Aristotle (348-322
B.C.)
·
Plato's student.
·
Credited with being a “practical man of
earth.” (Largely due to his metaphysics)
·
A biologist, physicist- Championed Observation as a
means to knowledge (Contra Plato-this makes him an Empiricist)
·
Tutor to Alexander the Great (Got him
into some political trouble in Athens after the death of Alexander)
In 323 BCE, when Alexander the Great died, Athens was no
longer not safe for Aristotle who was
seen as a Macedonian sympathizer. Aristotle
was on the verge of being charged for impiety.
So
he declared, "I will not allow the Athenians to sin twice against
philosophy"—and he fled to Chalcis on the island of Euboea. He died less than a year later.
There are divergent accounts of his character:
1. By some accounts, he was more or less a kind and generous man of refinement
2. By some accounts, he was more or less a vain and overly ambitious SOB.
No one ever accused him of being a god.
Modern (Post Renaissance) thought is largely defined by its rejection of the classical philosophical worldview and Aristotle’s Philosophy in particular. But, even so, Plato has always had an easier time appealing to moderns than Aristotle has.
Overall, then, Aristotle just isn't as "sexy" as Plato. In Aristotle
· There is something distinctively less sexy about Aristotle. (No hint of Plato’s mysticism/ mysterium)
· Champions of common sense and moderation. (Yawn)
· Those of his writings we have are dry and dull reading. (They seem to be mainly lecture notes and thus they lacks the literary flair of Platonic dialogues.[1])
· He rejects some of Plato’s most intriguing extreme positions.
· Like Plato, he is an elitist, but unlike Plato, he is not given to utopian social theorizing. (No Philosopher Kings)
o Even those modern secularists who hate the speculative metaphysics illustrated by Plato's “Allegory of the Cave” are nevertheless sympathetic to the idea that the masses are in the grip of illusion and ignorance and, if they cannot be emancipated, ought at least to be ruled by those who know better- philosopher kings.
o Aristotle similar inegalitarianism does not coincide with a contempt for conventional opinion.
Realism with Respect
to Forms/ Rejection of Dualism and Rationalism
Like Plato, Aristotle is a realist. Forms are objective realities which cannot be identified with anything mental or material. But they do not exist in Plato’s transcendent “heaven.” Rather they exist only "in" the things of which they are the forms. As pure abstractions these things exist only in the intellect. So then forms exist in two places: In their particular instantiations and in the minds of those who know the forms. They exist nowhere else. So we see a very clear rejection of Plato’s dualist metaphysics.
Furthermore, for Aristotle even intellect relies on the senses in coming to know the forms. So we also see a clear rejection of Plato’s Rationalism and Aristotle’s embrace of Empiricism. We now have very clearly drawn line demarking these two opposing epistemological views.
|
Rationalism |
Empiricism |
|
There are Innate Ideas |
There are no innate ideas |
|
The Senses are a poor, unreliable means to knowledge |
The senses are a reliable, indeed the only means to
knowledge. |
|
The most reliable means to gain knowledge and truth is via
a priori reason and introspection |
A priori reasoning is fine as far as it goes, but it is
very limited as to what is can provide us in the way
of knowledge. The most reliable way to
useful knowledge is through observation and experience. |
|
Representative Philosophers: |
Representative Philosophers: |
|
|
Key points to understanding his Metaphysics
Agrees with Plato on
the following:
- Knowledge (to be worthy of the title “knowledge”) must
be of Timeless/Eternal and Universal Truths and concerned with what things
have in common.
But what if there are no objects that are in fact
timeless/eternal? If so, then there
could be no knowledge. Not to worry
though….
- Some Realities are timeless and eternal and not subject
to change (e.g. Forms, God, heavenly objects such
as the planets and stars, and biological species) and therefore fixed,
(eternal) knowledge of these items was indeed possible.[2]
- Evolution was not true.
- There was a Hierarchy of reality or “degrees of
existence.” (But Aristotle reverses Plato's
ontology, i.e. turns it upside down, so to speak).
- Forms are real, objective and eternal. (However,
Aristotle argues that they cannot exist separately from the particular substances whose forms they are.)
