Philosophy
of Mind (Intro)
What
is the “Mind?”
The
(Outright) Rejection of Dualism Itself:
Physicalism
Physcialism
is the metaphysical position that there is only one kind of substance (Monism) and that substance is physical. Alternatively, it is the view that the only
things which exist are physical objects and physical forces. It follows from this view then that either
minds are physical (objects, forces, or operations of physical objects and
forces) or they do not exist at all.
Philosophers of recent years—and nearly all
psychologists—have taken a dim view toward dualism in any form. They have sought a resolution the mind/body
problem consistent with physical.
Species
of Physicalist Accounts of Mind
5.
Functionalism:
The Mind and the Computer
7. Final
Notes
John
Watson (1879 – 1958) began what he called
behaviorism.
Best-known behaviorist is B. F. Skinner (1904 – 1990).
Behaviorism, as a form of science, refuses to consider any events that cannot be
publicly
witnessed. This logically excludes (non-physical) mental events.
Strictly speaking,
as a scientific
method, Behaviorism does not explicitly deny the
existence of immaterial mental events or immaterial mental “substance.”
Note: Metaphysical Theory about the
possible or actual existence of an immaterial the soul does not strictly follow
from this thesis about the (proper) objects of scientific investigation.
But Watson himself suggested that belief in
consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic. He concludes that our concept of
consciousness is NOT merely complicated and confused but rather that
there could not possibly be any such thing.
He claimed that this "scientific"
approach is the only alternative to being a mere "savage and still
believing in magic."
"no one has
ever touched a soul, or seen one in a test tube, or has in any other way come
into relationship with it as he has with the other objects of his daily
experience."[1]
Gilbert
Ryle (1900 – 1976)
"The Dogma of the Ghost in the
Machine"
(following some Ludwig Wittgenstein) The Concept of Mind (1949)
First chapter "Descartes' Myth"
Ryle describes what he calls "the
official doctrine":
1. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and
infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind.
2. After the death of the body his mind may
continue to exist and function.
3. Bodies are:
a. in space and are
subject to the mechanical laws.
b. can be inspected
by external observers.
4. Minds are
a. not in space.
b. not subject to
mechanical laws.
The following are said to be properties of
mental events that are not properties of physical events
5. Private and Privileged: Only I can take
direct cognisance of the states and processes of my
own mind. (i.e. mental events are unmediated)
6. Privileged, Private
and Incorrigible: One has direct and unchallengeable cognisance
of at least some of the episodes of one’s own private history. (i.e. mental events are private)
7. One can be directly and authentically
apprised of the present states and operations of one’s mind through
introspection. (i.e. metal events are known through
introspection and incorrigible)
8. While one may have uncertainties about
events in the physical world, one cannot have similar uncertainties about (at
least part) of what is momentarily occupying his mind. (i.e.
mental events are incorrigible) A person's present thinkings,
feelings and willings, his perceivings,
rememberings and imaginings are intrinsically "phosphorescent";
The
problem occurs for the official position of how a
person's mind and body influence one another.
Transactions
between the private history and the public history remain mysterious since, by definition, such transactions belong to
neither series.
Thus:
a. They can be inspected neither by
introspection nor by laboratory experiment.
b. They have no ontological status since they
cannot have the status of physical existence nor the status of mental
existence.
It
is supposed some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental
existing.
1. What has physical existence
a. is
in space and time;
b. is
composed of matter, or else is a function of matter.
2. What has mental existence
a. is
in time but not in space.
b. consists
of consciousness, or else is a function of consciousness....
Ryle
argues that the "official doctrine" is an "absurd"
"category mistake":
“It is not merely
an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a
special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake.”
I must first
indicate what is meant by the phrase "Category-mistake." This I do in
a series of illustrations.
A foreigner
visiting
He was mistakenly
allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions
belong....
Similarly, one may
say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he
bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves. [2]
The
Dogma of The Ghost in the Machine
·
There exist both bodies and
minds;
·
There occur physical processes and
mental processes;
·
There are mechanical causes of
corporeal movements and there are mental causes of corporeal movements.
