In 323 BCE, when Alexander the Great died, Athens was no longer not safe for Aristotle who was seen as a Macedonian sympathizer. Aristotle was on the verge of being charged for impiety.

So he declared, "I will not allow the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy"—and he fled to Chalcis on the island of Euboea. He died less than a year later.

There are divergent accounts of his character:

1. By some accounts, he was more or less a kind and generous man of refinement

2. By some accounts, he was more or less a vain and overly ambitious SOB.

No one ever accused him of being a god.

Modern (Post Renaissance) thought is largely defined by its rejection of the classical philosophical worldview and Aristotle’s Philosophy in particular. But, even so, Plato has always had an easier time appealing to moderns than Aristotle has.

Overall, then, Aristotle just isn't as "sexy" as Plato. In Aristotle

· There is something distinctively less sexy about Aristotle. (No hint of Plato’s mysticism/ mysterium)

· Champions of common sense and moderation. (Yawn)

· Those of his writings we have are dry and dull reading. (They seem to be mainly lecture notes and thus they lacks the literary flair of Platonic dialogues.[1])

· He rejects some of Plato’s most intriguing extreme positions.

· Like Plato, he is an elitist, but unlike Plato, he is not given to utopian social theorizing. (No Philosopher Kings)

o Even modern secularists who hate the speculative metaphysics illustrated by Plato's “Allegory of the Cave” are nevertheless sympathetic to the idea that the masses are in the grip of illusion and ignorance and, if they cannot be emancipated, ought at least to be ruled by those who know better, e.g. philosopher kings.

o Aristotle’s similar inegalitarianism does not coincide with a contempt for conventional opinion or “common senses” of the common.

Realism with Respect to Forms But Rejection of Platonic Dualism and Rationalism

Like Plato, Aristotle is a realist. Forms are objective realities which cannot be identified with anything mental or material. But they do not exist in Plato’s transcendent “heaven.” Rather they exist only "in" the things of which they are the forms. As pure abstractions these things exist only in the intellect. So then forms exist in two places: In their particular instantiations and in the minds of those who know the forms. They exist nowhere else. So we see a very clear rejection of Plato’s dualist metaphysics.

Furthermore, for Aristotle even intellect relies on the senses in coming to know the forms. So we also see a clear rejection of Plato’s Rationalism and Aristotle’s embrace of Empiricism. We now have very clearly drawn line demarking these two opposing epistemological views.

Rationalism vs. Empiricism

Rationalism	Empiricism
There are Innate Ideas	There are no innate ideas
The Senses are a poor, unreliable means to knowledge	The senses are a reliable, indeed the only means to knowledge.
The most reliable means to gain knowledge and truth is via a priori reason and introspection	A priori reasoning is fine as far as it goes, but it is very limited as to what is can provide us in the way of knowledge. The most reliable way to useful knowledge is through observation and experience.
Representative Philosophers:	Representative Philosophers:
(Parmenides?) Plato Augustine Anselm Descartes Spinoza Leibnitz	(Heraclitus?) Aristotle Aquinas Locke Berkley Hume

Key points to understanding his Metaphysics

Agrees with Plato on the following:

Knowledge (to be worthy of the title “knowledge”) must be of Timeless/Eternal and Universal Truths and concerned with what things have in common.

But what if there are no objects that are in fact timeless/eternal? If so, then there could be no knowledge. Not to worry though….

Some Realities are timeless and eternal and not subject to change (e.g. Forms, God, heavenly objects such as the planets and stars, and biological species) and therefore fixed, (eternal) knowledge of these items was indeed possible.[2]

Evolution was not true.

There was a Hierarchy of reality or “degrees of existence.” (But Aristotle reverses Plato's ontology, i.e. turns it upside down, so to speak).

Forms are real, objective and eternal. (However, Aristotle argues that they cannot exist separately from the particular substances whose forms they are.)

Philosophical/ Dialectical Project is the worthwhile goal of theoretical reason. The successful conclusion of a philosophical inquiry (which must include observations as well as argument) will yield the correct definition of the concept under discussion or the essence of the species under consideration.

(E.g. What it is that all and only courageous acts have in common by virtue of which they ARE courageous acts. What is it that all cats have in common by virtue of which they are cats)

These discovered essences are critical for scientific demonstrations. (More on this in a bit.)

Disagrees with Plato on the following:

There is no real relationship between the 'Forms' (which Aristotle did hold to be eternal and unchanging) and particular things because Forms only exist as instantiated in particulars. . While form and matter can be separated in thought, they cannot be separated in reality. All existing matter must have a delineated form and all existing forms must be forms of some bit of matter.

By contrast Plato had argued that Forms exist independently of their particular instantiations

This visible world, our world which we encounter through our senses and reflect on with our minds, is all there is to reality, (By contrast Plato had argued that reality was divided into two realms, the invisible realm being “more real” than the visible world of the senses.)

