Why act morally?
Some claim it is an improper question.
Either one can give a moral reason (One should
do what is right simply because it is right.”), but that doesn’t really satisfy
anyone except the person who has already chosen to act morally. So this “answer” is merely preaching to the
converted.
Or one can give a non-moral (prudential) reason,
(One should do what is right because it is one’s own best interest.) in which case one has not really given a
reason to act morally (from moral motivations), but only to appear moral for
the prudential rewards.
Think of the
Calvin and Hobbes cartoon, where Calvin is worried that he has “done the right
thing” (been a good boy all year long), but for questionable reasons
(because wanted Santa to bring him lots
of presents). Calvin is worried that,
given that his motivation was self-interest and not “moral” his resulting
actions lacked moral worth and thus would not be considered moral by Santa
either. (And therefore Santa would bring
him squat and he wasted the year.)
Kant (et al.) held that morality was autonomous -- not based upon anything
outside, or other than itself. To
attempt to found morality on something else, self-interest, or the general
good, for instance, is to distort the very nature of morality, say the
deontologists.
H. A. Prichard (1871-1947) and W. D. Ross
(1877-1971) developed deontological views as a basis for criticizing
utilitarianism.
Like Kant, they see morality as a questions of
doing one’s duty. Unlike Kant. They see these
duties as arising out of our personal
relationships and our social position: duties of children to parents and
parents to children; duties to our friends, students, fellow-citizens, spouses,
teachers, clients, business partners, patients, creditors, employees, etc. etc.
How can we know what our duty is?
Kant argues that we know our duty simply by using
our practical reason. In so doing we
come to the Categorical Imperative.
But there are problems with Kant’s account of
Ethics. One chief one is that it leads
to Real (Strong) Moral Dilemmas
A Real Moral Dilemma is one in which there is no morally correct resolution. No matter
what one does, one has done something wrong. (This is to be distinguished from
apparent moral dilemmas which are simply situations in which determining the
morally correct thing to do is difficult, but there is a right thing to do.)
For Kant, since ALL DUTIES are absolute, one can
frequently find oneself in situations where one ought to two things, but one
cannot do both of those two things. (e.g. Honor the promise to meet one’s
friend for lunch and save a drowning child one happens to see on the way to
lunch.) There is no correct resolution since no matter what one does, one would
violate the Categorical Imperative. Now,
a moral theory that results in frequent real (strong) moral dilemmas has got to
have something wrong with it. It’s impractical, especially if you think the
whole point of a moral theory is to tell us what we ought to do (action
guiding). But it also suggests theoretical
problems as well because most have a strong intuition that a correct moral
theory would always direct action.
3 Objections to Real (strong) Moral Dilemmas:
1. Logical:
“Ought” implies “can.” Therefore, there is no
such thing as an impossible obligation. Any moral theory which says otherwise
is false.
2. Intuitive Moral:
We readily "see" that not all
obligations are equal serious or binding.
Any moral theory which says otherwise is false.
3. Practical:
Morality is about providing action guiding
behavior. A moral theory which allows for the possibility/actuality of real
moral dilemmas is one which cannot guide actions (in those situations at least)
and is therefore flawed.
H. A. Prichard (1871-1947) and W. D. Ross
(1877-1971) developed deontological views as a basis for criticizing
Utilitarianism.
They stress the variety of duties each one of us
will have, arising out of our personal relationships and our social position:
duties of children to parents and parents to children; duties to our friends,
students, fellow-citizens, spouses, teachers, clients, business partners,
patients, creditors, employees, etc. etc.
Ross attempts to resolve the problem of Real
(strong) Moral Dilemmas while retaining a deontological ethic.
Ross barrows a term from Juris Prudence: “Prima
Facie Duty”
Note: A prima facie
duty is a moral obligation which is initially binding. However, it is not an
Absolute duty. That is, while we are obligated to satisfy that duty prima
facie, it can be overridden (by a stronger obligation)
How can we know what our duty is?
While Kant argues that we know our duty simply by
using our practical reason, in contrast, Prichard and Ross claim that know our
duty by intuition.
