Aristotle suggests that
eudaimonia is the final end we all rightly seek. Eudaimonia is the result of realizing our
human nature. When we achieve the end
towards which we are naturally directed (full flowering of our human nature) we
will be excellent and happy. Utter
fulfillment.
See Aristotle’s Ethics
But Aquinas is critical of
Aristotle on this point.
1.
What we really
seek in not finite happiness, but rather infinite, indefinite happiness. (It's
not like I want to be happy for the next five years and after that I don't care
anymore.) Close attention reveals that what I truly
want is unending, unlimited ongoing happiness and fulfillment. So Aristotle's worldly are not the true end
we seek, not can his virtues cannot tell me how to achieve that, my true Summa
Bonum.
2.
Further, Aquinas
thought he could prove the existence of an all-powerful and all loving God. And for those who do not come to believe this
as a matter of philosophy there is also revelation. Thus both philosophy and faith direct us to seek
the happiness commensurate to God’s power and love. (Infinite- just what we wanted)
Baltimore Catechism No. 1
LESSON FIRST: ON THE END OF MAN
1. Q. Who made the world?
A. God made the world.
2. Q. Who is God?
A. God is the Creator of heaven and earth, and of all
things.
3. Q. What is man?
A. Man is a creature composed of body and soul, and
made to the image and likeness of God.
6. Q. Why did God make you?
A. God made me to know Him, to love Him, and to serve
Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in heaven.
3.
Thus for Aquinas,
our true end (telos) is in the knowledge, service and love of God and to be
united with him in the afterlife.
It is also worth
mentioning that Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s definition of Man (i.e. Man is the
Rational Animal) Thus the only
kind of eternal life man can have is as an animal/ body.
Ah! But that is precisely
the eternal life the Christianity promises.
And precisely what Christians are rightly to hope for, with God's
help. The eternal life promised by
Christianity is NOT one as a disembodied spirit (Plotinus’ assent of the soul),
but rather human existence as resurrected bodies, the same sort of existence
Christ is understood to enjoy now.
Aquinas says “Anima mea non est ego.”
And that this was anticipated, in a way, by the Pagan philosopher
Aristotle.[1] Hence Philosophy shows the necessity of the
resurrection of the body, just as promised by the Christian faith, for
everlasting human life.
Augustine and Aquinas on Hope
·
Augustine of
Hippo (Aurelius
Augustinus Hipponensis)
o (November 13, 354 AD –
August 28, 430 AD)
·
Christian Theologian and a "Father" of the Church
·
Both Catholic and Evangelical protestant traditions regard him as a
formative authority
Distinguishes among:
1.
things to be
enjoyed (make us blessed)
2.
things to be used
(sustain us as we move toward blessedness)
3.
things to be
enjoyed and used.
·
To enjoy
something is to cling to it with love for its own sake. (Not unlike the
concept of "Things of intrinsic value.")
·
To use something,
however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you love, provided that it is
worthy of love. (Not unlike "Things of Instrumental Value.")
·
An illicit use
(directed at an improper goal) should be called rather a waste or an abuse.
But we must be careful to
distinguish these and not to confuse them.
"If
we enjoy (and cling to with love) those things which should be used, our course
(to blessedness) will be impeded and sometimes deflected."
We are in danger, he says,
of being:
“shackled
by an inferior love”
Gives the metaphor of a
traveler making his way home.
“But if the amenities of the journey and the
motion of the vehicles itself delighted us, and we were led to enjoy those
things which we should use, we should not wish to end our journey quickly, and,
entangled in a perverse sweetness, we should be alienated from our country,
whose sweetness would make us, blessed.”
Mortal life must not
become “wandering from God”
The (only) thing(s) which
are to be (genuinely) enjoyed is/are God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, a single Trinity, (a certain supreme thing common to all who enjoy it)
Augustine notes:
"Between
temporal and eternal things there is this difference: a temporal thing is loved
more before we have it, and it begins to grow worthless when we gain it, for it
does not satisfy the soul, whose true and certain rest is eternity; but the
eternal is more ardently loved when it is acquired than when it is merely
desired.”
The end of the Law and of
all the sacred Scriptures (The Christian Religion) is the love of a Being which
is to be enjoyed. This is not dissimilar
to Plato cautioning us not the mistake the imitation of this world for the
really of the Forms. Further the only
proper response to the Forms is love, and an ardent love at that. For nothing less than they satisfies the soul
for Plato.