Believed that more concrete individual things, particular humans for instance, are more real than abstract items like the species Homo sapiens since there could not be a form of human if there were not humans for it to belong to (unlike Plato, who believes the more abstract is more real).

At the heart of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms is the idea that universals are not separate from particulars. Platonists argue that each material object has its own corresponding Form(s), which is not embodied in the object itself, but separate from it. For example, things are said to be beautiful in so much as they “participate in” the Form of Beauty, which is a separate existing thing, detached from the sensible world. For Plato then, a woman is beautiful to the extent she reflects the Form of Beauty, but not to the extent she embodies the Form of beauty. In this case, a particular (the woman) shares in a separate, detached universal (the Form), as opposed to the Form of Beauty being an inherent or intrinsic quality of the woman.

Aristotle refutes this separation of universals from particulars in two simple ways: first, he argues that Forms cannot constitute a substance. While Plato holds that Forms are detached, non-physical entities that underlie and cause physical things, Aristotle is quick to point out the impossibility of such a claim: “It would seem impossible for a substance to be separate from what it is the substance of. How, then, if the Forms are the substances of things, could they be separate from them.” That is, form cannot be individual, self-subsisting existing thing. Secondly, that since Forms are not substances, Forms cannot have (efficient) causal effects. That is, a form cannot cause substance to come into being.

That damn change things again:

The problem of change, as posed by Parmenides, persisted despite Plato’s best efforts to resolve the dilemma. In fact, Plato did not so much resolve the dilemma as he did entrench the dilemma. Aristotle’s resolution required being much more careful about what it means to say that something “is.”

Aristotle’s Resolution to Parmenides: Actuality and Potentiality

Perhaps the best place to start talking about Aristotle is with Parmenides. You will recall that Parmenides said that change and motion are impossible, and that if the senses tell us otherwise, so much the worse for them. You'll also recall thinking that Parmenides sounded like a nut.

Aristotle might not have put it quite that way, though he certainly had no inclination whatsoever to take Parmenides' conclusion seriously. But he did take his arguments for that conclusion seriously, and regarded them as interesting enough to merit a detailed reply. The paradox of change points to a serious problem with our ordinary understanding. This is like the stinking pipes that Mary Midgley speaks about in her characterization of philosophy.[3] What’s going on here? What’s wrong with our ordinary assumptions and what more adequate account might we give to resolve the paradox? This is often how philosophy progress occurs.

Aristotle's positive account of change: Change and Being in Actuality and Potentiality

Parmenides' claim was that something can't come from nothing, (being from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing) but that something can’t come from something either (being from being, since nothing was the only thing something new could come from, since the only thing there is other than what already exists (Le. being) is non-being or nothing.

Either a change is Being coming from Being or Being coming from Non-being.

If the first then there is no change because what is (being) still is (being).

But the latter is impossible; what is (being) cannot come from what is not. (Nothing can come from nothing.)

Therefore:

Thus change is impossible.

Hence nothing new can come into existence, all that is is, and change is impossible.

Parmenides and his False Dichotomy

Aristotle's reply is that it is true that something can't come from nothing, but it is false to suppose that nothing or “non-being” is the only alternative to “being” and thus the only possible candidate for a source of change. Parmenides presents us with a puzzle based on a false dichotomy[4]. But to see this we need to distinguish between two very different ways a thing can be said to “be.”

For instance, am I a French speaker?

• There is a sense in which the correct answer is “no.”

• There is another sense in which the correct answer is “yes.”

That is, I am a French speaker and I am NOT a French speaker. (WTF?)

Aristotle would say that I am a French speaker, in “potentiality,” but I am not a French speaker in “actuality.” I do not speak French at the moment. I do not possess the ability to speak French, again at the moment. Nevertheless, I do possess the ability to speak French in the sense that I am the sort of thing that can speak French. It is within my nature, as a human being, to be able to learn and speak French.

So there is a sense in which I “am” a French speaker. I am a French speaker in potentiality, though not in actuality. That is, I AM (be) the sort of thing (human) whose nature permits him to learn and speak French. Thus Aristotle would say I have the ability to speak French in potentiality, but not in actuality.

An apple tree to speak French NEITHER in potentiality nor in actuality. Apple trees are not even the sort of thing that could speak French.

And note, even French speakers possess the ability to speak French in potentiality only when they are sitting quietly doing a water color painting or knitting etc., that is, when not ACTUALLY speaking French.

So Parmenides puzzle was founded on a false dichotomy according to Aristotle. It is not the case that change is either being coming from being or being coming from nothing. A change is a preexisting potentiality moved to actuality. Potentiality is not actuality, but it’s not nothing either. Any change in a substance is the “actualization” of a pre-existing potentiality. What actual and potential characteristics a thing has are determined by the thing’s nature or “form.” Note further the only thing that could “move” a thing from potential to actual is a mover (impetus) outside the moved thing.

