Cosmological Arguments: Vertical
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274)
Cosmological Argument: an a posteriori[1]
(empirical, dependent on experience) argument which attempts to prove the existence
of God by claiming that God is a (transcendent) theoretical entity needed to
cause or explains[2] some
observable feature of the world.
William Lane Craig is a contemporary
philosopher who champions the Kalam
version of the Cosmological argument.
This version relies on the premise that the universe is NOT infinitely
old, but rather it is only finitely old.
Thus, it is NOT a “vertical” type of cosmological argument, but rather
an “horizontal” type of cosmological argument. (I am imagining a horizontal
timeline extending from the present backward to some finite point in the
past. The Kalam argument suggest that
since the universe cannot be infinitely old, it must have had a “beginning” in
time and thus a creator.)
Kalam: William Lane
Craig’s formulation/ video production: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/kalam?src=email
But Thomas Aquinas’s version does NOT
rely on the notion that the universe is only finitely old (contra Kalam). Aquinas is willing to accept, for argument’s
sake, that the universe is eternal with no beginning in time. As a Christian, Aquinas does not believe this
of course. As a matter of faith, he
believed that the universe was created by God at some point in the finite
past. However, Aquinas, did not think
that this could be proven philosophically[3][4][5] and so
he does not use this claim in his versions of the cosmological argument.
The early modern philosopher Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 -1716) offers a cosmological argument that is more of an
epistemological argument. He is
reasoning to the thing he believes necessary to explain the world. He suggests that the proposition “The
Universe exists.” is true and is not a self-explanatory proposition. Since the world is not self-explanatory,
there must exist something that is.
But Thomas Aquinas’s versions do not
rely on The Principle of Sufficient Reason (contra Leibniz et al.). St. Thomas Aquinas’ cosmological arguments
are traditional metaphysical arguments. He is reasoning to the thing
which causes the world (NOT the reason that explains
the world a-la- Leibniz). The world is
not “self-caused.” (Indeed, nothing is or could be.) Therefore, it must be caused by something
that is uncaused. And this uncaused
cause must exist simultaneously with its effects. Thus, he offers “vertical” cosmological
arguments.
It’s hard to do “a little Aquinas”
Most contemporary philosophers know that Aquinas believed
that the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and natural moral law
could be established through purely philosophical arguments. Nevertheless, often his arguments are very
badly misunderstood by those philosophers.
William Lane Craig explains it this way in the opening paragraph of his
chapter on Aquinas in Craig’s doctoral dissertation on the Cosmological
Argument.
Underrated by non-Thomists and
overrated by Thomists, Thomas of Aquino (1225-1274) is one of those
philosophers whom nearly everybody quotes, but whom few understand. Probably more ink has been spilled over his
celebrated “Five Ways” for proving the existence of God than over any other
demonstrations of divine existence, and yet they remain largely misunderstood
today. No doubt this is because these
five brief paragraphs are so often printed in anthologized form and are
therefore read in isolation from the rest of Aquinas's thought. To take these proofs out of their context in
Aquinas's thought and out of their place in the history of the development of
these arguments will tend only to obscure the true nature of these proofs. A proper understanding of Thomas's proofs
necessitates reading them in their immediate context, ferreting out of his
other works the basic epistemological and metaphysical principles they
presuppose, comparing them to similar versions which Aquinas formulated elsewhere,
and relating them to their historical context, particularly to the proofs
propounded, by Aristotle, the Arabic philosophers, and Maimonides. Few modern
philosophers of religion who are not already committed Thomists seem to have
sufficient interest in the thought of a medieval theologian for such an
admittedly arduous task. But this can
only result in neglect of Aquinas's important contributions to the philosophy
of religion or to shallow expositions of his thought, mingled with positive
misunderstandings.
