Lecture Supplement on Descartes’
Meditations [1641]
Copyright © 2014 Bruce W. Hauptli
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1. Introduction to
Descartes:
Descartes lived from 1596 to 1650.
Between 1618 and 1621 he pursued a study of mathematics which resulted in
the discovery and formulation of what we now call “analytic geometry”—that
branch of mathematics which relates the algebraic and geometric studies.
The “Cartesian Coordinate System” you were taught in High School gets its
name from him. He also did
important work in the fields of physics, astronomy, and optics, and his
Meditations on First Philosophy was published in 1641.
Descartes was a very well-known scientist of his age.
In his Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity, Stephen Toulmin notes that:
As we have seen, one of the core goals Descartes sets for himself is to
address skepticism and establish that human knowledge which attains the level of
certainty is possible. In her
“Othello’s Doubt/Desdemona’s Death: The Engendering of Scepticism,” Naomi
Scheman maintains that:
as narrated by Richard Popkin,
sixteenth-century Europe underwent a three-fold sceptical crisis: theological,
sparked by the Reformation and fueled by fideistic defenses of Catholicism;
humanistic, as a relativistic response to learning about the different ways of
life in the recently discovered new world and recently rediscovered ancient
world; and scientific, with the undermining of the bases of Aristotelian science
and the debates about what, if anything, could replace them.
Popkin situates Montaigne, especially
The Apology for Raymond Sebond, in
this context:
By extending the implicit
sceptical tendencies of the Reformation crisis, the humanistic crisis, and the
scientific crisis, into total crise
pyrrhonienne, Montaigne’s genial
Apologie became the coupe de grace
to an entire intellectual world. It
was also to be the womb of modern thought, in that it led to the attempt either
to refute the new Pyrrhonism, or to find a way of living with it.[2]
Montaigne himself chose to live with it, and his
Essays are largely a record of the
sort of life thereby chosen: forgiving of oneself and others, discursive,
amused, literate, and nondogmatically conservative, a place from which the world
is attentively observed, but never definitely known.[3]
Descartes’s world, as Popkin
notes, is in the throes of scepticism.
Although we may read Descartes as self-confidently working toward the
overthrow of Scholasticism and the institutalionalization of the epistemology of
modern science, he saw his project equally as one of warding off the threat of
epistemic nihilism, a threat he perceived the Montaignean sceptic as posing.[4]
Descartes’s doubt in the
Meditations is clearly self-induced,
and he confidently expects to regain the world he has willed away.
But, as Popkin argues, we need to take seriously the threat of scepticism
posed to Descartes. Epistemic
dependency was both intolerable and increasingly unreliable, and his central
interest in the growth of science demanded foundations more secure than the
scepticism of Montaigne would allow.[5]
To achieve this goal Descartes’ must clarify the nature of
justification.
The area of philosophy called
epistemology is especially concerned with the justifiability of our
knowledge claims. In his
Theaetetus Plato approaches the
question of justification by asking “How
we can tell whether we are dreaming or awake?” Remember that we rarely take
“dream reports” as indicative of the true character of reality, while we far
more frequently (but, of course, not always) take “awakened reports” as
indicative of true states of affairs.
The “dreaming” question, like all philosophical questions seems trivial,
yet its deceptive simplicity belies the complexity which arises as one tries to
answer it.
Since we base most of our
knowledge claims upon our sensory
experience, if we can not tell whether our experiences are the fluff of
dreams or the reports of the senses when we are awake, it seems that the
experiences we rely upon may not be very reliable ones.
No one, for example, would write his or her chemistry lab reports on the
basis of last night’s dreams.
Well, how
do we tell whether we are awake or
asleep? If we can’t tell which
state we are in, then can we place any reliability, credence, or worth in the
reports?
When the foundations of our knowledge claims are unclear
some philosophic work is necessary.
Descartes undertakes the project of trying to find a
firm and rational foundation for our
knowledge claims. He does this
because, in part, of the times in which he lives.
As we have seen, the Medieval period marked a significant departure from
the Ancient one—thinkers like St. Anselm maintained that reason must take its
cues from certain truths of faith.
They held that philosophy is important as we try to come to understand what we
antecedently believe (through faith).
Ancient thinkers like Plato, by contrast, held that we should believe
what we can rationally establish.
Thus contrast Plato’s Socrates’ statement that “I am the kind of man who listens
only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me” [Crito, 46b]
with Anselm’s desire to come to understand what he antecedently believes.
The Modern period is characterized by an immense “faith” in our ability
to rationally uncover universal and general truths about the world—it is, then a
return to the philosophical view of the Ancients.
As such a return, however, it is conditioned by the loss of both the
feelings of security and of certainty which the Medieval period provided with
its “faith-based” foundation. This
loss did not occur because of the development of a clear-cut and widely-accepted
“replacement” methodology however.
The methodology of the new empirical sciences was still under development in
Descartes’ time.
Descartes agrees with Galileo that the “book of nature” is written in the
language of mathematics[6]—he
believes the world was created according to mathematical formulae.
His ability to hook together geometry and algebra reinforced this view.[7]
He wants to firmly ground his knowledge claims, and thus wants to
establish that they are truly beyond
doubt—that they are certain.
There are several different senses of certainty (psychological
certainty, logical certainty, and metaphysical certainty), and it is the
latter which Descartes wants.[8]
Descartes believes he can show that there is one claim which legitimately
has this “highest” degree of certainty—his
cogito argument (his famous “I think,
therefore I am,” or “cogito, ergo sum”
argument) is to give us this level of certainty.
He will go on to justify much of human knowledge (including knowledge of
a deity) and to develop a dualistic metaphysics.
Central to his methodology, however, is the strategy of beating the
skeptics at their own game: his procedure is to doubt everything tinged with any
“possibility of doubt” (to reject everything which he can) until he finds
something which absolutely can not be doubted.
With this claim he will have a foundation upon which other knowledge
claims may rest securely.[9]
Descartes wants to do more than refute skepticism however.
He wants to show that the foundation which he “uncovers” is one which can
be built upon, and this means he must get
beyond subjectivity. Here his
proof of the existence of a deity comes in—the argument he develops for the
existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent deity provide him with
the intellectual tool to move with certainty beyond knowledge of subjectivity.
Thus far this introduction to has covered only the “epistemological”
aspects of Descartes’ thought, and it is already too long.
The Meditations are as
well-known and important for their “metaphysical” content as they are for their
epistemological however, and we need to understand this before we look at the
text. The general introductory
story regarding Descartes’ metaphysics maintains that he offers a “dualistic
metaphysic” which offers a picture of reality as bifurcated into two
distinct categories of “things:” the
mental and the physical.
To see the difference between
these two categories of reality, begin by considering your “visual field” (the
images you experience when you pay attention to your visual experience.[10]
Concentrating on this “field,” try and answer the question “Where, in
physical space, does this visual field reside?”
Is it to be located in the brain?
Descartes holds that “physical things” all have one central
characteristic: they are extended
(or have some shape or other).
While they can change their shapes (surely this is what we want to do when we
visit our health clubs), they always have some shape or other.
According to Descartes, however, “mental things” are not correctly
characterized as having a shape.
Instead, they are characterized as having “experiences.”
Descartes holds that the mental and physical are distinct categories of
things, and any thing (or, more
strictly speaking, any created
thing) must be one or the other (but not both).
This “dualistic picture” is right as far as it goes, but Descartes
actually holds a more complex metaphysical picture.
In addition to physical and mental substance, there is also a
deity according to him.
Strictly speaking, this “thing” is a mind, but it is significantly
different from the sorts of mental substances which we are—it is infinite, and
it is not dependent upon anything
else.[11]
Mention of Descartes’ deity, however, seems to take us right back to the
“picture” of the world offered by the Medieval world-view!
It is important to note, however, that while he was a Catholic, the deity
he discusses in the Meditations is
better seen as a “god of the philosophers”[12]—this
deity fulfills a particular role, and this role is what is important not any
“personalistic” characteristics of the deity.
