Pascal’s Wager
Non-Evidential Reason to Believe “That God Exists”
The Table of Options when it Comes to Theistic Belief
Calculating the Rationality of a Bet
"You bet your life" - William Lycan & George Schlesinger
(1989)
Epilogue: Dim View of Natural
Theology
Non-Evidential Reason to Believe “That God Exists”
What we looked at initially were attempts to show that
there is sufficient evidence to prove that the proposition “God exists.” is
true. Next we looked at attempts to show
that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the proposition “God exists.”
Is false. What we will be looking at
next are attempts to show that, despite the fact that there is NOT sufficient
evidence to prove the proposition “God exists.” is true, it is nevertheless
reasonable to believe the proposition anyway.
I classify these as “non-evidential reasons to believe that God exists.”
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pasc-wag.htm
"Belief is a wise wager. Granted that
faith cannot be proved, what harm will come to you if you gamble on its truth
and it proves false? If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing.
Wager, then, without hesitation, that He exists."
Pascal’s Wager is an instance of Game Theory – a means of deciding
what to DO by trying to figure out
likely outcomes of all possible courses of action. The reasonable choice is the one with the
greatest chances for the best success.
Game Theory‑ a
heuristic for decision making where one considers all the possible courses of
action that are under one's control and postulates how each would turn out in
each possible scenario or events beyond one's control (attaching the relevant
costs/benefits and probabilities). The
“right” (i.e. rational) choice is the one that is most likely to have the best
consequences in all of, or most of, the most likely scenarios.
http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/hum9/pascalswager.pdf
The Table of Options when it Comes to Theistic Belief
There are two possible states of affairs which are
beyond my control (or knowledge)
1. God exists.
2. God doesn't exist.
Can't control these
There are two courses of action which are (to some
degree) within my control.
1. Believe
2. Do not believe[1]
This makes for a very simple Game Theory matrix: The top row lists the variable you cannot
control. The left column lists the
variable you can control and from which you must select what to do. Note then that for Pascal, there is no way to
“sit on the sidelines” when it comes to the question of God. Each one of us is either living the life of a
believer or living the life of a non-believer.
We've made a choice. And his point is, regardless of what choice we've
made, it's a wager. The only question
that remains is “What is the most prudent wager to make?”
|
|
God Exists |
God Does Not Exist |
I Believe in God
|
Infinite
Joy (Heaven) |
Nothing
(Makes no difference) |
|
I don’t Believe in God |
Infinite
Misery (Hell) |
Nothing
(Makes No Difference) |
Four possible choice scenarios:
- If I believe God exists and I’m right; I will go to
Heaven.
- If I believe God exists and I’m wrong; there’s no
penalty.
- If I do not believe in God and God exists; I’m
wrong, I will go to Hell.
- If I do not believe in God and I’m right; there’s
no reward.
Best Option is the Rational Bet
Pascal claims that the best option (most reasonable
course of action) is to believe because the best that can happen is you go to
heaven and the worst is that nothing will happen. With belief, you have a shot at the best and
avoid the worst. With non-belief, you
have no shot at the best and you risk the worst. Thus he urges us, “Wager, then, without
hesitation, that He exists.”
Pascal gives non-evidential
reasons to believe that God exists; He claims that that the evidence
does not settle the matter of the existence of God one way or the other. So Pascal’s
Wager does not prove the existence of God; it just says that to believe in God
is rational because it is the best bet.
The conclusion is NOT "God Exists." But rather, "It is
rational, reasonable to believe that God exists."
Still…
Initial
Objections:
Is God happy with the wagerer, who believes
in God just because it seems a better bet?
Imagining getting to heaven and exclaiming, “OMG,, I
can’t believe I won!”
Pascal himself notes that this is a problem and says that
once convinced by his argument one ought to surround oneself with believers and
immerse oneself in the culture of belief so that the right, genuine belief
develops. In other words, if you are
convinced that belief is more prudent than non-belief, engage in those
activities that will help you achieve belief.
Calculating the Rationality of a Bet
But the rationality of a wager depends upon a number of
different factors. First, what is the
cost/ investment? Second what is the pay
off? And third, what are the chances for
success. The best bet is one with no
cost, high pay off and great odds for winning.
The worst bet would be one with high costs, low pay off and poor chances
of winning.
Notice, while I rarely play the lottery, I would be
irrational to turn down a FREE lottery ticket, no matter how high the odds or
how low the pay off. Similarly, it would
be irrational to turn down free earthquake insurance on my house, even though
here in Miami, the chances of us having an earthquake are very low. So, when
deciding to play the lottery or buy insurance I need to consider these factors
to determine the rationality.
We might render the values something like this:
The Probability of Winning times (the sum of the Pay Off
minus the investment) equals the Rationality of taking the bet.
(Pr W)* [(Pay Off)
– (Investment)] = Ra of Betting
But this means that, to consider the rationality of the
argument, we must consider these factors with respect to belief in God.
1.
What is the cost of the bet?
Pascal suggest it is nothing, or next to
nothing. But is that true? Wouldn’t it require that we give up certain
things (sin/ fun) and make certain sacrifices (attend weekly services)?
2.
What is the pay off?
3.
What are the odds for success?
He offers two options, but that does not
necessarily mean that that the odds are 50/50.
William Lycan & George Schlesinger (1989)
"You bet your life", in Reason & Responsibility, 7th
edition (ed. Joel Feinberg, Belmont CA: Wadsworth).
Lycan and Schlesinger first consider a couple of problems
with Pascal's argument
Q: 1. Does Pascal's argument turn on a 50% chance that
God exists‑ the existence of God may not be a 50/50 chance?
