The Second Meditation

-What of Jorge Luis Borges’ “The Circular Ruins,”[3] or Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass?[4]

-Discuss the difference between the “occurrent “and the “substantial” senses of ‘I.’ Indicate why the distinction is important here, and why it is the “substantial” sense which Descartes wants and needs (but doesn’t seem entitled to).

--Memory and the occurrent conception of the self: Christopher Nolen’s movie Memento [2000]—without short-term memory, we get a very different “self!” Of course there is also “long-term” memory, and other sorts! Moreover, does memory entail any sort of certainty?

--identity and Theseus’ ship—my “updated case would have one imagine a ship (Theseus’) which is rebuilt plank by plank (with the original planks saved and then reassembled according to the original plan. The question is: “Which of the resultant ships is Theseus’ ship?”

-Nonetheless, Descartes concludes that he knows he is an enduring thing—a substance:

--“For it is so obvious that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who will, that there is nothing by which it could be explained more clearly. But indeed it is also the same “I” who imagines; for although perhaps, as I supposed before, absolutely noting that I imagined is true, still the very power of imagining really does exist, and constitutes a part of my thought. Finally, it is this same “I” who senses or who is cognizant of bodily things as if through the senses….”

-Indubitability—three senses: psychological, logical, metaphysical: “psychological” certainty would be where a specific individual finds herself unable to raise doubts (because of her psychological constitution, or her deeply felt convictions, or her predispositions, etc.); “logical” certainty would be where no individual could raise doubts (because logic rules them out); and “metaphysical” certainty would be where absolutely no doubts could be raised (where error is absolutely inconceivable). “While we thus reject all that of which we can possibly doubt, and feign that it is false...we cannot in the same way conceive that we who doubt these things are not; for there is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not at the same time as it thinks, exist.”[5]

--Descartes asks “Do I exist?” The American philosopher, Morris Cohen, asks “Who wants to know?”[6]

-“Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property, quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a Substance; neither do we have any other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally or eminently. For by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.”[7] In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes defines ‘substance’ more carefully (and this is taken as the Cartesian definition) as follows: “by substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concourse of God. That is why the word substance does not pertain univoce to God and to other things, as they say in the Schools, that is, no common signification for this appellation which will apply equally to God and to them can be distinctly understood.”[8]

--Discuss the notion of the “natural light.” What guarantees the truth of the “dictates” of the natural light?[9]

-In his City of God [426], St. Augustine offers a version of the cogito. I discuss his version and the difference between it and Descartes’ version in A Supplement on Augustine's "Cogito."

65-66 Sum Res Cogitans. But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness what I am, though assured that I am. What, then, did I formerly think I was?

-A “rational animal”—this leaves us with two questions to answer (“What is rationality?” and “What is an animal?”) and we have no way of getting started here.

--Discuss the notion of an essential characteristic—Descartes is endeavoring to discover what he is “essentially.”[10]

-“...in the strict sense the knowledge of this “I” does not depend upon things of whose existence I do not yet have knowledge.”

--Memory, “occurrent self-identity,” and Theseus’ ship—my “updated case would have one imagine a ship (Theseus’) which is rebuilt plank by plank (with the original planks saved and then reassembled according to the original plan. The question is: “Which of the resultant ships is Theseus’ ship?”

--The 2000 movie Memento directed by Christopher Nolan is worth viewing and considering in the context of our discussions here. The movie centers on the trials undergone by a character who lacks the form of “short-term” memory which allows us to have plans for the future or remember what we did recently. While he can speak language, drive cars, and interact with the world, he can not remember whether he is chasing someone or being chased, who he is, or what he is doing. While he writes and even tattoos notes to himself, he has to try and fight against his lack of memory to understand what is going on in “his life.”