For Descartes, the deity will provide a causal and explanatory terminus
(and end for all questions of causation and justification), but this deity will
be bereft of most of the medieval adornments.
It is also important to note that from the “modern” view-point of
Descartes, the most appropriate way to approach (one almost wants to say
“worship”) this deity is via
reason—the goal is to come to know
(rather than to worship) this “thing” and to try to know reality as this deity
knows it. Such knowledge, it should
be clear, is not to be developed by examining texts or consulting religious or
scriptural authorities. Instead, it
is to be had by rationally examining the “book of nature.”
To see this clearly, however, we must turn to the text itself.
2. Dedication, Preface, and Synopsis:
Dedication:
47 His deity and the soul are to
be proved by
natural reason.[13]
49 Demonstrations of the highest
certainty and evidence require a mind entirely free from prejudice and
detached from the senses.
Preface:
51 Descartes (very) briefly
responds quickly to two critiques of his earlier Discourse on Method
[1637]:
-The first criticism is that:
“...from the fact that the human mind, when turned in on itself, does not
perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it does not follow
that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thinking
thing....” He responds that he did
not intend to prove this there, but he will show this (presumably in this work).
-The second criticism is that:
“...it does not follow from the fact that I have within me an idea of a thing
more perfect than me, that this idea is itself more perfect than me, and still
less that what is represented by this idea exists.”
He answers that if ‘idea’ is taken only “materially,” this is so; but if
it is taken “objectively” (that is “representationally”), this is not so—as he
will show in this work. What he
will show is that (p. 52): “...from the mere fact that there is within me an
idea of something more perfect than me, it follows that this thing really
exists.”
--In his Philosophy As Social
Expression, Albert W. Levi maintains that: “it is indeed ironic that in the
Cartesian system, while the authority of natural science derives ultimately from
the establishment of two basic propositions of metaphysics, these propositions
themselves are the most questionable and the most vulnerable to external
philosophical criticism. In the
“Preface to the Reader”...he refers back to the Discourse of 1637 of
which he had freely solicited criticism, and to the two chief criticisms which
he had in fact received. These were (1) that from the fact that the human mind,
reflecting on itself, does not perceive itself to be other than a thing which
thinks it does not follow that its nature or its essence does indeed
consist only in thinking; and (2) that from the fact that I have in myself
the idea of something more perfect than I am, it does not follow that
this idea is more perfect than I am, and even less that what is
represented by this idea exists.
The Cogito and the ontological proof are the ultimate foundations
of Descartes’ philosophy of science, as they are the cornerstone of his
metaphysics, but they are just those elements which subsequent philosophers have
been most reluctant to certify as acceptable components of the Cartesian
system.”[14]
52 Descartes notes again, that
his inquiry here will be one in “first philosophy,” and will require that the
reader give it serious attention. Indeed, he notes, he publishes a set of
“Objections” with the Meditations, and he asks the reader to withhold
final judgment until they have been considered also.
Synopsis:
The appropriate paragraphs of the “Synopsis” need to be
read before and after each of the Meditations.
54-55 The discussion of the
status of mental and physical substances is important, though it becomes clear
only upon completion of the “Sixth Meditation.”
3. The First
Meditation:
59 Goal—he desires to establish
firm knowledge in the sciences.
59-60 Type of doubt—doubt
whatever is not indubitable or entirely certain—even what is only slightly
tinged or possibly tinged! It is
general—he doesn’t doubt each
proposition but, rather, doubts them in groups.
60
Sometimes the senses mislead us!
-But, perhaps, sometimes the
senses don’t—then we are “close” to the object, etc.
The
dreaming argument: but I do dream:
“I have been deceived in sleep by similar perceptions.”
-May I suppose that dream images
represent? May I suppose
that there are simples like the
elements in a picture (that the structure of the painting may be all wrong, as
it were, but that the elements in it actually correspond or represent)?
-60-61 Surely “simples”
are true whether one is awake or dreaming?
That is, whether my experiences are dreaming or awakened ones, surely the
“simple components” of the experiences (those out of which the “complexes” are
formed) provide me with a solid (and valid) base of knowledge claims.
Can’t I suppose that dream images still represent the world somewhat?
That is, may I suppose that there are simples like the elements in a
picture (that the structure of the painting may be all wrong, as it were, but
that the elements in it actually correspond or represent?)
61 “Be that as it may, there is fixed in my mind a
certain opinion of long standing, namely that there exists a God who is able to
do anything and by whom I, such as I am, have been created.
How do I know that He did not bring it about that there is no earth at
all, no heavens, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, and yet bring
it about that all these things appear to me to exist precisely as they do now?
Moreover, since I judge that others sometimes make mistakes in matters
that they believe they know most perfectly, may I not, in like fashion, be
deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or
perform an even simpler operation, if that can be imagined?
“
-62 If one believes there is not
such a powerful deity, then, since the author of our being is less powerful, it
is increasingly probable that we easily fall into error.
-“...long standing opinions keep
returning, and, almost against my will, they take advantage of my credulity, as
if it were bound over to them by long use and the claims of intimacy.”
-62-63 I will suppose an
evil genius who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful and who employs all
his artifice to deceive me—note that the sense of ‘evil’ here is epistemic, not
moral or theological!
63 I will be a skeptic—I will
withhold my assent.
4. Comments on the
First Meditation:
(A). Avoid Error vs. Embrace Truth.
(B). Dreams and Deceivers:
A possible origin of the Deceiver
Hypothesis,
Alice, Wonderland, and dreaming,[15]
Jorge Luis Borges’ “The Circular
Ruins,”[16]
and the Star Trek Next Generation
episode entitled “Ship In A Bottle” where Professor Moriarty (a holodeck
character) manages to take control of both a holodeck fantasy program and of the
Starship Enterprise. At the end of
the episode, one of the crew-members is not at all sure that the “program” is
not continuing, and (sheepishly) worries that his “life” might be a fantasy.
In his
Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History
of Philosophy, Jostein Gaarder reminds us that:
the old Chinese sage
Chuang-tzu...said: Once I dreamed I was a butterfly, and now I no longer know
whether I am Chuang-tzu, who dreamed I was a butterfly, or whether I am a
butterfly dreaming that I am Chuang-tzu.[17]
As Gaarder’s overall story
develops, it appears as if one of his characters may “take control” of the
novel, and the overall discussion clearly has Descartes in mind.
(C). The problem of representationalism:
Imagine you are a physicist,
astronomer, chemist or psychologist, and you are charged with discovering
certain fundamental laws of the universe—that is, you are attempting to discover
the laws which govern the behavior of unobservable phenomena (electrons, quanta,
black holes, molecules, minds, etc.).
How will you proceed?
-Do chemical reactions, behavioral responses, and
gross macroscopic events which we can observe provide us with representations of
what occurs at the unobservable level?
Here is something parallel to the problem Descartes confronts and would
resolve. The scientist is,
literally, confined to his or her observations—what is observed differs
radically from the fundamental particles discussed in the theories.
Descartes looks for a
characteristic of some of his ideas which would
guarantee that they (truly) represent
(things in the world).
In his “Idealism and
Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed” M.F. Burnyeat notes
that: “Greek philosophy does not know the problem of proving in a general way
the existence of an external world.
That problem is a modern
invention....The problem which typifies ancient philosophical enquiry in a way
that the external world problem has come to typify philosophical enquiry in
modern times is quite the opposite.
It is the problem of understanding how thought can be of
nothing or what is not, how our minds
can be exercised on falsehoods, fictions, and illusions.[18]
I discuss this further in
Appendix III.
(D). Descartes
and the “Egocentric Predicament:”
It is important that we note that Descartes’ new
(“scientific”) epistemology explicitly begins with the
isolated self.
As C.A.J. Coady notes his
Testimony: A Philosophical Study:
it is interesting to contrast
[Thomas] Reid’s attitude with Descartes’s.