Intuitionism: The
position that holds that some things can be known and even justified by appeals
to one’s "intuition."
Because of the answer that Prichard and Ross gave
to the question of the epistemology of morals, their theory was known as deontological
intuitionism.
Prima Facie Duties
Ross claims that we intuitively perceive our
duties and these are the basis for our moral judgments.
Moral Judgements: A Three Step
Process:
1. recognize morally relevant factors (via intuition)
2. recognize our prima facie duties (via intuition)
3. arrive at a judgement about our duty proper (via intuition)
The strength of the theory advanced by Prichard
and Ross is that it is true to experience:
this is what it feels like to
go through the process of deciding what to do.
In situation
where we have competing but mutually exclusive prima facie duties, our
ultimate, actual duty is whichever one is strongest.
For example,
if my wife asks me whether I think she the dress she bought makes her look fat,
I have a prima facie duty to be truthful. However, if it does make her look fat
and if I run the risk hurting her feelings by being truthful, my greater
obligation is to avoid hurting her (beneficence). While both are duties prima
facie, my actual duty is whichever is stronger. (Guess which one I see
a more important. Hint: I’ve been married for years.)
Ross lists
the following seven foundational prima facie duties:
1.
promise keeping
2.
reparation for harm done
3.
gratitude
4.
justice
5.
beneficence
6.
self-improvement
7.
non-maleficence.
W. D. Ross is a pluralist who recognizes four
things as being intrinsically good:
1. Virtue
2. Pleasure
3. the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous
4. knowledge (and in a less degree right opinion)
5 points of clarification:
1. Moral principles emphasizes the personal
character of duty (based on what one actually deserves), unlike utilitarianism
which pursues general happiness with minimal consideration of which specific
individuals benefit. For instance I might have a greater duty to care for my
mother than other women due to my duty of gratitude to her personally. Likewise,
I might have no duty to seek the well-being of a child molester due to his
personal conduct and character. (This was Kant’s criticism of Utilitarianism.)
2. In fulfilling our duty our motives do not
matter. (Notice the stark contrast with Kant on this point.)
3. He acknowledges that the list of duties he
offers is not complete, but claims that it is essentially correct.
4. There is no single method to calculate which
of our various prima facie duties at a given time is our actual duty. While
these duties are of unequal weight and hierarchical, their relation to own
another is not fixed but differs in different contexts. Each move from relevant
prima facie duties to actual duty is a matter of individual judgement. There
can be no general trade-off principles.
5. Some duties are based specifically on the
intrinsic goodness of pleasure, (beneficence -regarding others and
self-improvement -regarding ourselves). Thus this is a deliberate attempt to
blend consequentialist and denotological thinking into a single coherent moral
theory. (Justice is founded on the intrinsic goodness of pleasure; the duty of
non-maleficence is based on minimizing intrinsic evils (such as unhappiness);
reparation is based on making up for harm which has been done. Gratitude is based
on beneficence which has been shown to us by others.
Two major problems:
1. the problem of conflicting duties
Some seem too close to call
We perceive our various prima facie duties by
means of a (self-evident) intuition; they cannot be logically deduced nor
argued. However, Ross is NOT a relativist. He claims that there are objectively
right and wrong resolutions to moral conflicts. Judgments regarding prima facie
duties and actual duties may be wrong even though sincerely made.
Near universal assent is best explained by the
existence of an objective truth which we come to knowledge.
But...
Even if this intuitionism is correct, so much the
worse for moral disputes; there is no rational way to settle such disputes, for
according to intuitionists, the beliefs are held for no publicly accessible
reason.
2. the challenge of cultural
relativism.
While moral intuitions are supposed to give us
insights into an unchanging universal moral law it must be pointed out there is
significant cultural divergence as to moral intuitions. For instance, many
raised in the Hindu culture have strong intuitions about the morally obligatory
practice of sutti. While others foreign to the culture have equally strong
intuitions about the practice being immoral.
Isn’t relativism as good, if not better, account
of how (conflicting) intuitions arise?