In time, the work of Aristotle waned in
influence with much of his work falling into obscurity in the West. By contrast, his teacher Plato became the
more influential philosopher. Over the
next several centuries Plato's philosophy grew into a kind of a new religion
called "Neo-Platonism." This
world view stressed all the major themes of Plato: the mind/body dualism, the
supremacy of the intellect, the frail and corrupting nature of "the
body." But it also added the idea
that one might be able to achieve a "mystical" union with permanent
transcendent reality through meditation and reflection.
Plato and
Neo-Platonism were widely influential in the Mediterranean, especially in the
early Christian communities. First
Century Jewish theologians living in Alexandria seemed to have been influenced
by these views as were early Christians.
Notice in the Book of John in the New Testament we have
Jesus identified with "The Word" of God (Gr. Logos). This capitalizes on
the earlier Jewish notion that God creates the world through spoken word. Like Plato, this seems to identify
spirituality with "Idea," Word, Law and Command. The Greek equivalent is "Nous" or
"Logos." Philosopher and Church Father, St. Augustine (354 – 430) in particular, who was
tremendously influential in the development of Christian Doctrine, credits
Platonism with helping him understand and accept the Christian Religion. He claimed that the most significant cause of
his resistance and rejection of Christianity was his materialistic conception
of God. (e.g. If God existed, He had to exist as a body, thus limited by space
and time.) Augustine credits Platonism
with enlightening him from this "physicalism" by allowing him to
conceive of immaterial spiritual reality. [6]
All this to say that the early medieval
period was highly Platonist/ Neo-Platonist in nature making it inhospitable for
Aristotelean ideas. Aristotle’s
philosophy, by contrast, had fallen into neglect and disarray in the second
generation after his death and remained in the shadow of the Stoics,
Epicureans, and Academic skeptics throughout the Hellenistic age.
But, while Aristotle was lost to the
Latin west of this period, he was not lost to Arab philosophers and
theologians. They had inherited Greek
ideas once they conquered Egypt and they brought their translations and commentaries
on Aristotle’s philosophy through the Arab West into Spain and Sicily by the
later Middle Ages, which became important centers for this transmission of
these ideas to the Neo-Platonic Christian West. The Arabic theologians and
philosophers also brought with them the cosmological argument along with the
legacy of Aristotle to the Latin West with principle encounters in Muslim
Spain. Christians and Jews lived side by side with Muslims in Toledo, and it
was inevitable that Arabic intellectual life should become of keen interest to
them. A linchpin making this transmission possible was the Jews. Hebrew was so close to Arabic that Jewish
thinkers, many of them writing in Arabic, translated Arabic works into Hebrew
and Latin. And the Christians in turn read and translated works of these Jewish
thinkers.
But recall that Aristotle disagreed
with much that Plato had taught. This
set up a challenge: How to make Aristotle’s Philosophy compatible with the
established and dominant Neo-Platonist Christian theology. Aquinas takes on this challenge.
Tries to synthesize:
1. Christian Neo-Platonism (St. Augustine) & Pagan Aristotelianism
2. Faith & Reason
3. Theology & Philosophy
In general, Aquinas’ work sought to
demonstrate that that if one is a good/efficient philosopher one can/will know
that God exists. Hence faith and reason,
theology and philosophy, far from being antagonistic, actually complement each
other.
His arguments for the existence of God fit
nicely within this framework and are based on one originally drafted by
Aristotle.
·
Aquinas works with
a model originated by Aristotle.
·
Aristotle did not
believe in a creation, but did argue for the existence of an unmoved mover.
Aquinas works this model into his “5
ways” Quinque Viae
Prefatory Remarks About the 1st Way: Argument from Motion
Both
Aristotle and Aquinas talk of an unmoved mover. But the notion of movement was
somewhat broader then we would understand it today. Aristotle believed and Aquinas accepted that
any change was a movement from potentially X to actually X. For instance, if I have a pot of water that
is actually cold, it is nevertheless potentially hot. (It is hot in potency, though not in
actuality.) That is, it could be moved
to being hot. But to move it from
potentially hot to actually hot, there must be something which moves it. In other words, there must be something which
actualizes the pre-existing potentiality.
