Social Hedonism/ Ulilitarianism

The Jeremy Bentham Version- Act-Utilitarianism

Seven Aspects to a Pleasure

Intuitive Aspects of Act Utilitarianism

Problems with Act-Utilitarianism (Practical and Theoretical)

Problems with Act-Utilitarianism: Responses

John Stuart Mill’s Version - Rule Utilitarianism

Rights to Personal Autonomy: Mill Against Paternalism

Godless Morality

“Mill’s Heresy” Qualitative vs. Quantitative Hedonism

<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">Social Hedonism/Utilitarianism

Note: “Egoistic Hedonism” is considered unsatisfactory as a moral theory because it explicitly rejects what many call the "Moral Point of View" – Moral action requires that one treats others and oneself equally.

The Moral Point of View – Moral action requires that one treat others (and their interests) and oneself (and one’s own interests) equally.

Being moral is NOT merely being prudent (as Egoism implies), but to (sometimes) sacrifice one’s own best interest for the welfare of another.

As a correction to Egoistic Hedonism of Epicurus, other Philosophers (e.g. Bentham, Mill et al.) propose Social Hedonism or “Utilitarianism,” the central tenant of which is the Principle of Utility.

Principle of Utility: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest good for the greatest number (of … people?).[1]

Note: there is a minor difference between Social Hedonism and Utilitarianism. Specifically:

Utilitarianism: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest GOOD for the greatest number (of people?). (Here “good” is not specified and may include other things besides pleasure. English philosopher G. E. Moore (1873 – 1958) was this sort of Utilitarian.)

Social Hedonism: An action is right if and only if it results in the greatest pleasure for the greatest number (of people?). (Here “good” is specified as pleasure. J. Bentham and J.S. Mill were this sort of Utilitarian.)

Were you to go on to take another course, perhaps an upper division course in ethics, this distinction might be important. But for our purposes, the only Utilitarians we are going to be looking at are social hedonists. So, I will treat these terms, utilitarianism and social hedonism, as synonymous for the purposes of our class.

Morality requires that one value everyone’s welfare, not just one’s own. Utilitarianism implies it may be morally necessary to sacrifice one’s own self interest for the good of others in some circumstances. Social Hedonism/Utilitarianism suggests a cost/benefits analysis where pleasure/pain is the "coin of the realm.” The right course of action among available alternatives is whichever one nets the greatest amount of pleasure.

Most famous advocates:

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

The Jeremy Bentham Version- Act-Utilitarianism

Imagine I have been invited over my neighbor’s for dinner this weekend and I am trying to decide if I ought to go or not. I consider that if I go, she’s not a very good cook and her kids get on my nerves. On the other hand, there is a season of Star Trek Voyager I’ve been wanting to binge watch. I could binge watch it if I stay home. I reason:

	Person Affected by my action	I go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s	I do not go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s
	Me	-2	+2

Now, an egoistic hedonist (Epicurus) would be done. I only have to consider how much pleasure an action would bring me and weigh it against alternative actions.

But the Utilitarian would say, wait, wait, wait, You can’t just consider yourself. You need to consider others affected as well. I must therefore consider my neighbor.

	Person Affected by my action	I go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s	I do not go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s
	Me	-2	+2
	Neighbor	+1	-1
Net Value		-1	+1

Ok. But look, I still create more “net” pleasure by staying home and binge watching. (yeah!). Therefore this is the moral thing to do (i.e. the right thing to do) since this action results in the greatest (net) pleasure.

Ah… but there is also my wife to consider. She enjoys my neighbor’s company, if not her cooking, and the thought of me lying around watching a silly science fiction T.V. series for hours will annoy her so…

	Person Affected by my action	I go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s	I do not go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s
	Me	-2	+2
	Neighbor	+1	-1
	My wife	+1	-1
Net Value		0	0

Ok. But look now. I create no more “net” pleasure by staying home than by going. Both actions are of equivalent value and thus morally equal. It does not matter which I choose. Therefore, it is moral for me to do either since I am not creating any more “pleasure” by going than I would by staying home. (So can you guess which one I’m going to do?)

Ah… but there are also those annoying children. For whatever reason, they enjoy having me over. So the final tally looks like this.