In the Discourse on the Method,
Descartes says in discussing the influence of custom and example upon belief,
‘And yet a majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are at all
difficult to discover; for a single man is much more likely to hit upon them
than a group of people’….The confident individualism of this passage will be
relevant to my discussion of the influences of individualist ideology upon the
neglect of testimony. Descartes’s
thought here is not only at odds with the (surely genuine) phenomenon to which
Reid draws attention but also with the facts of scientific co-operation and
mutual dependency in the uncovering of truths that are (often extremely)
difficult to discover.[19]
Whereas Thomas Reid [1710-1796] and today’s scientists begin squarely
in a social epistemology which sees the knower in a world which includes, and,
more importantly, accepts the testimony of others, Descartes begins his
epistemic journey alone and isolated from both others and the world.
From Descartes’ time to our own, many epistemologists have believed that
to achieve justified knowledge about the world we must begin from this
“egocentric” predicament and work our way out ward.
Some contemporary naturalistic epistemologists follow the line of thought
of Reid, however. They emphasize
that humans begin their epistemic journey learning from others, and they point
out that testimony is as common, and strong, a source of justification as
individual experience. We shall see
that Descartes has little to say about the role of testimony, because he has
significant difficulty even getting to the existence of others, let alone to
utilizing them as a possible source of epistemic justification.
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5. Problems with
Descartes’ Arguments for Skepticism:
(A). G.E. Moore raises this criticism of Descartes’
dreaming argument: “...can he consistently combine this proposition [a] that he
knows that dreams have occurred, with his conclusion [b] that he does not know
that he is not dreaming? Can
anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred, if, at the time, he does not
himself know that he is not dreaming?
If he is dreaming, it may be
that he is only dreaming that dreams have occurred; and if he does not know that
he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is
not only dreaming that dreams have
occurred? Can he possibly know
therefore that dreams have occurred?
I do not think that he can; and therefore I think that anyone who uses
this premise and also asserts the conclusion that nobody ever knows that he is
not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency.”[20]
(B). Philosophical argumentation and modeling:
senses sometimes mislead us →
perhaps they always do;
some paintings are forgeries →
perhaps they all are.[21]
Gilbert Ryle provides a version
of this criticism:
I must say a little
about the quite general argument from the notorious limitations and fallibility
of our senses to the impossibility of our getting to know anything at all by
looking, listening and touching.
A country which had no coinage would offer no scope to counterfeiters.
There would be nothing for them to manufacture or pass counterfeits of.
They could, if they wished, manufacture and give away decorated disks of
brass or lead, which the public might be pleased to get.
But these would not be false coins.
There can be false coins only where there are coins made of the proper
materials by the proper authorities.
In a country where there is a coinage, false coins can be manufactured
and passed; and the counterfeiting might be so efficient that an ordinary
citizen, unable to tell which were false and which were genuine coins, might
become suspicious of the genuineness of any particular coin that he received.
But however general his suspicions might be, there remains one
proposition which he cannot entertain, the proposition, namely, that it is
possible that all coins are counterfeits.
For there must be an answer to the question ‘Counterfeits of what?’”[22]
In his “I Only Am Escaped Alone
to tell Thee:’ Epistemology and the Ishmael Effect,” David Stove maintains:
well, it is true, and also
contingent, that some of us sometimes hallucinate.
But it does not follow from that, (even if Descartes thought it did),
that it is logically possible that all of us are always hallucinating.
Some children in a school-class may happen to be below the average level
of ability of children in that class, but it is not logically possible that all
of them are. Neither is it
logically possible that we are all
always hallucinating. For we—that
is, all human beings—are perceived by (unless indeed we are hallucinations of)
at least one human being: ourselves if no other.
Whence, on the supposition that we—that is, all human beings—are always
hallucinating, it follows that all
human beings are hallucinations of at least one human being.
And that is not logically possible.[23]
(C). J.L. Austin offers a related sort of criticism.
He claims that “...it is important to remember that talk of deception
only makes sense against a background
of general non-deception. (You
can’t fool all of the people all of the time.)
It must be possible to recognize
a case of deception by checking the odd cases against the more normal ones.”[24]
(D). In his Bright
Air, Brilliant Fire, Gerald Edelman notes that: “one matter Descartes did
not explicitly analyze, however, was that to be aware and able to guide his
philosophical thought, he needed to have language.
And for a person to have language, at least one other person must be
involved, even if that person is the memory of someone in one’s past, an
interiorized interlocutor. This
requirement shakes Descartes’ notion that his conclusions depended on himself
alone and not on other people.
Moreover, Descartes was not explicit as to when a human being first has access
to a thinking substance in his development.
Perhaps he should have pondered further the likelihood of a French baby
concluding, “Je pense donc je suis.””[25]
(E). Do the congenitally blind have “visual images?”
In his “Even Blind People Can Draw,” Daniel Zalewski maintains that:
early this year [2002], at the
All people blind since birth, cognitive scientists now say, share her
basic ability to create realistic drawings of everyday objects: a Coke bottle,
an armchair, a toothbrush. But how
can visual art possibly be made by people without vision?
The emerging idea is that picture-making is a cognitive ability so deeply
embedded in our brains that it flourishes even when our eyes fail us.[26]
What has really shocked cognitive
scientists, however, is that many blind artists seem to have tricks of the
Renaissance buried inside their brains.
Foreshortening, vanishing points and other devices of modern pictorial
realism—techniques that artists in the Middle Ages lacked—can be found in blind
art. At the Modern, when Kennedy
asked Carcione to draw a cube balanced on a point with three faces toward her,
she began by drawing a Y shape: three angles converging to a point.
When a cube was placed in front of a cone on the table, Carcione drew the
cone smaller, to convey distance.
This discovery suggests that realistic art isn’t just a nifty cultural
invention; it’s based on hard-wired systems of perception.
But if that’s true, why did it take Italian artists well into the 14th
century to develop what Carcione came upon through intuition.
Its still a mystery, but Kennedy theorizes that it has to do with the
fact that many blind people, out of necessity, develop an acute ability to
imagine physical space. In other
words, visual artists before the Renaissance were too bedazzled by sensory
overload to grasp the fundamental architecture of pictorial space.[27]
(F) If the dreaming argument is so powerful (and it seems
through the ages to be so), then why are
6. The Second
Meditation:
63 Doubt...until I shall find
something that is certain.
63-64 The
Cogito.
-Cf.,
Descartes’ Discourse On Method.[28]
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-What of “I walk therefore I am a
body with legs?”[29]
-What if Hamlet says “I think
therefore I am”?
-What of Jorge Luis
Borges’ “The Circular Ruins,”[30]
or Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland
and Through the Looking-Glass?[31]
-Discuss the difference between
the “occurrent “and the “substantial”
senses of ‘I.’ Indicate why the
distinction is important here, and why it is the “substantial” sense which
Descartes wants and needs (but doesn’t seem entitled to).
--Memory and the occurrent
conception of the self: Christopher Nolen’s movie
Memento [2000]—the movie centers on
the trials undergone by a character who lacks the form of “short-term” memory
which allows us to have plans for the future or remember what we did recently.
While he can speak language, drive cars, and interact with the world, he
can not remember whether he is chasing someone or being chased, who he is, or
what he is doing. While he writes
and even tattoos notes to himself, he has to try and fight against his lack of
memory to understand what is going on in “his life.”
Without short-term memory, we get a very different “self!”
Of course there is also “long-term” memory, and other sorts!
Moreover, does memory entail any sort of certainty?
--Identity and Theseus’ ship—my
“updated case” would have one imagine a ship (Theseus’) which is rebuilt plank
by plank (with the original planks saved and then reassembled according to the
original plan. The question is:
“Which of the resultant ships is Theseus’ ship?”
-Nonetheless, Descartes concludes
that he knows he is an enduring
thing—a
substance:
--On p. 65 he says: “For it is so
obvious that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who will, that there is
nothing by which it could be explained more clearly.
But indeed it is also the same “I” who imagines; for although perhaps, as
I supposed before, absolutely noting that I imagined is true, still the very
power of imagining really does exist, and constitutes a part of my thought.
Finally, it is this same “I” who senses or who is cognizant of bodily
things as if through the senses….”
