MSC Political
Compromise Course Supplement for Week 8
“Toleration,
Intransigence, and
How To Proceed?”
Copyright © 2019 Bruce W.
Hauptli
I. The Importance
for Toleration For Democracy:
Recognizing that we live in a social environment where
citizens are deeply committed to differing values, ideals, religions, and moral
standards we can easily see why political compromise is both necessary and
difficult. Citizens need to be
tolerant if democracy is to be possible in a pluralistic society.
Following Gutmann and Thompson suppose we do all we can to
promote principled prudence, mutual respect, and a reciprocity which “…seeks
mutually acceptable ways not only of resolving disagreements but also of living
with the disagreements which inevitably remain.” (p. 34)
That is, we do all we can to encourage our compatriots and our political
leaders to engage those who do not share our commitments and ideals in rational
discussion of proposals designed to address the disagreements which inevitably
emerge from our differences.
As Gutmann and Thompson note in their
Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided in
Politics, and What Should Be Done About It:
the principles of accommodation are
based on a value that lies at the core of reciprocity and deliberation in a
democracy—mutual respect.
It is what makes possible cooperation on fair terms.
Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree.
But mutual respect demands more
than toleration. It requires a
favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with
whom one disagrees. It consists in
an excellence of character that permits a
democracy to flourish in the face of fundamental moral disagreement.
This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character.
It is the character of individuals who are morally committed,
self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differences between
respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the
possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in
the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of
view.
Mutual respect not only helps sustain a moral community in the face of
conflict but also can contribute toward resolving the conflict.
One way in which it can do so is simply by
keeping open the possibility of
different, more accommodating solution in the future.
If we publicly recognize that a policy adopted by the government may be
justifiably rejected other citizens who accept the requirements of reciprocity,
we are more likely to remain open to proposals for alternatives that would be
mutually acceptable, and more dedicated to changing the social and economic
conditions to make those alternatives practicable.
Mutual respect can also help resolve moral disagreements by
discouraging other kinds of moral
rigidity. Citizens who respect
one another as moral agents are less inclined toward the moral dogmatism and its
accompanying attitude of arrogance that is common among those who take moral
opposition as a sign of ignorance or depravity.[1]
II. The Death of
Tolerance, the Rise of
Intransigence:
The mutual respect (or toleration) needed for democratic
governance can be very difficult for individuals who find themselves involved in
situations involving contested moral or
deeply-held personal values—especially as this becomes manifested in an
increasingly divided social context characterized by a pronounced closed mindset
with extreme principled tenacity and extensive mistrust while finding itself in
a context of unbendingly uncompromising perpetual campaigning.
Here, of course, one finds it very difficult to be tolerant of “the
others”—difficult to respect those who don’t share one’s values, commitments,
etc.; and if one can’t respect them, then “mutual respect” seems unsustainable.
Here we confront paradoxes:
how can one be tolerant of the
intolerant?
how can an individual respect
those who don’t respect him/her?
In some situations, then, the very atmosphere surrounding
political discussion becomes wholly polluted.
It is not just that there are moral or religious disagreements, it is
that they have engendered a toxic intransigence where there is (on at least one side) no
longer any degree of tolerance, respect, or willingness to rationally discuss
the disagreements.
Read this short article about Karl Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance.
III. Hate Speech
Laws—A Possible Solution to The Paradoxes and Problems?:
In such a situation it may be necessary to adopt a rather
radical set of new laws: to confront such intolerance or lack of respect some
thinkers believe we come up hard against the “right to free speech.”
The intolerant, it seems, have the right to say intolerantly whatever
they want, and if they do so within the context of “political speech,” they
claim, others must tolerate this behavior.
In many European democracies, this attitude runs afoul of what are called
“Hate Speech Laws.”
These laws disallow some forms of intolerant speech (in the broadest
sense). In his
The Harm In Hate Speech, Jeremy
Waldron provides a discussion as to why such laws are now necessary in our
country:
each group
must accept that the society is not
just for them, but is for
them too, along with all. When this
assurance is conveyed effectively, it is hardly noticeable; it is something on
of the others. And each person, each
member of each group should be able to go about his or her business, with the
assurance there will be no need to face hostility, violence, discrimination, or
exclusion by others which everyone can rely, like the cleanness of the air they
breathe….This sense of security in the
space we all inhabit is a public good, and in a good society is something that
we all contribute to and help sustain….[2]
This basic social standing, I call…dignity.