Ryle argues that all these conjunctions are
absurd.
Note: he is not denying that there are
mental processes. He is saying that the phrase "there occur mental
processes" does not mean the same sort of thing as
"there occur physical processes," and, therefore, that it makes no
sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.[3]
How are we to understand “metal” states/
processes? Ryle's answer depends on the
concept of a disposition.
Disposition: a tendency for
something to happen given certain conditions. (For example, when I say that the
glass is fragile, that is only to say that it is disposed to break if struck.)
Key is the “if... then” (or "hypothetical") form of the statement.
Ryle explains this in the following way:
He distinguishes two senses of
"explained";
We see the glass is broken and ask “Why is
the glass broken?”
One might say, “Because it was struck by a
rock.” But what if I challenged this explanation
by pointing out that the brick wall was also hit by a rock, but it did not
shatter. The person explaining would
have to add to the explanation that glass is fragile (and brick is not).
So here we find two different senses of
explanations: Causal and Dispositional
1.
Causal sense of explanation: namely
the event which stood to the fracture of the glass as cause to effect.
2.
Dispositional sense of explanation: an
existing law-like proposition indicating the disposition for the thing to
behave in a certain way under certain circumstances. In adding that glass is fragile, one gives a
"reason" for the glass breaking when struck.
The glass is fragile is shorthand for the
following dispositional conditional:
If the glass is
struck by a rock, it will shatter.
The event in question satisfies the protasis (antecedent)
of the general hypothetical proposition, and when the second happening, namely
the shattering of the glass, satisfies its apodosis.
Granted, this is sort of a shallow
“explanation” however, to say it broke when struck because it was “such as to
break when struck.” Still, useful to know that something is fragile.
Ryle’s main idea is this. "Mental" attributes really indicate
dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances.
Brief analysis of “acting from vanity”:
“The statement
"he boasted from vanity" ought, on one view, to be construed as
saying that ‘he boasted and the cause of his boasting was the occurrence in him
of a particular feeling or impulse of vanity.’ On the other view, it is to be
construed as saying ‘he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so
satisfies the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing
the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce this
admiration and envy.’
The general argument:
To say that a person knows something, or aspires to be
something, is not to say that he is at a particular moment in process of doing
or undergoing anything, but that he is able to do certain things, when the need
arises, or that he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of
certain sorts....
Thus to say “She is thirsty.” Is not to
attribute to her some unverifiable subjective or phenomenal state which is the
motivation/ cause of her behavior. It is
merely to say that “If you put a glass of water in front of her, she will drink
it. (And… if you put a glass of Coke in
front of her… and ginger ale, and Materva, …)
Mental talk is just shorthand for what would
otherwise be very large sets of “if/ than” statements about behavior. “I love my wife.” means “I am such as to exhibit love-behavior
towards her. (e.g. If it’s her birthday I will but her a present. I she is
sick, I will seek to give her medicine. If… and so on.)
Ryle's (and Wittgenstein's) logical behaviorism differs from radical behaviorism
1. It is not a theory about behavior and its
causes
2. It is a theory about the language of mind,
about the meaning of "mentalistic" terms such as "wants,"
"believes," "hurts," "loves," "feels,"
and "thinks."
Applying a mental term—attributing a mental
property to a person—is logically equivalent to saying that the person will act
in a certain way under certain circumstances.
Now admittedly the dispositional explanation
is ultimately shallow. We eventually
will want to know why the glass is fragile.
And that may take us to talk of molecules and molecular structure,
etc. Nevertheless, it is useful and
meaningful to know that something is fragile (which is why they mark certain
postal packages with the word “FRAGILE.”) whether I know what accounts for that
or not.
Likewise, knowing that someone is thirsty
(how they will behave if you offer him or her a coke) is useful, but leaves
unanswered for the moment at least WHY they are such as to behave that way. On this view, “I love my wife.” means I (my
body) is in a physical state that is disposed to behave in certain ways. “I
love my wife.” = “I am such as to exhibit love-behavior towards her.” (e.g. If
it’s her birthday I will buy her a present.