-Indubitability—three
senses: psychological, logical, metaphysical: “psychological” certainty would be
where a specific individual finds
herself unable to raise doubts (because of her psychological constitution, or
her deeply felt convictions, or her predispositions, etc.); “logical” certainty
would be where no individual could
raise doubts (because logic rules them out); and “metaphysical” certainty would
be where absolutely no doubts could
be raised (where error is absolutely inconceivable).
“While we thus reject all that of which we can possibly doubt, and feign
that it is false...we cannot in the same way conceive that we who doubt these
things are not; for there is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does
not at the same time as it thinks, exist.”[32]
--Descartes asks “Do I exist?”
The American philosopher, Morris Cohen, asks “Who wants to know?”[33]
-In his “Arguments Demonstrating
the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Soul and Body, Drawn Up In
Geometrical Fashion,” published as part of the “Objections and Replies” in 1641
with the Meditations, Descartes
maintains that: “Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject,
or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property,
quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a
Substance; neither do we have any
other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in
which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of
our ideas, exists formally or eminently.
For by means of our
natural light
we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.”[34]
In his Principles of Philosophy
[1644], Descartes defines ‘substance’ more carefully (and this is taken as
the Cartesian definition) as follows:
“by substance, we can understand noting else than a thing which so exists that
it needs no other thing in order to exist.
And in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly
needs nothing else, namely God. We
perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concourse of
God. That is why the word substance
does not pertain univoce to God and
to other things, as they say in the Schools, that is, no common signification
for this appellation which will apply equally to God and to them can be
distinctly understood.”[35]
--Discuss the notion of
the “natural light.” What
guarantees the truth of the “dictates” of the natural light?[36]
-In his
City of
65-66
Sum Res Cogitans. But I do
not yet know with sufficient clearness what I am, though assured that I am.
What, then, did I formerly think I was?
-A “rational
animal”—this leaves us with two questions to answer (“What is rationality?”
and “What is an animal?”) and we have no way of getting started here.
-64
Body:
--Discuss the notion of an
essential characteristic—Descartes is endeavoring to discover what he is “essentially.”[37]
-65
Soul: nutrition, walking
(locomotion), perception?
-Thinking:....I
am a thinking thing.
“...in the strict sense
the knowledge of this “I” does not depend upon things of whose existence I do
not yet have knowledge.”
-In his
Principles of Philosophy, he says:
“And when I stated that this proposition
I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain which presents itself
to those who philosophize in orderly fashion, I did not for all that deny that
we must first of all know what is
knowledge, what is existence, and
what is certainty, and that in order
to think we must be, and such like; but because these are notions of the
simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything
that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record.”[38]
66
A thing which thinks is a thing which
understands, affirms, denies, wills,
refuses, imagines, and perceives.
-Note:
if this is what he has discovered with the
cogito, then it is fairly clear that
he has the “substantial” conception of the self in mind—few can undertake this
many complex cognitive tasks all at the same time!
No “occurrent” self would be able to “understand, affirm, deny, will,
refuse, imagine, and perceive” all at once!
-Note:
In his On the Equality of the Two Sexes
[1673, anonymously], Francois Poullain de la Barre maintains that:
it is easy to see that the
difference between the two sexes is limited to the body, since that is the only
part used in the reproduction of humankind.
Since the mind merely gives its consent, and does so in exactly the same
way in everyone, we can conclude that it has no sex.
Considered independently, the mind is found to be equal and of the same
nature in all men, and capable of all kinds of thoughts.
It is as much exercised by small concepts as by large; as much thought is
required to conceive of a mite as an elephant….Since there seems not to be any
greater difference between the minds of the two sexes, we can say that the
difference does not lie there. It
is rather the constitution of the body, but particularly education, religious
observance, and the effects of our environment which are the natural and
perceptible causes of all the many differences between people.
A woman’s mind is joined to her body, like a man’s, by God himself, and
according to the same laws.
Feelings, passions, and the will maintain this union, and since the mind
functions no differently in one sex than in the other, it is capable of the same
things in both.[39]
67
The Wax Experiment: the wax is
something extended.
Here Descartes lets his mind “wander” and, clearly, stops, for the
moment, adducing claims to certain knowledge.
In this passage he clarifies the essential characteristic of non-mental
substance (the physical realm of corporeal things)—shape, divisibility,
occupation of space, having location, etc.
The background picture of the physical is provided by the emerging
science of the day—by Galileo’s “mechanics.”
-68 Descartes claims that
he knows the wax by his reason—not by the use of his senses or of his
imagination!
-69 “Each time I know the
wax, I know myself better (than I know the wax).”
“...I manifestly know that
nothing can be perceived more easily and more evidently than my own mind.”
7. Critical
Comments on the Second Meditation:
(A). Attributes without substances?
Substances without attributes?
Modes?
Bernard Williams notes
that “a mode presupposes its attribute, but equally an attribute which is really
present implies the presence of a mode—a
thing can not be extended without being extended in one way rather than another.”[40]
In his
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept
of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics, R.S. Woolhouse maintains
that: “but even if modes and accidents need substances, don’t substances also
require modes? Can we, as Descartes
says, ‘clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs
from it’? Descartes’s point here is
merely that substances do not require the particular modes that they happen to
have. It is not that they do not
require some modes or other. It is
clear that they do; for modes are accidental variations of an attribute, and the
distinction between a substance and at least some of its attributes is so close
as to be ‘merely a conceptual one’.
One substance can exist apart from another; it can exist apart from the
particular modes it happens to have; but it cannot exist with no modes, for
there are certain attributes without which substances are ‘unintelligible’.
For many substances the attribute of extension (the attribute of being
spatially dimensioned or of having length, breadth, and depth) is one such.
Though a given substance is intelligible without the particular modal
shape it has, it will be unintelligible with no shape at all, for it is
unintelligible apart from the attribute of extension.”[41]
(B). Descartes’ goal is the validation of reason, but isn’t
any such attempt question-begging?
(C). Does Descartes
prove that the mind and the body are different?
(D). Multiple personalities and the
cogito.
(E). We need to discuss what sort of claim Descartes makes
with his cogito—is it (A) an
inference, (B) an
intuition, or, finally, (c) is
an epistemic interpretation of the
cogito the right way to see it?[42]
(i) if the
cogito is an
inference, it must look something
like this:
(a) I think.
Whatever thinks
exists.
Therefore, I exist.
(b) Note, however, that
if Descartes is presenting us with an
inference, the conclusion can not be the
first thing he is certain of—the premises themselves become the first
certainties (or else, they are themselves in need of justification).
(c) Moreover, the universal
premise may be questioned—especially if the evil genius hypothesis and the
dreaming argument are considered.
(d) Also, if the premises are
certain, there is still the question of whether or not Descartes (or ourselves)
might be deceived regarding the validity of the inference.
Surely the evil genius could mislead us as we consider a complex
inference.
(f) Furthermore, we should note
that the inference might not in fact hold.
Consider the following comment by Bertrand Russell: “let us begin by
examining Descartes’ view. “I
think, therefore I am” is what he says, but this won’t do as it stands.
What, from his point of view, he should profess to know is not “I think,”
but “There is thinking”....He would say that thoughts imply a thinker.
But why should they? Why
should not a thinker be simply a certain series of thoughts, connected with each
other by causal laws?”[43]
(g) Finally (in regard to the
inference interpretation), we should note that Spinoza raised an important
objection to Descartes’ “argument.”
Feldman clarifies Spinoza’s objection as follows:
I am convinced that you could not
come to know that you had a headache by the use of [a similar] argument
[similar, that is, to the cogito].
The problem is not that the argument itself is defective....you would
undoubtedly know that you have a headache before you could go through the
various steps of the argument.
Furthermore, you would already be so certain that you have a headache that you
could not increase your certainty by the use of this argument.
Your knowledge that you have a headache would be more direct.
The headache itself is all the evidence you need for the conclusion that
you have a headache.
As I understand him, Spinoza wants
to make something like this point concerning the Cogito argument.
Perhaps there is nothing wrong with the argument itself.