- Philosophical/ Dialectical Project is the worthwhile
goal of theoretical reason. The
successful conclusion of a philosophical inquiry (which
must include observations as well as argument) will yield the
correct definition of the concept under discussion or the essence of the
species under consideration.
(E.g. What it is that all and only
courageous acts have in common by virtue of which they ARE courageous acts. What is it that all cats have in common by
virtue of which they are cats)
These discovered essences are critical for scientific
demonstrations. (More on this in a bit.)
Disagrees with Plato
on the following:
- There is no real relationship
between the 'Forms' (which Aristotle did hold to be eternal and
unchanging) and particular things because Forms
only exist as instantiated in particulars. . While form and matter can be separated
in thought, they cannot be separated in reality. All existing matter must have a
delineated form and all existing forms must be forms of some bit of
matter.
By contrast Plato had argued that Forms exist
independently of their particular instantiations
- This visible world, our world which we encounter
through our senses and reflect on with our minds, is all there is to reality,
(By contrast Plato had argued that reality was
divided into two realms, the invisible realm being “more real” than the visible
world of the senses.)
- Believed that more concrete individual things,
particular humans for instance, are more real than abstract items like the
species Homo sapiens since there could not be a form of human if there
were not humans for it to belong to (unlike
Plato, who believes the more abstract is more real).
That damn change things again:
The problem of change persisted despite Plato’s best efforts
to resolve the dilemma. In fact, Plato did
not so much resolve the dilemma as he did entrench the dilemma. Aristotle’s resolution required being much
more careful about what it means to say that something “is.”
A. Actuality and potentiality:
Perhaps the best place to start talking about Aristotle is with Parmenides. You will recall that Parmenides said that change and motion are impossible, and that if the senses tell us otherwise, so much the worse for them. You'll also recall thinking that Parmenides sounded like a nut.
Aristotle might not have put it quite that way, though he certainly had no inclination whatsoever to take Parmenides' conclusion seriously. But he did take his arguments for that conclusion seriously, and regarded them as interesting enough to merit a detailed reply. The paradox of change points to a serious problem with our ordinary understanding. This is like the stinking pipes that Mary Midgley speaks about in her characterization of philosophy.[3] What’s going on here? What’s wrong with our ordinary assumptions and what more adequate account might we give to resolve the paradox? This is often how philosophy progress occurs.
Aristotle's
positive account of change.
Change and Being in actuality and potentiality
Parmenides' claim was that something can't come from nothing, (being from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing) but that something can’t come from something either (being from being, since nothing was the only thing something new could come from, since the only thing there is other than what already exists (Le. being) is non-being or nothing.
Either a change is Being coming from Being or Being coming from Non-being.
If the first then there is no change because what is (being) still is (being).
But the latter is impossible; what is (being) cannot come from what is not. (Nothing can come from nothing.)
Therefore:
Thus change is impossible.
Hence nothing new can come into existence, all that is is, and change is impossible.
Aristotle's reply is that it is true that something can't come from nothing, but it is false to suppose that nothing or “non-being” is the only alternative to “being” and thus the only possible candidate for a source of change. Parmenides presents us with a puzzle based on a false dichotomy[4]. But to see this we need to distinguish between two very different ways a thing can be said to “be.”
For instance, am I a French speaker?
• There is a sense in which the correct answer is “no.”
• There is another sense in which the correct answer is “yes.”
That is, I am a French speaker and I am NOT a French speaker. (WTF?)
Aristotle would say that I am a French speaker, in “potentiality,” but I am not a French speaker in “actuality.” I do not speak French at the moment. I do not possess the ability to speak French, again at the moment. Nevertheless, I do possess the ability to speak French in the sense that I am the sort of thing that can speak French. It is within my nature, as a human being, to be able to learn and speak French.
So there is a sense in which I “am” a French speaker. I am a French speaker in potentiality, though not in actuality. That is, I AM (be) the sort of thing (human) whose nature permits him to learn and speak French. Thus Aristotle would say I have the ability to speak French in potentiality, but not in actuality.
An apple tree to speak French NEITHER in potentiality nor in actuality. Apple trees are not even the sort of thing that could speak French.
And note, even French speakers possess the ability to speak French in potentiality only when they are sitting quietly doing a water color painting or knitting etc., that is, when not ACTUALLY speaking French.
