Hauptli’s Lecture
Supplement Introducing Wittgenstein’s
Blue Book[1] [1933-1934]
Copyright © 2014
Bruce W. Hauptli
I. Overview:
Hold up a copy of a
logic text:
“This is a book.
What kind of book is it?
When the author dictated it, what did she or he mean to be teaching?”
Hold up your copy of the
Blue Book and ask the same questions.
Wittgenstein dictated this book to students at Cambridge in 1933-1934.
What was he doing?
Clearly, there is a significant difference between this book and his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus[2]—one
need read only a little way into The Blue
Book to see significant differences!
I believe that part of what
Wittgenstein is
doing here is touched on by O.K.
Bouwsma in his “The Blue Book.”[3]
He maintains that Wittgenstein is
introducing, displaying, and
teaching an
art. Bouwsma identifies
this art as:
“the art of attacking questions,”
“the art of disentangling,” “the art of cure,” “the art of finding one’s way
when lost,” “the art of discussion,” “the art of exposure,” “the art of working
puzzles,” “the art of freeing us from illusions,” “the art of the detective,”
and “the art of clarification, or relief from the toils of confusion.”[4]
Bouwsma emphasizes that what is important in the work is
...what the author is
doing rather than what the author is
saying in order to prevent the misunderstanding that one could be told what he
says and if one then remembered this, that would be what the author aimed
at...these dictations are designed in connection with other oral discussions to
help in teaching these students an art.[5]
Bouwsma maintains that Wittgenstein intends to
quicken the sense of the queer,
remind us of the particularity of cases
and uncover misleading analogies.
This, he contends, should help us to
resolve [dissolve]
philosophical confusion:
...the object is not a science of
misleading expressions from which one can now figure out what is misleading some
stranger. The object is to assist
some individual, always an
individual, to help him discover what misleads and has misled him.
And what misled him is to be seen only when he is no longer misled.
When he says: “Now, I see” and breathes a sigh of relief, even though it
may be a bit sheepishly, that is the moment to which the art is directed.[6]
These citations suggest that the Wittgenstein is primarily interested in
therapy, and this is a common interpretation of him (especially of his
“middle” and “later” periods). This
view of his work contends that he does not intend to advance (and, perhaps, does
not even advance) any “substantive philosophical theses.”
Instead, according to this sort of interpretation of his middle and late
work, he maintains that philosophy arises
from linguistic confusions, and contends that once these confusions are exposed
and the individual is cured of the “disease,” then there is
nothing left.
In trying to briefly characterize this interpretation of what the middle
and later Wittgenstein is “about,” one might offer what I will call the “saying/doing”
distinction (with an intended nod to
his earlier “saying/showing” distinction):
one must not look at what he says
(look for specific theses, views, and positions), but, instead, at what he is
doing—one must keep this actively in
mind, since the middle and later Wittgenstein does not want to leave us with a
position, view, or theory, but, rather, he wishes to free us from
[philosophical] confusion.
Cora Diamond advances this view of both the early, and the middle and
later Wittgenstein. In her
“Throwing Down the Ladder,” she discusses Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus and contends that:
what Wittgenstein wants to do is
then to describe a way of writing sentences, a way of translating ordinary
sentences into a completely perspicuous form.
As part of the transition to grasping what is thus made clear, we may say
such things as that the possibility of a state of affairs is not something that
you can say but that it shows itself in signs with such-and-such general
characteristics. But once the
transition is made, the analyzed sentences must in a sense speak of themselves,
and we should not any longer be telling ourselves that now we grasp what
possibility is, it is what shows itself, what comes out, in a sentence’s having
a sense. We are left using ordinary
sentences, and we shall genuinely have got past the attempt to represent to
ourselves something in reality, the possibility of what a sentence says being
so, is not sayable but shown by the sentence.
We shall genuinely have thrown the ladder away.
The whole of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from before the
Tractatus to his later work, contains
different workings out of the kind of view of philosophy that I have just
sketched.[7]
What I find particularly suggestive in her essay is that
she leads us to ask, “What happens when we use Wittgenstein’s “elucidatory
propositions,” recognize them as “nonsense,” and, having “climbed beyond them,”
throw them away?”[8]
According to Diamond, John McDowell has a useful metaphor here:
...in speaking of the kind of
philosophical illusion from which Wittgenstein in his later work tries to free
us, [McDowell] has used the phrase “the view from sideways on”, to characterize
what we aim for, or think we need to aim for in philosophy.
We have, for example, the idea of ourselves looking, from sideways on, at
the human activity of following a rule, and as asking from that position whether
there is or is not something objectively
determined as what the rule requires to be done at the next application.