The problem is that Descartes could not have used that argument to come
to know that he exists. He
undoubtedly knew that he existed before he made use of that (or any other)
argument. His knowledge of his own
existence could not have been dependent upon any premises.
He know immediately, and without evidence, that he existed.[44]
(ii) if the
cogito is an
intuition, there are still problems
(there are places in Descartes’ works where the intuition interpretation is
warranted: “by intuition I
understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading
judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the
conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and
distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand.
Or, what comes to the same thing,
intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind,
and springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction
itself in that it is simpler, though deduction, as we have noted above, cannot
by us be erroneously conducted.
Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and
that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only....”[45]
The main problem, of course, is that
intuiting something does not seem to
grant it metaphysical certainty [or
truth].
(iii)
the “epistemic” interpretation of
the cogito treats the “argument” as
neither an inference nor as an intuition but, rather, as an “epistemic
discovery.” As Feldman says, “this
belief is metaphysically certain, not because it has been derived from
indubitable premises, and not because it has been intuited.
Rather, it is metaphysically
certain simply because there is no reason to doubt it.”[46]
This, of course, suggests a view the
Meditations which would have
Descartes seeking to find claims which we can not doubt, but which need not be
metaphysically certain.
This sort of interpretation avoids some of the problems which Descartes
encounters on the other interpretations of the
cogito, but it is inconsistent with
other things which he says. Besides
this, the basic problem with this sort of interpretation is with the claim that
there is no reason for
doubting—establishing that the reasons for doubting adduced thus far do not
provide such a rationale for doubt does not establish that there is no reason
for doubt—just that such a reason for doubting has
not yet arisen!
(F). In his Sophie’s
World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy, Jostein Gaarder suggests
that when thinking of Descartes sum res
cogitans, one remember Sartre’s “existence takes priority over essence.”
As he notes that: “throughout the entire history of philosophy,
philosophers have sought to discover what man is—or what human nature is.
But Sartre believed that man has no such eternal “nature” to fall back
on. It is therefore useless to
search for the meaning of life in general.
We are condemned to improvise.
We are like actors dragged onto the stage without having learned our
lines, with no script and no prompter to whisper stage directions to us.
We must decide for ourselves how to live.”[47]
(G). In his Tragic
Sense of Life, Miguel de Unamuno offers the following critique of Descartes:
“the defect of Descartes’ Discourse on
Method lies in his resolution to empty himself of himself, of Descartes, of
the real man, the man of flesh and bone, the man who does not want to die, in
order that he might be a mere thinker—that is, an abstraction.
But the real man returned and thrust himself into his philosophy....
The truth is
sum, ergo cogito—I am, therefore I think, although not everything that is
thinks. Is not conscious thinking
above all consciousness of being?
Is pure thought possible, without consciousness of self, without personality?”[48]
8. Some Questions
on Meditations I and II:
(A). What right of his to the statement that he is a
thinking substance?
(B). What of his right to talk in terms of the
substance-attribute distinction at all?
(C). What of his right to talk about a
continuous substance—the problem of
multiple selves?
(D). What of the other propositions he accepts as certain
in the argument for the cogito?
(F). If you are negative on these points, where does it
leave you?
9. Preparation for
the Third Meditation:
Part IV of Descartes’
Discourse on Method[49]
(pp. 18-23 of our text) provides an excellent (and brief) summary of the
argument of the Meditations (both up
to this point and through the rest).
It may be a good idea to read it at this point.
As I noted above, Descartes’ deity is a philosophical deity![50]
We should contrast this sort of conception with Pascal’s “personalistic”
deity, for example.
|
This Meditation involves “building
a bridge” from the “subjective world” of the self to the “objective
world”—that which is “beyond” the self.
Note: the evil genius
may be considered to be the “troll” under the bridge!
He seeks the identification of a characteristic of some
ideas which assures that they [truly]
represent.
(A). Dark Pool
Analogy: if you are swimming alone in a dark pool and you feel something
brush your leg, it is natural to reach the (alarming) conclusion that you are
not alone.
(B). The “anthropology
example“:[51]
find a tribe that has a picture of a pile of stones and a picture of a complex
machine:
tells us something about the
level of development of the tribe.
They must have such machines of the imagination necessary to conceive of them.
Higher order understanding exhibited by the second picture.
degrees of reality and how this
applies to ideas.
objective reality of an idea → the
referential content the idea.
|
(C). The “Causal
Principle” and “Ideas:”
ex nihilo nihil fit (Descartes
believes it and the principle are equivalent) and, it is important to note, he
will be applying this principle to
ideas in his argument.
Aristotelian analysis of
causation: the efficient cause explains the existence of a thing, while the
formal cause explains the nature of that thing.
(D). Causation
without transfer—think of force
and of deduction:
Cause, reason, and
explanation.
Together the causal principle,
the idea of the degrees of reality of
ideas (objective reality), the idea of a deity and Descartes’ knowledge that he
does not have the power to cause this idea yield the proof that this deity
exists!
10. The Third
Meditation:
70 “I am a thing that
thinks....these modes of thinking...insofar as they are merely modes of
thinking, do exist in me.”
Substance metaphysics!
“...there is nothing but a
certain clear and distinct perception of what I affirm.
Yet this would hardly be enough to render me certain of the truth of a
thing, if it could ever happen that something that I perceived so clearly and
distinctly were false. And thus I
now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and
distinctly perceive is true.”
-What ‘clear’
and ‘distinct’ mean here: “I term
that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way
as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding
eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength.
But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other
objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear.”[52]
But, he came to doubt things
which he had previously thought to be perceived clearly and distinctly—for
example, he believed that besides his ideas, there were “external things” which
these ideas represented.
70-71 Similarly, he wonders,
might he not be wrong about mathematical “truths?”
71 The doubts he has, however,
are founded upon the supposition of the existence of an evil genius, and he has
no reason to believe that there is such a creature.
He terms this sort of doubt “...very tenuous and, so to speak,
metaphysical.”[53]
-In this extended passage we
confront a “conflict” between the “metaphysical
doubt,” on the one hand, and the “cogito”
and “clear and distinct ideas,” on the other—we might say that we encounter
Descartes’ “epistemological schizophrenia.”
-Moreover, we confront a serious
problem for Descartes here—the potential
problem of circularity. He says
that to remove the doubt, he “...should at the first opportunity inquire whether
there is a God, and, if there is, whether or not he can be a deceiver.
For if I am ignorant of this, it appears I am never capable of being
completely certain about anything else.”
Note that Cress’ translation has Descartes saying “...anything
else,” but other translations have Descartes saying, simply, “anything.”[54]
The difference, of course, is significant!
The latter engenders what is known as the problem of “circularity.”[55]
71 Ideas alone (without a
representational claim) are not
false. [Also, p. 73].
The possibility of
falsity arises with an idea’s representational claim.
72 Ideas are generally considered
to be either innate,
adventitious (caused from without),
or produced by me (factitious).
We must inquire into the grounds
for the representational claim of our ideas:
-Could the representational claim
of my ideas be grounded in the fact that I am
taught by nature that my ideas are
representations of things?
“When I say here “I have been so taught by nature” all I have in mind is that I
am driven by a spontaneous impulse to
believe this, and not that some light of
nature is showing me that it is true.”
-72-73 Could the representational
claim be justified by the fact that various of my ideas are
not dependent upon my will?
“I may have powers I don’t know of....”
-73 “Finally, even if the ideas
did proceed from things other than myself, it does not follow that they must
resemble those things.”
“...insofar
as these ideas are merely modes of thought,
I see no inequality among them; they
all seem to proceed from me in the same manner.
But insofar as one idea represents
one thing and another idea another thing, it is obvious that they do differ very
greatly from one another.
Unquestionably, those ideas that display substances to me are something more
and, if I may say so, contain within themselves
more objective reality than those
which represent only modes or accidents.”
-“Objective
reality” refers to the representational capacity of ideas.
Consider two different “ideas” (say the plots for an episode of “Married
With Children” and a plot for an episode of “Seinfeld”).