So Parmenides puzzle was founded on a false dichotomy according to Aristotle. It is not the case that change is either being coming from being or being coming from nothing. A change is a preexisting potentiality moved to actuality. Potentiality is not actuality, but it’s not nothing either. Any change in a substance is the “actualization” of a pre-existing potentiality. What actual and potential characteristics a thing has are determined by the thing’s nature or “form.” Note further the only thing that could “move” a thing from potential to actual is a mover (impetus) outside the moved thing.
Consider a blue rubber ball, for instance. What can we say about it? Well, there are the ways it actually is: solid, round, blue, and bouncy. And there are the ways it is not: square and red, for example; it is also not a cat, or college student, a Buick Skylark, or innumerable other things.
The ball's squareness, redness, dogginess, etc., since they don't exist, are different ways the ball is NOT. But in addition to all the this it is at the moment (actual) we can distinguish the various ways the ball potentially is: It is potentially red (if you paint it), soft and gooey (if you melt it), a miniature globe (if you draw little continents on it), and so forth. So being and non-being aren't the only relevant factors here; there are also a thing's various potentialities. Knowing a things potentialities means knowing the ways in which it can and cannot change. The distinction between actuality and potentiality, then, is the key to understanding how, contra Parmenides, change is possible.
Parmenides says: If we say that a solid rubber ball changes to become soft and gooey, then
1. it can't be the actual gooeyness itself that makes this possible, because actual gooeyness does not exist (yet), and
2. it can't be the non-existent gooeyness either, since what doesn't exist can't explain anything
Therefore:
3. The ball can never change to become gooey.
In general then, no sort of change is possible, regardless of what our senses tell us.
Aristotle replies: It is true that actual gooeyness itself doesn't yet exist in the ball, but the potential for gooeyness does exist in the ball, and this, together with some external influence that actualizes this pre-existing potential (e.g. heat), suffices to show how the change can occur.
Further, while heat can actualize the potential gooeyness of the rubber ball, NOTHING can actualize doginess in in the rubber ball. Potential doginess does not exist in the rubber ball. That is, a rubber ball in the sort of thing that has the potential to become a dog. Such a “change” would be impossible.
Important side
note about possibility and necessity
Modern philosophy treats possibility and impossibility differently than the ancients and the medievals. For moderns, if something is “conceivable without logical contradiction,” as modern philosopher David Hume might put it, it is thought to be “possible.” On this view, a married bachelor is impossible, but an apple tree speaking French is not. For instance, I can imagine walking through am apple orchard and hearing:
“Bonjour Professor. Comment ça va?
Alternatively:
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uIVwIGGXTaE
But for Aristotle, Apple Tree Nature (the Form of Apple Tree) is a timeless, eternal and immutable essence that does not possess the potentiality to speak French. Nothing that possess apple tree form can speak French or could be made to speak French.[5] Thus, a French speaking apple trees is as impossible (metaphysically impossible) as is a married bachelor. How we come to KNOW the impossibility of the former (empirically – learning apple tree nature) may differ from how we come to know the impossibility of the latter (a priori – considering the meanings of the terms), but they are equally impossible nonetheless for Aristotle.
Thus it is a mistake to imagine that a thing is "potentially" almost anything from Aristotle’s perspective. While today, we might imagine a "possible world" where rubber balls can bounce from here to the moon, or where apple trees speak French. But the potentialities Aristotle has in mind are the ones rooted in a thing's nature as it actually exists. Hence, in Aristotle's sense of "potential," while a rubber ball could potentially be melted, it could not “bounce to the moon” nor potentially follow someone around all by itself. It is NOT possible for apple trees to speak French then, because they are not the sort of things that can speak French. It is not in their nature.
So then, a thing's potentials are the
key to how it can change as well as how it cannot change. (Apple seeds cannot grow up into rose bushes
for instance.) Now an outside source of
change is also necessary to explain how the change occurs. For potential
gooeyness to be bought to actual gooeyness, say, requires are external
actualizer, precisely because a mere potential, cannot actualize itself; only
something else (like heat) could do that.