	Person Affected by my action	I go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s	I do not go to Dinner at the Neighbor’s
	Me	-2	+2
	Neighbor	+1	-1
	My wife	+1	-1
	Neighbor’s Children	+2	0
Net Value		+2	0

Thus “going” creates more pleasure than “not going.” I am morally compelled, by the principle of utility, to go and eat my neighbor’s lousy food and put up with her annoying children. While morality does not always require I sacrifice my own happiness for the sake of others, there are circumstances where it does, according to Utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism is, in one way, the most idealistic of all ethical theories: it takes for granted that people will be motivated to work for the general good.

This was the ethical theory which inspired the reform movements in the newly industrialized countries of Europe during the nineteenth century. Utilitarian thinking helped bring about and justify the welfare state. (Karl Marx's political theory was a reaction to the same social inequities.) This is also the principle behind decriminalizing “victimless crimes.” If I am not hurting anyone by what I’m doing, what sense does it make to hurt/ punish me for it?

In law and legal reasoning this is known as the “Principle of Harm.”

Aspects of a Pleasure to Consider

Since SO much depends upon correctly estimating the magnitude of the resulting pleasure, Bentham gives some pointers on what to consider.

Seven Aspects to a Pleasure:

1. Intensity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how acute, extreme or potent the pleasure is. The more intense, the greater its value all other things being equal.

2. Duration:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how long the pleasure lasts. The longer it lasts, the greater its value all other things being equal.

3. Purity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether or not the pleasure is mixed with any aggravation. The purer the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

4. Surety:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates the risk involved in the pleasure. The more certain one is of the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

5. Propinquity (Nearness):

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether the pleasure is close at hand or not. The more near at hand the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

6. Fecundity:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates whether or not the pleasure is likely to give rise to other, further pleasures in the future. The more fecund the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.[i]

7. Scope:

The aspect of pleasure one is considering according to Bentham, when one estimates how many others are affected by the action. The greater the scope of the pleasure, the greater its value all other things being equal.

Note that each of these aspects of a pleasure that Bentham points out has to do with quantity. In every case the more pleasure the better, the less pleasure the lower the value. Indeed, Bentham was what's called a quantitative hedonist. Between any two pleasures if they differ in value it was only because they differed in quantity. As we shall see, John Stuart Mill was a qualitative hedonist suggesting that two pleasures can differ in quality as well as in quantity. But we'll get to that later.

Certain Intuitive Aspects of Act Utilitarianism

The idea of Utilitarianism does capture how we try to reason morally at least sometimes:

Imagine that a physician gives a heart transplant to Annie instead of Bill and tells us he did so because Annie is a 30 year-old single mother of 3 and their sole means of support while Bill is a 55 year-old bachelor. He reasons that more good/happiness/pleasure is likely to come from giving the heart to the younger patient with dependent children. Even if we ultimately disagree with him, we can see his point. He is citing relevant moral reasons.

By contrast if he had said, “Well of course I gave it to Annie because I always go alphabetically.” that would strike us as weird and irrelevant. The fact that Annie’s name comes first alphabetically is morally irrelevant in a way that the amount of happiness that would result from giving her the heart does not.

So pleasure/consequences do seem to play SOME role in moral thinking. But... does it play EVERY role? Perhaps not.

Problems with Act-Utilitarianism (Practical and Theoretical)

Practical Problems:

Note: A Practical Problem is an objection to a theory which claims that whether or not the theory is true, the theory is problematic because it can't be used.

1. Estimating Values: (Seems impossible to put numbers on things like family, health, reputation)

Here the objection is that we could never be so course as to assign numbers to intangible human values of the sort as family, friends, marriage, reputation, health or career. But is we can’t assign numbers, we, literally, can’t do the math. We therefore cannot use the theory to guide our actions (tell us what we ought to do).

2. Predicting Consequences: This objection maintains that we cannot know the future consequences of our actions, nor can we predict them with the needed accuracy or rapidity to make all the moral decisions that confront us relentlessly. Therefore this theory cannot be used because we cannot estimate resulting pleasures or pains.

Again, if we cannot know the consequences, we cannot use the theory.

Theoretical Problems:

Note: A Theoretical Problem is an objection to a theory which claims that whether the theory can be used or not, the theory is problematic because it isn't true (complete, accurate, etc.).

1. "Is X (e.g. murder, lying, cheating, stealing) wrong?" Act-Utilitarianism can’t say anything more than, “Depends.”

If slavery benefits more people than it harms it is moral. This is not merely the position that “the ends justify the means.” In that case, "means" matter, they are morally relevant, so much so that they stand in need of justification. But according to Utilitarianism, “means” don't matter at all. So, the morality of cheating, stealing, murdering, all "depend" on the consequences in any particular situation, according to this moral theory. Further, if two courses of action result in the same amount of pleasure, but one requires theft, lying and murder while the other did not, neither course of action would be morally preferable according to Utilitarianism since it is only interested in “the bottom line.”