Insofar as two “ideas” (or “plots”) are considered simply as “ideas,”
they are “equal.” When one
considers what they represent (the interactions of actors, the motivations for
behavior, the very behaviors themselves), however, it is difficult to say they
are “equal.” They represent things
of greatly varying complexity.
-As noted above, In his
“Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Soul
and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,” Descartes maintains that:
“everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means
of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property, quality, or
attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a
Substance; neither do we have any
other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in
which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of
our ideas, exists formally or eminently.
For by means of our natural light
we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.”[56]
-In his “Translator’s Preface” to
Spinoza’s Ethics, Samuel Shirley
discusses Spinoza’s use of “formal” and “objective” essences maintaining: “these
are difficult terms not only to translate but to understand.
Here Spinoza takes over a Cartesian distinction which in turn is rooted
in Scholastic philosophy. Consider
some existing thing, say the planet Saturn.
As an existing thing revolving around the sun Saturn has formal essence
or reality….The formal essence, or being, of something is its very existence.
But in considering this planet we have made it an object of our thought.
As such it has objective essence or reality….Clearly, Saturn in the sky
and Saturn in our mind are different things, although the latter is supposed to
represent to us the former.
What makes this terminology confusing is that in current usage the term
‘subjective’ is often employed to express what the Scholastics meant by
‘objective.’ But the reader of
Descartes and Spinoza should realize that when these philosophers use the term
‘objective’ they are talking about a mental representation of a thing, the thing
as an object of thought.”[57]
73-74 Descartes’ Causal
Principle:
-Note the appeal to the natural
light (of reason).[58]
-Dependency of attributes and
modes on substances; dependence of finite substances upon infinite substance:
Everything which exists has a cause, or
ex nihilo nihil fit.
-Efficient, formal, eminent, and
total causes; objective and formal reality:
--the “efficient cause” is the
cause of the existence of an effect;
--the “formal cause” is the cause
of character (or nature) of an effect.
The contrasting notion of a “formal or eminent cause” is clarified by
Jean-Marie Beyssade in her “The Idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence”
when she refers to the Second Replies:
“who can give three coins to a beggar?
Either a poor man who has [formally]
the coins in his purse, or a rich banker who has [eminently]
far greater assets in his account....If I dream of three coins, they have only
an “objective” reality (in my mind); if I wake up and either find them in my
purse or their equivalent in my bank account, they also have “formal” reality
(outside my mind); the three coins that existed “objectively” in my mind will
now also exist “formally” (in my purse) or “eminently” (in my account).”[59]
One might also think of the difference between “being infected with a
disease” (correlated with “formal reality”) and “carrying a disease” (correlated
with “eminent reality”).
--the “objective reality”
of an idea is its representational capacity (‘objectif’
in French may be translated as “intentive” and designates an idea’s capacity of
referring to something other than or more than itself); and
--the “formal reality” of
a thing is its “nonideational reality”.
All ideas, as ideas (and not at representations of something else) have
the same degree (or level) of reality—they are dependent upon minds (or thinking
substances).
In his
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry,
Bernard Williams maintains that in this principle, “Descartes is in fact making
two logically distinct assumptions: not only that the cause of any idea must
have as much reality as the idea has objectively, but also, and more basically,
that ideas must have causes at all.
Descartes does not in fact think that there are two different principles at work
here. He thinks that everything
must have a cause, and he supposes that this is entailed by the causal
principle...which states that the cause must contain as much reality as the
effect; from which ‘it follows...that something cannot proceed from nothing’.
Descartes regarded it as self-evident that if the cause must have as much
reality as the effect, then no real thing can proceed from ‘something’ that has
no reality at all. This reasoning
indeed did appear self-evident to very many thinkers for a very long time; it
was Hume who detected that the argument is circular.”[60]
-The causal principle
asserts that the cause of an idea must be at least real enough to cause this
sort of idea—e.g., one which has this sort of objective reality (or
representational capacity).
-Our ideas have formal reality as
modes of thought—as such, of course, they are neither true nor false however.
It is their objective reality which is in question, then, when we are
discussing truth and falsity.
--“It is a first principle that
the whole of the reality or perfection
that exists only objectively [representationally] in ideas must exist in
them formally or in a superior manner in their causes.”[61]
--Anthropology Example:
find a tribe which has a picture of a pile of stones and a picture of a complex
machine.[62]
The latter tells us something about the level of development of the
tribe. They must have such machines
(or the imagination necessary to conceive of them).
“Higher order understanding” is exhibited by the second picture.
74 If some idea is such that
I
can’t cause it—then I am not alone.
Dark Pool Analogy: if you are swimming alone in a dark pool and you feel
something brush your leg, it is natural to reach the (alarming) conclusion that
you are not alone.
75 I have ideas of “...other men,
animals, or angels” which I could have caused.
I have various ideas of physical
objects—I could cause them.
76 There remains, then, only his
idea of a deity.
-Proof that Descartes could not
be its cause.
-Note the reasons offered and the
strength of the conclusion! Is the
argument strong enough to legitimate the claim that “I must conclude that God
necessarily exists?”[63]
--Note that Descartes
here says that “something can not come from nothing,” suggesting that
“everything has a cause.” Of
course, he can not actually maintain this—his deity is not to be caused by
anything!
--Note that additional (and more
powerful reasons are offered after the conclusion—both as the sentence
continues and in the following pages:
-Positive
and negative conception of a deity.
-77 “Nor can it be said that this
idea of God is perhaps materially false, and thus can originate from
nothing....On the contrary, because it is most clear and distinct and because it
contains more objective reality than any other idea, no idea is in and of itself
truer and has less of a basis for being suspected of falsehood.
I maintain that this idea of a being that is supremely perfect and
infinite is true in the highest degree true.
For although I could perhaps pretend that such a being does not exist,
nevertheless I could not pretend that the idea of such a being discloses to me
nothing real, as was the case with the idea of cold which I referred to
earlier.”
-Perhaps
I am (potentially)
this deity? No—not even
potentially! Were I so, I would
have made me different (no doubts)!
He says that: “...the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being,
that is merely potentially existent, which, properly speaking is nothing, but
only by a being existing formally or actually.”
-78 Indeed, there is nothing in
all these things that is not manifest by the light of nature to one who is
conscientious and attentive. But
when I am less attentive, and the images of sensible things blind the mind’s
eye, I do not so easily recall why the idea of a being more perfect than me
necessarily proceeds from a being that really is more perfect.
-79 Something must have created
(and must “conserve”) me. It
couldn’t be myself!
-Could I have been created by a
lesser deity—there would, then, be the need for a (“perfect”) deity to cause
this positive idea in that other being!
-A
cause—why not many? Not a
committee because of the simplicity and relatedness of the various conceptions
contained in the idea of his deity.
[A camel is a horse made by a committee].
80 “Thus the only option
remaining is that this idea is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is
innate in me.
Recall the earlier distinction (p. 72) between innate ideas, adventitious
(caused by something external) ideas, and ideas which are caused by oneself.
Another appeal to the
natural light “establishes” that
this deity is not a deceiver.
-Criticism: In his
Working Without A Net: A Study of
Egocentric Epistemology, Richard Foley maintains that:
…even were we to grant to
Descartes his proof, his attempt to use God as an epistemic guarantee would
still be problematic. For even
granting that there is a God who is by nature benevolent, omnipotent, and
omniscient, it does not follow that God would not allow us to be deceived about
what is clear and distinct. To get
this conclusion we would need detailed assurances about God’s ultimate aims and
methods. But, of course, it is no
simple matter to get such assurances.
After all, for some reason that is beyond our ken, allow us to be
deceived for our own good? Might
not God even allow us to be regularly deceived?
[64]
…regardless of how we marshal our
cognitive resources, there can be no non-question-begging assurances that the
resulting inquiry is even reliable, much less flawless.
This applies to metaphysical inquiry as much as it does to any other kind
of inquiry.
A fortiori it applies to any
metaphysical inquiry that purports to rule out the possibility of extensive
error. Any such metaphysics is
likely to strike us as implausible, but even if it did not, even if were wholly
convinced of its truth, it cannot provide us with a non-question-begging
guarantee of its own truth. Nor can
it provide us with a non-question-begging guarantee of its likely truth.