Consider also that if a potential could
actualize itself, there would be no way to explain why it does so at one time
rather than another. The ball melts and becomes gooey when you heat it. Why did this potential gooeyness become actual
just at that point? The obvious answer is that the heat was needed to actualize
it. If the potential gooeyness could have made itself actual all by itself, that
is, if potential gooeyness were sufficient for actually
gooeyness, then it would have happened already, since the sufficient
cause for the gooeyness was there already.
Side
note: Question:
Can it be that every actualizer derives it power to actualize
potentials from some other actulaizer?
Answer: No. Why? Short Answer “Infinite Regress” Long Answer Review Aquinas’ Argument from
Motion and his Argument from Efficient Causality
Back to Parmenides
Parmenides had posed the paradoxical dilemma of change this
way: Any change requires a substance
moving from being to being (which would not really be a change at all) or the
substance moving from non-being to being (which is impossible; nothing comes
from nothing). Aristotle’s solutions is to claim that when a substance moves from a preexisting potential
being to actual being. Any change in a
substance is the “actualization” of a preexisting potentiality.
What actual and potential characteristics a thing has are
determined by the thing’s nature or “form.”
Note further the only thing that could “move” a thing from potential to
actual is a mover (impetus) outside the moved thing.[6]
Now actuality and potentiality are fully intelligible only
in relation to each other, and there is an asymmetry between them. Actuality has metaphysical priority. A potential is always a potential for a
certain kind of actuality. And a potentiality
cannot exist on its own, but only in combination with actuality. That is, actual being is required for
anything to possesses potential of any kind.
So you cannot have a potential without
accompanying actuality.
But
you CAN have actuality without potentiality.
Indeed, if change is the moving from potential to actual and no
potentiality can actualize itself, then there must be something with pure
actuality… and that all men call God. J (More on this later. So, while for us to understand actuality and
potentiality, we need to contrast them with each other; in the real world
outside our minds actuality can exist on its own while
potentiality cannot.
The
first of the famous twenty-four Thomistic theses[7]
reads:
Potency and act are a complete division of being. Hence,
whatever is must be either pure act or a unit composed
of potency and act as its primary and intrinsic principles. (Wuellner 1956, p.120)
That is depend on what the meaning of “is” is.
What a being “Is”/ What “Being” is. (Quiddity)
There are several senses in which a thing can be said to
“be.” That is, there are several correct
answers to the question “What is that?”
- 'being,' means 'what a thing
is'
You might see me walking down the hall, point and ask “what is it?”
Were someone to respond, “That’s a human being.” he or she would have
answered correctly. But that would not
be the ONLY correct answer since that is not the only thing that I “be.”
One might also correctly respond, that’s an FIU professor,
or, less kindly, that an overweight middle-aged consumer.
So
what am I? (What and how do I “be?”) I am a human, 187 pound
FIU philosophy professor standing in this room before you. But the above mentioned
states importantly different ways I “be.”
One of these various ways that I “be” is more fundamental to what I am,
than the others.
Essential and
Accidental Properties
An essence or essential property is that which makes an
individual the specific thing that it is and explains why it behaves or
“changes” as it does. (formal and final causality). The Formal and Final causes of a thing
determine its actual and potential properties.
An accident, or accidental property, by contrast, is a property of a
thing which is NOT essential. The individual could gain or lose such a property,
but remain the same unique individual (i.e.. wart).
Of the various ways I “be” I am essentially a human.
(Quiddity) I am only accidentally a 187 pound philosophy professor. I could lose weight (undergo a quantitative
change) or get another job (undergo a qualitative change), or
go to Starbucks for coffee (undergo a change in location), but I would still
me. I would still be me in that I would
still have the same essential nature, quiddity, with its latent potentialities
(e.g. to speak French). I can survive a quantitative or qualitative
change, or a change in location. In
fact, I would very much like to undergo certain quantities changes, truth be
known.
The essence of a thing cannot change
or it will no longer be that same unique thing.
When I die, I undergo a substantial change. “I am” no longer a human; more precisely, “I
am” no more. In my place in a new
substance: a human corpse[8]. L In addition to
quantitative changes, qualitative changes and changes
in locations there is a fourth sort of change, according to Aristotle: A
Substantial Change.