So if the two courses of action have the same pleasure outcome, they are equivalent on Act-Utilitarian grounds even is one requires lying, cheating and murder and the other does not.

Action A	Action B
Lies	No Lies
Cheating	No Cheating
Murder	No Murder
+10	+10
Courses of actions are equivalent.

2. Diametrically opposed to "rights."

Rights seem best to be understood as a check on Utilitarian Advances. Notice that my “right to property” is another way of claiming that, no matter what noble ends you have in mind (helping the poor, feeding the hungry, educating children) you are morally prohibited from taking my stuff without my permission. Likewise with rights to life or liberty. Rights are thought to hold whether good (immediate) consequences result or not, and in fact do the most work in precisely those situations in which rights violations are an expedient means to good consequences.

The theoretical objections above are meant to show that Utilitarianism is counter-intuitive. Still, pointing out that a theory has weird results is not the same thing as proving it false. Furthermore, it can be said on Utilitarianism’s behalf that it is the job a moral theories to correct mistaken intuitions.

Problems with Act-Utilitarianism: Responses

To the Practical Problems:

We already do assign numbers in civil court proceedings.

Now the claim that we could never assign numbers to such human intangibles such as career, reputation, health, etc., is a weak objection when it's pointed out that we do precisely this in civil court proceedings. Now this is not easy and it can be somewhat awkward. But it's not as if the jury or judge are throwing darts at a board. Presumably they take into account a number of factors to arrive at what would be reasonable compensatory damages.

Maybe we should only hold people responsible for the consequences that they can reasonably foresee.

While it is true that I cannot know with the far distant consequences of my actions are, I can be relatively certain about the immediate consequences of my actions, at least in most cases. Therefore, one might respond that I should be held responsible for the consequences I could reasonably foresee whereas I need not be held responsible for consequences I could not reasonably foresee.[2]

To Theoretical Problems:

1. Calling a theory weird is not a critical response.

2. Reform the Theory

John Stuart Mill’s Version - Rule Utilitarianism:

John Stuart Mill attempts to refine Utilitarianism in a way that deals with the aforementioned problems. Mill accepts the idea that calculating every decision according to such criteria is a practical impossibility on a day to day basis. What ethics needs to provide then, are general action guiding rules. He uses the logic of Utilitarianism to provide us with good, action guiding (moral) rules.

Rule Utilitarianism: A moral theory which states that a moral rule is correct if and only if, following the moral rule, generally, results in the greatest good for the greatest number. And an act is moral if and only if it accords with a correct moral rule.

According to this view, the right act for a person to do is the one which conforms to the (right) moral code of the community; the right code for the community to adopt is the one which, when adhered to by all, will best promote the general good.

Because of the practical limitations on pleasure assessment, personal bias, efficiency and time constrains of moral decision making and consequence predictions, etc., morality must be about general action-guiding directives (rules of thumb- policies) rather than individual act assessments.

Therefore the moral question cannot (for practical reasons) be “What action in this particular case will produce the greatest pleasure?” but rather “Generally, what actions produce the greatest pleasure?”

Rule-utilitarianism was devised to cope with cases in which it appeared that applying the utilitarian standard directly to practical situations would lead us to contradict the traditional code of morality which enjoys strong intuitive support.

This version (Rule Utilitarianism) does address some of the objections raised against Act Utilitarianism:

PO1: As we move to the question of “General Good/ Happiness” the calculations can be more rough and estimated.

PO2: Again, since we are no longer concerned with predicting individual causal chains linked to individual actions, the business of evaluating the utility of a policy is more manageable and less speculative. (See marketing, economics, sociology, city engineering, etc.)

TO1: Mill has a means of justifying such intuitive moral claims as “Lying is wrong.” “Cheating is wrong.” “Murder is wrong.” etc. independently of knowing the individual consequences of individual actions. In this way, he could reasonably claim that his theory confirms our most basic moral intuitions, rather than contradicts them. Mill believe that Rule Utilitarianism yielded results that were in conformity with Christian Ethics and traditional ethics generally.

TO2: Further, Rule Utilitarianism provided Mill with a way of trying to justify rights, moral duties and a “Liberal Society.”

Note: It's obvious enough that a theory which attempts to base morality on the general good must also answer the question about what the “good” is.