I she is sick I will get medicine
for her, etc.). At some point we must
delve into the neuro-physiology to account for why my body behaves is these
ways, but even if I am ignorant of the causal explanation, the dispositional
explanation can be uselful.
Advantages:
1. Eliminates
all mysterious things mental. However complicated the translation from mental
language to behavioral disposition language, the problem of dualism does not
arise.
2. Consistent
account of the causal interaction between mind and body as the causal
connection between a physical state—
a disposition to behave in certain ways—and the actual consequent behavior.
Problems:
1. It
seems utterly absurd to think behavioristically while
talking to a friend or listening to someone talk to us.
2. Behaviorism
becomes pure nonsense in one's own case, when we are trying to understand and
talk about our own mental states (My pain is not the same as my pain behavior. When I say, “I have a headache.” I am NOT
saying “I am such as to take aspirin, or Tylenol, or Acetaminophen …). However therapeutic in psychology[4]
and however powerful as an antidote to Cartesianism, it
cannot be the whole story.
3. Some
mental states affect other mental states. (Behaviorism cannot account for
this.) “She is thirsty.” not only
equates to an infinitely long chain if in/then statements, it is actually more
complicated than that. Behaviorally she
will drink a coke if put in front of her … if she does not believe it is poisoned,
and if she does not believe it is diet Coke and if she is not trying to cut back on
sugary drinks and if she notices the coke and if she
genuinely believes that it is Coke, and….
But note the if/
then language which was trying to translate the mental into the behavior
actually must include more mental talk (believes, wants, notices, etc.)
As one of Watson's early critics commented, "What
behaviorism shows is that psychologists do not always think very well; not that
they don't think at all."
Mind and Body, or more accurately, mental
events and certain bodily events (presumably brain events) are identical.
Anticipated, in a sense, by Spinoza and
Russell with the dual aspect theory.
Unlike the others it tries to tie itself as
closely as possible with current scientific research, and although it is
not a scientific theory itself, it removes any mysterious
"something" such as found in Spinoza and Russell.
The identity theory says that there are
mental events, but they are identical to— the same thing as—certain physical
events, that is, processes in the brain.
Mentalistic terms do refer to something.
Insists that mentalistic terms
("wants," "believes," "loves," etc.) refer to is
not only a mental state, but also a neurological process that scientists,
someday, will be able to specify.
Dualism is eliminated.
"I have a headache" equals
"such and such is going on in my brain." Important:
this is meant to be an ontological reduction, not a sematic
one. I have a headache does not mean
such and such is going on in my brain any more than “Superman saved Lois.”
means “Clark Kent saved Lois.” One might
know the first claim is true without knowing that the second claim is true,
despite the fact that Superman is Clark Kent.
View associated with Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart:
Jerome
Shaffer (doesn’t agree with the view, but he)
characterizes Identity theory this way:
The sense of
"identity" relevant here is that in which we say, for example, that
the morning star is "identical" with the evening star. It is not that
the expression "morning star" means the same as the expression
"evening star"; on the contrary, these expressions mean something
different. But the object referred to by the two expressions is one and the
same; there is just one heavenly body, namely, Venus, which when seen in the
morning is called the morning star and when seen in the evening is called the evening
star. The morning star is identical with the evening star; they are one and the
same object.
Of course, the
identity of the mental with the physical is not exactly of this sort, since it
is held to be simultaneous identity rather than the identity of a thing at one
time with the same thing at a later time. To take a closer example, one can say
that lightning is a particularly massive electrical discharge from one cloud to
another or to the earth. Not that the word "lightning" means "a
particularly massive electrical discharge ..."; when Benjamin Franklin
discovered that lightning was electrical, he did not make a discovery about the
meaning of words. Nor when it was discovered that water was H2O was a discovery
made about the meanings of words; yet water is identical with H20.
