, “Clinton’s Military Problem”

Standard CU Policies

1. If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit to me a letter from Disability Services in a timely manner, so that your needs may be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities. Contact: 303-492-8671, Willard 322, and http://www.Colorado.EDU/disabilityservices

2. Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to reasonably and fairly deal with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. In this class, please see me if you have any conflicts or have questions about this policy. See full details at http://www.colorado.edu/policies/fac_relig.html.

3. Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, culture, religion, politics, sexual orientation, gender, gender variance, and nationalities. Class rosters are provided to the instructor with the student's legal name. I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate name or gender pronoun. Please advise me of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records. See polices at http://www.colorado.edu/policies/classbehavior.html and at http://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/code.html#student_code.

4. The University of Colorado at Boulder policy on Discrimination and Harassment, the University of Colorado policy on Sexual Harassment and the University of Colorado policy on Amorous Relationships apply to all students, staff and faculty. Any student, staff or faculty member who believes s/he has been the subject of discrimination or harassment based upon race, color, national origin, sex, age, disability, religion, sexual orientation, or veteran status should contact the Office of Discrimination and Harassment (ODH) at 303-492-2127 or the Office of Judicial Affairs at 303-492-5550. Information about the ODH, the above referenced policies and the campus resources available to assist individuals regarding discrimination or harassment can be obtained at http://www.colorado.edu/odh

5. All students of the University of Colorado at Boulder are responsible for knowing and adhering to the academic integrity policy of this institution. Violations of this policy may include: cheating, plagiarism, aiding academic dishonesty, fabrication, lying, bribery, and threatening behavior. All incidents of academic
misconduct shall be reported to the Honor Code Council (honor@colorado.edu; 303-725-2273). Students who are found to be in violation of the academic integrity policy will be subject to both academic sanctions from the faculty member and non-academic sanctions (including but not limited to university probation, suspension, or expulsion). Additional information on the Honor Code can be found at http://www.colorado.edu/policies/honor.html and at http://www.colorado.edu/academics/honorcode/

IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT IS OR IS NOT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE HONOR CODE, ASK FIRST!