-“And when I stated that this proposition I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain which presents itself to those who philosophize in orderly fashion, I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existence, and what is certainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like; but because these are notions of the simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record.”[11]

66 A thing which thinks is a thing which understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, and perceives.

-“For it is so obvious that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who desire, that there is nothing by which it could be explained more clearly. But indeed it is also the same “I” who imagines; for although perhaps, as I supposed before, absolutely nothing that I imagined is true, still the very power of imagining really does exist, and constitutes a part of my thought. Finally, it is this same “I” who senses or who is cognizant of bodily things as if through the senses. For example, I now I see a light, I hear a noise, and I feel heat. These things are false, since I am asleep. Yet I certainly do seem to see, hear, and feel warmth. This cannot be false. Properly speaking, this is what in me is called “sensing.” But this, precisely so taken, is nothing other than thinking.”

-Note: if this is what he has discovered with the cogito, then it is fairly clear that he has the “substantial” conception of the self in mind—few can undertake this many complex cognitive tasks all at the same time! No “occurrent” self would be able to “understand, affirm, deny, will, refuse, imagine, and perceive” all at once!

-Note: In his On the Equality of the Two Sexes [1673, anonymously], Francois Poullain de la Barre maintains that:

it is easy to see that the difference between the two sexes is limited to the body, since that is the only part used in the reproduction of humankind. Since the mind merely gives its consent, and does so in exactly the same way in everyone, we can conclude that it has no sex.

Considered independently, the mind is found to be equal and of the same nature in all men, and capable of all kinds of thoughts. It is as much exercised by small concepts as by large; as much thought is required to conceive of a mite as an elephant….Since there seems not to be any greater difference between the minds of the two sexes, we can say that the difference does not lie there. It is rather the constitution of the body, but particularly education, religious observance, and the effects of our environment which are the natural and perceptible causes of all the many differences between people.

A woman’s mind is joined to her body, like a man’s, by God himself, and according to the same laws. Feelings, passions, and the will maintain this union, and since the mind functions no differently in one sex than in the other, it is capable of the same things in both.[12]

67 The Wax Experiment: the wax is something extended. Here Descartes lets his mind “wander” and, clearly, stops, for the moment, adducing claims to certain knowledge. In this passage he clarifies the essential characteristic of non-mental substance (the physical realm of corporeal things)—shape, divisibility, occupation of space, having location, etc. The background picture of the physical is provided by the emerging science of the day—by Galileo’s “mechanics.”

-68 Descartes claims that he knows the wax by his reason—not by the use of his senses or of his imagination!

“...I manifestly know that nothing can be perceived more easily and more evidently than my own mind.”

Bernard Williams notes that “a mode presupposes its attribute, but equally an attribute which is really present implies the presence of a mode—a thing can not be extended without being extended in one way rather than another.”[13]

In his Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics, R.S. Woolhouse maintains that: “but even if modes and accidents need substances, don’t substances also require modes? Can we, as Descartes says, ‘clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it’? Descartes’s point here is merely that substances do not require the particular modes that they happen to have. It is not that they do not require some modes or other. It is clear that they do; for modes are accidental variations of an attribute, and the distinction between a substance and at least some of its attributes is so close as to be ‘merely a conceptual one’. One substance can exist apart from another; it can exist apart from the particular modes it happens to have; but it cannot exist with no modes, for there are certain attributes without which substances are ‘unintelligible’. For many substances the attribute of extension (the attribute of being spatially dimensioned or of having length, breadth, and depth) is one such. Though a given substance is intelligible without the particular modal shape it has, it will be unintelligible with no shape at all, for it is unintelligible apart from the attribute of extension.”[14]

(B). Descartes’ goal is the validation of reason, but isn’t any such attempt question-begging?

(E). We need to discuss what sort of claim Descartes makes with his cogito—is it (A) an inference, (B) an intuition, or, finally, (c) is an epistemic interpretation of the cogito the right way to see it?[15]

(b) Note, however, that if Descartes is presenting us with an inference, the conclusion can not be the first thing he is certain of—the premises themselves become the first certainties (or else, they are themselves in need of justification).

(c) Moreover, the universal premise may be questioned—especially if the evil genius hypothesis and the dreaming argument are considered.

(d) Also, if the premises are certain, there is still the question of whether or not Descartes (or ourselves) might be deceived regarding the validity of the inference. Surely the evil genius could mislead us as we consider a complex inference.