I will
continue to reference movement since this is the word that Aquinas is using as
did Aristotle. But bear in mind that each had a broader view. Each has metaphysical commitments to doctrines
of “potentiality and actuality.” This
means they were more talking about an unchanging changer or an unactualized
actualizer. Aquinas refers to God as
pure act: Actus Purus. God has no potential. Imagine being God’s high school guidance
counselor. 😊
First Argument ‑ Argument for Motion
The first and more
manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our
senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion
is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in
potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves
inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of
something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus
that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to
be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that
the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same
respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.
It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing
should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore,
whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is
put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no
other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put
in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in
motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put
in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.[7]
1. Begins with an observation. (Viola! There are moved objects.)
2. In order for any object to be moved it
has to be moved by another.
a. Both of these propositions are evident
through experience.
Can it be an
infinite system (no end)?
Yes…
For every moved
object N, it is moved by another moved object N -1, which in turn is moved by
another moved object N -2, and so on, and so on, and so on.
But…
Can this be the
whole of the story where every mover is a moved mover?
No.
Imagine a bicycle chain that formed a
circle. And we can only see a portion of the chain at a time. Notice in our
imagined situation there is no first link. It is infinite in the sense that there
is no end. No first and no last.
Each link in the chain is moving. And
each link in the chain is moving and being caused to move by being pulled by
the succeeding link. In other words, link A is moving because it's being pulled
by link B which is moving because it's being pulled by link C etc. If this were a chain with 10 links, then link
J is moving because it's being pulled by link A. So on this model, we know what the proximate cause
is for each individual moving link. What we don't know however is what's
causing the entire chain to move.
The links themselves have no
ability to move other things on their own. This ability must be transmitted to the links
in the chain by something outside the chain (transcendent of the system) that
does have the ability to move things. Now
that thing which is transmitting the ability to move things to the links is itself
moved by something, and thus borrows this power from something else, or does not.
If it's borrowing its ability to move
the bicycle chain links from something else, we have the beginnings of an
infinite regress. The only thing that can stop the regress would be something
that transmits the ability to move things, but does not need to borrow that
ability from something else. This is why
Aquinas concludes that, in addition to the moved movers we
observe on a daily basis, there must exist something we do NOT see, an unmoved
mover. Indeed, the very existence of
moved movers confirms the existence of the unmoved mover. There would be no motion at all were there not
an underived source of motion, that is, an unmoved mover.
The suppositions
that there only exist moved movers is unsatisfactory as an account of reality,
since it leaves us with an “infinite regress” and irreducible mystery.
Therefore:
3. It cannot be that every moved object is
moved by another moved object.
Well then that either leads us to the
position that there are NO moved objects (absurd) or that some moved objects
are moved by an unmoved mover which is radically different from that which we
observe on a daily basis. We observe the
“links” in the chain (the moved movers), but this observation rationally compels
us to hypothesize that which we do NOT directly observe, something radically
different than the other moved objects, something outside the
chain (transcendent). This outside mover-force Aquinas calls a Prime Mover and that is God.
The unmoved mover is “Prime” in the
sense of being the current source of all current motion. All the links exhibit derivative motion. If there is derived motion than there must be
a source of motion which is underived.
4. Therefore there exists an Unmoved
Mover.[8]
Now, as previously noted, while
Aristotle and Aquinas are represented most frequently as arguing from literal
“motion,” the argument can be fashioned with reference to any and all sorts of
change. A change is a “motion” from what
a thing was to what it subsequently became.
But for a thing to be changed (e.g. move from potentially hot to
actually hot) it must be changed/ moved by another (e.g. an actually hot fire). But, since this is so, in addition to
changing changers, there must be something which is actual, but did not and
does not change. (An Unchanged changer.)
