George Berkeley
George Berkeley (1685 – 1753)
- About
a Generation or so after John Locke (1632 – 1704)
Berkeley agrees with much of Locke, (He
too is an empiricist.), but points out where Locke has made claims that are
inconstant with Empiricism.
1. attacks Locke’s distinction between
primary and secondary properties
2. attacks Locke’s notion of “physical
substance”
3. attacks Locke’s causal theory of perception
1.
Attacks Locke’s distinction between
primary and secondary properties
Recall that Locke claims that “shape”
is primary property because one can’t alter the shape of a thing without
altering the object itself.
But, Berkeley claims one can
alter the shape of the table simply by changing my angle of viewing. This is certainly the case if by shape we
mean “apparent shape.” Artists know this
very well. If you have ever taken a
class in figure drawing of did a still life painting, you know how important it
is to have the same seat each week so that you view the objects from the same
angle constantly.
Notice the different shapes the fork
has depending on how I change my viewing angle.
Now, one might object to Berkeley that
I might be changing the shape the fork “appears” to have, but not I am not
changing the “real” shape of the fork.
But this response illicit on the basis of
Empiricism. It would seem to equate the
“real” shape of the fork with something that I have never seen nor could ever
see- and that is inconsistent with
empiricism’s major claim that “nothing is in the mind which was not first in
the senses.”
So the Empiricist is left with two
options:
Either the (real) shape of the fork is
something that we see or it is not.
A) If it is NOT something we see (perceive), then it was never in our “senses”
and there is no ground to talk about this supposed “idea” at all on Empiricist
grounds. Thus
the Empiricist cannot adopt this view.
B) If shape is something that we see
(perceive), then the (real) shape of the fork is the set of all the perceptions
of the shape of the fork and we do change it merely by changing our angle of
viewing.
Therefore, according to this test
provided by Locke, “shape” is not a primary property, but rather secondary
property.
But recall Locke offers as second test,
that is, whether the property can be accessed by more than one sense or not.
Locke claims that shape is primary
because one can access shape visually and tactilely.
However, this is a
dubious claim at best. On 7 July 1688
the Irish scientist and politician, William Molyneux (1656–1698), sent a letter
to John Locke in which he put forward a problem. The question Molyneux asked was whether a
man, who has been born blind but who had learned to distinguish globes and
cubes etc. by touch, would be able to distinguish these objects simply by
sight, once he had been enabled to see.
Berkeley claims the answer to that
question is definitely “no.” One does
NOT access one and the same property by two distinct senses. Rather one accesses visual shape visually and
tactile
shape tactilely and then
one’s mind correlates the two streams of data, learning through constant
conjunction that objects which look like “this” feel like “that.” (Example: if
a bind person who came to learn cube-shape by touch were later given sight,
could he recognize the cube by sight alone? No, says Berkeley, he would need to
touch the cube is he looking at first to make to coordination.)
Ironically, what we commonly call
“shape” as Locke understands it, is really MORE mind
dependent then visual shape and tactile shape since it is constructed from
these latter by mind.
Therefore, according to Berkeley, there
are NO primary (perception independent) properties. But that means all
properties are secondary properties (perception dependent), and thus
tell us nothing about this “physical substance.”
• Note: Besides, as
Berkeley notes, how can an idea/perception be “like” something that is not that
is not other idea/perception anyway? In
what way can a conscious experience be “like” was is
not conscious experience? Locke claim
that primary properties as they exist in our perception directly “resemble” the
properties as they exist in the object.
But what could this mean?
So while the “real” apple did not have
the properties of red or sweet, according to Locke, at least we can know that
the real apple is round and solid.
However, if ALL properties are secondary properties, then we cannot know
that the “real apple” is round or solid!
But then the “real apple” become a
complete mystery to us.
In fact, the very idea of an aspect of
reality beyond our own direct aquatiance with our own perceptions or “the
mental” is nearly, literally, inconceivable.
2.
Attacks Locke’s notion of “physical
substance”
All this lead
Berkeley to conclude that “physical substance” is a totally unknowable,
mysterious and thus incoherent thing. We can literally know NOTHING about
it. Further physical substance is non‑empirical
“idea” since even Locke admits were never experience
it directly.
§ 19. But,
though we might possibly have all our sensations without them (supposed
physical objects), yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain
the manner of their production (our sensations), by supposing external bodies
in their likeness rather than otherwise, and so it might be at least probable
there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds.
Here Berkeley is acknowledging the
initial appeal of Locke’s theory. While,
strictly speaking, extra-mental objects may not be necessary to account for
mental experience (Think of Descartes’ Dream Argument here.), isn’t it easier
to explain our perception on the presumption of extra-mental objects? Berkeley, responds, “Not at all.”
But neither can this be
said, for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their
own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since
they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon
spirit, or how it is possible it shou'd imprint any
idea in the mind.
This is another instance of the “interaction”
problem that faces by anyone who suggests that mind and body are different
substance which, nevertheless, interact.
How can non-mind affect mind?
Further, how can “mental properties” resemble “non-mental
properties?” But even more so, what sort
of interaction could the interaction between mind and body be? It could not be a non-physical mental
interaction (since it involves the non-mental/ physical bodies) and it could
not be a non-mental/physical interaction (since it involves then non-physical
mind).