Note further that one
might add this is true of all things; they are to be only to be used and
only to be used as a mean to God- (e.g. Art/Beauty)
Augustine on Hope:
The Handbook on Faith,
Hope and Love
But
it is not only man's intellect which must be perfected with regard to his
supernatural end (the Virtue that covers that it Faith), his will also must tend
to that end, as a good possible of attainment. Now the virtue, by which the
will is so perfected, is the theological virtue of hope. It is commonly defined
as a Divinely infused virtue, by which we trust, with an unshaken confidence
grounded on the Divine assistance, to attain life everlasting.
So Hope is a virtue of the
will. It is what enables us to “tend
towards our proper end.”
I
see that it is necessary for me to make here an additional remark, that we are
saved by hope. "But hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man sees,
why does he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with
patience wait for it." Romans 8:24-25
St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225 1274)
·
Influenced by the
philosophy of Aristotle (384 322 B.C.), he modifies Plato's Influence on
Christian thinkers.
·
Aristotle had
spoken of virtues.
·
Aquinas
“corrects” Aristotle's concept of Eudemonia
The influence of Plato on
Augustine and the formation of early Christian doctrine is clear. This influences together with the early
Church’s rejection of Roman sensuality and lasciviousness, lead to an
atmosphere very unfriendly to “the body.”
Plato had taught that we are NOT bodies essentially but rather we are
spirits who for a time are embody. What
is really real is the immaterial (we might say, the heavenly) and that is what
should occupy our attention. The world
of sense only serves us if is acts as a vehicle to getting at and to the immaterial
realm. (Recall Augustine’s metaphor of
the journey.) We must be careful not to
let it become a source of intellectual distraction and error, or a source of
moral temptation and sin. Plato claimed
our highest duty was the care of our immortal souls, and as immoral action
weakens our souls, it is better to suffer an injustice than to do an injustice.
We have seen that
Augustine retains much of this. Note how
he counsels us not to “love” that which should merely be used. Augustine, like Plato before him and the
tradition of Neo-Platonism saw the body as the prison of the soul. Our physical existence was a time for
learning and working and it is unwise to dwell on the bodily, but rather to
seek mastery over the body and ultimately discard it utterly at the point of
death.
The fully body of
scientific and philosophical works of Aristotle were unknown to Western Europe
until Latin translations of Arabic scholars reintroduced Aristotelian
philosophy to Western culture at the time of the Crusades. They were commented on by St. Albert (1193/1206
– 1280) who recognize the value Aristotle’s teaching and methodology could have
for Christian theology. Albert’s great
student St. Thomas Aquinas fully reconciles Aristotelian Philosophy with the
already developed Neo-Platonist influenced Christian world view. Some have suggested that by the late Middle
Ages, the other-worldly Neo-Platonism which had reigned for nearly 1000 years,
had become somewhat tired.
The Theological Virtue: Hope
Three Theological Virtues
are Faith Hope and Love
1 Corinthians 13
(Charity…)
7
Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all
things.
8 Charity never faileth: but whether there be
prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease;
whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.
9 For we know in part, and we prophesy in
part.
10 But when that which is perfect is come,
then that which is in part shall be done away.
11 When I was a child, I spake as a child, I
understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put
away childish things.
12 For now we see through a glass, darkly; but
then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am
known.
13 And now abideth faith, hope, charity,
these three; but the greatest of these is charity.
God is the source
and object of the faith, hope, and love. According to Christianity, these are the Theological
Virtues. Unlike the “worldly virtues” of
Aristotle, we will never be able fully to comprehend the habitual dispositions
(virtues) that lead to us to God.
The dictionary definition
of hope is something like this:
"the
feeling that what is wanted can be had, or that events will turn out for the
best."
But, while related to
this, this is NOT what is meant by the spiritual disposition of Hope.
St. Thomas Aquinas define
hope as
"...a
future good, difficult but possible to attain...by means of the Divine
assistance...on Whose help it leans" (ST II-II, 17.1).
"a
movement or stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good."
One thinks of Robert Browning:
"Ah!
But a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a Heaven for?" [2]
The "highest"
good we hope for is not just everlasting happiness (in God’s presence) but the
total realization of our true nature.
Not the (by comparison) puny eudemonia of Aristotle, but a happiness
proportional to the greatness and goodness of an all-loving, all-powerful God,
a happiness we cannot even imagine.
This is worth quite a
stretch, indeed!
Further, Aquinas keeps the
basic teleological structure of Aristotle.
Once we establish the Summa Bonum, all other things (decisions, values,
etc.) fall into appropriate order. We
should not hope for anything other than this happiness. Once we place our eternal happiness as the
thing of intrinsic value holding up all the instrumental values, everything
else should fall into place.
