The Problem of Evil

2. Physical Evil- pain and suffering. (This can include both human suffering and the suffering of non-human animals.) Physical evil might be brought about by wicked willful action (result from moral evil) or it may not be the result of moral evil such as the suffering that result from natural disasters, sickness, etc.

The Logical Problem of Evil version claims that Evil is logically incompatible with the existence of the O-God. That is, it is logically impossible that the universe contain evil (so specified) and the O-God. Evil coexisting with the O-God is as logically contradictory as there being a married bachelor, they claim, and thus inconceivable. Therefore, given that there IS evil, we can be absolutely certain that there is no O-God.

1. If O-God existed then He would want to eliminate all evil	From the definition of O-God, specifically, Omnibenevolent
2. If O-God existed then He could eliminate all evil.	From the definition of O-God, specifically, Omnipotent
3. If O-god existed then evil would not exist.	From 1 & 2
4. Evil does exist.	Evident from our experience of the world.
5. The O-God does not exist.	From 3 & 4 (Modus Tolens)

Gottfried Leibnitz had claimed:

If the O-God exists, then this is the best of all possible worlds.

The O-God exists. (He gave a separate, independent ontological proof.)

Therefore:

This is the best of all possible worlds.[1]

However, the Problem of Evil starts with the same conditional premise, but…

Logical Problem of Evil suggests that

If the O-God exists, then this is the best of all possible worlds.

This is NOT the best of all possible worlds. (We could easily imagine a better one.)

Therefore:

The O-God does not exist.

Responses: Non-traditional

Three possible Non-traditional or Non-orthodox Responses.

1. Deny that God is omnibenvolent. This would explain the evil. God is in some part malevolent ir indifferent.

2. Deny that God is omnipotent. This would explain the evil. He simply is not powerful enough to eliminate all evil. (This was William James’ view[2].)

Note: #1 & #2 concede that there is no O-God. They acknowledge that evil gives us sufficient reason to believe that there is no O-God. However, they counter that this is not sufficient evidence that there is no God whatsoever. It is worth mentioning that William James himself went with option 2. He believed that evil was sufficient evidence that that O-God does not exist, but not sufficient evidence that there was no God whatsoever. James maintained that if there did exist a god, he clearly only had limited power.

3. Deny that evil is real. (Like Baruch Spinoza, one might claim that what we call evil might be called good from another perspective and that all things ARE good from God's perspective. Or like some Christian Scientists who claim that evil is an illusion which does not fool the spiritually mature.)

These are non-orthodox because these contradict the traditional view of God and evil taught by the major Western monotheist religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam).

Problems with these responses.

1 & 2 would be deemed heresy by most Western monotheistic religions. Also, they may render a "god" who falls short of a "fit object of worship." (i.e. an imperfect, dependent being)

#3 would also be deemed heresy. Monotheistic religions claim that evil, whatever its ontological status, is a real force in the world to be resisted and opposed- e.g. feed the hungry, heal the sick, comfort the lonely, etc. Moreover we are called to oppose evil on God’s behalf.

Also, what would "Omnibenevolent" mean if not "opposed to human suffering or human wickedness?" What would it mean to say that God is all good, but NOT opposed to child abuse? Such a response weakens our grasp on the meaning of “good” as well as “evil.”

Further still, the difference between illusory suffering and real suffering is unclear since it would seem that suffering is perception dependent. If I think that I am in pain, then I’m in pain.

Responses: Traditional - Theodicy

Theodicy: An attempt to defend the character of God against the problem of evil. An attempt to provide is a morally sufficient reason (MSR) which explains why the O-God permits evil or otherwise why the existence of the O-God and the existence of evil are logically compatible. All theodicies appeal to some “good” which is supposed to justify, counterbalance, or out-weigh the evil.

We will briefly look at the four most prevalent theodicies offered. Each attempts to provide a morally sufficient reason why and All-Good, All-Powerful and All-Knowing God would/does permit evil. To succeed they must show the good secured by evil justifies and quantity and quality of the evil we see in the world.

Four Standard Theodicies:

1. Free Will Theodicy‑ God permits evil because evil is necessary for free will.

God permits evil because evil is necessary for free will. Free Will is a great good, necessary for morally praise-worthy actions. It provides human beings with responsibility. We become “co-creators” with God and this is a great gift; this is the source of human dignity. Further, only free beings can enter into a loving relationship with God.

But even so, shouldn’t God intervene, at least in some cases, when the misuse of the freedom results in grave suffering?

No, proponents of this Theodicy say, because “real” responsibility requires “real” consequences.

Free will is such a good thing that it is worth the price. This theodicy is most often used as an explanation for moral evil.