And of course Aquinas is surely
delighted that this proof seems consistent with certain scriptural passages.
Every best gift,
and every perfect gift , is from above, coming down from the Father of lights,
with whom there is no change, nor shadow of evil.
James 1:17
God did this so
that they would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he
is not far from any one of us. For in him we live and move and have our being.’
Acts 17: 27 &
28
Second Argument ‑ Argument from
Causality
The second way is
from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is
an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed,
possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so
it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is
not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate
is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several,
or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore,
if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate,
nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on
to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly
false. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which
everyone gives the name of God.[9]
1. Begins with an observation. (Voila! There are causes and effects.)
2. Now every effect has its cause. We know that some causes, indeed all the
causes we witness, are the effects of some previous causes. They are caused causes.
Could this chain of
caused causes extend infinitely backwards in time? Yes. says Aquinas,
(Brief
Aside) Accidentally Ordered Causal Series and Essentially Ordered Causal Series
Aquinas and Dun Scotus,
borrowing from Avicenna and Aristotle, say that causes may be ordered in two
ways: essentially or accidentally. As a
case of essentially ordered causes the medievals
typically gave the example of a man pushing a stone with a stick. Accidentally ordered causes were continually
exemplified by a father begetting a son, who in turn begets a son.
These two examples will
serve for discussing the three differences which Scotus proposes between
essentially and accidentally ordered causes:
1. In essentially ordered
causes, the second depends on the first precisely in the very act
of causation. This is not so in accidentally ordered causes.
2. In essentially ordered
causes, there is causality of another nature or order, since the higher is more
perfect. This is not so among accidentally ordered causes.
In a series of
accidentally ordered causes, because they are all of the same kind, they happen
to have to order that they do accidentally.
It is An accident of history that they enjoy the particular ordering
that they do.. Their actual, historical order is accidental. In other words, it could be the hand pushing the stick that
pushes the stone, but it could have just as easily had been the stick pushing
the hand pushing the stone. These are all
derivative causal forces, and where the derivative cause derives
its causal efficacy from the causal efficacy from its (accidental) causal
predecessor. This is what it means to
say that they are all of the same order. They are all derivative causes.
3. All essentially ordered
causes are simultaneously required to cause the effect; accidentally ordered
causes can be successive.
In terms of the two
examples the differences are as follows:
First, in the very act of
pushing a stone, the stick depends on the man to cause it to push; but while it
is true that Isaac depends on Abraham for his existence, he requires no direct
help from Abraham in begetting Jacob.
The second difference is
clear. There is a sense in which the hand-stick-stone
“system “really form a single simultaneous moving system of intermediate
efficient causes ultimately deriving their causal efficacies from the ultimate
uncaused efficient cause, however distant it may be removed from the hand and
the stick. This ultimate cause is a
different, superior, type of cause from which, ultimately, the hand and the stick
derive the efficacy to posh the stone.
Abraham and Isaac, however, are both fathers; neither is a superior type
or kind of cause.
Finally, the third
difference is present in the examples, according to the medievals,
because at the very moment the stick pushes, the man pushes with the
stick. As noted above, there is a
simultaneous unity to the series of the intermediate derivative efficient
causes. Distinguishing the hand, the
stick, and the stone are merely to distinguish nodes in a singular causal
chain. They really do not exist as causal forces independent of one another. By contrast, it is obvious that Isaac does
not beget Jacob at the very moment Abraham begets Isaac.