Consider a blue rubber ball, for instance. What can we say about it? Well, there are the ways it actually is: solid, round, blue, and bouncy. And there are the ways it is not: square and red, for example; it is also not a cat, or college student, a Buick Skylark, or innumerable other things.

The ball's squareness, redness, dogginess, etc., since they don't exist, are different ways the ball is NOT. But in addition to all the this it is at the moment (actual) we can distinguish the various ways the ball potentially is: It is potentially red (if you paint it), soft and gooey (if you melt it), a miniature globe (if you draw little continents on it), and so forth. So being and non-being aren't the only relevant factors here; there are also a thing's various potentialities. Knowing a things potentialities means knowing the ways in which it can and cannot change. The distinction between actuality and potentiality, then, is the key to understanding how, contra Parmenides, change is possible.

Parmenides says: If we say that a solid rubber ball changes to become soft and gooey, then

1. it can't be the actual gooeyness itself that makes this possible, because actual gooeyness does not exist (yet), and

2. it can't be the non-existent gooeyness either, since what doesn't exist can't explain anything

Therefore:

3. The ball can never change to become gooey.

In general then, no sort of change is possible, regardless of what our senses tell us.

Aristotle replies: It is true that actual gooeyness itself doesn't yet exist in the ball, but the potential for gooeyness does exist in the ball, and this, together with some external influence that actualizes this pre-existing potential (e.g. heat), suffices to show how the change can occur.

Further, while heat can actualize the potential gooeyness of the rubber ball, NOTHING can actualize doginess in in the rubber ball. Potential doginess does not exist in the rubber ball. That is, a rubber ball in the sort of thing that has the potential to become a dog. Such a “change” would be impossible.

Important Side Note About Possibility and Necessity

Modern philosophy treats possibility and impossibility differently than the ancients and the medievals. For moderns, if something is “conceivable without logical contradiction,” as modern philosopher David Hume might put it, it is thought to be “possible.” On this view, a married bachelor is impossible, but an apple tree speaking French is not. For instance, I can imagine walking through am apple orchard and hearing:

“Bonjour Professor. Comment ça va?

Alternatively:

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uIVwIGGXTaE

But for Aristotle, Apple Tree Nature (the Form of Apple Tree) is a timeless, eternal and immutable essence that does not possess the potentiality to speak French. Nothing that possess apple tree form can speak French or could be made to speak French.[5] Thus, a French speaking apple trees is as impossible (metaphysically impossible) as is a married bachelor. How we come to KNOW the impossibility of the former (empirically – learning apple tree nature) may differ from how we come to know the impossibility of the latter (a priori – considering the meanings of the terms), but they are equally impossible nonetheless for Aristotle.

Thus it is a mistake to imagine that a thing is "potentially" almost anything from Aristotle’s perspective.[6] While today, we might imagine a "possible world" where rubber balls can bounce from here to the moon, or where apple trees speak French. But the potentialities Aristotle has in mind are the ones rooted in a thing's nature as it actually exists. Hence, in Aristotle's sense of "potential," while a rubber ball could potentially be melted, it could not “bounce to the moon” nor potentially follow someone around all by itself. It is NOT possible for apple trees to speak French then, because they are not the sort of things that can speak French. It is not in their nature.

So then, a thing's potentials are the key to how it can change as well as how it cannot change. (Apple seeds cannot grow up into rose bushes for instance.) Now an outside source of change is also necessary to explain how the change occurs. For potential gooeyness to be bought to actual gooeyness, say, requires are external actualizer, precisely because a mere potential, cannot actualize itself; only something else (like heat) could do that.

Consider also that if a potential could actualize itself, there would be no way to explain why it does so at one time rather than another. The ball melts and becomes gooey when you heat it. Why did this potential gooeyness become actual just at that point? The obvious answer is that the heat was needed to actualize it. If the potential gooeyness could have made itself actual all by itself, that is, if potential gooeyness were sufficient for actually gooeyness, then it would have happened already, since the sufficient cause for the gooeyness was there already.

Side Note: Question: Can it be that every actualizer derives its power to actualize potentials from some other actualizer?

Answer: No.

Why? Short Answer “Infinite Regress”

Long Answer review Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ Argument from Motion

Back to Parmenides

Parmenides had posed the paradoxical dilemma of change this way: Any change requires a substance moving from being to being (which would not really be a change at all) or the substance moving from non-being to being (which is impossible; nothing comes from nothing). Aristotle’s solutions is to claim that when a substance moves from a preexisting potential being to actual being. Any change in a substance is the “actualization” of a preexisting potentiality.

What actual and potential characteristics a thing has are determined by the thing’s nature or “form.” This is what Aristotle has in mind when he refers to “Formal Causality.” A things “form” accounts for why is changes/ develops in some ways but not in others. Note further the only thing that could “move” a thing from potential to actual is a mover (impetus) outside the moved thing.