But of course, as will all
habits, it will take time to develop.
Spiritual progress is marked as a greater and increasingly deeper
realization that our life with God (evidenced by a deepening knowledge, love
and service) is the best thing we can desire.
This is what will make us truly blessed (eu) in this world and the
next. To echo Augustine here, all other
things are to be “used;” God alone is to be loved.
Hope (habit by which we
long for our personal eternal salvation) may seem at first very
self-interested, even to the point of selfishness. But recall the Virtue of Charity requires
loving God which necessarily leads to loving God’s creation. This includes loving ourselves, of course,
but also loving our neighbor. Therefore there is a social dimension to the
virtue of Hope, whereby we long not only for our own salvation, but for that of
others.
The Catholic Catechism
teaches:
"Buoyed
up by hope, [an individual] is preserved from selfishness and led to the
happiness that flows from charity" (1818).
Hope then is a gift not
given just to enrich the individual who receives it. The virtue of Hope
encourages us to embrace a selfless love that reaches out to all of God’s
creatures.
The virtue of Hope can
only exist in beings who have not yet achieved the goal they seek. It is, thus, always concerned with something
in the future. Angels or souls already
with God in heaven have no need of Hope, for they enjoy God’s eternal life as
an ongoing reality. [3]
Similarly, the souls of
the damned have no Hope for exactly to opposite reason. Those condemned to Hell are aware of the fact
that their punishment is everlasting.
Because they cannot escape this state to attain happiness of any sort,
they have nothing to hope for. Recall
the inscription above the gates to hell in Dante’s Inferno:
“All
hope abandon ye who enter here.”
We have all heard the
expressions "to give up" or "to lose" hope. In ordinary contexts this means to believe
that some desired good thing is beyond our reach. Such a realization can be
disappointing, but usually, after a time, we are able to leave behind the pain
and disappointment. But when we speak
of the despair of the damned we see that the loss of theological Hope is a far
more grievous matter.
The habit of Hope leads
and encourages us to embrace this truth that we are not damned, not yet at
least. And that God’s fervent wish is
for our eternal happiness, a happiness that He can provide. No matter the state of our soul at the
moment, our salvation is possible as all things are possible with God.
St. Thomas:
"the true opinion of the intellect about
God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind and pardon to sinners...."
(II-II, 20.1).
Also, the Letter to the
Hebrews reminds us:
"Let
us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for he who promised
is faithful" (Heb. 10:23).
Still, we are weak and
fallen and thus prone to sin and error.
Our God-given freedom will always allow us to reject this hope. We may err with respect to hope in the ways
that Aristotle cautioned us about. By missing the virtue of “Golden Mean.”
Vice: Too little hope
·
Imagining that
God will not pardon us, even if we repent.
·
Believing that
God does not turn sinners to Himself by means of grace.
Result: Sin of despair
Vice: Too much
·
Imagining that
eternal life is a goal within one’s own unaided reach
·
Placing too
little value on God’s justice, imagining God’s mercy to be so great that one
need not repent for sins committed.
Result: Sin of Presumption
St. Paul offers an
antidote to these temptations, encouraging us to surrender to:
"The
Holy Spirit...He poured out upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so
that we might be justified by His grace and become heirs In hope of eternal
life" (Titus, 3:6).
Each of these vices/sins
are alike in that they result from a lack of moderation. They jeopardize attaining the hoped for end,
the summa bonum of a spiritual life.
Thus the virtue of Hope is
what enables us to have the audacity to see life with God as a possible, though
difficult to achieve, goal. The
Theological Virtues are the habits we use to attain eternal happiness. Hope is
a very practical virtue, the disposition of wayfarers: individuals on a
pilgrimage that will only end in heaven.
"[we]
ought always to pray and not lose heart" (Lk 18:1).
This is an assurance that
our Hope is not in vain. The heroes of hope, virtuous men and women of the
Bible, stand as examples of what the life of hope looks like and what are acts
of hope. So too the saints. Pope Pius XII, at the canonization of St. Maria
Goretti suggested that her unwavering hope for paradise after having been
fatally stabbed by her would-be rapists, was …
"(s)ustained by divine grace.
“Let
those who are in the happy days of youth learn not to waste their energies on
the transient empty pleasures of self-indulgence...Rather may they strive
vigorously to form their character in the way of Christian living, hard and
rough though the way may be. For this
perfection can indeed be attained through personal determination, helped by the
grace of God, prayer and perseverance.”