(f) Furthermore, we should note that the inference might not in fact hold. Consider the following comment by Bertrand Russell: “let us begin by examining Descartes’ view. “I think, therefore I am” is what he says, but this won’t do as it stands. What, from his point of view, he should profess to know is not “I think,” but “There is thinking”....He would say that thoughts imply a thinker. But why should they? Why should not a thinker be simply a certain series of thoughts, connected with each other by causal laws?”[16]

(g) Finally (in regard to the inference interpretation), we should note that Spinoza raised an important objection to Descartes’ “argument.” Feldman clarifies Spinoza’s objection as follows:

I am convinced that you could not come to know that you had a headache by the use of [a similar] argument [similar, that is, to the cogito]. The problem is not that the argument itself is defective....you would undoubtedly know that you have a headache before you could go through the various steps of the argument. Furthermore, you would already be so certain that you have a headache that you could not increase your certainty by the use of this argument. Your knowledge that you have a headache would be more direct. The headache itself is all the evidence you need for the conclusion that you have a headache.

As I understand him, Spinoza wants to make something like this point concerning the Cogito argument. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with the argument itself. The problem is that Descartes could not have used that argument to come to know that he exists. He undoubtedly knew that he existed before he made use of that (or any other) argument. His knowledge of his own existence could not have been dependent upon any premises. He knows immediately, and without evidence, that he existed.[17]

(ii) if the cogito is an intuition, there are still problems (there are places in Descartes’ works where the intuition interpretation is warranted: “by intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself in that it is simpler, though deduction, as we have noted above, cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only....”[18] The main problem, of course, is that intuiting something does not seem to grant it metaphysical certainty [or truth].

(iii) the “epistemic” interpretation of the cogito treats the “argument” as neither an inference nor as an intuition but, rather, as an “epistemic discovery.” As Feldman says, “this belief is metaphysically certain, not because it has been derived from indubitable premises, and not because it has been intuited. Rather, it is metaphysically certain simply because there is no reason to doubt it.”[19] This, of course, suggests a view the Meditations which would have Descartes seeking to find claims which we can not doubt, but which need not be metaphysically certain. This sort of interpretation avoids some of the problems which Descartes encounters on the other interpretations of the cogito, but it is inconsistent with other things which he says. Besides this, the basic problem with this sort of interpretation is with the claim that there is no reason for doubting—establishing that the reasons for doubting adduced thus far do not provide such a rationale for doubt does not establish that there is no reason for doubt—just that such a reason for doubting has not yet arisen!

(F). In his Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy, Jostein Gaarder suggests that when thinking of Descartes sum res cogitans, one remember Sartre’s “existence takes priority over essence.” As he notes that: “throughout the entire history of philosophy, philosophers have sought to discover what man is—or what human nature is. But Sartre believed that man has no such eternal “nature” to fall back on. It is therefore useless to search for the meaning of life in general. We are condemned to improvise. We are like actors dragged onto the stage without having learned our lines, with no script and no prompter to whisper stage directions to us. We must decide for ourselves how to live.”[20]

(G). In his Tragic Sense of Life, Miguel de Unamuno offers the following critique of Descartes: “the defect of Descartes’ Discourse on Method lies in his resolution to empty himself of himself, of Descartes, of the real man, the man of flesh and bone, the man who does not want to die, in order that he might be a mere thinker—that is, an abstraction. But the real man returned and thrust himself into his philosophy....

The truth is sum, ergo cogito—I am, therefore I think, although not everything that is thinks. Is not conscious thinking above all consciousness of being? Is pure thought possible, without consciousness of self, without personality?”[21]

(B). What of his right to talk in terms of the substance-attribute distinction at all?

(C). What of his right to talk about a continuous substance—the problem of multiple selves?

(D). What of the other propositions he accepts as certain in the argument for the cogito?

Part IV of Descartes’ Discourse on Method[22] (pp. 18-23 of our text) provides an excellent (and brief) summary of the argument of the Meditations (both up to this point and through the rest). It may be a good idea to read it at this point.

As I noted above, Descartes’ deity is a philosophical deity![23] We should contrast this sort of conception with Pascal’s “personalistic” deity, for example.

This Meditation involves “building a bridge” from the “subjective world” of the self to the “objective world”—that which is “beyond” the self. Note: the evil genius may be considered to be the “troll” under the bridge!

