Faith: St Thomas
Aquinas:
Between the second and eleventh century AD, the main philosophical influence on Christian theology was that of Plato and the Neo-Platonist tradition (as represented, by example, in Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius).
Beginning in the twelfth
century, the works of Aristotle were reintroduced to the Western world. (Some
of Aristotle’s works in logic were in available prior to the twelfth-century, as
far back as Boethius 480–524 or 525). Aristotle's writing were preserved at the
The study of Aristotle spread rapidly by the thirteenth
century. Some of Aristotle’s ideas were banned
in the universities (e.g., at
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), a student of Albert the Great (an Augustinian) attempts the first thorough assimilation of Aristotle’s philosophy into Neo-Platonic Christian theology.
Two of Thomas’ main works were the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra Gentiles.
A. Aristotelian Influences
Scientia
1.The idea of scientia (science) as an organized body of propositions in the form of the syllogism, in which a conclusion/effect is logically deduced from a cause/ (universal and necessary) premises. Scientia is knowing some truth P, where P is logically demonstrated from premises which are themselves universal and necessary and which state the cause of what is affirmed in the conclusion.
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1 |
All men are mortal. |
Universal Affirmative claim which is necessarily true –apprehended from an understanding of the essence of "Man" |
Immediate truth grasped by intuition |
|
2 |
Socrates is a man. |
Universal Affirmative claim- necessarily apprehended from an understanding of Socrates essence |
Immediate truth grasped by intuition |
|
3 |
Socrates is mortal |
Necessarily true claim as it is validly deduced from to universal necessarily true claims. |
Scientia logically deduced from immediate truths. |
There are immediate truths grasped by intuition and there are objects of scientia deduced from these immediate truths. Aristotle articulates a foundationalist epistemology.
Important to realize that these universal first principles were thought to be necessary metaphysical truths about eternal essences, not empirical generalizations based on particular experiences.
Aristotle and Aquinas were empiricists, but they were NOT Lockean empiricists. They were direct realists, not representational realists. When the mind grasped the form of the thing (cat, dog, whatever) it was the actual form that the mind grasped, not a “representation” of the form grasped.
According to Aristotle, scientific knowledge is like this: we (scientifically) know a proposition P if and only if P is the conclusion of a logically demonstrative syllogism in which the premises state the cause of what is affirmed in the conclusion. (The essential mortality of human kind explains / is the formal cause of Socrates’s mortality.) He thought that every branch of science (biology, physics, mathematics) can be/ should be so arranged.
2. Generally Aristotle eschews Plato’s metaphysical dualism. Aristotle maintained that Plato’s forms do not have existence independent of actual, particular physical objects. (If we kill every dog, the "form" of dog would be eliminated, not that I would EVER entertain such an idea.)
Universals such as beauty, or justice exist in concrete individual things or acts, not as immaterial Forms in the Realm of Being, as Plato had taught. Further, Aristotle rejects Plato’s rationalism. Knowledge of these forms was gained by observing the world.[1] Consequently, Aristotle places a great deal of importance on visible world and sensory perception. He, and Aquinas with him, are Empiricists. Thomas is famous for saying what Aristotle surely would have agree with
"Nothing is in the mind that was not first in the senses."
3. Aristotle's metaphysics claims that world consists of concrete, individual existing things (substances) which themselves consist of an indeterminate part (matter) and a determinate part (form).
4. Aristotle argues that the phenomenon of change requires an unchanging initiator. This entity must have always existed, be immaterial (since matter is always a composite and all composites present the possibility of change), is intelligent, changeless, and moves the world by being the object of the world’s desire. (How else can a thing both be inert and effect change? Think of how little a girl need "do" to move a boy who is in love with her).
5. The world is has always existed. Aristotle reasons that the world have had a "beginning," since that would necessitate a "time" before the world began. This later is absurd since all "time" is the changing of things and there would be not "things" to change before there was a world.
B. Platonist
Influences
Aquinas incorporates Platonist/ Neo-Platonist principles in his philosophy.
1. The notion of transcendence (and hence unknowability) of God
Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysiu[2] (both 5th century AD) had each emphasized a negative theology: discourse about God by means of denying of him those things (predicates) which are true of humans. The more we know about God, the less we actually know about him. Theology ends in darkness. "God," wrote Dionysius, "is the darkness beyond the light." "Theology" must be agnostic with respect to the nature of God since God is infinite and humans are finite.