In this the pontiff sums
up the Theological Virtue of Hope:
1.
It is God’s gift
2.
Sustained by
God’s love.
3.
It is a way of
life
4.
Built on service
and prayer
5.
Not always be
easy to maintain virtuous hope (dangers of despair and presumption)
6.
Leads to an
everlasting goal God will enable us to grasp.
Aquinas on Hope:
Articles 1-8
Article 1. Whether hope is a virtue?
Considers objections to the
notion that hope is a virtue:
Objection
1. One can make ill use of hope, but man cannot make ill use of a virtue
Objection
2. Virtues do not result from merit, while hope, in part, results from merits.
Objection
3. “Virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing," but nothing that hopes (longs for what it lacks and cannot
provide) is perfect.
Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
I answer that…
According to the
Philosopher (Aristotle[4])
"the
virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise."
Now in all things measured
and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule. (i.e. for all things with prescribed end, the
good among that are those which achieves the prescribed end. Functional account of “good.” If a thing has a known form or essence, then
a good "think of its kind" is the one that realizes that form or
essence fully. Not my mom's Siamese
Cat.)
"thus
we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper
measurement."
Human acts have a twofold
measure;
1.
proximate and
homogeneous (the reason for the actions)
2.
remote and
excelling ( Summa Bonum- God)
The act of hope attains
God.
The object of hope is a
future good, difficult, but possible to obtain.
Now a thing is possible to
us in two ways
1.
by ourselves
2.
by means of
others
If we hope for anything as
being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God
Himself, on Whose help it leans.
"It is therefore evident that hope
is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule."
(I.e. Hope is a virtue
because if helps us get where we need to do.)
Reply to Objection 1
Man cannot make ill use of
hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which
attains to reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue.
Nevertheless, the hope of
which we speak now, is not a passion, but a habit of the mind.
Reply to Objection 2
The habit of hope, whereby
we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace
alone.
Reply to Objection 3
He who hopes is indeed
imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet
he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on
Whose help he leans.
Article 2. Whether eternal happiness is the proper
object of hope?
Objection
1.
Man
does not hope for that which surpasses the soul, but eternal happiness (the
wonder of God/ beatific visions) surpasses the soul (The Apostle says (1
Corinthians 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man."
(You
cannot hope for something you cannot understand. But none of us can understand the happiness
of being in the presence of God.
Therefore this cannot be something we hope for.)
Objection
2.
Prayer
is an expression of hope, for it is written (Psalm 36:5): "Commit thy way
to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it."
But
we pray for other things besides our salvation: for the goods, both temporal
and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer.
Objection
3.
The
object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal
happiness are difficult to man.
But…
On the contrary, The
Apostle says (Hebrews 6:19) that we have hope "which entereth in,"
i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into the
happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words.
Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
I answer that…
The hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good.
Now an effect must be
proportionate to its cause.
The good which we ought to
hope for from God is the infinite good (proportional to Divine power)
It consists in the enjoyment
of God Himself.
From Him for nothing less
than Himself
Reply to Objection 1
Eternal happiness does not
enter into the heart of man perfectly, but it is possible to be apprehended by
a man imperfectly.
"Hence
the Apostle says pointedly (Hebrews 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within
the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
"
Reply to Objection 2
Hope regards eternal
happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray to God, it regards secondarily
and as referred to eternal happiness.
Reply to Objection 3
Nothing else one might
hope for would appear arduous, as compared with that hope
Article 3. Whether one man may hope for another's
eternal happiness?
Objection
1.
It
would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness. The Apostle seems to do so
(Philippians
1:6): "Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good
work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ."
Objection
2.
Further,
whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring
others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one
another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for another's
eternal happiness.
Objection
3.
Further,
hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of
another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying
that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
also hope for another's eternal salvation.
But… Augustine also says
that "hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."
I answer that…
We can hope for something
in two ways:
1.
Absolutely: the
object of hope is arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes.
2.
Through something
else being presupposed: the object of hope can be something pertaining to
someone else.
Love and hope differ in
this:
Love denotes union between
lover and beloved
Hope denotes a movement
towards an arduous good.
Now union is of things
that are distinct.
Hope is always towards its
own term and regards directly one's own good
But if we presuppose the
union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another
man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's life,
inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of
charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the
same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
Article 4. Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Objection
1.
Yes:
Saints
Objection
2.
It
is a vice to fail to trust one's bother and sisters. Therefore is a virtue (one ought to)
"Hope" and trust in others.
Objection
3.
