Hauptli

Hauptli’s Supplement to James Cargile’s “In Reply to `A Defense of Skepticism’”[1]

Cargile wants us to examine Unger’s article carefully. He claims that (1) Unger relies upon a “preposterous” formula which requires that when one is certain there is nothing else one can be more certain of; (2) there is a difference between `flat’ and `certain’; (3) mental exercises do not always generate real doubts; and (4) Unger switches his theses and arguments at crucial junctures.

338-339 In arguing for skepticism Unger maintains that it is unusual for anyone to be certain of anything. To establish this, he relies upon the “formula” that “if I am more certain that p than I am that q, then I am not certain that q. But this formula is preposterous: whether speaking of mathematical statements (like ‘45+56=101’) or of statements about the existence of automobiles, Unger offers nothing to support his claim that one could be taught things which were more certain. He implies, in the case of the automobile example, one could be more certain of one’s own existence and, thus, that the statement about automobiles is not [absolutely] certain. Some philosophers have advanced claims regarding the cogito which make it more certain than mathematical truths, but:

339 “I think it is wrong to think that ruling out the logical possibility of error is always a case of leaving less “room” for error, or that not ruling out the logical possibility of error is automatically to leave “room” for error. But at any rate, in typical cases in which the question of certainty arises, these considerations are just irrelevant.”

--340 Suppose I am laid up in bed with a broken leg and I hear the cow’s bell in the garden. It turns out that I am wrong this time but also suppose that several days later I hear the same thing, but also see the cow in the garden. I call out in alarm, my wife asks me if I am certain this time and I say “Yes, I see her clearly.” This is correct—I am certain! “It is logically possible I am mistaken in thinking the cow is in the garden. It is logically possible that elves have taken a stuffed replica of the cow into the garden, and no harm is being done to the vegetables.” Nonetheless, “...I am perfectly correct in saying I am certain.”

341 Unger discusses ‘vacuum’ and ‘flat’ and what he says is partially off the mark. “The absence of actual, real-life occasions for applying such terms as ‘perfect vacuum’ or ‘mathematically flat’ is compensated by their clear roles in important idealized systems. This is not the case with ‘know’. Perhaps the skeptic who says that the term ‘know’ has no applications, or virtually none, in real-life situations, will be willing to formulate some idealized setup in which the term does have a use. But there is no such system which is not of overwhelming insignificance by contrast with the ordinary used of the term.”

-“One correct feature of Unger’s remarks is that for practical purposes there is no difference between something’s being strictly true and its being close enough to strictly true to be treated as true for practical purposes. But this obvious truth is no basis for claiming that claims to knowledge or certainty are hardly ever strictly true.”

343 The doubts one might come up regarding automobiles (by considering Cartesian skepticism, for example) are not necessarily reasonable doubts:

-“…being able to work up a feeling of doubt by mental exercises is not the same as doubting.”

343-344 Cargile maintains that Unger “...began by saying that, while he could not, of course, claim that little is known, he would show it is reasonable to believe that little is known. But at the crucial step just criticized we find him arguing that it is reasonable to suspend judgment on the question whether much is certain. And this falls short of arguing that it is reasonable to believe that very little is certain. But then even this more limited argument ends up in a question-begging suggestion that we can be careful about questions involving our understanding of people.”

344 H.A. Prichard, like Unger, re-defines ‘certain’ (requiring that it be logically impossible that one is wrong if one is to be legitimately certain). While Cargile has criticized this idea, at least Prichard offers a clear sense to ‘certain’—Unger does not do so!

-even though Prichard’s definition is criticizable, it is comprehensible; and it leads us to understanding.

-Unger offers us no re-definition (no theory in which his views would do any work).

Note: (click on note number to return to text for note)

[1] James Cargile, “In Reply to ‘A Defense of Skepticism,’” Philosophical Review v. 81 (1972), pp. 229-236. It is reprinted in Essays in Knowledge and Justification, eds. George Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1972), pp. 337-345, which is on Reserve in Green Library. These notes are to the reprint.