2. The existence of finite things can only be explained by way of "participation" in the existence of God. (Nothing we experience has "existence" as part of its essence so its existence must emanate from elsewhere.)
2. Plato had emphasized the idea of the "soul’s return" to the world of the forms after a period of separation in body. Thomas writes the Summa Theologica with this theme of the exitus et reditus in mind. Theology begins with discussion on the existence of God, then the creation and fall of human beings, their salvation through Christ, and finally their return back to God in death and resurrection.
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PLATO |
THOMAS |
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1. Forms: the source or pattern of all things. |
1. God: the source or pattern of all things |
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2. Visible world: a reflection of the forms. |
2. Visible world: a reflection of God. |
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3. Fall into body is separation from Forms/God. (EXITUS) |
3. Fall into sin is separation from God. (EXITUS) |
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4. Happiness: to return to the forms. (REDITUS) |
4. Happiness: to return to God. (REDITUS) |
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5. Philosophy: the way to happiness. |
5. Christ: the way to happiness. |
3. Aquinas retains something of Plato's hierarchical notion of reality (as the sum total of existing things). Plato's "divided line" represents but a scale of degrees of existence – from perfect existence (like the forms) to less perfect existence (objects in the physical world). Thomas combines Aristotle’s substance metaphysics with Plato’s doctrine of participation to yield the following result:
All created things are a composition of essence (essentia) and existence (esse). Every created thing has existence and has it by virtue of depending on God who is existence itself. The created world embodies many perfections which it has by virtue of its dependence on God (it’s coming from God), but the basic perfection all created things share in is the act of existence which they have from God. God freely wills to create the world because he wills that other things participate in his own goodness. The world does this most fundamentally by being given "existence."
II. Thomas on Faith
and Reason
Thomas distinguishes between truths about God which are known:
1. By natural reason -"in the light of natural reason"
2. By revelation -"in the light of divine revelation"
A. The Nature of
Knowledge
Thomas distinguishes between two kinds of natural knowledge:
1. immediate (what is known in itself)
2. mediate or inferential (what is known by means of something)
According to Thomas, we can have certainty of the object of knowledge in both cases.
Recall that the highest form of knowledge for Aristotle is scientia (scientific knowledge).
Example: scientific knowledge of "Socrates is mortal"
Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man.
=====================
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.
In a given syllogism, one or the other or even both of the premises could be themselves logically demonstrated from other propositions, giving us a whole chain of syllogisms. But Aristotle thought that at some point, each branch in science must have first principles which are self-evident and known immediately. These are called axioms (Like in geometry).
Therefore, all the propositions of a science can be know with certainty since they will either be self-evident axioms, or are logically demonstrated from this set of axioms. Every science will have it's own axiom/theorem division (in addition to what is common to all- i.e. logic).
B. Two-Fold Mode of
Knowing Divine Truth
With respect to divine revelation, Aquinas distinguishes between:
1. Preambles of the faith: those revealed truths that natural reason can in principle come to knowledge (scientia) of without the aid of divine revelation. (E.g., God exists, is one, is immutable, is good, etc.)
2. Mysteries of the faith: those revealed truths that natural reason cannot even in principle come to knowledge of without the aid of divine revelation. (E.g, God is a trinity, Christ is God incarnate, Creation, etc)
Some of Thomas’s points regarding this distinction are as follows:
1. The distinction is NOT one of content but rather one of mode of acquisition of the truth. Both the preambles and articles of faith belong to the genus of revealed truths. IN fact, Thomas points out that what might be accepted as an Article of Faith for one individual might be “seen” as a Preamble of Faith by another.
Now as stated above (Article 4), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. On like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.[3]
2. We can have certainty of both: the certainty of the preambles is guaranteed by evidentness or comprehension and the certainty it the mysteries is in psychological assurance (Faith in God’s revelation).
1. Firmness of adherence: Faith is more "certain" in this sense than either scientia or intellectus. (One can have skeptical doubts about that which is grasped only by the intellect.)