2. Soul Making Theodicy‑ God makes the world a rough, dangerous, violent place because only in such an environment can we develop our character and make something noble of ourselves.

In a "perfect world" there would be no need for, nor opportunity for, ministry, charity, bravery, generosity, perseverance, etc. No one ever came back from Club Med a better human being. But people do come back from boot camp better human beings. Boot camp is not paradise, but the roughness serves a noble worthwhile purpose. Further, these opportunities for soul making are worth the price. This theodicy is most often used as an explanation for physical evil.

3. Knowledge of Good & Evil. In a perfectly good world, we would be surrounded by goodness but utterly ignorant of it since we would have nothing to contrast it with. Consequently, God permits evil because it is necessary in order for us to come to know the difference between Good & Evil and that knowledge is worth the price.

4. Evil is Necessary for there to be any good at all.

Some have argued that even an omnipotent God could not create "good" without at the same time allowing for evil. Only God is perfect. So, whatever he creates will necessarily have flaws. Good and evil are logical counterparts they claim, (like big and small; even an omnipotent God could not create a big thing without as the same time allowing the something small exist). Therefore, for there to be anything that is big, there must be something that is small. So too they claim, for there to BE any good there must BE evil. The only way to avoid evil would be to not create anything as all. But that is less good than creating a world that contains some evil.

Challenges to these Theodicies

A) 1,2,& 3 is it really worth the price?

"It's not that I don't accept God, it's the world created by him I don't and cannot accept."[3]

Alyosha recounts the horrible story of general who has a surf boy thrown to his hounds and torn to bits while the boy’s mother was forced to watch.

"Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? I don't want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return him the ticket."[4]

"That's rebellion," murmered Alyosha, looking down.

The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan and Alyosha, Book V - Pro and Contra, Chapter 4 - Rebellion.

"Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance - and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell me the truth!"

"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.[5]

B) Contra #1. Evil is not necessary for free will; only the possibility for evil. There a possible world in which humans do not behave immorally. An O-God would have created that world, not this one. Therefore, the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil. We still should believe that no O-God exists.

C) Contra #2. While “first order” evils (like sickness and famine) allow for the possibility of “second order” goods (like charity and compassion) that also allow for the possibility of second order evils such as selfishness, indifference, cowardice, etc. There is a potential infinite regress here‑ about levels of goodness; pain (1st order) allows for compassion (2nd order) but also indifference (2nd order). Does indifference allow for some 3rd order good? Even if it did, this would open the door to some 3rd order evil, and so on?

Seems no answer to pointless suffering or suffering that actually destroys a person’s faith and morals.

Seems no answer to the suffering of very small children, especially when they die young. Yes, that I have an opportunity to be compassionate to them seems like a nice thing for me, but how does it justify the suffering to them? Seems like I’m sort of using them, but they are getting nothing out of it.

Seems no answer to the suffering of non-human animals.

Therefore, the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil.

D) Contra #3. How much evil would be necessary? Presumably, not as much as we have. For instance, if we lived in a world in which everything were red we would indeed be ignorant of redness since we had no medium contrast. However how much non red would really be necessary in order for us to understand red and non-red? A small patch of blue should suffice. It seems we have far more evil than would be necessary for us to understand the difference between good. Therefore, the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit (surplus) evil.

One might claim that suffering is relative. If this is the case then were God to eliminating all current examples of suffering, there could still be (perceived) suffering. (Imagine the world where the most horrible suffering were cold soup.) Sounds pretty good… to us. But this is only because in our world far worse things than cold soup can occur. But for all we know there are other worlds where the most imaginable suffering in this world would be cold soup by comparison. This suggests that if any suffering is justifiable, we are not in the position to know that the maximum amount of suffering we see in this world is more than is necessary.

Still, does that really address the issue. Isn’t it an impossibly pale response to those who are suffering? Or the victims of wickedness?

Further, it can be argued that, just as a world in which there was only horrible suffering would be really (objectively) bad, whether or not any resident of that world knows it or could know it, a world in which there was NO horrible suffering would be really (objectively) good (better than this one), whether or not any resident of that world knows or could know it.

E) Contra #4. (Same as D and…)

If we understand "evil" merely as suffering and wickedness, then the claim that any world where there is "good" there must be "evil" is simply false. We can imagine a Garden of Eden where there is no suffering. Here we have goodness without evil (i.e. suffering, perhaps wickedness). Similarly, Earth before the evolution of sentient creatures contained neither moral nor physical evil. So, the claim that any would God creates would have to contain evil is simply false when evil is understood as moral and physical evil. Therefore, the theodicy does not work- explain why and O-God would permit evil as defined. It only appears to work by changing the issue.

