George Dickie
Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach
Chapter 3 Notes
The
Aesthetic Attitude in the Twentieth Century
History
of the organizing strain of
aesthetics.
“Beauty ended with
the introduction of the concept of the aesthetic.”
Out of
the tradition of Schopenhauer developed "aesthetic-attitude theories."
The
attitude theories have been challenged by "metacriticism."
Aesthetic
Attitude theories claims to give the correct account of the nature of the aesthetic
criticism and aesthetic appreciation. The object of criticism is held to be "the aesthetic object."
Note:
If being an “aesthetic object” merely means being the object of
someone’s aesthetic attention, then nearly any object could be an aesthetic
object so long as it was attended to in the right way by someone. Saying that an object is aesthetic tells you
nothing about the object itself (nothing objective), but only how it is being
viewed. (The ugliest thing in the world
can be an aesthetic object.) This, it
seems to me, is a reductio of the whole theory.
Three versions of the
aesthetic-attitude theory.
1.
Edward Bullough (28 March 1880 – 17 September
1934)
2.
Jerome Stolnitz and Eliseo Vivas.
3.
Virgil
Aldrichs
3.
(Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion
and criticism of Monroe Beardsley's metacritical
version of aesthetic object.
Note: Not completely
clear what "attitude" means.
Acts
and psychological states (attitudes?) of persons are essentially involved in
the theories.
All
these views claim that a person can do
something (“achieve psychical distance,” “perceive disinterestedly,” or “see as”)
that will change any object perceived into an aesthetic object.
1. The
Edward
Bullough introduces the concept of psychical distance by using as an
example the appreciation of a natural phenomenon rather than a work of art.
Fog
at sea can be an aesthetic object.
“Distance is produced in the first
instance by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our
practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our
personal needs and ends—in short, by looking at it objectively," as it has
often been called, by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasize
the "objective" features of the experience.”
Bullough's account here is
reminiscent of Schopenhauer's theory of the sublime. Schopenhauer speaks of the forcible
detachment of the will (roughly the desires) required for the appreciation of a
sublime and threatening object.
Inhibition
may be induced by the perceiver or it may be a psychological state into which
the perceiver is induced. Once the state
has occurred, an object can be aesthetically appreciated.
Two
ways in which distance can be lost:
1
“under-distancing”
2.
“over-distancing”
Under-distancing
An example would be of a jealous husband
viewing Othello. He is pre-occupied with his own suspicions
about his wife, so much so that he cannot aesthetically appreciate the play.
Over-distancing
Sheila Dawson, gives as an example of
over-distancing the case in which a person is primarily interested in the
technical details of a performances.
Problems:
Do we need to postulate a special kind
of action called "to distance" and a special kind of psychological
state called "being distanced" to account for the fact that we can
sometimes appreciate the characteristics of threatening things?
More
economical to explain this phenomenon in terms of attention.
No
virtue in being theoretically economical if one ignores actual facts, but is
seems that we can give an adequate account of the “fact” of these sorts of
appreciations without positing a special kind of psychological state.
The
issue presumably has to be settled introspectively, but Bullough
suggests that to view threatening cases aesthetically requires a mental
mechanism to block thoughts.
Some
initial plausibility when invoked to deal with threatening natural objects, it
has very little plausibility when it is used to explain our relation to works of art. (according
to Dickie).
One
might explain the spectator who mounts the stage to save a threatened heroine
as one who has “lost psychical distance.”
But a better explanation would be
that he has “lost his mind” or that he is no longer mindful of the rules and
conventions that govern theater situations, in this case the rule that forbids
spectators from interfering with the actions of the actors.
Defenders
see psychical distance as the first and key step of an aesthetic theory, and it
is held to have far-reaching implications.
If
an art work is such as to encourage the loss of or inability to achieve
psychical distance it is considered critically flawed. Sheila Dawson and Susanne Langer refer to the
scene in Peter Pan in which Peter Pan turns to the audience and asks them to
clap their hands in order to save Tinkerbelle's life. They claim that Peter
Pan's action destroys psychical distance (or the necessary illusion). Arlene Croce refused to view a work by
choreographer Bill T. Jones because, as is included many critically ill people
talking and dancing about the real-life illnesses, she claimed she was unable
to achieve a “psychical distance.” For
that reason, she maintained, the work was not really art at all.
1. Provides some basis for evaluating works of art.
2. A state of psychical distance can
reveal the properties of a work of art
that properly belong to the aesthetic object (to which we ought to direct our attention).
3. Provides substantive guidelines for
art criticism and appreciation.
(If
no such state exists, it’s got problems)
2. Aesthetic
Awareness: Disinterested Attention
Jerome
Stolnitz suggests that the concept of “the aesthetic”
can be defined in terms of disinterested
attention.