Now actuality and potentiality are fully intelligible only in relation to each other, and there is an asymmetry between them. Actuality has metaphysical priority. A potential is always a potential for a certain kind of actuality. And a potentiality cannot exist on its own, but only in combination with actuality. That is, actual being is required for anything to possesses potential of any kind. So you cannot have a potential without accompanying actuality.

But you CAN have actuality without potentiality. Indeed, if change is the moving from potential to actual and no potentiality can actualize itself, then there must be something with pure actuality… and that all men call God. J (More on this later.) So, while for us to understand actuality and potentiality, we need to contrast them with each other, in the real world outside our minds, actuality can exist on its own while potentiality cannot.[7]

Well… that all depends on what the meaning of “is” is.

What “Being” is / What a being “Is” (Quiddity)

There are several senses in which a thing can be said to “be.” That is, there are several correct answers to the question “What is that?”

'being,' means 'what a thing is'

You might see me walking down the hall, point and ask “what is it?” Were someone to respond, “That’s a human being.” he or she would have answered correctly. But that would not be the ONLY correct answer since that is not the only thing that I “be.”

One might also correctly respond, that’s an FIU professor, or, less kindly, that an overweight middle-aged consumer.

So what am I? (What and how do I “be?”) I am a human, 167 pound FIU philosophy professor standing in this room before you. But the above mentioned states importantly different ways I “be.” One of these various ways that I “be” is more fundamental to what I am than the others.

Essential and Accidental Properties

An essence or essential property is that which makes an individual the specific thing that it is and explains why it behaves or “changes” as it does. (formal and final causality). The Formal and Final causes of a thing determine its actual and potential properties. An accident, or accidental property, by contrast, is a property of a thing which is NOT essential. The individual could gain or lose such a property, but remain the same unique individual (i.e.. wart).

Four Kinds of Changes:

1) Quantitative Change

2) Qualitative Change

3) Change in Location

4) Substantial Change

Of the various ways I “be,” I am essentially a human. (Quiddity) I am only accidentally a 167 pound philosophy professor. I could lose weight (undergo a quantitative change) or get another job (undergo a qualitative change), or go to Starbucks for coffee (undergo a change in location), but I would still me. I would still be me in that I would still have the same essential nature, quiddity, with its latent potentialities (e.g. to speak French). I can survive a quantitative or qualitative change, or a change in location. In fact, I would very much like to undergo certain quantities changes, truth be known.

The essence of a thing cannot change or it will no longer be that same unique thing. When I die, I undergo a substantial change. “I am” no longer a human; more precisely, “I am” no more. In my place in a new substance: a human corpse[8]. L In addition to quantitative changes, qualitative changes and changes in locations there is a fourth sort of change, according to Aristotle: A Substantial Change.

Note: Substantial Change is the creation of a new substance and passing away of an old substance. This happens when matter loses its old essential form and is given a new essential form. Forms themselves can never (do not) change, nor can the matter per se change, but they (form and matter) combine in different ways.

· If I cut a Sphere in half, the sphere no longer exists; instead two hemisphere exist. Spheres have potentials that hemispheres lack (e.g. rolling around).

· If I separate water into oxygen and hydrogen, water (along with its water-nature/form) no longer exists. The new substances (oxygen and hydrogen) have quite different potentialities and actualities (i.e. different nature/ form) than does water.

· Death is a substantial change; the human is destroyed and the corpse come into existence.)

Any existing thing then has properties, some of which are accidental and others are essential. Essences (formal causes) demarcate what the essential properties of a things are. That is to say, a thing’s form “causes” the thing to be the thing that it is, determines why it is the way that is and why it develops/ moves/ changes as it does (potential and actual properties). And also why it does not/cannot not develop/ move/ change in certain ways.

How a being “Is” - Primary vs Secondary Substances (Haecceity)

2. Being means how a thing is (haecceity): a quality or a quantity of a thing- (e.g. ‘being’ good or bad, red, many)

You might see a certain red bird landing on a tree branch, point and ask “What is it?” Were someone to answer, “That’s a cardinal,” he or she would have answered correctly. But that would not be the ONLY correct answer since that is not the only way the thing can be said to “be.”

A person might also truly reply, “That is red.” And so it “is.”

Now “redness’ DOES exists, to be sure, but redness only exists as a property of things, things that can exist on their own. Since “redness” cannot exist on its own Aristotle classified it as a “secondary substance,” but since individual cardinals can exist on their own, Aristotle called them “primary substances.” Aristotle would say that “redness” is a secondary substance, while the (actual, particular) cardinal is a primary substance.

Primary and Secondary Substances

Aristotle begins by distinguishing primary substances (particular things) and secondary substances (universals relating to the species and genera of the primary substances). He writes,

“Substance in the most proper sense of the word, that which is primarily and most of all called substance, is neither said of any subject, nor is it in any subject… What is called secondary substances are both the species which the things primarily called substances fall under and the genera of these species.” (2a13-16)

Ultimately, according to Aristotle, all things depend upon primary substances for their existence: All other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.