Extended Reponses To Challenges to the Freewill Theodicy:

1. No such possible worlds are actualizable by God alone, even an omnipotent God. Such worlds are only co-create-able with the free agents themselves. (Alvin Plantinga) Imagine two possible worlds, one where Professor Harris is needlessly cruel to a student and other where he is not. What could God do to create the first world and avoid the other? Nothing. It’s up to Professor Harris to cooperate with God to create the first one and not the other.

2. Given the above, there may in fact be no such possible worlds. So, even if God could know in advance which potential free beings would only do what it moral, it may be that as God surveys all possible free beings he sees that none of them do only what is right.

3. If an action is really free however, even an omniscient being cannot know in advance. The objective truth IS, what even an omniscient being knows, is that the choice is not yet made. (Richard Swinburne)

4. Some have argued that God need not create the best of all possible worlds. (McCord Adams) Maybe some better possible world does exist; it just not our world, and we are in no position to complain since were the other world the only one which existed, we would not be “better off” since we would not exist at all. God has no obligations to people who do not exist. Therefore, God harms no actual existing person by creating them, even if they do not always do what’s right.[6]

Stray Note 1:

Some have suggested that the evil and suffering we confront makes sense only when taken in context with the promise of an afterlife. Evil doers are brought to justice and the suffering in this world is inconsequential when compared with the infinite bliss of the afterlife.

But the afterlife answer was called “a very curious argument” by the philosopher Bertrand Russell in Why I’m Not a Christian.

• “If you looked at the matter from a scientific point of view, you would say, ‘After all, I only know this world. I do not know about the rest of the universe, but so far as one can argue at all on probabilities one would say that probably this world is a fair sample, and if there is injustice here then the odds are that there is injustice elsewhere also. Supposing you got a crate of oranges that you opened, and you found all the top layer of oranges bad, you would not argue: ‘The underneath ones must be good, so as to redress the balance.’ You would say: ‘Probably the whole lot is a bad consignment;’ and that is really what a scientific person would argue about the universe. He would say: ‘Here we find in this world a great deal of injustice, and so far as that goes, that is a reason for supposing that justice does not rule in the world; and therefore, so far as it goes, it affords a moral argument against deity and not in favor of one.’”

Nevertheless, that there is any evil at all still requires some justification.

Stray Note 2:

J. L. Mackie talks about various attempts to explain existence of evil; finds that all the explanations give up one of the properties of God

Mackie raises the problems that maybe concept of omnipotence is incoherent; the very idea of all powerful is maybe an incoherent idea. Can an omnipotent being create a creature whom it cannot control (a Free willing being)? No matter how you answer it would seem to lead to a contradiction.

Could God create a rock so heavy that he couldn't lift it? No matter how answer question seem to be denying God's omnipotence; the Greek's had a similar idea. That is why they held that either there is an unmovable object or irresistible force, but not both.

Apologetics:

Each of the Theodicies we have examined is trying to show that there is a Morally Sufficient Reason (MSR) that explains why the O-god would permit physical and/or moral evil. So far, they all seem to have problems. But some have taken a different tact in response to the Logical Problem of Evil. They suggest that even if we have not found a MSR for evil, that, in and of itself, does not demonstrate that there could not be any. The Logical Problem of evil claims that the existence of the O-God is impossible given evil. But this is the equivalent of saying that a MSR is impossible. Yet the proponent have not demonstrated that. But they cannot know that.

Apologists, unlike theodicies, do not claim to know what the MSR is evil, merely that there might be one. They attempt to defend theism by countering that there still might be some reason that a 0-God permits evil and that we just haven't thought of yet. The fact that, as far as we know, there might be some MSR demonstrates that we cannot know the co-existence of the O-god and evils are logically impossible.

The Theodicist's response to the Logical Problem of Evil seems to rest here:

“For any evil E, there is a greater good that even an omnipotent being could not bring about without allowing E.”

Since we cannot prove this above claim is false, (It may very well be false, but it is not clear that we can prove it to be so.) the logical problem of evil fails. Keep in mind that even and Omnipotent Being is limited by the laws of logic. So, we cannot know that there is no greater good logically entailed by any given evil E. Now, it is readily admitted that it is pretty easy to say that there are some evils which do not entail any greater good that we can think of. But that is not to say that there are none conceivable. [7]

Therefore, the Logical Problem of Evil fails to prove what it claimed to prove.

Hume’s Empirical Critique of Theism.

Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Part XI, 210)

On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present.

To those who claim the evil is necessary in ANY world, Hume is making two distinct replies. First, a world without sentient creatures would contain neither moral evil nor physical evil. So the claim that any world would have to contain some evil is simply false, at least when “evil” is understood as suffering and/or wickedness. Further, we could easily imagine a possible world in which there were some sentience and volition, but not nearly as much suffering or wickedness (one where animals have greater powers than merely those strictly required, or an environment with a more stable, friendly climate, for instance).

