Problem of Evil
Two Versions: The Logical Problem of Evil and Empirical Problem of Evil
Logical Problem of Evil
What is meant by
"evil?" Proponents of the
argument suggest two distinct kinds of evil.
1. Moral Evil- Wickedness. The evil that humans do or will.
2. Physical Evil- pain and suffering. (this can include
both humans and non-human animal suffering).
Might be brought about by wicked willful action (result from moral evil)
or natural disasters, sickness, etc.
This version claims that Evil
is logically incompatible with the existence of God. This is, it
is logically impossible that the universe contain evil and the
O-God. Evil coexisting with the O-God is
as logically contradictory as there being a married bachelor. Therefore, given that there IS evil, we can
be absolutely certain that there is no O-God.
|
1. If O-God existed then He
would want to eliminate all evil |
From the definition of
“O-God,” specifically, Omnibenevolent |
|
2. If O-God existed then He
could eliminate all evil. |
From the definition of of O-God, specifically, Omnipotent |
|
3. If O-god existed then
evil would not exist. |
From 1& 2 |
|
4. Evil does exist. |
Evident from our experience
of the world. |
|
5. The O-God does not exist. |
From 3 &4 (Modus Tolens) |
Leibnitz claimed:
If God
exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
God
exists. (He gave a separate, independent
ontological proof.)
Therefore:
This is
the best of all possible worlds.
However the problem of Evil
starts with the same conditional premise, but…
Logical Problem of Evil
suggests that
If God exists
that this is the best of all possible worlds.
This is
not the best of all possible worlds. (We
could easily imagine a better one.)
Therefore:
God does
not exist.
Three possible Non-traditional
or Non-orthodox Responses.
1. Deny that God is omnibenvolent. This
would explain the evil. God is in some
part malevolent.
2. Deny that God is omnipotent. This would explain the evil. He simply is not powerful enough to eliminate
all evil. (This was William James’ view.)
Note: #1 & #2 concede that there is no O-God. They acknowledge that evil gives us
sufficient reason to believe that there is no O-God. However, they counter that this is not
sufficient evidence that there is no God whatsoever.
3. Deny that evil is
real. (Like Spinoza, one might claim
that what we call evil might be called good from
another perspective and that all things ARE good from God's perspective. Or like some Christian Scientists who claim
that evil is an illusion which does not fool the spiritually mature.)
These are non-orthodox because
these contradict the traditional view of God taught by the major Western
monotheist religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam).
Problems with these responses.
1 & 2 would be deemed
heresy by most Western monotheistic religions.
Also they may render a "god" who falls short of a "fit
object of worship." (i.e. an imperfect,
dependent being)
#3 would also be deemed
heresy. Monotheistic religions claim
that evil, whatever its ontological status, is a real force in the world to be
resisted and opposed- e.g. feed the hungry, heal the sick, comfort the lonely,
etc.
Also what would
"Omnibenevolent" mean if not "opposed to human suffering
or human wickedness?" Such a
response weakens our grasp on the meaning of “good” as well as “evil.” Further still, the difference between
illusory suffering and real suffering is unclear since it would seem that
suffering is perception dependent. If I think
that I am in pain, then I’m in pain.
Traditional Responses:
Theodicy
Theodicy: An attempt to defend the character of God against the problem of evil.
An attempt to show that there is a morally sufficient reason which explains why
the O-God permit evil or otherwise why the existence of the O-God and the
existence of evil are logically compatible.
Four Standard Theodicies:
1. Free Will ‑ God
permits evil because evil is necessary for free will. Free will is such a good thing that it is worth
the price. (Most often used as an
explanation for moral evil.)
2. Soul Making ‑ God
makes the world a rough, dangerous, violent place because only in such an
environment can we develop our character and make something noble of
ourselves. In a "perfect
world" there would be no need for, nor opportunity for, ministry, charity,
bravery, generosity, perseverance, etc.. Further, these opportunities are worth the
price. (Most often used as an explanation for physical evil.)
3. Knowledge of Good &
Evil. In a perfectly good world we would be surrounded by goodness but have
nothing to contrast it with.