He seeks the identification of a characteristic of some ideas which assures that they [truly] represent.

(A). Dark Pool Analogy: if you are swimming alone in a dark pool and you feel something brush your leg, it is natural to reach the (alarming) conclusion that you are not alone.

(B). The “anthropology example“:[24] find a tribe that has a picture of a pile of stones and a picture of a complex machine:

tells us something about the level of development of the tribe. They must have such machines of the imagination necessary to conceive of them. Higher order understanding exhibited by the second picture.

ex nihilo nihil fit (Descartes believes it and the principle are equivalent) and, it is important to note, he will be applying this principle to ideas in his argument.

Aristotelian analysis of causation: the efficient cause explains the existence of a thing, while the formal cause explains the nature of that thing.

Together the causal principle, the idea of the degrees of reality of ideas (objective reality), his idea of a deity, and his certainty that he does not have the power to cause this idea yield the proof that this deity exists!

Notes: [click on note number to return to the text for the note]. This supplement, and the others for Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, reference the pages in Donald A. Cress’ translation in René Descartes: Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Fourth Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). They were developed over 40 years of teaching, however, and the citations are sometimes to other translations. In addition emphasis (italics, underlines, and bolding are regularly added to citations to help direct your attention.

[1] Cf., Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences [1637], trans. Donald A. Cress, in Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (fourth edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), p. 18.

[2] Cf., Descartes, Principles of Philosophy [1644] I 9, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 1 [1911], trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1969), p. 222.

[3] Cf., Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins,” op. cit.

[4] Cf., The Annotated Alice, ed. Martin Gardner, op. cit.

[5] Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, op. cit., I 7, p. 221.

[6] Cited in Avrum Stroll and Richard Popkin, Introduction to Philosophy (N.Y.: Holt Rinehart, 1972) (second edition), p. 44.

[7] Rene Descartes, “Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,” published as part of the “Objections and Replies” in 1641 with the Meditations, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 2, op. cit., p. 53.

[8] Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I 51, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

[9] Cf., John Morris, “Descartes’ Natural Light,” Journal of the History of Philosophy v. 11 (1973), pp. 169-187.

[10] Note that the question “What is the essential characteristic of a knife?” presumes that there is an essential characteristic of knives. Aristotle makes such an assumption, and assumes that the essence of knives is “to cut well.” Those of us who live in a “peanut butter age” might maintain that knives have a variety of functions and that there is no one of them which is essential. Similarly, one might contend, there might be a variety of characteristics which are relevant when Descartes’ question is asked regarding the self.

[11] Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, op. cit., I 10, p. 222. Note that he here allows that there are things which need to be known prior to the cogito. Does this undercut his argument in any way?

[12] Francois Poullain de la Barre, On the Equality of the Two Sexes [1673, anonymously], in Francois Poullian de la Barre: Three Cartesian Feminist Treatises, ed. Marcelle Welch, trans. Vivian Bosley (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 2002), pp. 49-121, p. 82.

[13] Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1978), p. 125. Cf., pp. 124-129.

[14] R.S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 18-19.

[15] The discussion of the status of the cogito which follows is largely lifted from Fred Feldman, A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986).

[16] Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927), p. 7. With this objection Russell is bringing to bear the distinction we raised earlier regarding the difference between the occurrent and substantial conception of the self. The question here is: what entitles Descartes to assume that there is anything more than the mere occurrence of thinking?

[17] Fred Feldman, A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy, op. cit, p. 66.

[18] Rene Descartes, Rules For the Direction of the Mind [posthumous, 1628], in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, v. 1, op. cit., p. 7.

[19] Ibid., p. 70.

[20] Jostein Gaarder, Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy, trans. Paulette Moller (N.Y.: Farr, Straus and Giroux, 1994), p. 350.

[21] Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, trans. C.J. Flitch (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1921), p. 34.

[22] Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences, op. cit.—Part IV is on pp. 18-23.

[23] For clarification of the distinction between the sort of deity discussed by philosophers and the deity as many conceive it, cf. Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, op. cit.

[24] This example is discussed in detail in Bernard Williams, in his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit, pp. 138-142.