What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it.

Here Hume is saying that, for all we know, maybe the better world he is envisioning is in fact impossible. That is, if we had independent reason for thinking that there is a God and that He is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, that is, if we had the kind of absolutely certain knowledge afforded by a sound a priori argument for God’s existence, then we might have to conclude with Leibnitz that, appearances to the contrary, this is the best of all possible worlds. God knows why it could not be any better, but we do not.

But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.[8]

But absent strong evidence for an O-God, we are left to ask then, are the ills of this world evidence of such a being or evidence of the absence of such a being. Fact-set “F” is evidence for hypothesis H if F is more probably given H and given ~H.

So, F provides evidence for H when:

Pr (F + H) > Pr (F + ~H)

What Hume is suggesting is that the suffering in nature and seeming indifference of nature is just what you would expect if there were no God, but not at all what you would expect if there were a God. Consequently, these constitute empirical evidence for atheism and against the hypothesis of theism.

The Empirical Problem of Evil: given the existence of evil God is (highly) improbable;

So this version of the argument claims that while the co-existence of evil and the O-God might be logically possible, it is nevertheless unreasonable to believe there is an O-god given evil and far more reasonable to believe that there is no such being. (Remember, it is logically possible that there are aliens from outer space living underneath my house who only come out at night when I’m sleeping, but it would be unreasonable for me to believe such a crazy thing, given the wealth of evidence to the contrary.)

Imagine someone called into a Talk Radio host and said:

"Neil, I knew that there was going to be an earthquake in Haiti on that day and I could have warned everybody, but I didn't.”

"Well then, you are a monstrous person!" Neil responds.

"No, no, I'm not. I have a really good reason why I didn't tell anyone."

Now is it possible that this person:

1. knew about the earthquake,

2. could have warned us but didn't and

3. that he has a really good reason why he didn't?

I suppose it is possible. But is it likely?

No.

It is far more likely that either this person didn't know, or that he couldn't have told or that he is a rotten person for not having done so.

Well, the theist is in exactly the same position. She is claiming that the Universe contains a person who knew about the earthquake, could have warned us (even subtly) and didn't but has a really good reason why he didn't. Is it possible? Perhaps. But the empirical problem of evil claims that it is implausible and therefore, irrational to believe such a thing. It is rational to believe what the evidence most strongly suggests, that there is no O-God.

Remember, it is logically possible that there are aliens from outer space living underneath my house, who only come out at night when I’m sleeping, but it would be unreasonable for me to believe such a crazy thing, given the wealth of evidence to the contrary.

The Best of All Possible Worlds

Leibnitz claimed:

If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.

God exists. (He gave a separate, independent ontological proof.)

Therefore:

This is the best of all possible worlds.

As previously stated, the problem of evil starts pretty much with the same conditional, but rather than a modus ponens, does a modus tollens.

Logical Problem of Evil suggests that

If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.

This is not the best of all possible worlds. (We could easily imagine a better one.)

Therefore:

God does not exist.

The empirical problem of evil is suggesting that the probably that God Does Not Exists and the probability that this is the Best of all Possible World are inversely proportional.

Empirical Problem of Evil

If God exists that this is the best of all possible worlds.

This is not the best of all possible worlds. (We could easily imagine a better one.)

Therefore:

God does not exist

The empirical problem of evil claims that premise #2, while not logically necessary, it highly, highly probable. It follows then that the conclusion is likewise highly, highly probable. This puts the theist in the position of claiming that the conclusion is false, despite being probably true.

Alternatively,

The antecedent probability of evil (horrendous suffering) existing on the hypothesis of God is very, very low.

Evil (horrendous suffering) exists.

Therefore:

Evil provides strong disconfirming evidence against the hypothesis of God, relative to the hypothesis of No God.

William Rowe: Perdue University

· Friendly Atheist

o Is confident that there is no God, based on the evidence he has surveyed so far. Nevertheless, he is open to the idea that further evidence may change his mind.

· Believes that one might rationally believe in God, but personally believes that the weight of evidence (Problem of Evil) is telling.

A. The Argument

1. An all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.

2. There exist horrendous evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit.

Therefore

3. An all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good being does not exist.[9]

Rowe believes that the first premise of this argument is certainly true and the second premise is, independent grounds for belief in God aside, very probably true. If he is right, then the conclusion of the argument follows inductively from its premises. Thus, it follows that the conclusion of the argument is, grounds for belief aside, very probably true. This is why Rowe says that the argument is not an attempt to show that God does not exist. It is an attempt to show that, positive arguments for God aside, it is very likely that God does not exist and hence atheism is rationally justified (over theism and agnosticism).