Consequently, God permits evil because it is necessary in order for us
to come to know the difference between Good & Evil and that knowledge is worth
the price.
4.
Evil is Necessary for Good. Some have
argued that even an omnipotent God could not create "good" without at
the same time allowing for evil. Good
and evil are logical counterparts they claim, (like big and small; even an
omnipotent God could not create a big thing without as the same time allowing
the something small exist). Therefore,
for there to be anything that is big, there must be something that is
small. If so, then for there to BE any good
there must BE evil.
Challenges to these Theodicies
A)
1,2,&
3 is it really worth the price?
"It's not that I don't accept God, it's the world created by him I
don't and cannot accept."
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan to Alyosha,
Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 3 - The Brothers Make Friends.
"Is
there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive and could
forgive? I don't want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would
rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather remain with my
unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong. Besides,
too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter
on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest
man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's
not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most
respectfully return him the ticket."
"That's
rebellion," murmered Alyosha,
looking down.
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan
and Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 4 -
Rebellion.
"Imagine
that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men
happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential
and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - that baby beating
its breast with its fist, for instance - and to found that edifice on its
unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?
Tell me, and tell me the truth!"
"No,
I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan
to Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 4 -
Rebellion.
B)
Contra #1. Evil is not
necessary for free will, only the possibility for evil. Is there a possible world in which humans do
not behave immorally? Yes. Then an O-God would have created that world,
not this one. Therefore the theodicy
does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil.
C)
Contra #2. While “first order” evils allow for the
possibility of “second order” goods (like charity and compassion) second order
evils also are created (selfishness, indifference, cowardice, etc.) Leads to
infinite regress ‑ about levels of goodness; pain (1st order) allows for
compassion (2nd order) but also indifference (2nd order). Does indifference allow for some 3rd order
good? Even if it did, this would open
the door to some 3rd order evil, and so on.
Therefore the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit
evil.
D)
Contra #3. How much evil would be necessary? Presumably, not as much as we have. Therefore the theodicy does not work- explain
why and O-God would permit (surplus) evil.
E)
Contra #4. (Same as D and…) If we understand
"evil" merely as suffering and wickedness, then the claim that any
world where there is "good" there must be "evil" is simply
false. We can imagine a Garden of Eden
where there is no suffering. Here we have
goodness without evil (i.e. suffering, perhaps wickedness).
Reponses to B:
1.
No such possible worlds are actualizable by an omnipotent God. Such worlds are only co-create-able with the
free agents themselves. (Alvin Plantinga)
Imagine two possible worlds, one where Professor Harris is needlessly
cruel to a student and other where is not.
What could God do to create one and not the other? Nothing.
It’s up to Professor Harris to create one and not the other.
2.
Given the above, there may be
no such possible worlds. So, even if God
could know in advance which potential free beings would only do what it moral, it may be that as God surveys all possible
free beings he sees that none of them do only that is right.
3.
If an action is really free
however, even an omniscient being cannot know in advance. (The objective truth
IS that the choice is not yet made.) (Richard Swinburne)
4.
Some have argued that God need
not create the best of all possible worlds. ( McCord Adams) Maybe some better possible world does exist;
it just not our world, and we are in no position to complain since were the
other world the only one which existed, we would not. God has no obligations to people who do not
exist. God harms no actual existing
person by creating them, even if they do not always do what’s right.[1]
Each of the Theodicies we have
examined is trying to show that there is a Morally Sufficient Reason (MSR) that
explained why the O-god would permit physical and/or moral evil. So far they all seem to have problems. Still, defenders of theism counter that there
still might be some reason that a 0-God permits
evil and that we just haven't thought of yet.
The fact that there could be a reason demonstrates that it is not logically
impossible that the O-God exist given evil.
The Theodicist's response to the Logical Problem of Evil seems
to rest here:
“For any evil E, there is a
greater good that even an omnipotent being could not bring about without
allowing E.”
Since we cannot prove this above claim is false, (It may be, but it is not clear
that we can prove it to be so.) the logical problem of evil fails. Keep in mind that even and Omnipotent Being
is limited by the laws of logic. So, we
cannot know that there is no greater good logically entailed by any given evil
E.