To think of the question in that way is to try to step outside our
ordinary saying what a rule requires, our ordinary criticisms of steps taken by
others, our ordinary ways of judging whether someone has grassed what a rule
requires. We do not want to ask and
answer those ordinary questions, but to ask what in reality there is to justify
the answers we give when we are unselfconsciously inside the ordinary practice.
McDowell takes Wittgenstein to have tried to show us how to come out of
the intellectual illusion that we are thus asking anything.
My point now is that that image of McDowell’s is useful in characterizing
Wittgenstein’s early view of philosophy as well.[9]
According to this sort of interpretation (of either the later
Wittgenstein, or of the early and later Wittgenstein), when the ladder is thrown
away there is “Nothing beyond the ‘art of the cure’—no substantive theses, and
nothing which resembles what used to be called philosophy.”
If the therapy cures the disease, then it is also gone!
At the end of his essay, Bouwsma cites G.E. Moore’s notes on
Wittgenstein’s lectures at Cambridge in 1930-1933 where Moore says:
[10]
he went on to say that, though
philosophy had not been “reduced to a matter of skill,” yet this skill, like
other skills is very difficult to acquire.
One difficulty was that it required a “sort of thinking” to which we are
not accustomed and to which we have not been trained—a sort of thing very
different from what is required in the sciences.
And he said that the required skill could not be acquired merely by
hearing lectures: discussion was essential.
As regards his own work, he said it did not matter whether his results
were true or not: what mattered was that “a method had been found.”[11]
The interpretation emphasized thus far would have Wittgenstein mainly
concerned with meta-philosophy—instead
of advancing substantive theses, he is viewed as concerned with developing and
teaching a methodology, and the application of this methodology itself leads to
no substantive philosophic theses.
While there is a substantial grain of truth to this interpretation, I believe
that
Wittgenstein (whether the
“early,” or the “middle,” and the “later” one)
isn’t simply doing meta-philosophy.
I contend that he is discussing central problems in the philosophy of
logic, in the philosophy of language, and in the philosophy of mind (as well as
in other areas), and that
he does defend significant, and
substantive, philosophical theses.
Consider the following passage from the
Blue Book (it is one of his most
influential sentences):
4 but if we had to name anything
which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its
use.
This is an extremely influential sentence.
It encouraged a lot of mistaken (at least from a Wittgenstenian point of
view) ordinary language philosophy.
While many felt that this passage provides us with a straight-forward theory of
meaning, an understanding of it must also refer to the following passage:
67-68 think of words as
instruments characterized by their use, and then think of the use of a hammer,
the use of a chisel, the use of a square, of a glue-pot, and of the glue.
(Also, all that we say here can be understood only if one understands
that a great variety of games is played with the sentences of our language:
Giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an
event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate
experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world; making
scientific hypotheses and theories; greeting someone, etc., etc.).
Together, these passages may be read (and should be read, I
contend) as advancing theses—I contend that they are not (or not simply)
therapeutic tools.
Clearly there is a difference between the “Blue
Book view” and the view of the early Wittgenstein.
Language is no longer seen as a
single, unified, systematic, logically ordered phenomenon.
When we try to specify what his substantive theses are, the middle and
later Wittgenstein will frustrate us no less than did the early Wittgenstein!
We tend to look for philosophers to develop clear-cut and fully (and
clearly) developed arguments.
Moreover, given what one learns from the early Wittgenstein, one expects nothing
less than crystalline clarity from him.
The middle and later Wittgenstein, however, differ in significant
respects from the early Wittgenstein.
To uncover what he contends, as well as to come to understand the
methodology which he offers, however, we must turn to the text itself.
II. Transition from
the “early” to the “middle,” and the “later,” Wittgenstein:
Look at Philosophical Investigations
I, 47-49, and 60 and the later Wittgenstein’s critique of the
Tractatus notion of “simples.”[12]
Then consider the following additional “differences:”
PI I, 60 and 63-64 for his attacks on
the notion of an “analysis” which is
of central importance to the Tractatus.
PI I, 65-66 for his critique of his
Tractatus notion of the “essence of
language.” This introduces us to
the important notion of a language-game.
Clearly, something is different as one compares the early
and the later Wittgenstein. In his
Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?
Norman Malcolm points out that
Investigations I, 47-49 provides an excellent critique of the distinction in
the Tractatus between the simple and
the complex. Malcolm maintains
that:
...since nothing whatever
is ‘intrinsically’ simple, simple in an ‘absolute’ sense, then this basic
conception of the Tractatus is
empty; and so is the conception of a
‘name’—for a name is supposed to mean
a simple object; and so is the conception of an ‘elementary’ proposition—for an
elementary proposition is supposed to consist of an interconnection of names,
and so is the conception of ‘analysis’ in the
Tractatus—for analysis is supposed to
determine whether any given proposition is elementary or non-elementary.