2. Evidentness of the object of assent: Faith is less "certain" in this sense than either scientia or intellectus.
While the Mysteries of faith cannot be demonstrated true, neither can they be proven false either. Therefore, any argument which purports to do so must be defective (unsound). We can demonstrate the unsoundness of objections to the articles and indeed, this is the charge of Christian philosophers. Pope John Paul II reaffirmed this responsibility in one of his last encyclical.
Mysteries of faith have two of the central features of scientia.
1. We can use them to prove that other things are true in the same way scientia uses first principles (which are not demonstrable).
2. As "first principles" they can be established by the light of another "higher" science. They are established in the highest of all sciences, scientia Dei - the knowledge of God.
Demonstrations of the preambles of faith differ from the scientia of Aristotle in that they do not proceed from premises which state the "essence" of God, since the essence of God is unknowable to humans.
Two kinds of
Demonstratio:
Demonstratio Propter Quid: A demonstrative syllogism which argues from the formal cause or essence of a thing to some fact about it[4]; an argument which moves from a knowledge of "what it is" to some detail entailed in the thig’s essence.
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore
Socrates is mortal
This is the form of scientia. In the forgoing we see that the cause of Socrtes’s mortality is his human nature. We cannot have arguments of this kind with respect to God since we cannot have definitive knowledge or "what God is."
Demonstratio Quia: An argument which proceeds from premises about
the effects
of what is then reasoned to as a necessary postulate in the conclusion.
From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13:
"Knowledge of the fact (quia demonstration) differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact (propter quid demonstrations). [...] You might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B, since that which does not twinkle is near--we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that we have demonstrated that the planets are near. This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact (propter quid) but only the fact (quia); since they are not near because they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle...."
A (major term) = close heavenly body
B (middle term) = non-twinkling heavenly body
C (minor term) = planet
Major Premise: All B are A
Minor Premise: All C are B
Conclusion: All C are A
=
Major Premise: Non-Twinkling heavenly bodies are close heavenly bodies.
Minor Premise: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).
Conclusion: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).
From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13 (cont'd):
"The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact (propter quid). Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling. Then B is an attribute of C, and A-not twinkling-of B. Consequently A is predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact (propter quid), since its middle term is the proximate cause...."
A (major term) = non-twinkling heavenly body
B (middle term) = close heavenly body
C (minor term) = planet
Major Premise: B is A
Minor Premise: C is B
Conclusion: C is A
=
Major Premise: Close heavenly bodies are non-twinkling heavenly bodies.
Minor Premise: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).
Conclusion: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).
Arguments for the existence of God will be cases of demonstratio quia[5], which proceed from premises about the effects of what is then reasoned to as a necessary postulate in the conclusion. (Thinks of his Viae Quintae; In each, God is the presented as the necessary theoretical postulate needed to explain some observed effect, e.g. motion, causes, etc.) The first kind of demonstration tells us why something is so; the second tells us that something is so.
Note: Thomas denies that we can have a natural knowledge of the articles of faith, but this does not entail that we can have no knowledge of them at all because there are (at least) two ways of knowing divine truth.
The Nature of God and Theological Discourse
Thomas distinguishes between questions as to whether something exists and what it is that exists. Having shown that there exists a first being, whom he calls God, he must now investigate the properties of such this first existent.
A. Preliminary Dangers to Understanding the Nature of God
1. Anthropomorphism: The position according to which God is a being who has perfections proportionate to those of creatures, only to a much higher degree
2. Obscurantism: The position according to which God is so utterly different from creatures that none of the perfections belonging to creatures in any way resembles any perfection belonging to God
B. Via remotionis [= the method of removing or denying]
Two Crucial Limitations on our Knowledge of God:
1. All knowledge is rooted in sensory perceptual experience. But God, being immaterial and invisible, is not an object of sensory experience
2. All "strictly" scientific knowledge of a thing requires a logical demonstration from the essence of the thing and the classification of a thing in terms of genus and species. But we do not know the essence of God and so we cannot locate God as a member of any genus. In fact, God IS NOT a member of any class of things.
In the Summa Theologica, Thomas says: "We cannot know what God is, but only what he is not." That statement must be understood in terms of the above two constraints. It does not mean that we can make no true statements about God or hold no true beliefs about God. We have no positive quidditative or natural-kind concept of God (also called negative theology or via negativa).