B. Defense of Premise 2

The bulk of Rowe’s efforts are devoted to establishing that (independent grounds for theist belief aside) premise 2 is very probably true. He takes premise 2 to be equivalent to the claim that there are pointless evils in the world. He defines a “pointless” evil as an evil that an all-powerful being could have prevented without forfeiting some outweighing good. According to Rowe, what makes premise 2 likely is the enormous amount of apparently pointless, horrendous suffering in the world. He gives two examples of such suffering. I’ll add two of my own offered by Paul Draper.

Example One:

A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightening. It lies on the forest floor suffering for five days before death relieves its suffering.

Example Two:

A five year-old-girl is brutally beaten, raped and strangled in Flint, Michigan on New Year’s eve a few years ago.

Example Three:

A cement mixer truck driver rushes home so he can have lunch with his wife. He runs to the truck to return to work, not realizing that his 3-year –old child is playing behind his truck. He backs up and kills his own child.

Example Four:

A nine-year old girl and her mother are on their way to visit the girl’s grandmother for the first time. A van has a blow-out, crosses the median strip, striking their car head on. The girl is paralyzed from the neck down and her mother is killed.

If these were the only examples of apparently pointless, horrendous suffering in the world, then perhaps, Rowe says, one could reasonably believe that none of them are in fact pointless. But Rowe emphasizes that the world contains an abundance of cases like these. The idea that EVERY SINGLE one has a point- that an all-powerful being could not prevent even a single one without forfeiting a outweighing good- strikes Rowe as absurd, “quite beyond belief.” This is why Rowe believes that premise two is very likely true.

Objections to Rowe: Can We Know That There Are No MSRs?

Rowe’s argument turns on the truth (or likelihood) of a Negative Existential, specifically the claim that there are no morally sufficient reasons –MSR- for an O-God to permit evil. Some have argued that just because we do not know of any morally sufficient reasons why an O-God would permit all the evils we witness, this does not demonstrate conclusively that there are none.

Sometime referred to as the "Noseeum" defense.

Note: This is a defense, not a theodicy because it does NOT attempt to give the reason (e.g. free will, soul making, etc) why an O-God permits evil; it only attempts to salvage the rationality of belief in the face of evident evil. In other words it merely is trying to show that the Empirical Problem of Evil is NOT sufficient to justify atheism.

Howard-Snyder and Bergmann’s Critique of Rowe’s Argument[10]

They accuse Rowe of assuming an unjustified noseeum argument. Recall that the key premise (#2) of Rowe’s argument is the following:

(2) There exist horrendous evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit.

Advancing this amounts only to the following:

a. So far as we can tell there is no morally sufficient reason (MSR) for an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being to permit the horrendous evils like E1, E2, etc..

c. Therefore it is much more likely than not that there is no justifying reason for an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being to permit the horrendous evils like E1, E2 etc..

But "c" only follows from "a" on the presumption of an unstated premise:

b. More likely than not, we’d know about a MSR if it existed.

But, they argue, we have no reason to belief or accept "b."

H&B call the above necessary assumed but unstated premise (b) the “Atheist Assumption.”

They reject it on the grounds that we really have no idea what reasons an omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect being might have for permitting horrendous evil and so have no idea of how likely it would be that we would detect such a reason if one existed. They offer a Rowe “Chess- Kasparov” analogy. They point out that a chess master may make moves that seem like mistakes to non-chess-masters simply because non-chess-masters lack the cognitive wherewithal to rightly appreciate the wisdom of the moves.

Therefore, we have no way to establish the atheist noseeum assumption

You can distinguish between good noseeum arguments and bad ones by the fact that in good ones, it is also true that, more likely than not, if there were the thing in question we would detect it (e.g. unicorns), whereas in bad noseeum arguments, we do not have ground fro claiming that, more likely than not, if there were the thing in question we would detect it.

But since we cannot know (make justifiable inferences about) the probability of detecting MSR’s if they existed, we cannot justifiably claim that the probability is high (or low or midland, etc.)

Another way to put this is:

Our sample is : Possible MSR (goods) that we can think of.

Our target is: All possible MSR (goods) that exist.

We have no reason to think that our sample is a representative sample.

Rowe’s reply:

1. If what they said were right, then NO amount of suffering could ever justify the claim that there is no loving God.

But, that’s absurd.

2. Rowe’s claims it is not merely a “noseeum” argument. He’s not merely saying that he doesn’t “see” any justifying goods, but rather, he cannot even conceive any such good.