This is evident from a consideration of cases. For example, animal is predicated of man, and therefore of the individual man (for if it were predicated of no individual man, it would not be predicated of man at all.) Again, color is in body, and therefore in an individual body (for if it were not in any individual, it would not be in body at all). Thus, all other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. Therefore, if there were no primary substances, there could not be anything else. (2a34-b7)[9]

Further, while being a cardinal is essential to that primary substance’s nature (said of it as a subject), being red is accidental (in it as a subject). We could spray-paint it blue, not that I would ever, and the thing would still be a cardinal. Similarly, being human is essential to my nature; being 167 pounds is accidental. (Let’s hope.)

Primary substances: things that can exist on their own (Individual particular things with an essential nature. e.g. actual cardinals- ontologically independent)

Secondary substances: things that can only exist as properties of other things; cannot exist on their own.

So:

Primary substances have a host of properties, (red, avian, 5 oz.).
Some of these properties are accidental and others are essential.
The substances are defined by their natures/forms (formal causes or essences).
A thing’s nature or essence determines why it is the way it is and why it develops/ moves/ changes as it does (potential and actual properties).

(Which is also to say, why it doesn’t / cannot develop, move or change is ways unpermitted by its nature. An acorn cannot grow into a rosebush, for instance.)

The meaning of “is” is:

The primary sense of "to be" is to be a substance.

e.g. To Be a particular human

The secondary sense of “to be” to is be an instance of a quality or quantities.

e.g. To Be a Tall (secondary) humaness.

A bit more about Primary and Secondary Substances

A Primary Substance (existing thing) is always a combination of Form and Matter.[10]

Hence we have Aristotle's famous doctrine of hylomorphism (or "matter/form-ism," from the Greek hyle or "matter" and morphe or "form").

So for Aristotle, it is a mistake it true to say, as some materialists might, that the ball is "just a piece of matter." Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter cannot exist without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change).

Note: For Aristotle Form does not/ cannot exist apart from matter, though separable in thought- We can imagine Michelangelo’s "David" for instance apart from the marble that actually constitutes it- (done instead in cheese say).

Secondary substances are those “objects” or “properties” constituted by particular individual primary substances. (philosophy teachers, blonds, wedding rings)

Matter

It is important to realize that while Aristotle talks about matter and suggest that all existing substances are some combination of matter and form, he does not have in mind our modern notion of physical substance. Or material substance. We will be looking at where this idea originates in modern philosophy largely with the philosophes of enlightenment thinkers such as Rene Descartes who talks about res extensa and John Locke etc. But for Aristotle matter is simply the ability to receive form. Material substance must be given organizing principle in order to be a substance at all otherwise it is as Martha Nussbaum mentions in the YouTube clip below merely a heap.

Aristotle's Arguments Against Materialism[11]

Martha Nussbaum discussing Aristotle's arguments against Reductive Materialism with Bryan Magee (1987)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBx506a7clU

Is “discovered” (the concept is introduced and utilized) by Aristotle.
What things are “made out of.”
This theoretical device makes it possible for Aristotle to explain change.
Given its shape, structure and potentials by form.
Cannot exist without Form any more than form can exist without matter

Doctrine of the Four Causes:

Aristotelian Doctrine which holds that to truly know what a thing is, one must know four things about it. That is, to explain what a thing is as it is and behaves as it does one must know four things about it:

1. Material Cause: (What's it made of?)

2. Efficient Cause: (Who or what brought generated it.)

3. Formal Cause: (To what species and genus does it belong?)

4. Final Cause: (What is it supposed to do?)

Imagine a thousand years from now someone is digging around in his backyard and comes across a curious object that he can see is very old, but he does not know what it is. And he wants to find out. So he takes it to his chemist friend. “What is this?” he asks. And his chemist friend replies, “Why I can tell you what it is: it is steel with some iron and chrome. There is also a bit of rubber here.”

Despite the fact that what the chemist has said is true, our discoverer is not satisfied. “Yes, that’s fine, he says to himself, but what is it?” So he takes it so another friend of his, this time an Economic Historian. “What is it?” he asks. “Oh my, that’s an artifact, that is.” she says. “It was designed by Franz Wagner. It was produced in Underwood factories in New York sometime in the very early 1900s.”

Ok, so now this guy knows how it came to be and who made it, but still, “What is it?” He sees a third friend, an archeologist this time. “Yes I’m certain I can help you. I know precisely what it is. It is an Underwood number 5. It is very similar to the Densmore, but differs from that kind in that it is a 4-bank frontstrike version. It differs from the Daugherty in that it was less likely to have its keys jam. Well now our discoverer understands the object’s type, that is, he can recognize another one of the same type when he sees it and he can distinguish it from things of a different type. He knows that class of things it belongs to in that he knows its form, but there is a sense in which he still does not know what the thing is.