And nothing else can either.[65]
11. Summary of and
Comments on the Third Meditation:
First, here is a “quick” summary of the core argument for
the existence of a deity in Meditation
Three:
1. He relies upon his
knowledge of himself and his ideas,
and upon the fact that he knows he is not
perfect (he has, for example, doubts).
This knowledge is guaranteed by the
cogito.
2. He relies upon the ideas
(which he has). The mere “having”
of them makes any doubt about them (as ideas) irrelevant.
Note that in this sense, however, the ideas are “merely had,” and are not
“true or false.”
3. He accepts the “causal
principle” as guaranteed by the
natural light of reason—that is, as clearly true, and as true as the
cogito.
This is “new” (not established by earlier “meditations”).
4. He accepts that (as
it applies to “ideas”) this principle indicates that we must discuss both the “formal”
and “objective” (that is,
representational) reality of our ideas.
It is the latter sense which is relevant as the proof
continues—individual ideas are distinguished in terms of their representational
capacity (or “degree of objective
reality).
5. He relies upon his idea of the
deity—a perfect, infinite, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-moral being.
The idea, as an idea, needs no justification.
As the most complex idea
(speaking in terms of its representational reality), it is important that his
“description” (characterization, depiction, etc.) of the idea be right.
6. He contends that this idea is
infinite in the “positive” sense.
Given this, it is unlikely he, a finite
substance could have caused such an idea.
7. He contends that this idea
could not have been caused by multiple
causes.
8. He contends that he is not
even potentially infinite, but if he were, that would not assign him sufficient
objective reality to be able to cause an
actually infinite idea.
9. Thus, he concludes, he must
conclude that his deity exists.
Only it could cause the idea he has.
Secondly, here are a number of points we need to consider critically as
we reflect on this Meditation:
(A). Is it
always an imperfection to deceive?
Doctor-patient cases; Plato’s “noble lie;” Kant’s problem regarding the innocent
individual who is being hunted by a vicious person; parents telling their
children about Santa Claus and the tooth-fairy; etc.
(B). Cosmological vs.
ontological proofs of a deity’s existence.
(C). Bernard Williams notes that:
an idea, even when viewed from
the point of view of its objective reality, is still an idea, and hence, in
Descartes’ metaphysical classification, is a mode, a mode of the attribute of
thought. It must, therefore, by an
ontological ordering, possess less reality than a substance, (in particular,
than himself). To bring about this
mode (and it is after all the existence of the idea that is at issue) surely
cannot demand quite as much reality or perfection as is required by, or
possessed by, its object.[66]
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(D). In his David
Hume, Anthony Flew offers a succinct criticism of the sort of argument
offered by Descartes in this Meditation:
the form of these arguments is
egregiously unsound in as much as the desired conclusions, not merely do not
follow from, but are also actually incompatible with, the proffered
premises….[for example] arguing that, since everything must have a cause, and
since the chain of causes allegedly cannot extend indefinitely backwards in
time, therefore there must have been, in the beginning, a First Cause![67]
(E) When Descartes says that he needs to establish that his
deity exists and is not a deceiver if he is to be certain of anything other than
the cogito (and suggests that even
that might be in doubt without such knowledge),
and when he speaks of his deity’s
power as utterly unlimited and beyond our scope of understanding, he almost
seems to allow for what he explicitly postulates at other times—that the deity
is not necessarily limited by logic (or anything else).
This suggests that his “epistemological schizophrenia” runs very deep in
his view—he both wants to found his theory upon what is [absolutely] clear and
distinct and revealed by the “light of nature,” and he wants to allow that these
deliverances are truthful only if guaranteed by his deity.
He can’t have it both ways, however.
I discuss this conflict further in a supplement on the course website:
A Brief Note
On Descartes, Eternal Truths, and Rationality.
Notes: [click on note number to return to the text for the note]
[1] Stephen
Toulmin,
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1990), p. 73.
[2] Scheman
is quoting from Richard H. Popkin,
The
History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes
(N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 55.
[3] Naomi
Scheman, “Othello’s Doubt/Desdemona’s Death: The
Engendering of Scepticism,” in
Epistemology: The Big Questions, ed. Linda
Alcoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 365-381,
p. 366.
The essay originally appeared in
Power,
Gender, and Values, ed. Judith Genova (
[4]
Ibid.,
p. 369.
[5]
Ibid.,
p. 371.
[6]
Cf.,
Galileo Galilei, “Letter to the Grand Duchess
Christina” [1615], trans. Stillman Drake, in
The Philosophy of the 16th and 17th Centuries,
ed. Richard H. Popkin (New York: Free
Press, 1966), p. 62.
[7] See
Appendix I for an account of the metaphysical
view Descartes was reacting against.
[8]
“Psychological” certainty would be where
a
specific individual finds herself unable
to raise doubts (because of her psychological
constitution, or her deeply felt convictions, or
her predispositions, etc.), for example, she
might be certain that her significant other was
faithful to her; “logical” certainty would be
where
no
individual is able to raise valid doubts
(because logic rules them out), for example,
regarding the claim that bachelors are unmarried
males of the age of consent; and “metaphysical”
certainty would be where
no doubts
whatsoever could be raised (where error is
absolutely inconceivable).
[9] For a bit
more detail on his method of doubt, see Appendix
II.
[10] I will
not be as careful as I should be in
distinguishing between “experiences” and
“ideas.”
There are translators of Descartes who
take his talk of mentality to be talk of
experience generically (all “contents of
consciousness”), while others point out that he
is primarily concerned with our “ideas” (in the
sense of “propositions”).
While I think Descartes himself is
sometimes unclear on this issue, I believe that
he is primarily concerned with our “ideas” in
the latter sense and with trying to ensure that
they are true.
Ultimately, of course, if he is concerned
with developing a deductive structure to ensure
the justification of his claims, it must be
propositions which he is concerned with.
A proposition is a sentence which is
capable of being true or false (thus, commands
and questions are not such).
[11]
Ultimately, Descartes’ definition of ‘substance’
is that it is something which is not dependent
upon anything else, and, given his views of
divine creation, it follows that both [finite]
‘physical substance’ and [finite] ‘mental
substance’ are oxymorons.
[12] For
clarification of the distinction between the
sort of deity discussed by philosophers and the
deity as many conceive it
cf.
Anthony Kenny,
The God
of the Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,
1979).
[13] The
phrase ‘natural reason’ needs clarification
here.
In using this phrase, Descartes means to
indicate that he wishes to prove these things
without appeal to revelation or faith.
It is reason alone that is to be the
court of appeal—it alone is to provide
justification for our beliefs and theories.
[14] Albert
W. Levi, Philosophy As Social Expression
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1974), p. 209.
Levi has it wrong at one point here—he
terms the poof in the of the deity’s existence
in the
Third Meditation “ontological,” whereas that
is the proper designation of the
Fifth
Meditation proof.
[15]
Cf.,
“Chapter IV Tweedledum and Tweedledee” in Louis
Carroll,
Through The Looking Glass [1871], in
The
Annotated Alice: Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass,
ed. Martin Gardner (N.Y.: Meridian, 1963), pp.
229-244.
[16]
Cf.,
Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins,” in
The Light
Fantastic, ed. Harry Harrison (N.Y.:
Scribners, 1971).
[17] Jostein
Gaarder,
Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of
Philosophy, trans. Paulette Moller (N.Y.:
Farr, Straus and Giroux, 1994), p. 177.
[18] M.F.
Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What
Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,”
The
Philosophical Review v. 91 (1982), pp. 3-40,
p. 19—emphasis is added to the passage twice.
[19] C.A.J.
Coady,
Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford:
Oxford U.P., 1992), p. 12, footnote.
[20] G.E.
Moore,
Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1959), pp. 248-249.
D. Blumenfeld and J.B. Blumenfeld’s “Can
I Know That I Am Not Dreaming,” in
Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays,
ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978), pp. 234-255, has an
excellent discussion of the dreaming argument.