A person’s dignity is….their social standing, the fundamentals of basic
reputation that entitle them to be treated as equals in the ordinary operations
of society. Their dignity is
something they can rely on—in the best case implicitly and without fuss, as they
live their lives, go about their business, and raise their families.[3]
The idea of hate crimes is an idea
that definitely does focus on motivation: it treats the harboring of certain
motivations in regard to unlawful acts like assault or murder as a distinct
element of crime as an aggravating factor.
But in most hate speech legislation, hatred is relevant not as the
motivation of certain actions, but as a possible
effect of certain forms of speech.[4]
The issue is publication and the harm
done to individuals and groups through the disfiguring of our social environment
by visible, public, and semi-permanent announcements to the effect that in the
opinion of one group in the community, perhaps the majority, members of another
group are not worthy of equal citizenship.[5]
The point of the bigoted displays
that we want to regulate is that they are not just autonomous self-expression.
They are not simply the views of racists letting off steam.
The displays specifically target the social sense of assurance on which
the members of vulnerable majorities rely.
Their point is to negate the implicit assurance that a society offers to
the members of vulnerable groups—that they are accepted in society, as a matter
of course, along with everyone else; they aim to undermine this assurance, call
it in question, and taint it with visible expressions of hatred, exclusion, and
contempt.[6]
…hate speech laws aim not only to
protect the public good of dignity-based assurance, but also to block the
construction of this rival public good that the racists and Islamophobes are
seeking to construct among themselves.
It is sometimes objected that such laws simply drive hate underground.
But in a way, that is the whole point: we want to convey the sense that
the bigots are isolated, embittered individuals, rather than permit them to
contact and coordinate with one another in the enterprise of undermining the
assurance that is provided in the name of society’s most fundamental principles.[7]
What Waldron is proposing is that some forms of moral or
ethical disagreement must be subject to legal penalties if we are to ensure the
sort of tolerance and respect which allow for democratic governance.
When the uncompromising mindset has become so pervasive that mutual
respect and trust have all but disappeared, and our political differences have
become so pronounced that governing has given way to perpetual disrespectful
uncompromising campaigning, it seems that the only way forward within the
constraints of a democracy is to enact new ground rules!
A similar sort of
argument is offered by Rainer Forst in his “The Limits of Toleration:”
the limits of toleration…are
reached when one party tries to dominate others by making its rejectable views
the general norm. Such a denial of
the right to justification is a form of intolerance that cannot be tolerated.
Not tolerating this, however, is not simply another form of intolerance,
for it is justified by the principle of justification itself and does not
absolutize one controversial ethical view.
The determination of the limits of toleration itself is reflexive and can
always be questioned by those who see themselves excluded.
As opposed to this, the way the permission conception draws the limits of
toleration is partial and potentially repressive towards minorities.[8]
…a sense of fairness must grow
culturally and mutually, out of experiences of fairness and in a democratic
political culture the relevant sense of justice must gain an autonomous
character, insofar as the respect of the right to justification is owed to and
required of each and every person without exception, regardless of his or her
ethical-cultural or religious identity.
If citizens of a pluralist society are not connected through such a sense
of justice, if they think that basic moral capacities require specific
ethical-religious foundations, they will not trust persons with the wrong kind
of religion or those without religion–-which indeed was Locke’s position.
The result will be a one-sided, narrow drawing of the limits of
toleration, excluding those who are not morally trustworthy.[9]
A democratic state lives from the
normative attitudes of its citizens and from their willingness to act on
democratic principles, to act in solidarity and to fight undemocratic
prejudices. This is even more
important in light of the consideration that right-wing radicalism is often not
merely a phenomenon on the fringes of society; rather, racist and nationalist
resentment can be widely found in society and provides a background for racist
violence.
A further important question is how far citizens should use the law as a
means of stressing and defending the limits of toleration–-classically speaking,
how tolerant the legal state should be.