This
is an outgrowth of both the theory of psychical
distance and the notion of disinterestedness.
"psychical distance" names a special action or psychological state.
"disinterested attention" names the ordinary
action of attending done in a special way.
Two pairs of
concepts:
1.
interested/disinterested and
2.
interested/ uninterested
The
Former: financial interest, partiality and impartiality, and/or selfishness
verses unselfishness
The
Latter: Notions of concern and attentiveness verses indifferent and not
attentive to it
If
the distinction between the two pairs of notions is preserved, it can be seen
how a person can be both interested in something and be disinterested
concerning that something at the same time. (For example, a juror)
Jerome
Stolnitz's definition:
"disinterested (with no ulterior purpose) and sympathetic
attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own
sake alone."
Eliseo
Vivas's conception:
Uses
the term "intransitive" (i.e. there is no direct object of the
action) as the crucial mode of attention, (same meaning).
If
Ann is listening to some music in order to write an analysis of it, then this
is a “non-aesthetic ways of “attending to” etc. (Sort of like Allison;s contention that
criticism destroys aesthetic appreciation.)
Accordingly,
a work of art or a natural object may or may not be an aesthetic object,
depending on whether or not it is attended to disinterestedly.
Central
to the theory is the notion that there are at least two distinguishable kinds
of attention and that the concept of “the aesthetic” can be defined in
terms of one of them.
Problems:
Perhaps
there is only one kind of attention.
Cases
of alleged non-disinterested attention turn out to be cases of inattention. If so, then there is no reason to think that
there is more than one kind of attention involved.
Also,
it is easy enough to see what it means to have different motives, it is not so easy to see how having different motives affects the nature of attention.
Different
motives may direct attention to different objects, but the activity of
attention itself remains the same.[1]
Consider
Vivas's contentions about literature as aesthetic
object:
He
claims that his conception of the aesthetic posits "that The Brothers Karamazov can hardly be
read as art," (probably because one can hardly avoid reading it to some
extent as social criticism, which is one of the ways that Vivas
mentions literature is attended to non-aesthetically)
But
this seems a counter-example; any theory that claims this must be suspect. Now we might be willing to accept a theory
which has counter-intuitive results (such as claiming that The Brothers Karamazov is hardly art), but only if it were the only
way to explain the facts of art/aesthetic experience. This does not seem to be the case here.
Another
alleged example failing to have aesthetic attention would be using a work of
fiction to diagnose the author's neurosis.
But this seems better described as a way of being distracted from the work rather
than failing to attend to it in the right way.
Another
alleged example failing to have aesthetic attention is (mistakenly) reading a fictional
work as, history.
But
So? The historical or socially critical
content, if any, of a literary work is a part of the work (although only a
part), and any attempt to say that it is somehow not a part of the aesthetic
object when other aspects of the work are, seems strange.
There
remains therefore serious doubt that such a species of attention exists.
Alternative
(more economical) explanations of alleged Non-Disinterested Attention.
Ann's
attention to the music turned out to be just like that of any other listener;
Bob's
"interested attention" to the painting turned out to be a case of not
attending;
Free
associating and diagnosing the author's neurosis turned out also to be cases of
not attending;
Attending
to historical or socially critical content turned out to be simply attending to
one aspect of literature.
#3 Aesthetic Perception:
"Seeing As"
Virgil Aldrich developed an
aesthetic theory out of one of the central notions of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Claims
it is something that a subject does or something that happens to the subject
that determines whether an object is an aesthetic object or not.
Aldrich's
view concludes that there is an aesthetic mode of perception.
Wittgenstein
called attention to ambiguous figures.
Most
famous is "the duck-rabbit":
(see: http://faculty.ccri.edu/paleclerc/existentialism/perc_figure.shtml)
Three things can be distinguished
1. the design the lines make on paper
2. the representation of, say, a duck
3. the other representation of, say, a rabbit.
Note this phenomenon require a more complicated model of perception then is commonly appreciated:
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
|
Object (Distal Stimulus) à |
Retinal Image (Proximal Stimulus) à |
Active Mind à |
Percept (Duck or Rabbit, depending on #3; that's the only variable.) |
Note that whether one see a duck or a rabbit is the result of something the perceiver does, consciously or unconsciously.
Three
things can be distinguished in the case of such figures.
1.
the design the lines make on paper
2.
the representation of, say, a duck
3.
the other representation of, say, a rabbit.
Aesthetic
theory parallels the perceptual phenomenon of ambiguous figures.
Claims
that earlier theorists were mistaken in thinking that there is only one mode of
perception. There are two: the aesthetic mode of perception and the
non-aesthetic mode of perception.
1. Non-aesthetic
("observation")
2. Aesthetic mode ("prehension")
Observation
and its object ("physical object") parallel the
seeing of, say, the
duck.
