Continental Rationalism Characterized
Copyright © 2014 Bruce W. Hauptli
The Continental Rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz) each helped to cement the downfall of the Medieval world-view and the
rise of the modern scientific world-view.
A central tenet of the Medieval period was that faith and reason could
not contradict one another:
the natural dictates of
reason must certainly be true; it is impossible to think of their being
otherwise. Nor again is it
permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are false, being so evidently
confirmed by God. Since therefore
falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to
be contrary to the principles known by natural reason.[1]
The Medieval view was that faith and reason co-operated to
depict a world in which everything accorded with the divine purpose.
While this picture was the dominant one for about a thousand years (from
about 400-1400 C.E.),[2]
with the Renaissance (1400-1600) this world-view came under substantial
pressure.
The Rationalists’ period is marked by a change in the attitude toward the
Medieval institutions and beliefs.
These philosophers did not so much ask new questions, instead, they endeavored
to provide “new” answers. These
answers weren’t wholly different from the sorts of answers offered by the
Medievals, but they were offered in a
new spirit, with a new method,
and in a new manner.[3]
The Rationalists’ fundamental break with the previous tradition was an
unrelenting “faith” in
human reason.
They held we could arrive at knowledge
unaided by religious faith or revelation.[4]
For the Continental Rationalists, Leibniz’
principle of sufficient reason may
be considered the basic principle: they all held that there is a complete, and
completely rational, explanation for everything which occurs.
It should be stressed that their conception of reason is that knowledge
(or truth) is arranged in a deductive system, and that
one must “begin” with self-evident,
a priori truths of which we can be
certain. That is, their “faith
in reason” was a faith in a priori
reasoning—they did not believe that our sensory experience could provide us with
knowledge of the world. Instead,
the Continental Rationalists held that it is only
via a priori intellectual perceptions
that we grasp the fundamental nature of the universe (the notions of substance,
essence, etc.).
According to the Continental Rationalists, the appropriate methodology
for building upon the self-evident truths is the
deductive axiomatic method of
mathematics (as especially exemplified in geometry) wherein theorems are derived
from axioms and postulates. Of
course, the truth of the theorems is dependent upon the truth of these
postulates.
The Continental Rationalists believed that these axioms and postulates
were not to be accepted on faith but,
rather, that they must be known by and guaranteed by some sort of
intellectual understanding (or
rational intuition). These
intuitions showed certain facts to be
necessary truths and upon this
sort of a priori, rational, and
certain basis, the Continental Rationalists would ground all of our knowledge.
They did not hold, as many now do, that logical truths (tautologies)
are mere “truths of language” (which give us no substantial information about
the way the world is). Instead,
they held that the necessary truths they which they relied upon reflected
necessary facts and gave us
(certain) knowledge of the basic ways of the world.
In saying that the Continental Rationalists’ conception of reason is that
knowledge (or truth) is arranged in a deductive system, we speak about both
their epistemology and their metaphysics.
Metaphysically speaking, they hold that the world has a fundamentally
deductive structure. Moreover, for
all of them the ontological argument
occupies position of central metaphysical importance.
The fact “exposed” by this proof provides the “metaphysical
ground” for the whole system of truth which constitutes the created
universe. Epistemologically
speaking, of course, this “ground” provides the explanation for all the other
truths in the total “system” of truths.
At the core of the Continental Rationalists’ orientations, then, are what
are called innate principles or ideas.
These “ideas” express the intellectual intuitions which are the heart of
their systems. The clearest example of an innate idea is
the idea of a deity.
Standard examples of innate principles for these thinkers (claims which
they hold to be know a priori, and
which are held to be intellectual intuitions that are
certain, self-evident, and necessarily
true) include: “What is, is” and
“It is impossible for the same thing to
be, and not to be.” As noted in
the Encyclopedia Britannica:
the Cartesian metaphysics
is the fountainhead of Rationalism in modern philosophy, for it suggests that
the mathematical criterion of clarity, distinctness, and absence of
contradiction among ideas are the ultimate test of meaningfulness and truth.
This stance is profoundly antiempirical.
Bacon, who had said that “reasoners resemble spiders who make cobwebs out
of their own substance,” might well have said so of Descartes, for the Cartesian
self is just such a substance from which the idea of God originates and with
which all deductive reasoning begins. Yet
for Descartes the understanding is vastly superior to the senses, and, in the
question of what constitutes truth in science, only man’s reason can ultimately
decide.[5]
A major problem for Continental Rationalism is directly evident when we
note the diversity of basic postulates which the different rationalists advance,
and the radically different conclusions which they draw from shared principles,
postulates, or ideas. Since they
wished to offer objective theories (which all rational thinkers would have to
accept), their differences at this fundamental level were a matter of no small
concern.
Another problem with their orientation is that they have a great deal of
difficulty admitting any degree of
contingency into their systems.
Since their model of knowledge is one which begins with necessary truths,
since their systems posit deductive connections between truths, and since they
hold that everything is so explicable, there seems little room for contingency
in the universe. After all,
deductive consequences of necessary truths are themselves necessary.
[1] Aquinas,
Summa
Contra Gentiles [~1260], I. 7.
[2] This
includes the Medieval Renaissance (1100-1300):
where there was translation of Greek texts
(Euclid, Ptolemy, Aristotle); study of
Aristotle’s methods of observation, experiment,
and logical reasoning; and work to reconcile
faith and the new forms of reasoning.
Aquinas (1226-1274) was especially
concerned with the latter.
William of Ockham (1300-1349) denied
Aquinas’ project because religious claims must
be taken only on faith—he rejected Medieval
metaphysics and contended that non-revealed
claims must be based on experience.
[3] In his
“Introduction,” Martin Hollis maintains that
“the novelty of Rationalism lies in its method
of enquiry, which owed more to logic and
mathematics and, at the same time, to scientific
experiment than any before.
The results of the method, however, often
owed more to the past than the Rationalists
admitted.
Presumptions made about God, about human
nature and about the character of rational
order...” (Martin Hollis, “Introduction” to
The Light
of Reason: Rationalist Philosophers of the 17th
Century, ed. Martin Hollis [London:
Fontana/Collins, 1973], pp. 9-36, pp. 10-11).
[4] Of
course, this·is·one reason·for·also looking at,
and contrasting, their orientation with,
Pascal’s orientation.
[5]
“Philosophy, history of,”
Encyclopedia Britannica Online,
<http://www.eb.com:180/bol/topic?artcl=108652&seq_nbr=4&page=p&isctn=12>,
accessed 19 August 1999.
Last revised on: 11/04/2014.