Aquinas and other medievals suggested that accidentally ordered causes,
might, for all Philosophy can tell,
regress to infinity. But
essentially ordered causes cannot. They must
terminate in a cause of a different and superior kind. Arguments to show this were based on the
three differences mentioned above. For
instance, consider the third difference: Since all essentially ordered causes
are required simultaneously, if there were an infinite regress among them,
there would, at one moment, be an actual completed infinite set of causes. But the medievals
felt Aristotle had shown this to be absurd. The existence of a completed
infinite series is a metaphysical impossibility. Therefore, there can be no infinite regress
among essentially ordered causes. The
sequence must come to a stop at some first cause—which we call God. 😊
Thus a model consisting
exclusively of caused causes would be unsatisfactory for precisely the same
reason as before. This model leads to an
infinite regress. Even an infinite chain
of (intermediate derivative) caused causes requires a cause of a different
order, i.e., that which provides causal efficacy without having to borrow it
from some previous cause, in short, an uncaused cause. Again we must suppose something radically
different from the sort of causes we see on a daily basis, an Uncaused Cause, which causes the system
of causality. This something is
radically different, transcendent, outside the system; A FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE ‑
GOD
Third Argument ‑ Argument of
Contingent Objects
The third way is
taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things
that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated,
and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it
is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be
at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at
one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing
was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd.
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something
the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its
necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity
in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate
the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This
all men speak of as God.
I chose to render this argument of Aquinas as a Reductio ad Absurdum:
A redutio ad absurdum is an argument technique
where one begins by assuming what one wishes to disprove and then shows how, by
valid inference, it leads to an absurdly false claim.
We know from logic that, when a valid
argument has a false conclusion, then at least one of the premises is false. If we end with falsity, there must be falsity
in our premise set, presumably the assumed premise we are seeking to discredit.
|
|
Premise |
Justification |
|
1 |
There are
contingent objects. |
Viola! (This
rests on observation.) |
|
2 |
Everything which
exists is contingent. |
Atheist
Assumption #1- that there is no Necessary Being- Of course,
Aquinas does not believe this is true.
But does his belief in the existence of a Necessary Being rest only on
his Christian Faith, or is it grounded in Reason as well? |
|
3 |
Everything could
go out of existence. |
Follows from the
conjunction of #1-Definition of Contingent & #2 that everything that
exists is contingent. |
|
4 |
All real
possibilities occur in an infinite amount of time. |
Metaphysical Principle- It seems to follow from reason that, given
enough time anything possible would happen. If after an infinite amount of
time, it still hasn’t happened, then it was never really possible in the first place. |
|
5 |
An infinite
amount of time has occurred. |
Atheist Assumption #2- If one does
not believe in creation, then time stretches infinitely backwards because
there is no beginning. If there was no
creation therefore the universe is infinitely old. Of course
Aquinas does not believe this is true.
But does his belief rest only on his Christian Faith, or is it
grounded in Reason as well? |
|
6 |
All real possibilities have occurred. |
Follows from
4&5 |
|
7 |
Everything has
gone out of existence. –Nothing exists. |
Follows from
3&6 |
|
8 |
There are no
contingent objects |
Follows from 7 |
|
9 |
There are
contingent objects and there are no contingent objects. |
Conjunction of
1&8 |
The conclusion here is a logical
contradiction, and thus, (absurdly) false.
When a valid argument has a false conclusion,
then at least one of the premises is false.
Therefore, Aquinas says that there must
be something which has necessary existence (premise 2 MUST be false).[10] And that necessary being is GOD.
Principle of Sufficient Reason: (From William Rowe)
Rowe suggests that all cosmological
arguments depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. For what it’s worth, I agree that it is
operative in Leibnizian type cosmological arguments, but not the other two
kinds (i.e. Kalam and Aristotelian/ Thomistic)
Two Parts:
P.S.R =
a. there is an
explanation for every object.
b. there is an
explanation for every positive fact (why it is as it is and not other than it
is).
Imagine the Universe is an eternal string
of contingent objects (e.g. Chickens) so that history is an infinite series of
contingent objects producing other contingent objects. (e.g. Chickens making
chickens). While every link in the chain
would have an explanation, that is, while every contingent object would be
explained by the model (satisfies PSR
part “A”), there would still be something left unexplained by this model of
reality, namely, “why is it that there are and always have been contingent
objects (chickens)?”(PSR part “B”) Thus, if PSR is true, then there must be a
necessary being, in addition to the contingent beings we witness.