In a similar
fashion, the identity theorist can hold that thoughts, feelings, wishes, and
the like are identical with physical states. Not "identical" in the
sense that mentalistic terms are synonymous in meaning with physicalistic
term, but "identical" in the sense that the actual events picked out
by mentalistic term are one and the same events as those picked out by physicalistic terms.
Advantages
of the Identity Theory.
Interaction avoided. (There exist only the
physical phenomena)
We have here a dualism of language, but not a
dualism of entities, events or properties.
Problems
With Identity Theory
1. Unlike
successful ontological reductions (such as how “a nation” can be reduced to the
sum of its parts acting is a particular way), the two languages are so very
different that there may still be good reason to suppose that the thing(s) they
refer to is/are very different as well.
2. In
the case of the Morning/Evening Star, without Venus’s unique history, there
would be no point to the different ways of referring to it. But physicalistic
and mentalistic terms do not refer to different phases in the history of one
and the same object.
What sort of
identity is intended?
3. The
analogy of the identity of lightning distinguishes two aspects (the appearance
and the physical composition) of a single physical item. Now it is agreed that the appearance to the
naked eye of a neurological event is utterly different from the experience of
having a thought or a pain, but it is still difficult to regard these as
different aspects of “the same thing.”
One might be tempted to say that one is looking at the same event from
“outside” verses “inside,” but strictly speaking this is only a misleading
analogy, rather than an accurate characterization of the relationship between
the mental and the physical.
“Am I free to roam
about inside my brain, observing what the brain surgeon may never see? Is not
the "inner" aspect of my brain far more accessible to the brain
surgeon than to me? He has the X rays, probes, electrodes, scalpels, and
scissors for getting at the inside of my brain. If it is replied that this is
only an analogy, not to be taken literally, then the question still remains how
the mental and the physical are related....”
“... If by X rays
or some other means we were able to see every event which occurred in the
brain, we would never get a glimpse of a thought. If, to resort to fantasy, we
could so enlarge a brain or so shrink ourselves that we could wander freely
through the brain, we would still never observe a thought. All we could ever
observe in the brain would be the physical events which occur in it. If mental
events had location in the brain, there should be some means of detecting them
there. But of course there is none. The very idea of it is senseless.[5]
4. The
problem of the indiscernibility of identicals
resurfaces. Think of the spots that
appear before one’s eyes after a bright flash.
The person aware of a red “after-image” is aware of something, but the
something is not a brain event nor a physical event of any kind. This thing that one sees has a shape and a
color and does not seem match the shape or color of anything in the brain. The red after-image has a shape and color
that no event in my brain has. If he is
not aware of any physical features, he must be aware of something else. And that shows that we cannot get rid of those
nonphysical features.
Shaffer's criticism is based on the principle
is that if two things are identical, then they must have all the same
properties.
But, Shaffer argues, no amount of research could
possibly show that brain processes and thought have the same properties.
Identity Theory proponents would counter that
the identity of brain processes and thoughts is an empirical identity. It is an identity that must be discovered
through experiment and experience. It is not a logical (semantic) identity, as
if the two terms "brain process" and "thought" are synonymous.
Research can and has shown that certain
thoughts are correlated with certain brain processes, but correlation is not yet identity.
Further
Complications for Identity Theory
Token – Token Identity?
Type – Type Identity?
Let’s say that we observed that every time I
heard a C chord you observed I had brain state A, that is, that every token of
C-chord-hearing was conjoined to a token of brain state A. And on this basis we decided that the events
were not merely coordinated, but identical.
The question would still remain: is this Type of mental event equivalent
to that Type of brain event such that, when one (anyone) were in brain state A,
one was hearing a C chord? And if one is
not in brain state A one is NOT hearing a C chord? Is the identity of the type of mental state
identical to a type of brain state and vice versa? Or even me, a year from now,
or having undergone some brain trauma or new learning?)
Note if it were, there is no way my dog or
aliens from outer space (Vulcans) could ever be said to “hear a C chord” –
(have the same mental state as I) since it is biologically impossible that they
ever have the same brain state as I.