It is pretty easy to say that there are some evils which do
not entail any greater good that we can think of. But that is not to say that there are none
conceivable. [2]
Therefore, the Logical Problem
of Evil fails to prove what it claimed to prove.
Stray Note:
Some have suggested that the
evil and suffering we confront makes sense only when taken in context with the
promise of an afterlife. Evil doers are
brought to justice and the suffering in this world is inconsequential when
compared with the infinite bliss of the afterlife.
Nevertheless, that there is
any evil as all, still requires some justification. Further, independent of faith, what reason do
we have to think this IS an
afterlife, etc.
The afterlife answer was
called “a very curious argument” by the philosopher Bertrand Russell in Why I’m Not a Christian.
“If you
looked at the matter from a scientific point of view, you would say, ‘After
all, I only know this world. I do not know about the rest of the universe, but
so far as one can argue at all on probabilities one would say that probably
this world is a fair sample, and if there is injustice here then the odds are
that there is injustice elsewhere also.'
Supposing
you got a crate of oranges that you opened, and you found all the top layer of
oranges bad, you would not argue: ‘The underneath ones must be good, so as to
redress the balance.’ You would say: ‘Probably the whole lot is a bad
consignment;’ and that is really what a scientific person would argue about the
universe. He would say: ‘Here we find in this world a great deal of injustice,
and so far as that goes that is a reason for supposing that justice does not
rule in the world; and therefore so far as it goes it affords a moral argument
against deity and not in favor of one.’”
Stray Note 2:
J. L. Mackie talks about
various attempts to explain existence of evil; finds that all the explanations
give up one of the properties of God
Mackie raises the problems
that maybe concept of omnipotence is incoherent; the very idea of all powerful is
maybe an incoherent idea. Can an
omnipotent being create a creature whom it cannot control (a Free willing
being)? No matter how you answer it
would seem to lead to a contradiction.
Could God create a rock so
heavy that he couldn't lift it? No matter
how answer question seem to be denying God's omnipotence; The Greek's had a similar idea. That is why they held that either there is an
unmovable object or irresistible force, but not both.
Empirical Problem of Evil
Hume:
Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion (Part XI, 210)
To
those who claim the evil is necessary in ANY world, Hume is making two distinct
replies. First a world without sentient creatures
would contain neither moral evil nor physical evil. So the claim that any world would have to
contain SOME evil is simply false, at least when “evil” is understood as
suffering and/or wickedness. Further, we
could easily imagine a possible world in which there were some sentience and
volition, but not nearly as much suffering or wickedness. (one
where animals have greater powers than merely those strictly required, or an environment
with a more stable, friendly climate, for instance.)
What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we
say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have
been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too
presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our
conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a
goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a
priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert
that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to
it.
Here
Hume is saying that, for all we know, maybe the better world he is envisioning
is in fact impossible. That is, if we
had independent
reason for thinking that there is a God and that He is omnibenevolent and
omnipotent, then we might have to conclude with Leibnitz that, appearances to
the contrary, this is the best of all possible worlds. God knows why it could not be any better, but
we do not.
But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not
antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be
no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe,
and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human
understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to
allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings,
may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can
never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our
confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from
these phenomena.[3]
But absent strong evidence
for an O-God, we are left to ask then, are the ills of this world evidence of
such a being or evidence of the absence of such a being. Fact-set “F” is evidence for hypothesis H if
F is more probably given H and given ~H.
Pr (F + H) > Pr (F + ~H)
What Hume is suggesting is
that the suffering in nature and seeming indifference of nature is just what
you would expect if there were no God, but not at all what you would expect if
there were a God. Consequently, these
constitute empirical evidence against the hypothesis “God” and for the
hypothesis “No God.”
Empirical problem of evil ‑ given the
existence of evil God is (highly) improbable;
Claims that while the
existence of evil and the existence of O-God might be logically possible
it is unreasonable to believe there is one and far more reasonable to believe
that there is no such being. (Remember,
it is logically possible that there are aliens form outer space living
underneath my house who only come out at night when I’m sleeping, but it would
be unreasonable for me to believe such a thing, given the wealth of evidence to
the contrary.)