Norman Malcolm has a more complex
discussion of Descartes’ “dreaming argument” in
his “Dreaming and Skepticism,” which is
collected in
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays,
ed. Willis Doney (Garden City: Anchor, 1967),
pp. 54-79—this essay originally appeared in
The
Philosophical Review v. 65 (1956), pp.
14-37.
[21]
Cf.,
Jay Rosenberg,
The
Practice of Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 15-17.
Note that this argument applies to both
the “evil demon” and the “dreaming” arguments
(it can’t all be a dream without the notion of a
dream being undercut).
[22] Gilbert
Ryle,
Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1960), pp. 94-95.
[23] David
Stove, “‘I Only Am Escaped Alone to Tell Thee:’
Epistemology and the Ishmael Effect” in his
The Plato
Cult (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp.
61-82, p. 75.
[24] J.L.
Austin,
Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1962), p. 11.
Cf., Anthony Kenny,
Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New
York: Random House, 1968), p. 25; and O.K.
Bouwsma, “Descartes’ Evil Genius”
in
Meta-Meditations, ed. A. Sesonske (Belmont:
Wadsworth, 1965)—this essay originally appeared
in The
Philosophical Review v. 58 (1949), pp.
141-151.
[25] Gerald
Edelman,
Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (N.Y.: Basic
Books, 1992), pp. 34-35.
[26] Daniel
Zalewski, “Even Blind People Can Draw,”
New York
Times Magazine, December 15, 2002, p. 88.
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Cf.,
Rene Descartes,
Discourse
on the Method for Rightly Conducting One’s
Reason and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences
[1637], trans. Donald A. Cress, in
Discourse
on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy,
trans. Donald A. Cress (fourth edition)
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), p. 18.
[29]
Cf.,
Descartes,
Principles of Philosophy [1644] I 9, in
The
Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 1
[1911], trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T Ross
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1969), p. 222.
[30]
Cf.,
Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins,”
op. cit.
[31]
Cf.,
The
Annotated
[32]
Descartes,
Principles of Philosophy, op. cit., I 7, p.
221.
[33] Cited in
Avrum Stroll and Richard Popkin,
Introduction to Philosophy (N.Y.: Holt
Rinehart, 1972) (second edition), p. 44.
[34] Rene
Descartes, “Arguments Demonstrating the
Existence of God and the Distinction Between
Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,”
published as part of the “Objections and
Replies” in 1641 with the
Meditations, in
The
Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 2,
op. cit.,
p. 53.
[35]
Descartes,
Principles of Philosophy I 51,
op. cit.,
pp. 239-240.
[36]
Cf.,
John Morris, “Descartes’ Natural Light,”
Journal
of the History of Philosophy v. 11 (1973),
pp. 169-187.
[37] Note
that the question “What is the
essential
characteristic of a knife?” presumes that there
is an
essential characteristic of knives.
Aristotle makes such an assumption, and
assumes that the essence of knives is “to cut
well.”
Those of us who live in a “peanut butter
age” might maintain that knives have a variety
of functions and that there is no one of them
which is essential.
Similarly, one might contend, there might
be a variety of characteristics which are
relevant when Descartes’ question is asked
regarding the self.
[38]
Descartes,
Principles of Philosophy, op. cit., I 10, p.
222.
Note that he here allows that there are
things which need to be known prior to the
cogito.
Does this undercut his argument in any
way?
[39] Francois
Poullain de la Barre,
On the
Equality of the Two Sexes [1673,
anonymously], in
Francois
Poullian de la Barre: Three Cartesian Feminist
Treatises, ed. Marcelle Welch, trans. Vivian
Bosley (
[40] Bernard
Williams,
Descartes:
The
Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmonsworth:
Penguin, 1978), p. 125.
Cf., pp. 124-129.
[41] R.S.
Woolhouse,
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of
Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 18-19.
[42] The
discussion of the status of the
cogito
which follows is largely lifted from Fred
Feldman,
A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1986).
[43] Bertrand
Russell,
An Outline of Philosophy (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1927), p. 7.
With this objection Russell is bringing
to bear the distinction we raised earlier
regarding the difference between the occurrent
and substantial conception of the self.
The question here is: what entitles
Descartes to assume that there is anything more
than the mere occurrence of thinking?
[44] Fred
Feldman,
A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy, op. cit,
p. 66.
[45] Rene
Descartes,
Rules For
the Direction of the Mind [posthumous,
1628], in
The Philosophical Works of Descartes, v. 1,
op. cit.,
p. 7.
[46]
Ibid.,
p. 70.
[47] Jostein
Gaarder,
Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of
Philosophy, trans. Paulette Moller (N.Y.:
Farr, Straus and Giroux, 1994), p. 350.
[48] Miguel
de Unamuno,
Tragic
Sense of Life, trans. C.J. Flitch (N.Y.:
Macmillan, 1921), p. 34.
[49] Rene
Descartes,
Discourse
on the Method for Rightly Conducting One’s
Reason and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences,
op. cit.—Part IV is on pp. 18-23.
[50] For
clarification of the distinction between the
sort of deity discussed by philosophers and the
deity as many conceive it, cf. Anthony Kenny,
The God
of the Philosophers, op. cit.
[51] This
example is discussed in detail in Bernard
Williams, in his
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit,
pp. 138-142.
[52]
Descartes,
Principles of First Philosophy, I 45,
op. cit.,
p. 237.
[53] This is
why it makes sense to speak about a level of
certainty beyond the “psychological” and the
“logical”—he needs certainty which is greater
than that provided by logical truths, certainty
which “survives” such “metaphysical doubts.”
[54]
Cf.,
Rene Descartes,
Meditations on First Philosophy [1641],
trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, in their
edition of
The
Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 1,
op. cit.,
p. 159 and pp. 183-184.
Cf.,
also “Reply to Objections II,”
op. cit.,
pp. 38- 39.
Most telling here, where there is a
question raised by Cress’ translation, is a long
paragraph from “Meditation Five” on p. 91 of
Cress’ translation.
Whichever translation is correct, the
supporting citations from Descartes show that
his “epistemological paranoia” is extensive.
[55]
Cf.,
Alan Gewirth, “The Cartesian Circle,”
Philosophical Review v. 50 (1941), pp.
368-395; and Edwin B. Allaire, “The Circle of
Ideas and the Circularity of the Meditations,”
Dialogue
v. 2 (1966), pp. 131-153.
[56] Rene
Descartes, “Arguments Demonstrating the
Existence of God and the Distinction Between
Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,”
op. cit.,
p. 53.
[57] Samuel
Shirley, “Translator’s Preface” to his
translation of Baruch Spinoza’s
Ethics,
Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect, and
Selected Letters (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1992), pp. 21-29, pp. 26-27.
[58]
Cf.,
John Morris, “Descartes’ Natural Light,”
op. cit.
[59]
Jean-Marie Beyssade, “The Idea of God and the
Proofs of His Existence,” trans. James
Cottingham, in
The
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. James
Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1992),
pp. 174-199, p. 197, footnotes 13 and 14.
[60] Bernard
Williams,
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit.,
p. 141.
[61]
Descartes, “Replies to Second Objections,”
The
Philosophical Works of Descartes v. II,
op. cit.,
p. 35.
[62] As noted
above, this example is discussed in Bernard
Williams,
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit.,
pp. 138-142.
[63] Note
that Descartes clearly overstates what he has
demonstrated here.
He has not established the
necessary
existence of his deity—his proof begins with
the contingent facts of his [Descartes’]
existence, the existence of his idea [of a
deity], and the contingent fact of his
limitations.
No proof of necessary existence is
possible given such contingent foundations!
What Descartes may claim (I will not say
“legitimately claim,” since the proof may have
serious problems) is that “we
must
conclude that God exists”—here the ‘must’
(or ‘necessarily’) modifies the concluding, not
the deity’s existence!
[64] Richard
Foley,
Working Without A Net: A Study of Egocentric
Epistemology (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1993), p
74.
[65]
Ibid.
[66] Bernard
Williams,
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit.,
p. 143.
[67] Anthony
Flew,
David Hume (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986),
p. 33.
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