Finally he takes it to an expert on Religion and Culture from the early 20^th Century. “I understand your difficulty,” she says. “You know what it is made of (Material Cause) and how it came to be (Efficient Cause) and the class of things it belongs to (Formal Cause), but what you what to know is ‘What is it supposed to do; what’s it for?’ (Final Cause). Well I can help you there. This was called a Typewriter. This was a machine by which people in the early 20^th Century communicated with their gods. They would sit in front of it all day and use the keyboard to type messages of praise or petitions for help to the deities.“

Now another friend is walking by and overhears this and says, “What? Don’t be ridiculous! That was not the telos[12] of this thing. The telos of this machine was to make music. It was a percussive instrument and people would use it to play all sorts of complicated rhythms throughout the day. Note the little bell on the side.”

Figure 1: What Is It?

Well. if our discoverer believed either one of these stories he would be wrong, of course, and there is a sense in which he would still not know what this thing is. He would still not know what the telos of a typewriter was and thus his knowledge of the typewriter would consequently be incomplete, this despite the fact that he knew the material cause, the efficient cause, and the formal cause. He would still not know the final cause of the object. And of course, he still could not tell a good one from a bad one. Thus knowing what a things is for, what it’s supposed to do, to what end it is directed, is part of any adequate understanding of what a thing is.

Note: For Aristotle, a “Nature” is what a substance is supposed to do, what it will do if nothing stops it. (Think “Natural Tendency” or Activity)

Knowing what a thing is (science) required knowing all the causes of the thing. Aquinas defines philosophy as the science of all things and their causes investigated through unaided human reason alone.

In order to know what apple trees are supposed to do, (what the “apple tree things” are- apple tree nature- the apple tree telos) one must engage in an empirical study of the species and see what they do do. Through careful observation one will be able to distinguish the healthy, thriving apple trees from the sick, diseased, withering apple trees.[13] Studying the characteristic behavior of the healthy ones will reveal the “nature” and thus the function of the species. Hence there is an inherent normative quality to these judgments[14], at least when applied to humankind; the normative force is provided by health vs. disease (i.e. one ought to be healthy/ excellent, one ought not be sick/ pathetic.)

Let’s consider an example:

Suppose you, a native Floridian, move up to my hometown in Pennsylvania and you buy a house, in part, because of the big apple tree in the front yard.

However, in the middle of September, you notice that all the leaves are turning funny colors and start falling off. “Oh no!” you think, “There’s something terribly wrong with my apple tree.” You call me up in a panic and tell me what’s going on.

“Calm yourself.” I would reassure you. That how apple trees are supposed to behave. It is natural for apple trees to lose their leaves in the autumn.” However, if all the leaves start turning funny colors and falling off your tree in the middle of May, when then, yah, you got a problem.

Human-made products cannot be considered to be true substances because they do not have their

own immutable nature. They are not “natural kinds.” Therefore they cannot be identified with an immutable nature. (Ex: table, chair, bed, cell phones.)[15]

Teleology

Telos the Greek word for "purpose' or 'goal.'

Teleology explains an event or object in terms of its purpose, goal, or end. (She skipped dessert because she is trying to lose weight. The heart contracts in order to pump blood.) A Teleological investigation is one in which one is looking for the goal, function or purpose of a thing. A teleological world view is one which contends that reality itself has (or items is reality have) goals, functions or purposes.

Aristotle's Science/Philosophy seeks to explain why (for what purpose) something came about, while Modern science seeks to explain how (mechanistic causal). (Biology/Ecology may have a problem here.)

Mechanistic Causal explanation Vs. Teleological explanation (theory of falling objects).

The Structure of Aristotelian Science

Aristotle insisted that science (Scientia) follow a syllogistic structure. Real science must proceed deductively valid syllogisms where the first premise is a fundamental necessary principle of nature.

Example:

1.) All men are mortal.

2.) Socrates is a man.

Therefore:

3.) Socrates is mortal

1.) All men are mortal.

The major premise of the syllogism is a necessarily true claim arising from our knowledge of the nature of humankind.

2.) Socrates is a man.

The minor premise is an observation of the essence of Socrates. He is essentially a man; he is only accidentally snub-nosed.

3.) Socrates is mortal

The conclusion, which follows necessarily from the premises, deduces an effect/consequent from the cause. Socrates’s mortality is a necessary effect (formally) caused by his humanity.

(Problem) Now there’s nothing wrong with deductively valid categorical syllogisms. The problem arises however, as to how we are to get the necessary universal first principles. Aristotle never satisfactorily addresses this nor did centuries of adherents to his view of science to come after. See “Nous” and Direct Realism below.

Three Ways of Characterizing a Substance

A Substance is an essence, what is essential. (Common Noun: Cat)

A Substance is anything referred to as any noun, that is, that can act as the subject of a predication, which is independent of anything else. Other things might depend upon substance, but a substance does not depend upon them.