But if we deny type – type identity all were
left with is the claim that every mental state is identical to some
brain state, but we cannot determine with any precision which one. This does not really seem to be a very
helpful theory of mind.
Proposes that our increasing knowledge of the
workings of the brain will make outmoded our "folkpsychology" talk about
the mind and we will all learn to talk the language of neurology instead.
Paul
Churchland (1942 - )
Defends utilizing neurological explanations
of human behavior and discarding mentalistic explanations
(contra Identity Theory). He is not
trying to reduce mental talk to brain talk (or map out an equivalency table);
rather he is saying we should simply abandon metal talk as a serious way of
understanding human behavior. He claims
that with increased knowledge of neurology, our ordinary language will be
replaced or, at least, seriously revised:
The identity theory is deeply problematic because
a materialist account of our mental capacities seems unlikely. There seems to
be no “nice one-to-one match-ups” in the offing between the concepts of folk
psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience.
But an intertheoretic
reduction requires one.
Initial Problem was that different physical
systems seem to be able to instantiate the same mental states and certainly the
same functional organization. (Vulcan Brains- Same “memory” on two different
days)
Churchland claims that the one-to-one
match-ups will not be found because our “commonsense psychological framework is a
false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behavior and
the nature of cognitive activity.”
Folk psychology is a misrepresentation of our internal states and
activities. An inaccurate theory of
behavior (folk psychology) cannot be reduced to an accurate one (neuroscience).
Churchland predicts that the older framework
will simply be eliminated, rather than be reduced, by a matured neuroscience.
Cites historical Parallels
"phlogiston"
Phlogiston was something chemists posited to
explain combustion and corrosion. It
turns out that Phlogiston was not as an incomplete description of what was
going on, but rather a radical misdescription.
Scientific progress does not lead to a “reduction,” but rather to an elimination
of the concept by a mature science.
“The simple
increase in mutual understanding that the new framework made possible could
contribute substantially toward a more peaceful and humane society.”
Arguments
for Eliminative Materialism
Conviction that folk psychology is “a
hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal
activities.” [6]
Three
Reasons
1. Widespread
explanatory, predictive, and manipulative failures of folk psychology. (Cannot
really explain sleep, leaning, memory, etc.) Central things about us remain
almost entirely mysterious from within folk psychology. Problems magnify when it comes to pathology
2. Useless
in understanding the effect of damaged brains.
3. Draws
an inductive lesson from our conceptual history. Our early folk theories of
motion were profoundly confused, and were eventually displaced entirely by more
sophisticated theories.
Problems
With Eliminative Materialism
One might claim that eliminative materialism
is false because one's introspection reveals directly the existence of pains,
beliefs, desires, fears, and so forth. Their existence is as obvious as
anything could be.
But the eliminative materialist would reply
that this argument makes the same mistake that an ancient or medieval person
would be making if he insisted that he could just see with his own eyes that
the heavens form a turning sphere, or that witches exist.
The
fact is, all observation occurs within some system of concepts, and our
observation judgments are only as good as the conceptual framework in which
they are expressed.
In all three cases—the starry sphere,
witches, and the familiar mental states—precisely what is challenged is the
integrity of the background conceptual frameworks in which the observation
judgments are expressed. To insist on the validity of one's experiences,
traditionally interpreted, is therefore to beg the very question at issue. For in all three cases, the question is
whether we should re-conceive the nature of some familiar observational domain.
Problems
with Eliminative Materialism:
EM exaggerates the defects in folk
psychology, and underplays its real successes. (Note that every social science
depends on the concepts of “folk psychology” and are nevertheless valuable
account and predictors of human behavior.
So does marketing and advertising.)
Nevertheless the problems with EM serve to
underscore that we are not faced with merely two possibilities here:
1. pure reduction
2. pure elimination.
These are end points of a smooth spectrum of
possible outcomes.
5.
Functionalism: The Mind and the Computer
Since the introduction of computers,
scientific criticisms of dualism have taken another line.
No coincidence that this view arrived during
the “computer age.”
