(Evidential) Arguments for Theism: The Ontological
Argument
His Ontological Argument
Initial Criticisms Of Anselm’s Argument
·
Gaunilo
Immanuel
Kant’s Criticism of the Ontological Argument
That's not quite
the end of the Argument though: The Second Formulation
Epilogue: Where does that leave us?
(Evidential) Arguments for Theism: The Ontological Argument
Refers to the fool (that hath said in
his heart, ‘There is no God.’). Takes as
his inspiration the Psalms, but does not rely on faith for justification, only
natural reason.
Psalms
Psalms 53:1 “The fool hath said in his heart, [There is] no God. Corrupt are
they, and have done abominable iniquity: [there is] none that doeth good.)
Anselm attempts to show that that only
a fool would claim that God does not exist. He wished to demonstrate that if
you really think carefully about the concept
of God you realize that God must exist;
understanding the nature God is enough that convince us any clear thinking
person that He must exist. Because this
argument is meant to show that "being" is part of God's nature, it is
called an:
Ontological Argument
Late Greek, from Greek ōn, ont-, present
participle of einai, “to be.”
“Being”
Thus “Ontology” is the “Study of Being.”
A general theory of being/ existence.
Ontological
Argument:
An a priori attempt to prove
the being of God from an examination of His nature. (His essence is
existence).[i]
It is logical and a prioi in nature (as opposed to empirical).
Begins by examining the Atheist
Contention "God does not exist."
But, when the Atheist denies the
existence of God, what does the Atheist mean by “God?” If the atheist is merely denying the
existence of “Zeus” or “Odin” etc. then Anselm doesn’t have a problem with
that. There is only a dispute between
the Atheist and Anselm if they have the same concept of God in mind.
Anselm proposes a “definition” of God:
"God"
means "That then which nothing greater can be conceived."
Either the Atheist can reject the
definition in which case the Atheist is NOT denying the existence of Anselm's
God (because they really are not talking about the same thing), or the Atheist can
accept Anselm's definition.
Here is a schematic of the argument:
|
Premises |
Justification |
|
1. God is that than which nothing
greater can be conceived. |
Definition of God- (for St. Anselm
& the Atheist -God is O‑God); |
|
2. It is greater to exist in understanding
and in reality than it is to exist in understanding alone. |
Metaphysical principle- i.e. clear to commonsense. Consider:
Which is greater, the 100 dollar bill that only exists in your mind or the
100 dollar bill that exists in your mind and in your back pocket? |
|
3. That than which nothing greater
can be conceived must exist in the understanding and in reality. |
Follows from 2. Otherwise It would not
be “that then which nothing greater can be conceived”
since it would be flawed (less great then if it did in fact exist in both the
understanding and in reality) and thus we could think of something greater,
i.e. without that flaw. |
|
4. God exists in the Understanding
and in reality. |
Follows from 1 & 3 by substitution of co-referring terms. |
According to Anselm, the Atheist is
left claiming that:
“God (who by
definition does/must exist in the understanding and in reality) does not exist in reality.
or
"That then
which nothing greater can be conceived" is "is something than which something
greater can be conceived."
But of course, this is Foolish; the only person who would say
something like that is someone who literally doesn’t know what he’s talking
about.
Consider
this. I might tell you that I can
conceive of a four-sided triangle. But
while I may say this and even believe this, you would know whatever I might be
thinking of, either it’s NOT a triangle or it DOESN’T have four sides. But there’s no way it could be both four
sided and triangular and I must be a FOOL for thinking otherwise.
Likewise,
according to Anselm, whatever the Atheist is thinking about, either it does
exist or it’s not God (i.e. that
then which nothing greater can be conceived), but there’s no way to truly
conceive of God as not existing.
Anselm's Argument is meant to be an a priori proof of existence of God.
A priori: knowable,
independent of experience or empirical confirmation.
An "Ontological Argument" claims
that that if just think about what we mean by “God,” (i.e. God’s nature, His
definition or essence), then it becomes clear to us that He must exists.
Another way a putting the argument is
to say
|
1. |
1. God is a being with all
perfections |
Def. Of God |
|
2. |
2. Existence is a perfection. |
Obviously true that a thing with
existence is greater than one without it. |
|
therefore: |
||
|
3. |
3. God has existence. |
From 1 & 2 |
The idea is this: The definition is such that it always points
to the “greater” conception of God. For
any two conceptions of God, by definition, Anselm (and the Atheist too for that
matter) means the greater of the two.
Take two god-conceptions A & B: Zeus and the O-God for instance.
|
God A |
> |
God B |
|
O-God |
|
Zeus |
Since God B (Zeus) is less perfect than
God A (O-God), God B is NOT TTWNGCBC. Whatever Anselm and the atheist are referring
to, it’s NOT God B (Zeus) since God B is flawed. Maybe TTWNGCBC isn’t God A either,
if it turns out one can think of something greater, but it certainly isn’t
Zeus.