Note: Substantial
Change is the creation of a new substance and
passing away of an old substance. This happens when matter loses its old
essential form and is given a new essential form. Forms themselves can never
(do not) change, nor can the matter per
se change, but they (form and matter) combine in different ways.
·
If I cut a Sphere in half, the sphere
no longer exists; instead two hemisphere exist. Spheres
have potentials that hemispheres lack (e.g. rolling
around).
·
If I separate water into oxygen and
hydrogen, water (along with its water-nature/form) no longer exists. The new substances (oxygen and hydrogen) have
quite different potentialities and actualities (i.e.
different nature/ form) than does water.
·
Death is a substantial change; the
human is destroyed and the corpse come into
existence.)
Any existing thing then has properties, some of which are accidental and others are essential. Essences (formal causes) demarcate what the
essential properties of a things are. That is to say, a thing’s form “causes” the thing to be the
thing that it is, determines why it is the way that is and why it develops/
moves/ changes as it does (potential and actual properties). And also why it does
not/cannot not develop/ move/ change in certain ways.
How a being “Is”
2. Being means how a thing is (haecceity): a
quality or a quantity of a thing- (e.g. ‘being’ good
or bad, red, many)
You might see a certain red bird landing on a tree branch,
point and ask “What is it?” Were someone to answer, “That’s a cardinal,”
he or she would have answered correctly.
But that would not be the ONLY correct answer since that is not the only
way the thing can be said to “be.”
A person might also truly reply, “That is red.” And so it “is.”
Now “redness’ DOES exists, to be
sure, but redness only exists as a property of things, things that can exist on
their own. Since “redness” cannot exist on its own Aristotle classified it as a
“secondary substance,” but since
individual cardinals can exist on their own, Aristotle called them “primary substances.” Aristotle would say that “redness” is a
secondary substance, while the (actual, particular) cardinal is a primary
substance.
Aristotle begins by distinguishing primary substances (particular things) and secondary substances (universals
relating to the species and genera of the primary substances). He writes,
“Substance in the most proper sense of the word, that which
is primarily and most of all called substance, is neither said of any subject,
nor is it in any subject…What is called secondary substances are both the
species which the things primarily called substances fall under and the genera
of these species.” (2a13-16)
Ultimately, according to Aristotle, all things depend upon
primary substances for their existence: All other things are either said of primary
substances as subjects or in them as subjects.
This is evident from a consideration of cases. For example,
animal is predicated of man, and therefore of the individual man (for if it
were predicated of no individual man, it would not be predicated of man at
all.) Again, color is in body, and therefore in an individual body (for if it
were not in any individual, it would not be in body at all). Thus, all other
things are either said of primary substances as subjects or in them as
subjects. Therefore, if there were no primary substances, there could not be
anything else. (2a34-b7)[9]
Further, while being a cardinal is essential to
that primary substance’s nature (said of it as a subject), being red is accidental
(in it as a subject). We could
spray-paint it blue, not that I would ever, and the thing would still be a cardinal. Similarly, being human is essential to my
nature; being 185 pounds is accidental. (Let’s hope.)
Primary substances: things
that can exist on their own (Individual particular things
with an essential nature. e.g. actual cardinals-
ontologically independent)
Secondary substances: things
that can only exist as properties of other things; cannot exist on their own.
So:
- Primary substances have a host of properties, (red,
avian, 5 oz.).
- Some of these properties are accidental and others are
essential.
- The substances are defined by their natures/forms
(formal causes or essences).
- A thing’s nature or essence which determine why it is the
way it is and why it develops/ moves changes as it does (potential and
actual properties).
(Which is also to say why it doesn’t / cannot develop, move
or change is ways unpermitted by its nature.
An acorn cannot grow into a rosebush, for instance.)
The meaning of “is” is:
The primary sense
of "to be" is to be a substance.
e.g. To Be a particular human
The secondary sense
of “to be” to is be an instance of a quality or
quantities.
e.g. To Be a Tall (secondary) humaness.
A bit more about Primary and Secondary
Substances
A
Primary Substance (existing thing) is always a combination of Form and Matter.[10]
Hence we have Aristotle's famous doctrine
of hylomorphism
(or "matter/form-ism," from the Greek hyle or "matter" and morphe or
"form").