Rights to Personal Autonomy: Mill Against Paternalism

Mill argues against Paternalism in 'On Liberty"

Paternalism: Refers to those laws or other prohibitions imposed on persons which constitute a limit on an individual's personal freedom for his or her own good.

Mill argues that the government (and society in general) should stay out of an individual’s private (self-regarding) affairs. He acknowledges that we ought to encourage character development, but not through punitive regulation. Mill is thus seen as an early proponent of a “Liberal Society,” that is, a society where government stays out of our private affairs as much as possible, (That government is best which governs least[3].) Government ought only limit our individual freedom when our exercise of that freedom impinges on the freedom of another.

But note: The ONLY thing which justifies the rights of the individual according to Mill, is Utility. That is, generally speaking, it is an empirical fact that society or government micro-managing the private affairs of individuals is a less efficient means to general happiness than letting people pursue happiness privately unmolested by government.

However, if this is the ONLY justification of rights, then in principle, should government develop more efficient methods or regulating the private lives of citizens[4], it would be justified in taking more intrusive action. Mill would have probably disapproved, even under these circumstances. However, it is unclear what philosophical objections his system would present.

Godless Morality

According to Mill, our knowledge of moral values and moral obligations is based upon experience, the experience of ordinary people. This appeal to human desires and preferences, rather than to Reason (Rational/ Moral Structure of the Universe) or Nature (teleology) or the Will of God earned utilitarianism the reputation of being a "godless" doctrine.

“Mill’s Heresy”

Mill departed from Bentham's doctrine that all pleasures were of equal quality (Push Pin was as Good as Poetry) by saying that some kinds of pleasure are intrinsically better than others.

Unlike Bentham who was a “Quantitative Hedonist” Mill was a “Qualitative Hedonist.”

Quantitative Hedonist: one who holds that the only value difference between two pleasures is amount. (Bentham)

Qualitative Hedonist: one who hold that two pleasures of equal quantity may differ with respect to value based on their respective qualities. (Mill)

Mill’s Utilitarianism was accused of being a “swinish doctrine” since it only appeals to pleasure. Mill counters that this would only be the case if we imagined humans capable only of swinish pleasures. But humans can experience more that those, and these latter are superior.

How can we know which pleasures are superior to which? Experience, says Mill, specifically, by consulting the feelings and preferences of people who have a wide experience of life.

“Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.”

Mill would urge us to acquiesce to the judgements of “pleasure-assessors” to decide on the moral desirability of various pleasures. Ask those who are familiar with both which they prefer.

Mill claims that experience demonstrates that Mental Pleasures are judged more satisfying than mere Physical Pleasures by those well acquainted with both. Thus, we have empirical reason to believe that mental pleasures are of a superior quality (for humans at least) than physical pleasures.

Thus, says Mill:

It is better to be human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.

It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

In both cases, the “dissatisfied” party is, nevertheless, enjoying better qualities of pleasure and thus a better quality of life than the intellectual inferior.

Note: This is termed “Mill’s Heresy because to claim that two pleasures of equal quantity may nevertheless differ in value seems to presuppose a standard of evaluation (a “good-making quality) other then pleasure. Thus it seems to contradict Hedonism.

Note: He is stacking the deck since the only persons qualified to judge on his terms are going to be those who have developed (distorted?) pleasure tastes. This is why he is accused of being an elitist who sanctifies the preferences of upper-middle class middle-aged European white men.

Further, this smacks of Aristotelian Virtue. The Happy Life (meaning “State”) verses momentary satisfaction. I am unconvinced Mill can defend this view on purely Hedonistic grounds.

One can devise examples which would have been embarrassing to Mill, e.g., "Which is better, gay sex or straight sex?" The jurors would have to be persons who had experienced both, and enjoyed both, if they were to be able to tell us which is morally preferable.

[1] A former colleague of mine, Dr. Kenneth Henley, would always stress when teaching Utilitarianism that the Principle of Utility was largely a slogan that supporters of Jeremy Bentham popularized, but that Bentham never actually used. Further, as a principle it contains two unbounded variables which means it is imprecise. So, while the slogan does indeed convey the general idea, it does not survive close scrutiny. Greater precision is required and fortunately both Bentham and John Stuart Mill gave just such greater precision to their moral systems.

[2] This is by no means a problem free move on the part of the act utilitarian however because notice they have left the criterion of evaluating actions solely based on consequences and added a new criterion that is the intention of the moral agent.