Essentially, this argument asks: “Why
is there something rather than nothing?”
The (best/only) explanation is God:
The First Three of the Five Ways In Sum:
A Thomistic Reading
1. System of objects exhibiting derivative
motion can only exist given a source of motion which is not itself
derivative. Therefore, there must be
some outside (transcendent) unmoved force-mover.
2. System of objects exhibiting derivative
causality can only exist given a source of causation which is not itself
derivative. Therefore, there must be some outside (transcendent) uncaused cause.
3. System of contingent objects
(derivative being) can only exist given a source of existence which is not
itself derivative. Therefore, there must be some outside (transcendent)
necessary being.
A Leibnizian (PSR) Reading
1. System of moved objects is not self‑explanatory therefore there must be some outside
(transcendent) force-mover and that must be God.
2. System of finite causality is not self‑explanatory therefore there must be some outside
(transcendent) cause and that must be God
3. System of contingent objects is not
self-explanatory therefore there must be some outside (transcendent) object and
that must be a necessary being ‑ God
We will not scrutinize the fourth and fifth ways here,
but…
Fourth Argument –
depends on there being objectively true comparative judgements. Therefore there must be a best (Best).
Fifth Argument ‑
Teleological argument. Universe exhibits
intelligent direction, adherence to rational principle. That can only be if it is directed by a being
with intelligence and power, and that must be God.
His Fifth way is often interpreted as a
sort of design argument similar to William Paley. However, I do not believe that it is. I see this as much closer to his others. The universe (and objects in the universe)
exhibit intelligence/ order/ Logos. But
this is a derived intelligence. And if
anything has derived intelligence, then there must be a source of underived
intelligence to bestow it.
Objections to Cosmological Arguments in General and Aquinas’ Ways In
Particular:
1. “Prime Mover,” “First Cause,”
“Necessary Object”‑ Aquinas says we call these “God”, but taken
individually, they certainly are not equivalent to the Theistic O-God. Further, even taken jointly they may fall
short of what religions teach.
Response:
Aquinas is trying to show, like any good empiricist, that it is more reasonable to believe in God, then to
disbelieve or remain agnostic. Given
that we know the universe has a necessary source of being, movement and
causality which is supremely good and intelligent, it is far more reasonable to
be a theist than to be an atheist or to remain agnostic.
2. Principle of Sufficient Reason makes
perfect sense when applied to objects and events within the universe. But it
makes no sense whatsoever when applied to the Universe itself as a whole. The question “Why is there something rather
then nothing?” is a pseudo-question and a category mistake. It assumes that “the universe” belongs to the
category of things with an explanation, but there is no reason to make that
assumption. We should accept the
existence of the Universe as a Brute
Fact. If PSR is denied, specifically as a tool of metaphysics, the
cosmological argument is defanged.
Jean Paul Sartre felt that the universe
was "gratuitous" and Bertrand Russell claimed that the question of
origins was tangled in meaningless verbiage and that we must be content to
declare that the universe is "just there and that's all."
Response: Why should we accept
that the existence of the universe is indeed a brute fact? Isn’t this an arbitrary stipulation
manufactured just to avoid assenting to the existence of God? Further, even some scientists are interested
in asking –perhaps even answering the question: “Why is there something rather
than nothing?”. (e.g. The Grand
Unification Theory Quest of some physicists.)
For
instance Stephen Hawking once wrote:
“…if
we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad
principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all,
philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the
discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist.
If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason
– for then we would know the mind of God.”[11]
(emphasis added.)
Further
still, it is not really clear that Aquinas’ argument turns on the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. Notice that Rowe invokes
it, but Aquinas did not mention it.
3. Concepts like “move,” “cause,”
“exist,” “time,” etc. are only concepts that arise from human intellect and
perception and can only apply to human experience. To try to apply these concepts to the world
“as it is,” that is, to the world as uncategorized by the concepts of mind is illicit. It is an attempt to use them outside their
rightful/useful jurisdiction.