“Substance” (in the sense of substratum) is that which underlies all of the properties and changes in something, usually the most basic realities. (This is the sort of use of substance that the Pre-Socratics had in mind –a substratum.) For Aristotle, it was “matter.”

The Prime Mover

1. Everything which is moved (changed) is moved by some other thing.

2. That which moves a thing is itself moved or it is not.

3. A system, even infinite system, comprised only of moved movers is impossible. (infinite regress).

Therefore

There must be a mover which is itself unmoved.

Unmoved Mover (Ultimate Final Cause / Animates the World by Love: inspiring desire)

Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover has some of the characteristics of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God;

“The God in Whom “we live and move and have our being.”[16]

but According to Aristotle:

He (it) did not create the universe.
He (it) has no special concern for man.
He (if) seems more of a metaphysical necessity than a proper object of worship.

Epistemological Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

It is clear that Aristotle maintains that the Forms are learned through experience. He suggests that We see particulars and our minds “abstract” the forms. Therefore there is no need to posit an immortal soul to explain knowledge of abstract forms. But you must not imagine that we “generalize” to the “essence.” The Modern philosopher/empiricist John Locke and those who follow him would say something like that, but not Aristotle.[17]

Direct Realism and Representational Realism

Aristotle advocated what today we would call Direct Realism. (Also known as naive realism). In On the Soul he claims that a seer is informed of the object itself. “what can perceive is potentially such as the object of sense is actually” (De Anima ii 5, 418a3-4)

As Sven Bernecke explains:

The distinction between direct and indirect realism about perception has an interesting history. There was a time when perception was understood to be of things themselves, not of our ideas of things. This is what we find in Aristotle and Aquinas, who maintain that the mind or understanding grasps the form of the material object without the matter. What we perceive directly, on this view, are material objects. This changed in the seventeenth century with Descartes and Locke who can be read as saying that the primary objects of perception are not things external to the mind but sense-data. Sense-data are the messengers that stand between us and physical objects such as tables and chairs.[18]

Nevertheless, Aristotle claims that experience is the source of any real knowledge of Ultimate Reality. (This makes him an Empiricist) Thus, Aristotle directs our attention to observation of the physical world.

Intellect (Nous, Active intellect, and Passive intellect)

So how does the mind get to the Forms of things if NOT through a process of generalization? Aristotle says that the active intellect (Nous) has the ability to apprehend the forms directly. This active function of the intellect has no bodily organ (in contrast with other psychological abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination). Indeed, Nous is not mixed with the body. Note if the mind/soul took on the form of the cat directly AND the mind/soul were itself corporeal matter, well… corporeal matter plus cat form equals CAT. The mind would become a cat. Since that doesn’t happen, the mind must take on the Form without the mind itself being corporeal matter.

Now the idea that the mind/soul is one thing and the body is something else, seems to contradict Aristotle's claim that the soul is nothing other than the form of the body and cannot be separated from it. Scholars disagree on how best to resolve this apparent contradiction in Aristotle.

A person's ability to think (unlike his other psychological abilities) belongs to some incorporeal organ distinct from his body.

This would amount to a form of dualism.

But if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of the soul?

The passive intellect is a property of the body, while the active intellect is a substance distinct from the body. (two alternatives)

each person has his own active intellect
active intellect as a single divine being/force, perhaps the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle's God

Forms can have properties of their own. The soul is a property of the body, but the ability to think is a property of the soul itself, not of the body. If that is the case, then the soul is the body's form and yet thinking need not involve any bodily organ.

Philosophical/ Dialectical Project:

Philosophical argument must be informed by details observations and will take the form of reflections and abstractions from these.

Ethical Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

The attainment of knowledge of eternal forms is only PART of human nature. It is a worthy life activity, but only part of a full human life. (Man is the Rational Animal.)

What are the most real and attainable goals, worthy of our attention and service is the fulfillment of

our own (human) nature.

As Rational Animals, the excellent human is the one who most fully expresses Unique Human

Nature, that is, who lives a life guided by reason which culminates in the fulfillment of one's natural

human capacities (i.e. social, familial, political, creative, etc.- in short, a functional human life).

It is not clear whether Aristotle believed in some sort of afterlife, but probably the most consistent position with everything else he said would be “No.”

[1] But remember that a LOT of his work is lost. Some ancient commentators such a Cicero who would have been familiar with works lost to us have suggested that Aristotle was every bit as good a writer as Plato, perhaps even superior.

[2] Now if you thinking, wait a minute, the planets are not unchanging and neither are biological species, you are, of course, correct. But Aristotle did not know that, nor did centuries of humans to follow him. This, in part, explains the modern rejection of Aristotle’s philosophy. More (much more) on this later.