3. Rowe attacks the “Chess- Kasparov” analogy (that a chess master may make moves that seem like mistakes to us- non-chess masters). God isn’t playing Chess. God has a strong moral reason for providing us with the reason for permitting horrendous suffering (help us bear the burden).

Therefore, we DO have reason to suppose that if there were MSR’s (and an O-God), we’d know about it.

A good parent would explain to the child why she is permitting her child to suffer. Ans even If, in fact, God could not explain his MSR, He would at least give us His comforting presence (as with a parent).

J. L. Schellenberg [11]

J. L. Schellenberg tries to get around objection of Theistic Defense (e.g. We can’t know the conclusion of the noseeum.) against the Negative Existential (There are no morally sufficient reasons for O-God to permit evil.). Just because we can't think of any morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrendous suffering does not show that there aren't any nor even that there probably aren't any.

G= O-God exists

E= Horrendous Evil/Suffering Exists

M= Morally Sufficient Reasons for Allowing Evil exist.

This is, basically Rowe’s argument. The problem is premise 2.

1. G -> ( ~M ->~E)	Definition of God and Evil – Certainly True
2. ~M	Very Probably True
Therefore:
3. G ->~E	1& 2 Modus Ponens - Very Probably True
4. E ->~G	Transposition - Very Probably True
5. E	In evidence
6. ~G	4&5 Modus Ponens - Very Probably True

Thus:

The probability of the claim (If G then ~E) is very high.

But E

Therefore:

The probability of G is very low./ The probability of ~G is very high.

1. Pr (G -> ~E) = ++

2. E

Therefore

Pr(~G) = ++

But how can we demonstrate that ~M is probably true? (Conversely, that M is probably false?)

While #2 may not be necessarily true, it need only be true for the argument to work. Schellenberg drops the “unless he has a sufficient reason…” clause. Also, it helps to read E as “this evil” does not exist.

The challenge for the theist then is to show that Pr(G -> ~E) is low which is the same as claiming that the Pr(M) is (very) high.

Schellenberg offers 3 reasons for thinking 2 is true.

1. Because E is just so horrible (intrinsically bad). The worse an evil is, the more reasonable the claim that an O-God would eliminate it. The real force of the problem of evil is not merely that we can’t imagine MSR, but the horrendous ugliness of the evil itself.

2. God is maximally empathetic person[12]. Empathy provides motive to end the suffering. The stronger the empathy, and the worse the suffering, the greater the motivation. Therefore, we have very good reasons for thinking the O-God (max-empath) would have great motivation to eliminate the worst suffering.

3. Horrific Suffering is instrumentally bad. (ie. Prevents the occurrence of known goods - character development, relationship with God, etc.)

Paul Draper’s Criticism

E is evidence for H when:

1. E is true and

2. the antecedent probability of E being true given hypothesis H is greater than the antecedent probability of E given the hypothesis ~H.

For instance, Casey Anthony did not tell police or her family that her daughter was missing. This is a fact in evidence (E). This E is more probably given the hypothesis that she was involved in her daughter’s disappearance and death then on the hypothesis that she was not involved in her daughter’s disappearance and death. Therefore, her not telling the police and her family is evidence of her involvement.

Pr (e/h) > Pr (e/~h)

Sch is committed to the idea that the horrendous suffering is not equally probable on both the hypothesis “that God exists” and the hypothesis “that God does not exist.” Specifically, he's committed to the idea that the existence of horrendous suffering is more probable on the hypothesis of ~ God than on the hypothesis of God. Only if the existence of horrendous suffering is antecedently more probable on the hypothesis of atheism relative to the hypothesis of theism can this count as evidence in favor of the former and against the latter.

Draper argues that Sch does not show that Pr (horrific suffering/ atheism) > Pr (horrific suffering/ theism) It may be true, but Sch does not demonstrate why we should think it is.

For horrific suffering to be really strong evidence for atheism one must show that horrific suffering is much more likely given no god.

If Sch’s argument is not a logical problem of evil, then he must demonstrate the probability of horrific suffering given atheism is not low, at least not as low as the probability of horrific suffering given theism.

General Problems with Probability and Modus Tolens Arguments

P > Q

Therefore

But this standard inference pattern fails if one fails to consider the initial probabilities of the constituent claims.

If the lottery is fairly drawn I will lose (highly probable)

I don’t lose.

Therefore

The lottery was not fairly drawn. (highly probable)

Let’s stipulate that premise one is very probably true. The odds of winning this lottery are 10000000 to 1. But if I win the lottery, does this fact alone give us good reason to believe that the lottery was rigged in my favor? No, because, while the initial probably of me winning is very low, the initial probability of someone rigging the lottery in my favor is very, very low.

If the lottery was not rigged in your favor you would not win (b/c such slim chance).

