MSC Political Compromise Course

Recognizing that we live in a social environment where citizens are deeply committed to differing values, ideals, religions, and moral standards we can easily see why political compromise is both necessary and difficult. Citizens need to be tolerant if democracy is to be possible in a pluralistic society.

Following Gutmann and Thompson suppose we do all we can to promote principled prudence, mutual respect, and a reciprocity which “…seeks mutually acceptable ways not only of resolving disagreements but also of living with the disagreements which inevitably remain.” (p. 34) That is, we do all we can to encourage our compatriots and our political leaders to engage those who do not share our commitments and ideals in rational discussion of proposals designed to address the disagreements which inevitably emerge from our differences.

As Gutmann and Thompson note in their Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided in Politics, and What Should Be Done About It:

the principles of accommodation are based on a value that lies at the core of reciprocity and deliberation in a democracy—mutual respect. It is what makes possible cooperation on fair terms. Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree. But mutual respect demands more than toleration. It requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees. It consists in an excellence of character that permits a democracy to flourish in the face of fundamental moral disagreement. This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character. It is the character of individuals who are morally committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differences between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view.

Mutual respect not only helps sustain a moral community in the face of conflict but also can contribute toward resolving the conflict. One way in which it can do so is simply by keeping open the possibility of different, more accommodating solution in the future. If we publicly recognize that a policy adopted by the government may be justifiably rejected other citizens who accept the requirements of reciprocity, we are more likely to remain open to proposals for alternatives that would be mutually acceptable, and more dedicated to changing the social and economic conditions to make those alternatives practicable.

Mutual respect can also help resolve moral disagreements by discouraging other kinds of moral rigidity. Citizens who respect one another as moral agents are less inclined toward the moral dogmatism and its accompanying attitude of arrogance that is common among those who take moral opposition as a sign of ignorance or depravity.[1]

The mutual respect (or toleration) needed for democratic governance can be very difficult for individuals who find themselves involved in situations involving contested moral or deeply-held personal values—especially as this becomes manifested in an increasingly divided social context characterized by a pronounced closed mindset with extreme principled tenacity and extensive mistrust while finding itself in a context of unbendingly uncompromising perpetual campaigning. Here, of course, one finds it very difficult to be tolerant of “the others”—difficult to respect those who don’t share one’s values, commitments, etc.; and if one can’t respect them, then “mutual respect” seems unsustainable. Here we confront paradoxes:

In some situations, then, the very atmosphere surrounding political discussion becomes wholly polluted. It is not just that there are moral or religious disagreements, it is that they have engendered a toxic intransigence where there is (on at least one side) no longer any degree of tolerance, respect, or willingness to rationally discuss the disagreements.

In such a situation it may be necessary to adopt a rather radical set of new laws: to confront such intolerance or lack of respect some thinkers believe we come up hard against the “right to free speech.” The intolerant, it seems, have the right to say intolerantly whatever they want, and if they do so within the context of “political speech,” they claim, others must tolerate this behavior. In many European democracies, this attitude runs afoul of what are called “Hate Speech Laws.” These laws disallow some forms of intolerant speech (in the broadest sense). In his The Harm In Hate Speech, Jeremy Waldron provides a discussion as to why such laws are now necessary in our country:

each group must accept that the society is not just for them, but is for them too, along with all. When this assurance is conveyed effectively, it is hardly noticeable; it is something on of the others. And each person, each member of each group should be able to go about his or her business, with the assurance there will be no need to face hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by others which everyone can rely, like the cleanness of the air they breathe….This sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good, and in a good society is something that we all contribute to and help sustain….[2]

This basic social standing, I call…dignity. A person’s dignity is….their social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of society. Their dignity is something they can rely on—in the best case implicitly and without fuss, as they live their lives, go about their business, and raise their families.[3]

The idea of hate crimes is an idea that definitely does focus on motivation: it treats the harboring of certain motivations in regard to unlawful acts like assault or murder as a distinct element of crime as an aggravating factor. But in most hate speech legislation, hatred is relevant not as the motivation of certain actions, but as a possible effect of certain forms of speech.[4]

The issue is publication and the harm done to individuals and groups through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public, and semi-permanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of equal citizenship.[5]

The point of the bigoted displays that we want to regulate is that they are not just autonomous self-expression. They are not simply the views of racists letting off steam. The displays specifically target the social sense of assurance on which the members of vulnerable majorities rely. Their point is to negate the implicit assurance that a society offers to the members of vulnerable groups—that they are accepted in society, as a matter of course, along with everyone else; they aim to undermine this assurance, call it in question, and taint it with visible expressions of hatred, exclusion, and contempt.[6]

…hate speech laws aim not only to protect the public good of dignity-based assurance, but also to block the construction of this rival public good that the racists and Islamophobes are seeking to construct among themselves.

It is sometimes objected that such laws simply drive hate underground. But in a way, that is the whole point: we want to convey the sense that the bigots are isolated, embittered individuals, rather than permit them to contact and coordinate with one another in the enterprise of undermining the assurance that is provided in the name of society’s most fundamental principles.[7]

What Waldron is proposing is that some forms of moral or ethical disagreement must be subject to legal penalties if we are to ensure the sort of tolerance and respect which allow for democratic governance. When the uncompromising mindset has become so pervasive that mutual respect and trust have all but disappeared, and our political differences have become so pronounced that governing has given way to perpetual disrespectful uncompromising campaigning, it seems that the only way forward within the constraints of a democracy is to enact new ground rules!