Image someone guy on Talk
Radio called the host and said:
"Neil,
I knew that there was going to be an earthquake in Haiti on that day and I
could have warned everybody, but I didn't.”
"Well
then, you are a monstrous person!"
Neil responds.
"No,
no, I'm not. I have a really good reason
why I didn't tell any one."
Now is it possible that this person knew about
the earthquake, could have warned us but didn't and that he has a
really good reason why he didn't? I
suppose it is possible. But is it likely?
No.
It is far more likely that
either this person didn't know, or that he couldn't have told or that he is a
rotten person for not having done so.
Well the theist is in exactly
the same position. He is claiming that
the Universe contains a person who knew about the earthquake, could have warned
us (even subtly) and didn't but has a really good reason why he
didn't. Is it possible? Perhaps. But the empirical problem of evil claims that
it is implausible and therefore, irrational to believe such a thing. It is rational to believe what the evidence
most strongly suggests, that there is no O-God.
Leibnitz claimed:
If God
exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
God
exists. (He gave a separate, independent
ontological proof.)
Therefore:
This is
the best of all possible worlds.
The problem of evil starts
pretty much with the same claim, but rather then a modus ponens, does a modus tollens.
Logical Problem of Evil
suggests that
If God
exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.
This is probably
not the best of all possible worlds. (We
could easily imagine a better one.)
Therefore:
Probably God
does not exist.
Empirical Problem of Evil
suggests that
The
antecedent probability of evil (horrendous suffering) existing on the
hypothesis of God is very, very low.
Evil
exists.
Therefore:
Evil
provided strong disconfirming evidence against the hypothesis of God relative
to the hypothesis of No God.
It would seem that the
probability of “O-God exists” and the probability of “This is the best of all
possible world” are inversely proportional.
William Rowe: Perdue University
·
Friendly Atheist
o
Is confident that there is no God, based on the evidence he
has surveyed so far but is open to the idea that further evidence may change
his mind.
·
Believes that one might rationally believe in God, but
personally believes that the weight of evidence (Problem of Evil) is telling.
A.
The Argument
1. There exist horrendous
evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good being would have no
justifying reason to permit.
2. An all-powerful,
all-knowing and perfectly good would not permit an evil unless he had a
justifying reason to permit it.
Therefore
3. An all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly
good being does not exist.[4]
Rowe believes that the second premise of this argument is
certainly true and the first premise is, independent grounds for belief in God
aside, probably true. If he is right,
then the conclusion of the argument follows inductively from its premises. Thus it follows that the conclusion of the
argument is, grounds for belief aside, very probably true. This is why Rowe says that the argument is
not an attempt to show that God does not exist.
It is an attempt to show that, positive arguments for God aside, it is
very likely that God does not exist and hence atheism is rationally justified
(over agnosticism).
[1] This line of argument has always seemed suspicious to me, sophisticated legalism which evades rather than resolves the issue. It is as if, due to the curious circumstances, no one exists to press charges. Therefore God is blameless. But surely this is a question of “character” not rights. What sort of God would create a broken and suffering world? Even if we grant that a “less than perfect world is logically necessary” the question would remain, “Why this less than perfect world?” "Why this evil?" We can (and do) quibble about the details.
[2] One way around this might be to say that no “good” can be “greater” than some existent evil. Thus this claim would be false. One might show that the whole project of counter-balancing evil with good couldn’t be made out.
[3] Hume, David Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Second Edition) ed. Richard H. Popkin, Hackett Publishing, 1998
[4]
But we might, nevertheless retain faith in a
Non-omnipotent God. Rowe defines God as
O-God. But Cleanthes resolves the matter
by lessening the attributes of God.
“If we abandon all analogy to humanity, then we
retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. But if we preserve human analogy then we
cannot reconcile the evil in the world with infinite attribute. But suppose the Author Of Nature to be
finitely perfect but far exceeding mankind... benevolence governed by wisdom
but limited by necessity might produce just such a world”