Lecture Supplement on Descartes’ First Meditation [1637][1]

Copyright © 2018 Bruce W. Hauptli

Dedication, Preface, and Synopsis:

Dedication:

47 His deity and the soul are to be proved by natural reason.[2] 

49 Demonstrations of the highest certainty and evidence require a mind entirely free from prejudice and detached from the senses. 

Preface:

51 Descartes (very) briefly responds quickly to two critiques of his earlier Discourse on Method [1637]:

-The first criticism is that: “...from the fact that the human mind, when turned in on itself, does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it does not follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thinking thing....”  He responds that he did not intend to prove this there, but he will show this (presumably in this work). 

-The second criticism is that: “...it does not follow from the fact that I have within me an idea of a thing more perfect than me, that this idea is itself more perfect than me, and still less that what is represented by this idea exists.”  He answers that if ‘idea’ is taken only “materially,” this is so; but if it is taken “objectively” (that is “representationally”), this is not so—as he will show in this work.  What he will show is that (p. 52): “...from the mere fact that there is within me an idea of something more perfect than me, it follows that this thing really exists.” 

--In his Philosophy As Social Expression, Albert W. Levi maintains that: “it is indeed ironic that in the Cartesian system, while the authority of natural science derives ultimately from the establishment of two basic propositions of metaphysics, these propositions themselves are the most questionable and the most vulnerable to external philosophical criticism.  In the “Preface to the Reader”...he refers back to the Discourse of 1637 of which he had freely solicited criticism, and to the two chief criticisms which he had in fact received.  These were (1) that from the fact that the human mind, reflecting on itself, does not perceive itself to be other than a thing which thinks it does not follow that its nature or its essence does indeed consist only in thinking; and (2) that from the fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect than I am, it does not follow that this idea is more perfect than I am, and even less that what is represented by this idea exists.  The Cogito and the ontological proof are the ultimate foundations of Descartes’ philosophy of science, as they are the cornerstone of his metaphysics, but they are just those elements which subsequent philosophers have been most reluctant to certify as acceptable components of the Cartesian system.”[3] 

52 Descartes notes again, that his inquiry here will be one in “first philosophy,” and will require that the reader give it serious attention.  Indeed, he notes, he publishes a set of “Objections” with the Meditations, and he asks the reader to withhold final judgment until they have been considered also. 

Synopsis:

The appropriate paragraphs of the “Synopsis” need to be read before and after each of the Meditations. 

54-55 The discussion of the status of mental and physical substances is important, though it becomes clear only upon completion of the “Sixth Meditation.” 

The First Meditation:

59 Goal—he desires to establish firm knowledge in the sciences. 

59-60 Type of doubt—doubt whatever is not indubitable or entirely certain—even what is only slightly tinged or possibly tinged!  It is general—he doesn’t doubt each proposition but, rather, doubts them in groups. 

60 Sometimes the senses mislead us! 

-But, perhaps, sometimes the senses don’t—then we are “close” to the object, etc. 

The dreaming argument: but I do dream: “I have been deceived in sleep by similar perceptions.” 

-May I suppose that dream images represent?  May I suppose that there are simples like the elements in a picture (that the structure of the painting may be all wrong, as it were, but that the elements in it actually correspond or represent)? 

-60-61 Surely “simples” are true whether one is awake or dreaming?  That is, whether my experiences are dreaming or awakened ones, surely the “simple components” of the experiences (those out of which the “complexes” are formed) provide me with a solid (and valid) base of knowledge claims.  Can’t I suppose that dream images still represent the world somewhat?  That is, may I suppose that there are simples like the elements in a picture (that the structure of the painting may be all wrong, as it were, but that the elements in it actually correspond or represent?) 

61 “Be that as it may, there is fixed in my mind a certain opinion of long standing, namely that there exists a God who is able to do anything and by whom I, such as I am, have been created.  How do I know that He did not bring it about that there is no earth at all, no heavens, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, and yet bring it about that all these things appear to me to exist precisely as they do now?  Moreover, since I judge that others sometimes make mistakes in matters that they believe they know most perfectly, may I not, in like fashion, be deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or perform an even simpler operation, if that can be imagined?” 

-62 If one believes there is not such a powerful deity, then, since the author of our being is less powerful, it is increasingly probable that we easily fall into error. 

-“...long standing opinions keep returning, and, almost against my will, they take advantage of my credulity, as if it were bound over to them by long use and the claims of intimacy.” 

-62-63 I will suppose an evil genius who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful and who employs all his artifice to deceive me—note that the sense of ‘evil’ here is epistemic, not moral or theological! 

63 I will be a skeptic—I will withhold my assent. 

Comments on the First Meditation:

(A). Avoid Error vs. Embrace Truth. 