Well the same can be said for the
difference between a Non-existing O-God and an Existing O-God, according to
Anselm. Just as Zeus simply cannot be
what either Anselm or the Atheist mean by God, given their shared
definition/understanding since as we have seen, Zeus is not TTWNGCBC, so too, neither
can mean a Non-existing O-God.
|
God A |
> |
God B |
|
O-God which exists in
the understanding and in reality |
|
O-God which exists in
the understanding alone |
But…
Again, since God B is less perfect than
God A (not as great/ “A” is greater), God B is NOT TTWNGCBC. God B simply cannot be what either Anselm or
the Atheist mean by “God,” given their shared
definition/understanding. At a minimum,
they both mean God A. But if this is so,
look at what the Atheist is committed to saying:
“The O-God, which by
definition we know exists in the understanding and in reality, does not exist
in reality.”
Alternatively
“That than which
nothing greater can be conceived is that than which something greater can
be conceived.”
Pretty foolish, eh?
This argument drew criticism
immediately, even from those inclined to think that the conclusion was
TRUE. They just thought that the
argument itself did not work.
Gaunilo, an 11th century Benedictine
monk and contemporary of Anselm, wrote In
Behalf of the Fool[1],
where he contends that Anselm's argument fails.
According to Gaunilo, the same sort of argument could be used to “prove”
all sorts of absurd things. As an
empiricist, Gaunilo thought that the human intellect is only able to gather
information about what does and does not exist through the senses.[2]
To this end he offers a
counter-argument to demonstrate the weakness of Anselm’s reasoning here.
He asks that we consider the “most
perfect island.”
|
1. |
1. The Most Perfect Island has all
perfections |
-Def. of most perfect |
|
2. |
2. Existence is a perfection. |
–Obviously true that a thing with
existence is greater then one without it. |
|
therefore: |
||
|
3. |
3. The Most Perfect Island has
existence. |
From 1 & 2 |
But this is ridiculous. We cannot know that there exists a Most
Perfect Island a priori, that is, simply by its definition.
NB: Gaunilo has
not precisely said what is wrong with Anselm’s argument; rather, he gives an
argument with the same form and nearly the same premises, but which concludes
with an unknowable claim. He is saying
that we can clearly see the conclusion of his arguments is unsupported and so,
by parity of reason, must regard the conclusion of Anselm’s argument as equally
unsupported.
St. Thomas Aquinas
(c. 1225 – 1274)
Likewise, St. Thomas Aquinas, also an
empiricist, criticizes this argument[3] by
claiming “One cannot prove the existence
of anything a priori.”
Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii)
says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of
a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is
greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word
"God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this
word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But
that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only
mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it
exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the
proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
This (the above) is Aquinas’s rendering
of Anselm’s Argument which he is about to criticize.
(But) I answer
that,… (Aquinas’ own opinion on the matter)
A thing can be
self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself,
though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A
proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of
the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the
essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known
to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to
the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and
such like.
If, however, there
are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the
proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know
the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it
happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of
which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some
mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal
substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition,
"God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the
same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter
shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is
not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word
"God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater
can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not
therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists
actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it
actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something
than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted
by those who hold that God does not exist. [4]
Peter Kreeft and Matt Fradd discussing this.
David Hume (1711 –1776), the Scottish empiricist philosopher,
historian, economist, and essayist, does
not address the argument directly, but can be seen to have said much the same thing
indirectly in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:
Part IX (Page 92)
·
I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident
absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any
arguments a priori. Nothing is
demonstrable (a priori –my addition)), unless the contrary implies a
contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a
contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as
non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non- existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable
(a priori). I propose this argument
as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.
He is saying, in essence:
1. To
prove any proposition “P” (e.g. “God exists.” or what have you) a priori requires proving that its
opposite "~P" entails a logical contradiction.
2. The
non-existence of anything (including God) can be conceived clearly.
3. Anything
which can be conceived clearly entails no logical contradiction.
4. The
non-existence of anything, including God, entails no logical contradiction.
Therefore:
5. One
cannot prove the existence of God a
priori.
Immanuel
Kant’s Criticism of the Ontological Argument
While all these aforementioned objections (Gaunilo’s,
Aquinas’ and Hume’s) are directed at the argument, none precisely says what wrong
with his argument. Note, they do not precisely
specify which of the premises in this valid argument is/are false and why. (Don’t you try that is your papers for me!J)
Actually
David Hume does actually comes quite close to Kant’s own critique in another
work if his when Hume states:
"...to reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on
it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea (“existence”- my addition), when conjoin'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition to
it."[5]
Recall I claimed that one might
usefully understand Anselm’s argument as saying essentially this:
|
1. |
1. God is a being with all
perfections |
Def. Of God |
|
2. |
2. Existence is a perfection. |
Obviously true that a thing with
existence is greater than one without it. |
|
therefore: |
||
|
3. |
3. God has existence. |
From 1 & 2 |
Immanuel Kant actually identifies the
troublesome premise. (#2) Kant claims
that "existence" is not a great-making property
(perfection) because it is not a property at all. Therefore, according to Kant, premise 2 is
false. Existence is NOT a
perfection. To tell me that a thing “exists”
(has existence) simply does not describe the thing at all, good bad or
indifferent.
Consider the following scenario: let’s
say we are hiring a new instructor in philosophy. This happens far too infrequently here at FIU
and who knows what we will be able to do this again, so we want to make you we
are hiring the best. To that end, we set
up two search committees, each charged with coming up will a list of desired
qualities this new hire is to have. The
committees are formed (A and B) to construct a list of required
qualifications.
The committees come up with the
following two lists, one of which lists three attributes, the other listing
four.