Therefore, we must first ask not what God is but what He is not.
C. Via affirmationis [= the method of affirming]
There must be some similarity between God and the created order. (Mover argument seems to rely on this.)
The principle of divine simplicity provides constraints on how we are to think about God. Positive affirmations about God (that God is good, wise, etc.) are not to be understood as negations nor metaphors, but are predicated literally of God but ANALOGICALLY.
There are three types of literal predication:
As applied to God: 'Socrates is wise' --- 'God is wise' --- 'God is Wisdom'
Qualities literally
predicated of God:
Qualities that are
metaphorically predicated of God:
'rock', 'mighty fortress', 'lion'
Used to suggest a perfection, but in fact express a quality can only be belong to a creature
Note: Thomas denies that we can have a natural knowledge of the articles of faith, but this does not entail that we can have no knowledge of them at all.
One of the points to his distinction between articles of faith and preambles to the faith is to show that there are (at least) two ways of knowing divine truth. Moreover, if there is a sense of "natural knowledge" distinct from scientia, Thomas need not (and probably would not) object to the claim that we could know the articles of faith by natural reason in that sense.
Four Natural Questions (corresponding to Summa Contra Gentiles Chapters, 3-6)
1. Is it reasonable to think that there are truths about God that exceed our natural cognitive abilities? (Chapter 3)
Yes, because human intellects are naturally limited to sense experience and God is beyond the data of sense perception, so it would be foolish for anyone to think that something is false merely because it falls outside the scope of human reason to logically demonstrate. This consideration is strengthened by comparison with everyday knowledge in which we discover that we are ignorant of many of the intelligible features of the natures of physical things which fall within the scope of human experience.
2. Wasn't it not pointless of God to reveal the preambles of the faith? (Chapter 4)
No, because (I) the arguments which establish the preambles are difficult for many to grasp, (ii) those who grasp them usually do so after spending a long time studying the arguments, and (iii) truth is mixed with error in human reasoning because of sin. But the truths about God in the preambles are very important for us to know. Our salvation and happiness depends on us knowing them.
3. Isn't it wrong of God to demand that we assent to the mysteries of the faith, given that these mysteries cannot be rendered intellectually compelling to us? (Chapter 5)
No, since we are thereby reminded of God’s greatness and our finitude, and since these truths are not evident to us (by reason) we are allowed to embrace them freely by faith.
4. Isn't it foolish and intellectually irresponsible for us to assent to the mysteries of the faith? (Chapter 6)
No, because the articles of faith (I) are confirmed by positive empirical and moral evidences and (ii) are not inconsistent with what we know with certainty as a deliverance of reason.
Arguments against the articles of faith which proceed from first principles or otherwise evident truths must thereby derive their conclusions incorrectly or invalidly, since the articles of faith are true and a valid inference from all true premises must also be true. It is also possible that such objections to the mysteries are based on false premises which are not in fact first principles of reason.
Five theses about faith and reason (from SCG, Chapters 7-9)
1. There can be no genuine conflict between the deliverance of faith and the deliverance of reason.
2. Apparent conflicts are in principle resolvable by us
3. Philosophical or scientific objections to the faith can and should be answered on their own terms--this is an important task for Christian intellectuals.
4. Reason, while not so corrupted by sin that on its own it yields falsehoods as certitudes, nonetheless needs the guidance of faith to do its best.
5. Philosophical reason is an important tool in spreading and maintaining the faith.
[1] Now, he does not give a very detailed account of just how the knowledge of these forms was acquired. It is an intellectual process of “abstraction.” Aristotle uses nous as an intuitive faculty that grasps the “first principles” once and for all as true in such a way that it does not leave any room for the skeptic to press his skeptical point any further. The traditional account views Aristotelian nous as having an internalist justificatory function.
[2] Pseudo-Dionysius
was a theologian and philosopher of the late 5th to early 6th century. He was initially believed to be Dionysius the
Areopagite, the Athenian converted to Christianity by
[4] demonstratio propter quid, that is, X is demonstrated of Y because of what Y is. A explanation of "why" the fact is so.
[5] demonstratio quia — demonstration from effects. A demonstration from the fact to the nature of things more generally.