So for Aristotle, it is a mistake it
true to say, as some materialists might, that the ball is "just a piece of
matter." Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter
cannot exist without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for
permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change).
Note: For Aristotle Form does not/ cannot
exist apart from matter, though
separable in thought- We can imagine Michelangelo’s
"David" for instance apart from the marble that actually
constitutes it- (done instead in cheese say).
Secondary substances are those
“objects” or “properties” constituted by particular
individual primary substances. (philosophy teachers,
blonds, wedding rings)
Aristotelian Doctrine which holds that
to truly know what a thing is, one must know four things about it. That is, to explain what a thing is as it is
and behaves as it does one must know four things about it:
1. Material Cause: (What's it made of?)
2. Efficient
Cause: (Who or what brought generated it.)
3. Formal Cause:
(To what species and genus does it belong?)
4. Final
Cause: (What is it supposed to do?)
Imagine a thousand years from now
someone is digging around in his backyard and comes across a curious object
that he can see is very old, but he does not know what it is. And he wants to find out. So he takes it to
his chemist friend. “What is this?” he
asks. And his chemist friend replies,
“Why I can tell you what it is: it is steel with some iron and chrome. There is also a bit of rubber here.”
Despite the fact
that what the chemist
has said is true, our discoverer is not satisfied. “Yes, that’s fine, he says to himself, but
what is
it?” So he
takes it so another friend of his, this time an Economic Historian. “What is it?” he asks. “Oh my, that’s an artifact, that is.” she
says. “It was designed by Franz Wagner. It was produced in Underwood factories in New
York sometime in the very early 1900s.”
Ok, so now this guy knows how it came
to be and who made it, but still, “What is it?” He sees a third friend, an archeologist this
time. “Yes I’m certain I can help you. I know precisely what it is. It is an
Underwood number 5. It is very similar
to the Densmore, but differs from that kind in that it
is a 4-bank frontstrike version. It differs from the Daugherty in that it was
less likely to have its keys jam. Well
now our discoverer understands the object’s type, that is, he can
recognize another one of the same type when he sees it
and he can distinguish it from things of a different type. He knows that class of things it belongs to
in that he knows its form, but there is a sense in which he still
does not know what the thing is.
Finally he takes it to an expert on Religion
and Culture from the early 20th Century. “I understand your difficulty,” she
says. “You know what it is made of
(Material Cause) and how it came to be (Efficient Cause) and the class of
things it belongs to (Formal Cause), but what you what to know is ‘What is it
supposed to do; what’s it for?’ (Final
Cause). Well I
can help you there. This was called a Typewriter. This was a machine by which people in the
early 20th Century communicated with their gods. They would sit in front of it all day and use
the keyboard to type messages of praise or petitions for help to the deities.“
Now another friend is walking by and
overhears this and says, “What? Don’t be
ridiculous! That was not the telos[11]
of this thing. The telos of this machine
was to make music. It was a percussive
instrument and people would use it to play all sorts of complicated rhythms
throughout the day. Note the little bell
on the side.”
Figure 1: What Is It?
Well. if our discoverer believed
either one of these stories he would be wrong, of
course, and there is a sense in which he would still not know what this thing is. He would still not know what the telos of a
typewriter was and thus his knowledge of the typewriter would consequently be
incomplete, this despite the fact that he knew the
material cause, the efficient cause, and the formal cause. He would still not know the final cause of the
object. And of course, he still could
not tell a good one from a bad one. Thus knowing what a things is for, what it’s supposed to do,
to what end it is directed, is part of any adequate understanding of what a thing
is.
Note: For Aristotle, a “Nature” is what a substance is supposed
to do, what it will do if nothing stops it. (Think “Natural Tendency” or
Activity)
Knowing what a thing is (science)
required knowing all the causes of the thing.
Aquinas defines philosophy as the science of all things and their causes
investigated through unaided human reason alone.
In order to know what apple trees are supposed to do, (what the “apple tree
things” are- apple tree nature- the apple tree telos) one must engage in an
empirical study of the species and see what they do do.
Through careful observation one will be able to distinguish the healthy,
thriving apple trees from the sick, diseased, withering apple trees.[12] Studying the characteristic behavior of the
healthy ones will reveal the “nature” and thus the function of the
species. Hence there is an inherent normative
quality to these judgments[13],
at least when applied to human kind; the normative force
is provided by health vs. disease (i.e. one ought to be healthy/ excellent,
one ought
not be sick/ pathetic.)