(B). Dreams and Deceivers:

A possible origin of the Deceiver Hypothesis: the trial of an alleged warlock in France at the time for “infesting a convent of nuns” wherein the defendant claimed that he had the necessary powers of deception, he would be able to avoid court by deceiving he magistrates, judge and others involved in the trial. 

Alice, her “Wonderland, and Tweedledum/Tweedledee claiming she is dreaming—a claim Alice vehemently denies![4]  

Jorge Luis Borges’ “The Circular Ruins,”[5] and the Star Trek Next Generation episode entitled “Ship In A Bottle” where Professor Moriarty (a holodeck character) manages to take control of both a holodeck fantasy program and of the Starship Enterprise.  At the end of the episode, one of the crew-members is not at all sure that the “program” is not continuing, and (sheepishly) worries that his “life” might be a fantasy. 

In his Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy, Jostein Gaarder reminds us that:

the old Chinese sage Chuang-tzu...said: Once I dreamed I was a butterfly, and now I no longer know whether I am Chuang-tzu, who dreamed I was a butterfly, or whether I am a butterfly dreaming that I am Chuang-tzu.[6] 

As Gaarder’s overall story develops, it appears as if one of his characters may “take control” of the novel, and the overall discussion clearly has Descartes in mind. 

(C). The problem of representationalism:

Imagine you are a physicist, astronomer, chemist or psychologist, and you are charged with discovering certain fundamental laws of the universe—that is, you are attempting to discover the laws which govern the behavior of unobservable phenomena (electrons, quanta, black holes, molecules, minds, etc.).  How will you proceed? 

-Do chemical reactions, behavioral responses, and gross macroscopic events which we can observe provide us with representations of what occurs at the unobservable level?  Here is something parallel to the problem Descartes confronts and would resolve.  The scientist is, literally, confined to his or her observations—what is observed differs radically from the fundamental particles discussed in the theories. 

Descartes looks for a characteristic of some of his ideas which would guarantee that they (truly) represent (things in the world). 

In his “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed” M.F. Burnyeat notes that: “Greek philosophy does not know the problem of proving in a general way the existence of an external world.  That problem is a modern invention....The problem which typifies ancient philosophical enquiry in a way that the external world problem has come to typify philosophical enquiry in modern times is quite the opposite.  It is the problem of understanding how thought can be of nothing or what is not, how our minds can be exercised on falsehoods, fictions, and illusions.[7] 

Descartes and “the Egocentric Predicament:”

It is important that we note that Descartes’ new (“scientific”) epistemology explicitly begins with the isolated self.  As C.A.J. Coady notes his Testimony: A Philosophical Study:

it is interesting to contrast Reid’s attitude with Descartes’s.  In the Discourse on the Method, Descartes says in discussing the influence of custom and example upon belief, ‘And yet a majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are at all difficult to discover; for a single man is much more likely to hit upon them than a group of people’….The confident individualism of this passage will be relevant to my discussion of the influences of individualist ideology upon the neglect of testimony.  Descartes’s thought here is not only at odds with the (surely genuine) phenomenon to which Reid draws attention but also with the facts of scientific co-operation and mutual dependency in the uncovering of truths that are (often extremely) difficult to discover.[8] 

Whereas Thomas Reid and today’s scientists begin squarely in a social epistemology which sees the knower in a world which includes, and, more importantly, accepts the testimony of others, Descartes begins his epistemic journey alone and isolated from both others and the world.  From Descartes’ time to our own, many epistemologists have believed that to achieve justified knowledge about the world we must begin from this “egocentric” predicament and work our way out ward.  Some contemporary naturalistic epistemologists follow the line of thought of Reid, however.  They emphasize that humans begin their epistemic journey learning from others, and they point out that testimony is as common, and strong, a source of justification as individual experience.  We shall see that Descartes has little to say about the role of testimony, because he has significant difficulty even getting to the existence of others, let alone to utilizing them as a possible source of epistemic justification. 

Problems with Descartes’ Arguments for Skepticism:

(A). G.E. Moore raises this criticism of Descartes’ dreaming argument: “...can he consistently combine this proposition [a] that he knows that dreams have occurred, with his conclusion [b] that he does not know that he is not dreaming?  Can anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred, if, at the time, he does not himself know that he is not dreaming?  If he is dreaming, it may be that he is only dreaming that dreams have occurred; and if he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is not only dreaming that dreams have occurred?  Can he possibly know therefore that dreams have occurred?  I do not think that he can; and therefore I think that anyone who uses this premise and also asserts the conclusion that nobody ever knows that he is not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency.”[9] 

(B). Philosophical argumentation and modeling:

senses sometimes mislead us → perhaps they always do;

some paintings are forgeries → perhaps they all are.[10] 

Gilbert Ryle provides a version of this criticism:

I must say a little about the quite general argument from the notorious limitations and fallibility of our senses to the impossibility of our getting to know anything at all by looking, listening and touching. 