Prayer
is the expression of hope and it is proper to pray to saints.
On the contrary, It is
written (Jeremiah 17:5): "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
I answer that…
Hope, as stated above
regards two things:
1.
the good which it
intends to obtain (final cause)
2.
the help by which
that good is obtained. (efficient cause)
"Accordingly,
just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one's last
end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful
to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of
movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental
agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to
happiness. "
That is: it is proper to
hope in men/ Saints that they are the instruments of God.
Article 5. Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection
1
It
would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is
one that has God for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God but
also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a
theological virtue.
Objection
2
Further,
a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (I-II,
64, 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is
not a theological virtue.
Objection
3
Further,
expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since,
then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological,
but a moral virtue.
Objection
4
Further,
the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which
is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a
theological virtue.
But…
On the contrary, Hope is
enumerated (1 Corinthians 13) together with faith and charity, which are
theological virtues.
I answer that:
Since specific
differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under
what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its
character of virtue.
Now it has been stated
above (Article 1) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it
attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its
first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its
last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof.
Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God
for its object, as stated above (I-II, 62, 1), it is evident that hope is a
theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1
Whatever else hope expects
to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first
efficient cause, as stated above (Article 4).
Reply to Objection 2
In things measured and
ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond
the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency.
But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things
are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as
regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned
with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper
object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its
proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally
with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith
can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things
believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean
between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its
principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine
assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man
trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or
despairs of things of which he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3
The expectation which is
mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the
expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4
Magnanimity tends to
something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one's
power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other
hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained
by another's help, as stated above (Article 1).
Article 6. Whether hope is distinct from the other
theological virtues?
Objection
1
It
would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For
habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2). Now
the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore
hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection
2
Further,
in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: "I
expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come."
Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above (Article
5). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Objection
3
Further,
by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope
is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There
cannot be number without distinction.
Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory
says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that:
A virtue is said to be
theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may
adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because
something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God
for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope
and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things
accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment
of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source
whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells
us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive
perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance
for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1
God is the object of these
virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2).
Reply to Objection 2
Expectation is mentioned
in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but
because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further
on (7). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3
Hope makes us tend to God,
as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist:
whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our
affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
Article 7. Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection
1
It
would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Psalm 36:3, "Trust
in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to faith and
the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby we are
justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection
2
Further,
that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be
more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith (Hebrews 11:1):
"Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore hope
precedes faith.
Objection
3
Further,
hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:10):
"He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit." But
the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is
written (Matthew 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e. "Faith begot
hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that:
Absolutely speaking, faith
precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to
obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object
of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one
way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained
above (2; 6, ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we
come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose
the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Hebrews 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1
As the same gloss observes
further on, "hope" is called "the entrance" to faith, i.e.
of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or
we may reply that it is called the "entrance to faith," because
thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2
The thing to be hoped for
is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is
something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3
Hope does not precede
every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
Article 8. Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1
It
would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Luke 17:6, "If
you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity flows
from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity. Therefore
charity precedes hope.
Objection 2
Further,
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions and affections
proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope, considered as an act of
hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3
Further,
the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which
precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the order
of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The
Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from
a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e. "from hope,"
according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that:
Order is twofold. One is
the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect
precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect
of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect.
On respect of the first
order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all
movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above (I-II, 27, 4; I-II,
28, 6, ad 2; I-II, 40, 7) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect,
and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself,
as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves
his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its
own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what
he desires.
The first love of God
pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains
to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of
something for himself.
Hence in the order of
generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love God,
through fear of being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In
primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a
man through hoping to be rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey
His commandments. On the other hand, in
the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the
advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our
friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states (Objection 1) that charity
flows from hope: so that this suffices for the
Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2
Hope and every movement of
the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is
loved. But not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement
of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a
friend.
Reply to Objection 3
The Master is speaking of
living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by
charity.
[1] Well, actually no. It is not clear at all the Aristotle thought there was a personal immortality.
[2] From the poem “Andrea del Sarto”
[3] Note that Hope eventually passes away when we achieve the object of our hope. So too, Faith passes away when we see the object of our faith. In the end, it is love that remains.
[4]
Aristotle teaches that a Virtue is a habit that
contributes to success. Thus
"spotting" while doing multiple turn is a virtue of dance. Relaxing one's grip a bit when swinging a
club is a virtue of golfing. Carrying
one's weight on the balls of one's feet is a virtue of playing basketball.