The impressive edifice of the Tractatus is demolished by
Wittgenstein’s description in the
Investigations of how the terms ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are
actually used.[13]
The introduction and first five pages of
The Blue Book help us begin to
understand his “newer” method and theses.
Another central difference between the
Tractatus and the
Blue Book:
25-26 “Why then do we in
philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact
rules? The answer is that
the puzzles we try to remove always spring from just this attitude just this
attitude towards language.”
-26-27 Consider one such puzzle:
Augustine’s question about time.
Consider another puzzle: Plato’s question “What is knowledge?”
--27 As the problem is
put, it seems that there is something wrong with the ordinary use of the work
‘knowledge’. It appears we don’t
know what it means, and that therefore, perhaps, we have no right to use it.
We should reply: ‘There is no one exact usage of the word ‘knowledge’;
but we can make up several such usages, which will more or less agree with the
ways the word is actually used.
The man who is
philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to
apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to
paradoxical results.” Philosophers
try to come up with a definition and finding counter-examples to it they then
presume that if it is wrong, some other definition must be right.
-27
Philosophy...is a fight against the
fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.
I want you to remember that words have those meanings which we have given
them; and we give them meanings by explanations.
III. An Arbitrary
Division of the Text:
1. The “main question” of the
book [1]:
2. His response and his method
[1-2]:
3. Getting close to the answer
[2-3]:
4. The “main false start” [3-4]:
5. The answer [?] [4]:
6. Outward & inward charts
vs. “understanding a language [5-6].
7. Philosophical problems,
linguistic puzzlement, and mental activity [6-11]:
8. Learning meaning and learning
how words are used [11-12]:
9. Drill and rules (reasons and
causes) [12-15]:
10. Thinking, operating with
signs, language games, and philosophy [15-20]:
11. A’s expecting from 4:00 to
4:30 that B will come to tea [20-24]:
12. My criteria for another’s
having a toothache: behavior: [24]:
13. Criteria and symptoms
[24-25]:
14. A central difference between
Tractatus and Blue Book: exact rules [pp. 25-27]:
15. The “grammar” of “to wish,”
“to expect,” etc. [30]
16. Thinking what is not the case
and philosophical questions [30-32]:
17. What makes this a portrait of
Mr. N? [32-35]:
18. What is the object of
thought? [pp. 35-39]:
19. The mind as a place [39-41]:
20. Nothing is gained by talk of
an accompanying mental process [41-44]:
21. Discussion of
personal experience and philosophy [44-46]:
22. Regarding the “privacy” of
personal experience [46-48]:
23. We are up against the trouble
caused by our way of expression [48-57]:
24. Common sense and philosophy
[58-59]:
25. On personal identity [59-66]:
26. The distinction between ‘I’
as object and as subject [66-70]:
27. Regarding sense-data
and meaning [pp. 70-74 (end)].
[1] Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
The Blue
Book, in
The Blue
and Brown Books (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1958
[posthumously]).
All citations to this work in these
lectures and notes will be accompanied by the
appropriate page number.
The book was dictated by Wittgenstein to
his class at Cambridge in 1933-1943.
Note that emphasis is sometimes added to
passages for pedagogic purposes in this
supplement without other notice!
[2]
Cf.,
Wittgenstein,
Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1922).
Further references to this text will cite
the work as
Tractatus
and will include the relevant section number.
[3] O.K.
Bouwsma, “The Blue Book,”
The
Journal of Philosophy v. 58 (1961), pp.
141-162.
[4]
Cf., ibid.,
pp. 147-149.
[5]
Ibid.,
p. 147.
[6]
Ibid.,
p. 153.
Emphasis added to passage.
[7] Cora
Diamond, “Throwing Away The Ladder,” in her
The
Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and
the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), pp.
179-204, p. 184.
The essay was originally published in
Philosophy v. 63 (1988).
[8]
Cf.,
Tractatus, section 6.56., section 6.56.
[9]
Ibid.,
pp. 10-11.
Diamond is referring to John McDowell’s
“Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. Steven
Holtzman and Christopher Leich (London:
Routledge, 1981).
[10] Remember
that at this point, Moore is the Professor of
Philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge.
Wittgenstein is a Lecturer at Trinity who
has just recently been awarded his Ph.D.
[11] G.E.
Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33,”
Mind
vols. 63 (1954) and 64 (1955), p. 26.
The passage is cited in Bouwsma’s “The
Blue Book,”
op. cit.,
p. 162.
Moore’s lectures are also published in
his
Philosophical Papers (London: Unwin, 1959),
pp. 252-324.
[12] Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M.
Anscome (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1953).
Further references to this work will be
indicated by the relevant section number (in the
case of Part I), or page number (in the case of
Part II).
[13] Norman
Malcolm,
Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?
(Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1994),
p. 39.
File revised on 02/18/2014.