You win the lottery.

Therefore

The lottery was rigged in your favor.

We would agree that the first premise is probably true, But if the initial probability of the conclusion. that someone rigged lottery in your favor is also very low so much [ Pr (w/lot rigged) = !!! low], This winning the lotto does not provide you with reason to think that the lotto was rigged in your favor.

Or again. Consider:

Art Thief “Pierre”

If Pierre were innocent, then his ring would not be inside the display case at the scene of the crime.

His ring was found inside the display case at the scene.

Therefore

So Pierre is not innocent

P > [Pr (Q)= --]

Therefore

Pr (~P) = ++ /(or Pr (P)= --

Skilled Art Thief “Pierre”

P > [Pr (Q)= --]

Therefore

~P > [Pr (Q)= ---]

Therefore

Pr (~P) = ++ (or Pr (P)= --

Pr (P) = +++ (or Pr (~P)= ---

While the probability of his ring being at the scene is low, in the case where he is a skilled art thief, the probability of his ring being at the scene given that he is not innocent is even lower. If he is skilled, then the probability would be very, very low that he would leave behind his ring.

Examples of Modus Tolens arguments which fail because they do not take into account confirmation theory.

The same mistake can take place with Modus Tolens arguments for or against God.

Example of Similar Empirical Argument in Favor of the Probability of Theism

Fine Tuning Argument:

If the universe were such that God does not exist (P), then the world is not fine tuned for complexity. (Q)

The world IS fine tuned for complexity. (~Q)

Therefore

God does exist. (~P)[13]

Hume makes the claim that the pattern of pain and pleasure is more consistent with a Universe that is indifferent to our pain or suffering.

Analogous argument:

Theo is a father who had little exchange with his children. He eventually runs off and does not provide for their welfare.

F (= Known fact about the behavior of Theo with respect to his kids.)

L (= Hypothesis that Theo loves his kids.)

IH (= Theo is indifferent to the welfare of his kids.)

Now, the initial probability (IP) of IH is at least as high as that of L

And

Pr (F/L) is much lower than Pr (F/IH)

Therefore

F confirms IH above L (without appeal to other evidence).

D1. O: statement reporting what we know about pain and pleasure

D2: HI= the hypothesis of indifference:

neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.

D3: T= Theism

D4: N= Metaphysical Naturalism

D5: Pr (x/y) >! n means “independent of the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge of O is based, the epistemic probability that X is true on the assumption that y is true is much greater than n.

D6: The intrinsic probability of a statement is its probability independent of all evidence

–i.e., the probability it has only in virtue of its content.

The more complex the hypothesis, the lower the lower the IP. The more “and’s” (x and y and z) the lower, the more “or’s” (x or y or z) the higher. EX: You have a dog vs. You have a brown dog named Spot. Note: Draper keeps HI very flexible for this reason thus giving it a higher IP.

D7: An instance of pain or pleasure is biologically useful just in case it causally contributes to the biological goals of survival or reproduction and its doing so is not accidental.

D8: An instance of pain or pleasure is biologically gratuitous just in case it is not biologically useful.

D9: O1 a statement that we know about biologically useful pain and pleasure of moral agents.

D10: O2 a statement that we know about biologically useful pain and pleasure of sentient beings that are not moral agents.

D11: O3 a statement that we know about biologically useful pain and pleasure.

P1: O is known to be true (some statement about the pain and suffering in the world)

P2: Pr (O/HI) >! Pr (O/T)

P2. HI is at least as probable intrinsically as T.

Therefore

(SC) :Other evidence held equal, HI is much more probable than T

P4: HI and T cannot both be true.

Therefore

(C) Other evidence held equal, T is very improbable. (It is understood that ~(P&Q) and Pr (P) is !!!high, the Pr (Q) is !!! low.

Defense of Premise Two

a. O is logically equivalent to O1&O2&O3.

b. Pr(01/HI>!Pr(O1/T)

c. Pr(02/HI&01>Pr(O2/T&01)

d. Pr(03/H&01&02I>!Pr(O3/T&01&02)

Therefore:

e. Pr(O/H)>! (Pr(O/T)

NB: for any Pr (a & b & c/ d) = Pr (a / d) * Pr (b/ a & b) * Pr (c/ a & b & d)

The more complicated the theory, the lower it’s probability (were the probability of the various parts is individually less then one).

a.) from the assumption of HI, you might very well expect that pain and pleasure play the same role as other things in the life of bio creatures, but given the moral status of suffering, on the assumption of T, you would have less reason to feel confident that pain and pleasure play the same role in the life of bio creatures.

On the assumption house builder who cares a great deal about energy conservation, you might expect the roof to be about as efficient as the rest of the house.