Let’s consider an example:
Suppose you, a native Floridian, move
up to my hometown in Pennsylvania and you buy a house, in part, because of the
big apple tree in the front yard.
However, in the middle of September,
you notice that all the leaves are turning funny colors and start falling
off. “Oh no!” you think, “There’s
something terribly wrong with my apple tree.”
You call me up in a panic and tell me what’s going on.
“Calm yourself.” I would reassure you. That how apple trees are supposed to
behave. It is natural for apple trees
to lose their leaves in the autumn.”
However, if all the leaves start turning funny colors and falling off
your tree in the middle of May, when then, yah, you got a problem.
Human-made products cannot be considered to be true
substances because they do not have their
own immutable nature. They are not “natural kinds.” Therefore they cannot be identified with an immutable
nature. (Ex: table, chair, bed, cell phones.)[14]
Teleology
- Telos the Greek word for "purpose' or 'goal.'
- Teleology explains an event or object in terms of its
purpose, goal, or end. (She skipped dessert because she is trying to lose
weight. The heart contracts in order to pump blood.) A Teleological investigation is one in
which one is looking for the goal, function or
purpose of a thing. A teleological world view is one which contends that
reality itself has (or items is reality have) goals, functions
or purposes.
- Aristotle's Science/Philosophy seeks to explain why
(for what purpose) something came about, while Modern science seeks to
explain how (mechanistic causal). (Biology/Ecology may have a problem
here.)
- Mechanistic Causal explanation Vs. Teleological
explanation (theory of falling objects).
The Structure of Aristotelian Science
Aristotle insisted that science (Scientia) follow a
syllogistic structure. Real science must proceed deductively valid syllogisms
where the first premise is a fundamental necessary principle of nature.
Example:
1.)
All men are mortal.
2.)
Socrates is a man.
Therefore:
3.)
Socrates is mortal
1.)
All men are mortal.
The major premise of the syllogism is a necessarily true
claim arising from our knowledge of the nature of humankind.
2.)
Socrates is a man.
The minor premise is an observation of the essence of
Socrates. He is essentially a man; he is
only accidentally snub-nosed.
3.)
Socrates is mortal
The conclusion, which follows necessarily from the premises,
deduces an effect/consequent from the cause.
Socrates’s mortality is a necessary effect (formally) caused
by his humanity.
(Problem) Now there’s nothing wrong with deductively valid
categorical syllogisms. The problem
arises however, as to how we are to get the necessary universal first
principles. Aristotle never satisfactorily
addresses this nor did centuries of adherents to his view of science to come
after. See “Nous” and Direct Realism below.
Three Ways of Characterizing a Substance
- A Substance is an essence, what is essential. (Common
Noun: Cat)
- A Substance is anything referred to as any noun, that is,
that can act as the subject of a predication, which is independent of
anything else. Other things might
depend upon substance, but a substance does not depend upon them.
- “Substance” (in the sense of substratum) is that which underlies
all of the properties and changes in something,
usually the most basic realities. (This is the sort of use of substance
that the Pre-Socratics had in mind –a substratum.) For Aristotle, it was “matter.”
Matter
It is important to realize that
while Aristotle talks about matter and suggest that all existing substances are
some combination of matter and form, he does not have in mind our modern notion
of physical substance. Or material substance. We will be looking at where this
idea originates in modern philosophy largely with the philosophes of
enlightenment thinkers such as Rene Descartes who talks about res extensa
and John Locke etc. But for Aristotle
matter is simply the ability to receive form. Material substance must be given
organizing principle in order to be a substance at all
otherwise it is as Martha Nussbaum mentions in the YouTube clip below merely a
heap.
Aristotle's Arguments Against Materialism[15]
Martha Nussbaum discussing Aristotle's arguments against Reductive
Materialism with Bryan Magee (1987)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBx506a7clU
- Is “discovered” (the concept is introduced and
utilized) by Aristotle.
- What things are “made out of.”
- This theoretical device makes it possible for Aristotle
to explain change.
- Given its shape, structure and
potentials by form.