For instance, David Hume argues that
causation is a psychological, not a metaphysical, principle, one whose origins
lay in the human propensity to assume necessary connections between
events when all we really see is constant conjunction, contiguity and
succession. If apparent causation is a
psychological propensity and not an objective fact, then we cannot reason to an
objective "Uncaused Cause."
Immanuel Kant echoes Hume here,
somewhat, by arguing that causation is a category of thought built into our
minds as one of the many ways in which we constitute our experience to
ourselves. This has the same, familiar result of limiting the jurisdiction of
"causality" to the realm of human-experience-reality only and not the
mind-independent world.
Response: This is an objection
to metaphysics generally, not an
objection to the particular arguments per
se. As such, a full response would
require a general defense of metaphysics as a legitimate form of inquiry.
Finally:
I found the place in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant
says that the cosmological argument is dependent on the ontological argument
and can therefore be dismissed as the latter was.
Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of
God:
"But no ens realissimum is in any respect different
from another, and what is valid of some is valid of all. In this present case,
therefore, I may employ simple conversion, and say, every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as
this proposition is determined a priori
by the conceptions contained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum
must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is
exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and not recognized by
the cosmological, although it formed the real ground of its disguised and
illusory reasoning."[12]
Modern Versions (sort
of):
The “Fine Tuning
Argument”
There are various
versions of this argument proposed with greater or lesser sophistication. I will merely outline the nature of the
argument below. What intrigues me here
is that they seem rather similar to Aquinas’ notions asking, if not “Why is
there something rather then nothing?” they ask “Why is there this
something rather then any of an infinite variety of equally possible
somethings?” Further, even if we cannot
discover the answer to that, doesn’t the type of universe we have itself give
us a clue as to what lies beyond the boundaries of empirical investigation?
Begins with observations:
Our Universe, with its present complexity is a Life-friendly universe. (Viola!)
But, the more we know
about all the many variables that went into the “Big Bang” the more we should
see that OUR Universe as “fine tuned” for “life-friendly.” Altering any one of the variables that
account for the development of our universe, even slightly would result in a universe
devoid of complexity and therefore even the possibility of life. For instance, were the rate of expansion even
slightly faster, the universe would never have developed large clops of stuff
(solar systems, galaxies, planets, etc.), but rather be an endlessly expanding
cloud of hydrogen gas. Or, say the rate
of expansion were only infinitesimally slower, the universe would have simply
collapsed back on itself seconds later.
1.
Let us assume that it is
a fact that that this life friendly universe (and only this life friendly
universe) exists is a positive fact.
2.
Since PSR claims that
every positive fact has an explanation (sufficient reason for why it is so)
then PSR commits us to the idea that there is an explanation for why this life
friendly universe exists.
But notice, nothing within
the life friendly universe can explain this fact, since any and all things
(causes, forces, principles) within the universe are precisely what were trying
to explain.
3.
This being the case, only
something radically different (transcendent) can explain it. And that we call God, as Aquinas might
say.
Well, of course there is
a logical gap between “That which explains the Life-friendly Universe” and “Jehovah” et alia, but that reason and
experience commits us to the notion of a transcendent cause of a life friendly
universe supports a theistic view of reality more than an atheistic view of
reality. Put another way, a life
friendly universe is just the sort of thing you would expect given theism, but
have no particular reason to expect it given atheism. (Buying a one-way airline ticket under an
assumed name is just the sort of thing you’d expect the suspect to do if he
were guilty, but you would have no particular reason to expect this if he were
not guilty.) Therefore, while such
arguments may or may not demonstrate that a Fine Tuner is a necessary
theoretical presupposition of observable fact, if successful they would
demonstrate that (these) observable facts confirm the Theistic Model more than
they confirm the Atheistic Model.