In this context, the aspects of legitimacy and effectiveness need to be
distinguished. As far as legitimacy
is concerned, “zero tolerance” is called for with respect to violent attacks.
But apart from that, difficult questions arise about restricting the
basic liberties of expression and communication, the rights of assembly and
association of racist and neo-Nazi groups–-questions about whether such drastic
forms of restriction are necessary as a kind of ultima ratio to secure the basic
rights of citizens (which may be the case in certain social situations).
Also, one needs to consider questions of effectiveness, for it may well
be that such legal restrictions are not very successful and can even lead to
unintended, negative side-effects.
At times it can be more useful not to defend the limits of toleration by means
of laws but instead out of pragmatic considerations to exercise tolerance
towards groups that are in principle intolerable–-which may even have positive
results.[10]
Of course whatever arguments one uses to promote hate
speech laws or restrict free speech or the exercise of religious commitments,
such efforts seem to challenge core commitments in a pluralistic democracy—that
is why Popper and others speak of a “paradox”
here! Yet if one doesn’t adhere to
such restrictions…
IV. An Alternative
Solution—Disciplined Campaigning To Create A Sufficient Majority to Govern
Without Compromising With “The Other Side:”
An alternative would be for one to join with others to
become a sufficiently strong political majority to be able to resolve to one’s
satisfaction the most pressing of the disagreements which have arisen.
How could this to be done?
First one would need to recognize that there will be significant
differences amongst those who are one’s compatriots.
If “we” cannot come to significant compromises amongst ourselves, we will
never be able to achieve sufficient political power to achieve the desired ends.
In many ways this is the most difficult of the steps to take if
“compromise with “the other side(s)” has become impossible.
But if no “majority” can emerge, then divided government is inevitable,
and the disagreements will not be resolved.
Here is one example of a group that wants to produce such a
political majority in the upcoming 2020 national election—a recent email from
the National Indivisible Group:
Dear Bruce,
Big News: we launched our first
major initiative of the 2020 Presidential Election yesterday!
As of yesterday, there are 21
Democrats running for President -- and that’s great.
A competitive primary contest with many
highly-qualified candidates will produce the strongest possible Democratic
nominee. But on the day after our nominee
is picked, we all need to unify behind them. That’s
where the We Are Indivisible pledge comes in.
We’re launching a massive
grassroots campaign to get every Democratic presidential hopeful and every
grassroots activist to sign on to a simple promise: that no matter our
differences in the primary, once Democrats have a nominee, we'll do everything
in our power to get the nominee elected.
The details of the pledge we’re
asking candidates and activists to take and our action items are below, but it’s
a long email, so if you’re already all in to get as many of them to sign it as
possible, here’s our ask….
Suppose this was successful, and also suppose that it led
to both a successful Democratic Presidential campaign
and a successful campaign to gain a Democratic majority in the
Senate. Would all that be sufficient
to produce a political majority which could resolve many of the most significant
disagreements in a manner likely to please “us?”
If so, would it lead “the pendulum” to swing next in the
other direction in the future?
What Could Avoid This?
Is it “enough” to produce a new “status
quo?”
Could such a result be sustained?
Couldn’t “the other side” advance
the same agenda? Aren’t they doing
so, and what would/do “we” think were they successful….
V. Is Democratic
Governing With Principled Prudence, Mutual Respect, and Reciprocity Possible In
A Context of Perpetual Competitive Campaigning?
[1] Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson,
Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict
Cannot Be Avoided in Politics, and What Should
Be Done About It (Cambridge: Harvard U.P.,
1996), pp. 79-80.
[2] Jeremy Waldron,
The Harm In Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 2012), p. 4.
Emphasis (bold) added to the passage
twice.
[3]
Ibid.,
p. 5.
[4]
Ibid.,
p. 35.
[5]
Ibid.,
p. 39.
[6]
Ibid.,
p. 88.
[7]
Ibid.,
p. 95.
[8] Rainer Forst, “The Limits
of Toleration,”
Constellations Volume 11 (2004), pp.
312-325, pp. 318.
[9]
Ibid.,
pp. 320-321.
[10]
Ibid.,
pp. 321-322.
Return to Hauptli's MSC Spring 2019 Course Website
Last revised on 04/29/19.