Prehension and its object
("aesthetic object") parallel the seeing of, say,
the rabbit.
The
parallel of the ambiguous design itself Aldrich calls a "material
object."
Thus
we have (paralleling the above):
1.
Material Object
2.
Physical Object (Observation and its object)
3.
Aesthetic Object (Prehension and its object)
A
material object is seen as a physical object when observed and as an aesthetic
object when prehended.
A
neat solution to the problem of aesthetic object.
1.
It avoids any commitment to disinterested attention or psychical distance,
which were seen to involve difficulties.
2.
It purports to be a development out of one of the most powerful and influential
philosophical movements of the twentieth century, the philosophy of
Wittgenstein.
Problems:
True?
Any
good evidence for his contention that there really are two modes of perception?
(Doesn’t seems to be.) The fact that a
single design can function alternatively as two representations gives no
evidence for two modes of perception. For
example, the seeing of the duck representation is exactly like the seeing of
the rabbit representation so far as the
seeing is concerned.
The
notion of “seeing as” may be useful in providing an analysis of the concept of
representation, but that is clearly another matter.
The
only evidence that Aldrich gives is this alleged example:
a dark city and a pale western sky
at dusk, meeting at the sky line.
The
sky is closer to the viewer than are the dark areas of buildings.
This
is the disposition of these material things in aesthetic space.
The
fact, however, that things look different and that visual relations appear to
alter under varying conditions of lighting is no reason for thinking that there
are two modes of perceiving that a person can switch off or on.
He
writes that aesthetic perception "is, if you like, an 'impressionistic'
way of looking, but still a mode of perception."
1.
Does it makes sense to speak of an impressionistic way of looking?
2.
Not the case that all the experiences we call aesthetic are impressionistic,
although perhaps some are. (What is impressionistic about watching Hamlet?)
Another
example: Watching illuminated snowflakes falling at night.
Does
not serve as evidence for the theory that there are two ways of perceiving.
Aldrich
has given us no reasonable evidence for the truth of his theory.
Dickie’s Concluding Remarks
Aesthetic-attitude
theories grew out of such nineteenth-century theories with roots in
the eighteenth-century notion of
disinterestedness.
view that a psychological
analysis is the key to a correct theory.
But
they reject the eighteenth-century assumption that some particular feature of
the world such as uniformity in variety triggers the aesthetic, or taste,
response.
The
aesthetic-attitude theories share with the nineteenth-century aesthetic
theories the view that any object (with certain reservations about the obscene
and the disgusting) can become an object of aesthetic appreciation.
They
reject the nineteenth-century assumption that aesthetic theory must be embedded
in a comprehensive metaphysical system, (e.g., Schopenhauer's philosophical
system).
Theories
of aesthetic attitude have three main goals.
1.
Isolate and describe the psychological factors constituting the “aesthetic attitude.
“
2.
Develop a conception of aesthetic object as that which is the object of the
aesthetic attitude.
3.
Account for aesthetic experience by conceiving of it as “the experience derived
from an aesthetic object.”
Aesthetic-attitude
theories held that these works of art contain elements that are not only
aesthetically irrelevant, but positively destructive to aesthetic values. But
to make this case, they must define “aesthetic properties” (those relevant to
aesthetic appreciation) in a non-question begging way.
The
danger is that they seem to be defining/explaining aesthetic experience in
terms of aesthetic properties in terms of aesthetic attitude in terms of
aesthetic experience. (Viciously circular
and as such pseudo-explanations.)
For
these theories, an aesthetic object has the function of being the proper locus
of appreciation and criticism (with criticism understood as including description,
interpretation, and evaluation). But
while this seems counter intuitive and out of step with actually practice, they
offer no compensating explanatory power.
Stolnitz et al. attempt
to explain the class of experiences referred to as “aesthetics” by to a certain
frame of mind: the "aesthetic attitude." Stolnitz'
definition: the aesthetic attitude is "disinterested and sympathetic
attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own
sake alone." "Disinterested" means "no concern for any
ulterior purpose," "sympathetic" means "accept the object
on its own terms to appreciate it," and "contemplation" means
"perception directed toward the object in its own right where the
spectator is not concerned to analyze it or ask questions about it."
But
Dickie suggests that no successful argument has been
given for believing these accounts. It
is not clear that there really is any such thing or that the target experiences
cannot be explained without positing such.
Thus Dickie argues against the idea of the
aesthetic attitude in all its forms.
Further,
Dickie suggests that the very notion of “disinterested
attention” is incoherent. One’s
motivations for attending to a thing makes no perceptual difference. The idea of "disinterested
attention" is only sensible if "interested attention" is, and it
is not, because in all cases "interested attention" is not really a
special kind of attention, but rather perception with different motivations or
intentions; the “attention” remains the same.