Hence it is evident the
production of ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason why we shou'd suppose matter or corporeal substances, since that
is acknowleg'd to remain equally inexplicable with,
or without this supposition.
If therefore it were
possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must
needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason
at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and
serve to no manner of purpose.
§ 20. In short, though
there were external bodies, 'tis impossible we shou'd
ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same
reasons to think there were that we have now.
Thus, these mysterious “physical
objects” seem neither necessary nor sufficient to account for our mental
experiences. There supposition seems to
be quite beside the point.
Suppose, what no one can deny
possible, (that there could be) an intelligence without the help of external
bodies to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are,
imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind.
I ask whether that
intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal
substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you
can possibly have for believing the same thing?
Of this there can be no
question, which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person,
suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for
the existence of bodies without the mind.
Sum up on Physical Substance
• Since it is totally mysterious.
• Since it is anti-empirical.
• Since it is of no practical/explanatory
use…
Get rid of it!
Thus Berkeley advocates Idealism
Idealism: the only things that exist are ideas, mental objects, and
the minds that perceive them
Locke was a dualist ‑ believes in
two substances mental & physical, Berkeley is a monist[1] ‑ believes
that only one kind of stuff; mental substance
When one speaks of objects and their
qualities, all one is talking about or referring to are past, present, future
or imagined experiences. “Objects” are only what one has seen, is
seeing, will see or would have seen, heard, felt, tasted etc. The world appears the same, indeed the world
“appears” exactly as it “is,” but the metaphysical basis for everything
changes. Since all properties
are perception dependent, Esse est percipi ‑ To be is to be perceived.
Since all properties as perception
dependent, Esse est percipi ‑
To be is to be perceived.
Locke was a dualist ‑ believes in two substances mental & physical, but
Berkeley points out that he runs into the same problems with interaction as
Descartes did. Berkeley is a monist,
that is, he believes that there is only one kind of stuff, mental substance.
But Berkeley is an
Monist Idealist
– (Note:
Materialism/ Physicalism is another kind of monism which contends that there is
only one kind of stuff; material substance.)
But wait…
Now, one might object that the wall of
the classroom is “real and physical, and not just an “idea.” After all, I can’t walk through the
wall. Doesn’t that prove that it is not
just an “idea?”
Not at all according to Berkeley. Of course you cannot
walk through the wall. Why? Because it is SOLID. But what does “solid” MEAN? What one has felt, is feeling, will feel or
would have felt. In other word, “solid”
refers to ideas/ perceptions and nothing else.
English essayist Samuel Johnson
proposes a refutation…
After we came out of the church, we
stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry
to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I
observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is
impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson
answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it -- "I refute it thus."[2]
But of course, this is no refutation
whatsoever. It merely shows to
demonstrate that that Johnson did not fully understand the implications of
Berkeley’s epistemology.
3.
Attacks Locke’s causal theory of
perception
Thus it is not the case mysterious
“objects,” whose properties we cannot know “cause” our ideas in ways we could
never explain, and which could not “resemble” these object even if they did
exist. Rather reality is exactly as it
appears to be and therefore perfectly knowable.
• § 38. But after all, say
you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does
so; the word "idea" not being used in
common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible
qualities which are called
"things"; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the
familiar use of language will seem harsh
and ridiculous.
• But this doth not concern
the truth of the proposition, which in
other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive
immediately by our senses.
• § 39. If it be demanded
why I make use of the word "idea," and do not rather in
compliance with custom call them
"thing"; I answer, I do it for two reasons-first, because the term "thing" in
contradistinction to "idea," is generally supposed to denote
somewhat existing without the mind;
secondly, because "thing" hath a more comprehensive signification than "idea,"
including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas.
• Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in
the mind, and are withal thoughtless and
inactive, I chose to mark them by the word "idea," which
implies those properties.
Problems for Berkeley:
Yet the world seems to exist even when unperceived.
You light a candle, go out of the room
for a while and when you come back the candle has burned down.
You go on vacation and forget to have
someone water your plants; when you get back all the plants are dead.
While Locke might have contended that
if a tree falls in the woods and there is no one there to hear it, it doesn’t
not make a sound, he would not deny that the tree
still exists, even when unperceived.
This is because he would say that the physical substance exists
unperceived, possessing primary properties.
But Berkeley insists that this is a
bankrupt theory, incoherent with the tenets of empiricism. There are no primary properties, and we
cannot have knowledge of extra-mental physical substance which would not
explain anything even if some such thing did exist. Thus things cannot
exist unperceived, since to exist at all is to exist as an object of
(someone’s) perception.
Problem:
There was a young man who said
"God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the
quad."
Locke would explain this phenomenon by appealing
to physical substance and primary properties, but Berkeley thinks he has shown
that avenue of explanation to be conceptually bankrupt. All properties occur only in a mind. There are no mind-independent “ideas.”
Berkeley reasons that these phenomena
(the persistence of “objects” when no (finite) mind perceives them) constitute
evidence that SOME (infinite) mind must be perceiving the
world at all times and at all places even when (finite) human mind do
not.
Therefore, experience gives us reason
to suppose that the is some infinite Mind.- i.e. God
Reply:
"Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully,
God.” J
Therefore, experience gives us reason
to suppose that there is some infinite Mind.- i.e.
God If one is going to be a good
Empiricist then one has to hold that physical substance is an incoherent. The endurance of the world then is evidence
of God.