- Cannot exist without Form any more than form can exist
without matter
The Prime Mover
1. Everything which is moved (changed) is moved by some
other thing.
2. That which moves a thing is itself moved or it is not.
3. A system, even infinite system, comprised only of moved
movers is impossible. (infinite regress).
Therefore
There must be a mover which is itself unmoved.
Unmoved Mover (Ultimate Final Cause / Animates the World by
Love: inspiring desire)
Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover has some of the characteristics of
the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God;
“The God in Whom “we live and move and have our being.”[16]
but According to Aristotle:
- He (it) did not create the universe.
- He (it) has no special concern for man.
- He (if) seems more of a metaphysical necessity than a
proper object of worship.
Epistemological Ramifications
of this Metaphysical View:
It is clear that Aristotle maintains that the Forms are learned through experience. He suggests that We see
particulars and our minds “abstract” the forms.
Therefore there is no need to posit an immortal
soul to explain knowledge of abstract forms.
But you must not imagine that we “generalize” to the “essence.” The Modern philosopher/empiricist John Locke and
those who follow him would say something like that, but not Aristotle.[17]
Aristotle advocated what today we would call Direct Realism. (Also known as naive
realism). In On the Soul he claims that a seer is
informed of the object itself. “what can perceive is potentially such as the object of sense
is actually” (De Anima ii 5, 418a3-4)
As Sven Bernecke explains:
The distinction between direct and indirect realism about
perception has an interesting history. There was a time when perception was
understood to be of things themselves, not of our ideas of things. This is what
we find in Aristotle and Aquinas, who maintain that the mind or understanding
grasps the form of the material object without the matter. What we perceive
directly, on this view, are material objects. This changed in the seventeenth
century with Descartes and Locke who can be read as saying that the primary
objects of perception are not things external to the mind but sense-data.
Sense-data are the messengers that stand between us and physical objects such
as tables and chairs.[18]
Nevertheless, he claims that experience is the source of any
real knowledge of Ultimate Reality. (This makes him an Empiricist) This Aristotle directs our attention to
observation of the physical world.
Intellect (Nous,
Active intellect, and Passive intellect)
So how does the mind get to the Forms of things if NOT through
a process of generalization? Aristotle
says that the active intellect (Nous) has the ability to
apprehend the forms directly. This
active function of the intellect has no bodily organ (in contrast with other
psychological abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination). Indeed, Nous is not mixed with the body. Note if the mind/soul took on the form of the
cat directly AND the mind/soul were itself matter, well… matter
plus cat from equals CAT. The mind would
become a cat. Since that doesn’t happen,
the mind must take on the Form without the mind itself being matter.
Now the idea that the mind/soul is one thing
and the body is something else, seems to contradict Aristotle's claim that the
soul is nothing other than the form of the body and cannot be separated from it.
Scholars disagree on how best to resolve this apparent
contradiction in Aristotle.
- A person's ability to think (unlike his other
psychological abilities) belongs to some incorporeal organ distinct from
his body.
This would amount to a form of dualism.
But if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the
body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of
the soul?
- The passive
intellect is a property of the body, while the active intellect is a
substance distinct from the body. (two
alternatives)
- each person has his own active intellect
- active intellect as a single divine being/force,
perhaps the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle's God
- Forms can have properties of their own. The soul is a
property of the body, but the ability to think is a property of the soul
itself, not of the body. If that is the case, then the soul is the body's
form and yet thinking need not involve any bodily organ.
Philosophical/
Dialectical Project:
Philosophical argument must be informed by details observations
and will take the form of reflections and abstractions from these.
Ethical
Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:
The attainment of knowledge of eternal forms is only PART of
human nature. It is a worthy life activity, but only part of a full human life.
(Man is the Rational Animal.)
What are the most real and attainable goals, worthy of our
attention and service is the fulfillment of
our own (human) nature.
As Rational Animals, the excellent human is the one who most
fully expresses Unique Human
Nature, that is, who lives a life guided by reason which
culminates in the fulfillment of one's natural
human capacities (i.e. social,
familial, political, creative, etc.- in short, a functional human life).
It is not clear whether Aristotle believed in some sort of
afterlife, but probably the most consistent position with everything else he
said would be “No.”