Could, for example, mental processes be based
upon a network of electronic signals in a properly designed complex of
transistors and circuit boards? In other words, could mental processes be the
product of a computer?
Functionalism
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (1926 - ) That minds are
produced not so much by particular kinds of materials, but rather by the relations between parts).
Some functionalists claim that it is, in
principle, possible to build a human mind out of computer parts. Others claim only that the mind is, in
effect, a function of the patterns of neurological activity in the brain.
Crucial distinction between "hardware" (the actual computer
with its circuits) and "software."
(the program that gives the computer specific
instructions to react to stimuli).
According to functionalists, the mind is
nothing other than an elaborate program of sorts, which is the product of a
spectacularly complicated pattern embodied in the physical workings of the
brain.
Behavioral Output is a product of Stimulus and
the “internal” states of the program. This
is how they can account for the fact that sometimes identical stimuli result is
different behavioral outputs (something that the old behaviorists had trouble
with). Thus the
behavioral output of some mental states will depend on other mental states (again,
something Behaviorism couldn’t account for).
Functionalism is similar to
behaviorism, but while behaviorists could not account for the fact that
identical stimulus can result in different behavioral outputs, the
Functionalist can. Consider a coke
machine dispensing bottles of cokes for 10 cents. (It’s a very old machine.)
Sometimes when you input a nickel in the Coke
machine you don’t get a Coke and sometimes you input a nickel you get a coke. Why?
Because sometime the internal state of the machine is at State A (having
zero credit), and sometimes the machine is in State B (already has credit for a
five cents). Depending on the internal
state of the machine, the behavioral output will be different, even given
identical input.
Let’s stipulate that there are only two
possible stimuli:
1. insert a dime
2. insert a nickel.
Let’s further stipulate that there are two
possible “internal” states of this machine.
1. State A
2. State B.
So, if the machine is in State A and I input
a dime. the machine dispenses a coke and remains in State A. If the machine is in State A and I input a
nickel, the machine does not dispense a coke, but moves to State B.
If the machine is in State B and I input a nickel,
the machine dispenses a coke and returns to State A. If the machine is in State B and I deposit a
dime, the machine dispenses a coke and a nickel change and returns to State A.
We can operationally define “believing” as a
set of functions relative to a stimulus.
If the Coke machine believes I've already deposited five cents, this
means that, if I deposit a nickel, it will dispense a Coke and if I deposit a
dime, it will dispense a Coke and 5 cents change. If the Coke machine is in this state, the
Coke machine is in the state of believing that I've already deposited five
cents.
Note that this account of belief need not
appeal to “private internal states” to which the subject has private and
privileged access. These states are just
as public as any other behavioral disposition.
In fact, the subject may not be as aware that she is in this state (of
believing) as well as a third person observer might be. More broadly, understanding “mind” is a matter of mapping the functional
relations between inputs and possible outputs.
John Searle’s Objection to Functionalism
John Searle offers a thought experiment
begins with this hypothetical premise: suppose that artificial intelligence
research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it
understands Chinese. That is, it takes
Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer
program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, that this computer
performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test:
it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese
speaker. To all of
the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that
any Chinese speaker would be convinced that they are talking to another
Chinese-speaking human being.
The question Searle wants to answer is this:
does this demonstrate that the machine literally "understands"
Chinese? Or is it merely simulating
the ability to understand Chinese? Searle
calls the first position "Strong AI" and the latter "Weak
AI".
Searle then supposes that he is in a closed
room and has a book with an English version of the computer program, along with
sufficient papers, pencils, erasers, and filing cabinets. Searle could receive Chinese characters
through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's
instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. If the computer had
passed the Turing test this way, it follows, says Searle, that he too would do
so as well, simply by running the program manually. Searle asserts that there is no essential
difference between the roles of the computer and himself in the experiment.
Each is simply mechanistically following a program, step-by-step, producing a
behavior which is then interpreted as demonstrating intelligent conversation.