Vs/ the assumption that the house builder cares a great deal about energy conservation and hates those roof solar heaters. Notice that this added detail may give you some reason for thinking that the roof would NOT be as efficient as that rest of the house. But this assumption is has less initial probability as it is more complex than its rival.

b.) O2 the same sort of justification. We might expect pain and suffering for moral agents, but no reason to think for sentient a-moral beings.

c. On the assumption of T we’d expect a lot less biologically gratuitous suffering and a lot more biologically gratuitous pleasure.

Defense of Premise Three

Premise 3 is true because Theism is a specific supernaturalistic hypothesis while HI is compatible with both metaphysical naturalism and a variety of supernaturalist hypotheses.

Defense of Premise Four

Premise four is obviously true since God is, by definition, a benevolent being, and thesis entails that both the nature and the condition of sentient beings on earth results in part from God’s creation of the universe.

D. Objections

1. Premise 1 is false because of the success of the Free Will Theodicy. (Swinburne)

2. Premise 2 is false because it is impossible to assess Pr(O/T). (VanInwagen)

3. There are no such things as intrinsic probabilities. Initial probabilities are subjective. (Otte/Hasker)

4. Premise 2 is false because it is impossible to assess Pr(O/HI)

5. Even if the e argument is sound, it has little significance because theists have strong non-inferential evidence for theism (Plantinga).

[1] Candide (Candide, ou l'Optimisme) is a French satire by Voltaire in which Voltaire basically makes fun of this Leibnizian pronouncement. Candide’s teacher, Professor Pangloss, repeatedly assures Candide that "all is for the best" and that this is "the best of all possible worlds." This, despite the many misfortunes that befall Candide in the novel. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vmc72fCJivA

[2] From: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3143883/#fn5

“At the turn of the twentieth century, many of his colleagues were supporters of monistic or ‘absolute idealism’.5 Essentially, their metaphysical systems rested on the belief that all the elements in the universe contribute to some sort of unified and rational system, and that there is, ultimately, a benign grand plan underlying ‘the kosmos’ and all its events.6 For James though, the existence of real evil meant that such metaphysical assumptions were fundamentally flawed. One of the key facets of his metaphysics was that the universe is pluralistic not monistic; ‘an aggregate or collection of higher and lower things and principles’7 within which any god or benevolent spiritual agency is only one entity amongst many. The reason James gave for this was the existence of evil – if God is infinite, then He must also be ultimately responsible for this ‘excrementitious stuff’8 of the universe, and thereby lies a puzzle: If ‘the absolute’ is omnipotent, a being ‘upon which nothing alien can be forced, [why has it] spontaneously chosen from within to give itself the spectacle of all that evil rather than a spectacle with less evil in it?’9 As far as James was concerned, the solution to this conundrum was that ‘the only God worthy of the name must be finite,’10 and therefore relieved of responsibility for the evil parts of the world.

[6] This line of argument has always seemed suspicious to me, sophisticated legalism which evades rather than resolves the issue. It is as if, due to the curious circumstances, no one exists to press charges. Therefore God is blameless. But surely this is a question of “character” not rights. What sort of God would create a broken and suffering world? Even if we grant that a “less than perfect world is logically necessary” the question would remain, “Why this less than perfect world?” "Why this evil?" We can (and do) quibble about the details.

[7] One way around this might be to say that no “good” can be “greater” than some existent evil. Thus this claim would be false. One might show that the whole project of counter-balancing evil with good couldn’t be made out.

[8] Hume, David Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Second Edition) ed. Richard H. Popkin, Hackett Publishing, 1998

[9] But we might, nevertheless retain faith in a Non-omnipotent God. Rowe defines God as O-God. But Cleanthes resolves the matter by lessening the attributes of God.

“If we abandon all analogy to humanity, then we retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. But if we preserve human analogy then we cannot reconcile the evil in the world with infinite attribute. But suppose the Author Of Nature to be finitely perfect but far exceeding mankind... benevolence governed by wisdom but limited by necessity might produce just such a world”

[10] “Grounds for belief in God aside, does evil make atheism more reasonable than theism?” Howard-Snyder, Daniel & Bergmann, Michael In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. pp. 140--55 (2003)

[11] J. L. Schellenberg argues in book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason that reasonable atheism is itself evidence of God’s non-existence. If God does did exist, why would he hide? One would think that he would want a loving relationship with us and so would provide any open-minded rational agent sufficient evidence of God’s existence.

[12] Side note: Can a perfect being empathize? Is suffering an imperfection? What might the experience of God be like?

[13] What if the claim was “If the lottery was not rigged in my favor I would not have won.”? The starting probability would be very low.