[3] “People think of philosophy as a special and rather grand subject cut off from others, something you could put on the mantelpiece. I think it is much more like plumbing the sort of thinking that people do even in the most prudent, practical areas always has a whole system of thought under the surface which we are not aware of. Then suddenly we become aware of some bad smells, and we have to take up the floorboards and look at the concepts of even the most ordinary piece of thinking. The great philosophers of the past didn't spend their time looking at entities in the sky. They noticed how badly things were going wrong, and made suggestions about how they could be dealt with.” https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17223154-800-mary-mary-quite-contrary/

[4] A false dichotomy (di/ chot- cut in two) is a fallacy in reasoning that claims there are only two choices, when in fact there are more than two. Were I to claim that either you must be an atheist, or be intolerant of anyone’s religion but your own, this would be a false dichotomy. Since I suspect you do not wish to be thought of as an intolerant person, I might say something like this to convince you to embrace atheism. But that would be fallacious reasoning on my part (and yours if you believed me) because there are really plenty of other options than the two I propose.

[5] I am reminded of an old joke: Never try to teach a fish to sing because it wastes your time and annoys the fish.

[6]But there may be something of an equivocation going on here. It's one thing to image a scenario of an apple tree speaking French. It's another thing to conceive of an apple tree speaking French. I remember as a child watching a fantasy adventure movie. Perhaps it was “Jason and the Argonauts.” In the movie (through the magic of clay-mation cinematography) a iron metal sculpture “came to life” and started chasing Jason and. his companions around an island. And even as a child I was thinking. “That's not possible. That's not how iron behaves.” The point I'm making here is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive a sculpture both being iron and In behaving in these ways at the same time. I could image such a thing. But even in my imaging, I would know that what I'm imaging is NOT an iron sculpture. I mistook it for an iron sculpture, perhaps. It sure looked like an iron sculpture to me initially. But I know it's not an iron sculpture because it is doing things that iron doesn't do. Similarly with a French speaking apple tree. It might look like an apple tree, but I know darn well it's not an apple tree. Why is that? Because it's speaking French.

[7] The first of the famous twenty-four Thomistic theses[7] reads:

Potency and act are a complete division of being. Hence, whatever is must be either pure act or a unit composed of potency and act as its primary and intrinsic principles. (Wuellner 1956, p.120)

[8] And note that human corpse have very different potentialities than do living human beings.

[10] But there can also be such a thing as an immaterial object? Matter, in Aristotle’s sense, does not necessarily mean “corporeal,” but merely having some potency, that is, the ability to take on form. Aristotle hints that (a part of) the human soul might be an example an immaterial kind of matter-and like everything else, such a thing would have a form. Hence it is possible, at least in principle, for forms to exist without corporeal matter. Such forms would be immaterial particular things, though, not uninstantiated universals; hence this qualification to Aristotle's theory does not mark a return to Plato's view that forms are abstract universal natures in which different material things "participate," much less to the idea that forms in general exist apart from the material world. Aristotle himself just hints at all this; it was left to his medieval successors to develop it in detail.

[11] A clip of Martha Nussbaum discussing Aristotle's arguments against (reductive) materialism and his view of forms with Bryan Magee in a 1987 program on the Great Philosophers. The full interview can be found here: https://youtu.be/DbTUAqlLlHg

[12] Telos is the Greek word for end or purpose.

[13] For items of the natural world, especially living natural things, the formal cause of the thing is the final cause of the thing. For examples, what cats “are” is what cats are supposed to be.

[14] Note this is in stark contrast to the Modern world view as represented by David Hume who claims that one cannot validly deduce an “ought” from an “is.” According to Hume, no amount of information about how the world is can tell us how the world ought to be, and for that matter, no amount of information about how the world ought to be can tell us how the world is. But, Hume’s caution only follows if your world view lacks teleology. Only if the natural world is purposeless, without inherent meaning or directedness, is there this strict fact/value divide. On that view Man truly is “the measure of all things.”

“Man is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.” as quoted in The Theaetetus by Plato (section 152a).

[15] Now, if a human artifact is a necessary byproduct of human nature, say, like politics, then it would have a nature as immutable as human nature.

[17] There seems to be some dispute as to whether perception is mediated or not according to Aristotle. For instance he says “If one placed something that has color upon the eye itself, it will not be seen.” (DA 419a12-13) “as it is now held (dokei) that taste and touch act by contact, while the other senses act from a distance? But this is not the case; rather we do perceive the hard and the soft through something other also, just as we do that which can sound, the visible, and the odorous. But the latter are perceived from a distance, the former from close, and for this reason the fact escapes our notice; since we perceive everything surely through a medium but in these cases we fail to notice. Yet, as we said earlier, even if we perceived all tangibles through a membrane without noticing that it separated us from them we would be in the same position as we are now when in water or in air; for we suppose that we touch the objects themselves and that nothing is through a medium..” DA 423b2-7)

[18] Bernecker, S. (2008). The Metaphysics of Memory. Philosophical Studies Series. Springer. p. 62. ISBN 9781402082191. LCCN 2008921236.