A:
No. They respond that it doesn’t
matter since the pay-off is infinite. So
long as there is any chance at all it is worth it.
(Pr W)*
[(Pay Off) – (Investment)] = Ra of Betting
(Pr W)*
[(∞) – (Investment)] = Ra of Betting (i.e.∞)
Q: 2. Which God do you believe in?
A: They respond that:
a.) you should, using the motivating logic of
the argument itself, believe in the God
with the best heaven and the worst hell and thereby get an opportunity for the
best while avoiding the worst and
b.) one that has some historical weight
behind it.
Q: 3. What if it
is on the pains of martyrdom?
What if you are living in the age of persecution? Would this wager give you the right answer in
a time that you must be willing to die for your faith? If not then this argument is not going to
give you the right kind of belief that will get you into heaven (i.e. if real
faith requires that one be willing to die for one’s belief).
A: They respond that:
a.) we are not living in the age of religious persecution and
b.) even if we were, any finite amount of suffering is worth the
investment when the possible pay-off is infinite.
Again:
(Pr W)*
[(Pay Off) – (Investment)] = Ra of Betting
(Pr W)*
[(∞) – (Investment – i.e. less than ∞)] = Ra of Betting
(i.e.∞)
Two more not considered in "You bet your
life":
Q: 4. Could you actually make yourself believe or not
believe something? Beliefs are
involuntary (for the most part)
Pascal suggests that you can make yourself believe by immersing
yourself in the religion, but that doesn’t always (ever?) work. I recall speaking with a former protestant
minister who left the ministry after a number of years. I asked him why and he said that he woke up
one morning and “God was gone.” He felt
bad about this and in fact regretted losing his faith in God, but he had lost
his faith despite the fact that he was immersed in the culture of belief.
Q: 5. Is such a “Jealous God” worthy of worship?
Pascal’s concept of God does not offer a guarantee a God
that is worthy of worship; Anselm offers a God that is worthy of worship, but
Pascal’s God could be a spiteful, vengeful egomaniac. Such a being would not merit worship even if
he could command it.
Nevertheless…
Perhaps this argument is just good
for those who are on the fence about a traditional religious faith and want to
feel more “rational” about believing without evidence.
But if it cannot give rational
justification for belief in (a particular) God to one who is NOT on the fence,
then is does not give rational justification to one who is on the fence
either. Either it is a sound argument or
it is not.
Pascal himself entitles this:
“A letter to
incite to the search after God.”
Curiously, Pascal himself seems to
have had his faith grounded in a profound personal religious experience.
Pascal's
Prayer : The Memorial
He took a somewhat dim view of
Natural Theology and philosophical attempts to prove the existence of God. He suggests that at best they lead to
philosophical abstractions and not to the God of the Bible, the dynamic living
God that scripture names, the God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, but
rather to “the God of the Philosophers and the learned.” What's worse, they may even contribute to a
prideful arrogant attitude on behalf of humans and rather than leading to an
acknowledgement of our dependence on God give us a sense of prideful
self-sufficiency.
Following his profound religious
experience in 1654, Pascal abandoned mathematics and physics for philosophy and
theology. His most influential work, the Pensees,
was never completed, but a version of his notes for that book were published in
1670, eight years after his death.
From
Pensees: OF
THE NECESSITY OF THE WAGER
Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason
for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give a
reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a foolishness, stultitiam[2] and then you complain that
they do not prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is
in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense. "Yes, but although this excuses those who offer it as
such and takes away from them the blame
of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those who receive it." Let us then
examine this point, and say, "God is, or He is not." But to which
side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite
chaos which separated us. A game is
being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails
will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the
one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.
Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for
you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this
choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses
tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not
to wager at all."
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which
interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and
two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your
happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your
reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must
of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us
weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two
chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then,
without hesitation that He is.
"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps
wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of
loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager.
But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are
under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are
forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is
an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness.
And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only
would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life
against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for
you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there
is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain
against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is
all divided; where-ever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances
of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all.
And thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his
life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of
nothingness.
For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the
infinite distance between the certainty of what is staked and the uncertainty
of what will be gained, equals the
finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain infinite. It is not so, as every
player stakes a certainty to gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite
certainty to gain a finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason.
There is not an infinite distance between the certainty staked and the
uncertainty of the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between
the certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the gain is
proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the proportion of the
chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes
that, if there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the uncertainty of
the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an infinite distance between
them. And so our proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to
stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite
to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is
one.
"I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of
seeing the faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc.
"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager,
and am not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?"
True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings
you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to convince yourself,
not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You
would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure
yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been
bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who
know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would
be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed,
taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make
you believe, and deaden your acuteness. "But this is what I am afraid of."
And why? What have you to lose?
But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen
the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.
The end of this discourse.- Now, what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful,
humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not
have those poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others?
I will tell you that you will thereby
gain in this life, and that, at each
step you take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you risk,
that you will at last recognise that you have wagered
for something certain and infinite, for which you have given nothing.
"Ah! This discourse transports me, charms me," etc.
If this discourse pleases you and seems impressive, know that it is
made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in prayer to that Being,
infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he has, for you also to lay
before Him all you have for your own good and for His glory, that so strength
may be given to lowliness.
234. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an uncertainty,
sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at all, for nothing is certain, and that there is
more certainty in religion than there is
as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it
is certainly possible that we may not,
see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is not certain that it is; but
who will venture to say that it is certainly possible that it is not? Now when
we work for to-morrow, and so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we
ought to work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was
demonstrated above.[3]