However, Searle would not be able to
understand the conversation. ("I don't speak a word of Chinese," he
points out.) Therefore, he argues, it
follows that the computer would not be able to understand the conversation
either. Searle argues that, without
"understanding" (or "intentionality"), we cannot describe
what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think,
it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the
word.
Therefore, he concludes that "Strong
AI" is false. Further, as two
radically different programs can be functionally isomorphic, even if we were to
create a program that perfectly simulates human cognition, that would not
assure us that we were any closer to understanding actual human cognition.
John
Rogers Searle (1932 - ) attacks the “Functionalist”
understanding of mind. Specifically the
idea that machines can think or that thinking is merely the computational
function of any sort of computing machine.
Connectionists complain that Functionalism is
a "top-down," "software" approach, which can never be
accurate in its representation of the "hardware" of either the brain
or the computer. A functionalist starts
with behavior—either human behavior or computer behavior—and claims that
understanding human consciousness is just a matter of finding the
"program" for that behavior.
Anything ruining that “program” (exhibiting
that behavior) is conscious. The functionalist claims that to understand the
"program" is to understand the behavior, regardless of the mechanical
and physical interactions which make the program run.
The connectionist, on the other hand, claims
that the mechanical and physical interactions that occur in the brain determine
the kinds of behavior—which kinds of software that computers are
capable of processing.
Connectionists advocate a "bottom-up"
approach to understanding the mind.
Note: Connectionists are still
materialists.
Believe that consciousness—in its full color
and quality—is a result of the complicated "connections" that really
do go on in the brain.
But they are also critical of any kind of
strict neurological reduction. There is no
one-to-one correspondence between neurons and thoughts or perceptions;
rather, they claim, the "hardware" of the brain is an immensely
complex mechanism to which the functionalists do not do justice.
7. Final Note: Freud
and the Problem with “Incorrigiblity”
Descartes claimed that what he could
not be wrong about is his seeming to be sitting in front of the fire.
Sigmund Freud introduces the notion of the
“the unconscious” mind. If correct, not
everything mental is knowable, and therefore surely not everything "in the
mind" can be described incorrigibly.
1. We infer the
unconscious from its effects.
2. Same relation to
it as we have to a physical process in another person (except that it is in
fact one of our own).
3. There are ideas
(experiences, intentions) in our minds that we do not and sometimes cannot
know, much less know with certainty.
Thus the traditional notion of the
"incorrigibility" of the mental is seriously challenged.
•
But; one might counter, “If it isn't
knowable incorrigibly then it can't be mental at all.”
•
Could we possibly be wrong in our
confidence that "right now, I am experiencing a cold feeling in my
hand"?
The empiricists assumed that
one could not be wrong about this, for it was on the basis of such certainties
that we were able to construct, through inductive reasoning, our theories about
the world. Consider this example (it
comes from Bishop Berkeley): A mischievous friend tells you that he is going to
touch your hand with a very hot spoon. When you aren't looking, he touches you
with a piece of ice. You scream and claim, with seeming certainty, that he has
given you an uncomfortable sensation of heat. But you're wrong. What you felt
was cold. What you seemed to feel was heat. But even your "seeming,"
in this case, was mistaken.
Sum
Up
Since Descartes' philosophers have struggled
to explain how mind and body worked together to constitute a complete human
being. Certain properties of mind make
the connection between mind and body extremely problematic.
•
Some suggest that mental events and
bodily events are different aspects of some other event (dual aspect theory),
or that they occur in parallel, like the sound and visual tracks on a film (parallelism
or pre-established harmony), or that bodily events cause mental events but
not the other way around (epiphenomenalism), or that mental events and
bodily events are in fact identical (identity theory) or await a mature
neuroscience that will dispense will “mental talk” altogether (eliminative
materialism).
•
Others claim that reference to a
"mental event" is in fact only shorthand for a complex description of
patterns of behavior (logical behaviorsim). Still others hold that the brain is in
fact an extremely sophisticated computer and the mind is causally but not
logically dependent on the brain (functionalism). Lastly, some hold that mind is the unique
biological function of human brain in bodies (connectionism).