  A country which had no coinage would offer no scope to counterfeiters.  There would be nothing for them to manufacture or pass counterfeits of.  They could, if they wished, manufacture and give away decorated disks of brass or lead, which the public might be pleased to get.  But these would not be false coins.  There can be false coins only where there are coins made of the proper materials by the proper authorities. 

  In a country where there is a coinage, false coins can be manufactured and passed; and the counterfeiting might be so efficient that an ordinary citizen, unable to tell which were false and which were genuine coins, might become suspicious of the genuineness of any particular coin that he received.  But however general his suspicions might be, there remains one proposition which he cannot entertain, the proposition, namely, that it is possible that all coins are counterfeits.  For there must be an answer to the question ‘Counterfeits of what?’”[11] 

In his “I Only Am Escaped Alone to tell Thee:’ Epistemology and the Ishmael Effect,” David Stove maintains:

well, it is true, and also contingent, that some of us sometimes hallucinate.  But it does not follow from that, (even if Descartes thought it did), that it is logically possible that all of us are always hallucinating.  Some children in a school-class may happen to be below the average level of ability of children in that class, but it is not logically possible that all of them are.  Neither is it logically possible that we are all always hallucinating.  For we—that is, all human beings—are perceived by (unless indeed we are hallucinations of) at least one human being: ourselves if no other.  Whence, on the supposition that we—that is, all human beings—are always hallucinating, it follows that all human beings are hallucinations of at least one human being.  And that is not logically possible.[12] 

(C). J.L. Austin offers a related sort of criticism.  He claims that “...it is important to remember that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception.  (You can’t fool all of the people all of the time.)  It must be possible to recognize a case of deception by checking the odd cases against the more normal ones.”[13] 

(D). In his Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, Gerald Edelman notes that: “one matter Descartes did not explicitly analyze, however, was that to be aware and able to guide his philosophical thought, he needed to have language.  And for a person to have language, at least one other person must be involved, even if that person is the memory of someone in one’s past, an interiorized interlocutor.  This requirement shakes Descartes’ notion that his conclusions depended on himself alone and not on other people.  Moreover, Descartes was not explicit as to when a human being first has access to a thinking substance in his development.  Perhaps he should have pondered further the likelihood of a French baby concluding, “Je pense donc je suis.”“[14] 

(E). Do the congenitally blind have “visual images?”  In his “Even Blind People Can Draw,” Daniel Zalewski maintains that:

early this year [2002], at the museum of Modern Art, scholars gathered to witness an astonishing presentation by an untutored “outsider” artist named Tracy Carcione.  At first glance, Carcione’s simple ballpoint-pen drawings of geometric objects did not seem so impressive—they looked like preparatory sketches for a still-life painting.  What made them remarkable, however, is the fact that Carcione has been blind since infancy.  Although she could only touch, not see, the wooden objects placed on a table in front of her, Carcione’s drawings featured easily recognizable cones, cubes and spheres—all infused with a deft use of perspective that even Leonardo would have admired. 

  All people blind since birth, cognitive scientists now say, share her basic ability to create realistic drawings of everyday objects: a Coke bottle, an armchair, a toothbrush.  But how can visual art possibly be made by people without vision?  The emerging idea is that picture-making is a cognitive ability so deeply embedded in our brains that it flourishes even when our eyes fail us.[15] 

What has really shocked cognitive scientists, however, is that many blind artists seem to have tricks of the Renaissance buried inside their brains.  Foreshortening, vanishing points and other devices of modern pictorial realism—techniques that artists in the Middle Ages lacked—can be found in blind art.  At the Modern, when Kennedy asked Carcione to draw a cube balanced on a point with three faces toward her, she began by drawing a Y shape: three angles converging to a point.  When a cube was placed in front of a cone on the table, Carcione drew the cone smaller, to convey distance.  This discovery suggests that realistic art isn’t just a nifty cultural invention; it’s based on hard-wired systems of perception. 

  But if that’s true, why did it take Italian artists well into the 14^th century to develop what Carcione came upon through intuition.  It’s still a mystery, but Kennedy theorizes that it has to do with the fact that many blind people, out of necessity, develop an acute ability to imagine physical space.  In other words, visual artists before the Renaissance were too bedazzled by sensory overload to grasp the fundamental architecture of pictorial space.[16] 

(F) If the dreaming argument is so powerful (and it seems through the ages to be so), then why are Berkeley and solipsism so implausible? 

Go to my Supplement for the Second Meditation. 

Return to my webpage for the course. 

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Email: hauptli@fiu.edu 

Last revised: 04/25/18.