A similar sort of argument is offered by Rainer Forst in his “The Limits of Toleration:”

the limits of toleration…are reached when one party tries to dominate others by making its rejectable views the general norm. Such a denial of the right to justification is a form of intolerance that cannot be tolerated. Not tolerating this, however, is not simply another form of intolerance, for it is justified by the principle of justification itself and does not absolutize one controversial ethical view. The determination of the limits of toleration itself is reflexive and can always be questioned by those who see themselves excluded. As opposed to this, the way the permission conception draws the limits of toleration is partial and potentially repressive towards minorities.^{^[8]}

…a sense of fairness must grow culturally and mutually, out of experiences of fairness and in a democratic political culture the relevant sense of justice must gain an autonomous character, insofar as the respect of the right to justification is owed to and required of each and every person without exception, regardless of his or her ethical-cultural or religious identity. If citizens of a pluralist society are not connected through such a sense of justice, if they think that basic moral capacities require specific ethical-religious foundations, they will not trust persons with the wrong kind of religion or those without religion–-which indeed was Locke’s position. The result will be a one-sided, narrow drawing of the limits of toleration, excluding those who are not morally trustworthy.^{^[9]}

A democratic state lives from the normative attitudes of its citizens and from their willingness to act on democratic principles, to act in solidarity and to fight undemocratic prejudices. This is even more important in light of the consideration that right-wing radicalism is often not merely a phenomenon on the fringes of society; rather, racist and nationalist resentment can be widely found in society and provides a background for racist violence.

A further important question is how far citizens should use the law as a means of stressing and defending the limits of toleration–-classically speaking, how tolerant the legal state should be. In this context, the aspects of legitimacy and effectiveness need to be distinguished. As far as legitimacy is concerned, “zero tolerance” is called for with respect to violent attacks. But apart from that, difficult questions arise about restricting the basic liberties of expression and communication, the rights of assembly and association of racist and neo-Nazi groups–-questions about whether such drastic forms of restriction are necessary as a kind of ultima ratio to secure the basic rights of citizens (which may be the case in certain social situations). Also, one needs to consider questions of effectiveness, for it may well be that such legal restrictions are not very successful and can even lead to unintended, negative side-effects. At times it can be more useful not to defend the limits of toleration by means of laws but instead out of pragmatic considerations to exercise tolerance towards groups that are in principle intolerable–-which may even have positive results.^{^[10]}

Of course whatever arguments one uses to promote hate speech laws or restrict free speech or the exercise of religious commitments, such efforts seem to challenge core commitments in a pluralistic democracy—that is why Popper and others speak of a “paradox” here! Yet if one doesn’t adhere to such restrictions…

IV. An Alternative Solution—Disciplined Campaigning To Create A Sufficient Majority to Govern Without Compromising With “The Other Side:”

An alternative would be for one to join with others to become a sufficiently strong political majority to be able to resolve to one’s satisfaction the most pressing of the disagreements which have arisen. How could this to be done?

First one would need to recognize that there will be significant differences amongst those who are one’s compatriots. If “we” cannot come to significant compromises amongst ourselves, we will never be able to achieve sufficient political power to achieve the desired ends. In many ways this is the most difficult of the steps to take if “compromise with “the other side(s)” has become impossible. But if no “majority” can emerge, then divided government is inevitable, and the disagreements will not be resolved.

Here is one example of a group that wants to produce such a political majority in the upcoming 2020 national election—a recent email from the National Indivisible Group:

Big News: we launched our first major initiative of the 2020 Presidential Election yesterday!

As of yesterday, there are 21 Democrats running for President -- and that’s great. A competitive primary contest with many highly-qualified candidates will produce the strongest possible Democratic nominee. But on the day after our nominee is picked, we all need to unify behind them. That’s where the We Are Indivisible pledge comes in.

We’re launching a massive grassroots campaign to get every Democratic presidential hopeful and every grassroots activist to sign on to a simple promise: that no matter our differences in the primary, once Democrats have a nominee, we'll do everything in our power to get the nominee elected.

The details of the pledge we’re asking candidates and activists to take and our action items are below, but it’s a long email, so if you’re already all in to get as many of them to sign it as possible, here’s our ask….

Suppose this was successful, and also suppose that it led to both a successful Democratic Presidential campaign and a successful campaign to gain a Democratic majority in the Senate. Would all that be sufficient to produce a political majority which could resolve many of the most significant disagreements in a manner likely to please “us?”

If so, would it lead “the pendulum” to swing next in the other direction in the future?

Couldn’t “the other side” advance the same agenda? Aren’t they doing so, and what would/do “we” think were they successful….

V. Is Democratic Governing With Principled Prudence, Mutual Respect, and Reciprocity Possible In A Context of Perpetual Competitive Campaigning?

Notes: [click on the note number to return to the text for a given note]

[1] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided in Politics, and What Should Be Done About It (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1996), pp. 79-80.

[2] Jeremy Waldron, The Harm In Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012), p. 4. Emphasis (bold) added to the passage twice.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

[4] Ibid., p. 35.

[5] Ibid., p. 39.

[6] Ibid., p. 88.

[7] Ibid., p. 95.

[8] Rainer Forst, “The Limits of Toleration,” Constellations Volume 11 (2004), pp. 312-325, pp. 318.

[9] Ibid., pp. 320-321.

[10] Ibid., pp. 321-322.