Lecture Supplement on Descartes

Once Descartes has proved the existence of his deity, his problem undergoes a radical shift (or at least we may see it in this manner): prior to this point he had to explain how the phenomenon of human knowledge was possible, but now (with a deity who is not a deceiver) his problem is to account for (or allow for) the phenomenon of error! In philosophy of religion one of the core problems is the problem of evil. Various religiously inclined philosophers offer theodicies which endeavor to prove that there is no inconsistency or contradiction between the existence of evil and the existence of an omni-powerful, omniscient, and omni-good deity. In this Meditation, Descartes offers an argument akin to such theodicies in an effort to reconcile the existence of the sort of nondeceptive deity he thinks he has proven to exist and the existence of error. In this Meditation he shows not only how we fall into error, but how we can avoid it and obtain truth about other things (than our own existence and the existence of his deity).

-“And from the fact that this idea is in me, or that I who have this idea exist, I draw the obvious conclusion that God also exists, and that my existence depends entirely upon him at each moment. This conclusion is so obvious that I am absolutely confident that the human mind can know nothing more evident or more certain.^{^[2]} And now I seem to see a way by which I might progress from this contemplation of the true God, in whom, namely, are hidden all the treasures of the sciences and wisdom, to knowledge of other things.”

His deity does not deceive us; for it is imperfect to deceive; and we have a faculty of judgment which we may use to distinguish truth from error—a faculty which we received from his deity.^{^[3]} He would not give us a faculty which would lead us astray (if we use it correctly).

-82 “...I make mistakes because the faculty of judging the truth, which I got from God, is not, in my case infinite.”

-“No doubt God could have created me such that I never erred. No doubt, again, God always wills what is best. Is it then better that I should be in error than not?”

--Note that animals lack this “faculty,’ and consequently can’t have the sort of certain knowledge we can have. Indeed, Descartes considers them “thoughtless brutes.”

-82-83 “...whenever we ask whether the works of God are perfect, we should keep in view not simply some one creature in isolation from the rest, but the universe as a whole. For perhaps something might rightfully appear imperfect if it were all by itself, and yet be most perfect, to the extent that it has the status of a part in the universe.”

83 “...[my] errors depend on the simultaneous occurrence of two causes: the faculty of knowing that is in me and the faculty of choosing, that is, the free choice of the will, in other words, simultaneously on the intellect and will.”

-84 Descartes contends that the faculty of understanding is limited in us (but not in his deity), as are the faculties of memory, imagination, perception, etc. (and, again, in his deity, he holds, these faculties are infinite). On the other hand, our faculty of willing resembles that of the deity—it is (nearly boundless).

-84 “...the power of willing, which I got from God, is not, taken by itself, the cause of my errors, for it is most ample as well as perfect in its kind. Nor is my power of understanding the cause of my errors. For since I got my power of understanding from God, whatever I understand I doubtless understand rightly, and it is impossible for me to be deceived in this. What then is the source of my errors? They are owing simply to the fact that, since the will extends further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same boundaries; rather, I also extend it to things I do not understand. Because the will is indifferent in regard to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin.”

85 “...it is manifest by the light of nature that a perception on the part of the intellect must always precede a determination of the will.”

-86 His deity does not cause the errors, they are the result of privation (the fact that we were created with finite understanding [and infinite will]).

--He clearly presupposes some form of "epistemic voluntarism" here (that our beliefs are, to some extent, under our control. He also believes we have "epistemic responsibility"—that we are, to some extent, responsible for our beliefs.

-“...I should never judge anything that I do not clearly and distinctly understand.”

-87 “...as often as I restrain my will when I make judgments, so that it extends only to those matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it plainly cannot happen that I err. For every clear and distinct perception is surely something, and hence it cannot come from nothing. On the contrary, it must necessarily have God for its author: God, I say, that supremely perfect being to whom it is repugnant to be a deceiver....Therefore the perception is most assuredly true.”

Notes: [click on note number to return to the text for the note]

[1] This supplement, and the others for Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, reference the pages in Donald A. Cress’ translation in René Descartes: Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Fourth Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). They were developed over 40 years of teaching, however, and the citations are sometimes to other translations. In addition emphasis (italics, underlines, and bolding are regularly added to citations to help direct your attention.

[2] Note that this suggests that his claim regarding the deity’s existence is even more certain than the cogito, but this can not be, since the former claim depends upon the latter (at least in the epistemological context).

[3] Note that while he has argued that we must conclude that an infinite and perfect deity exists (and is not a deceiver), his proof in the previous “Meditation” did not establish that his deity causes him, others, or other things. While being all-powerful would, of course, allow for this, it doesn’t require it—omnipotence is an ability, but it might not be exercised. Here, then, there is the danger that Descartes is (simply) assuming that his deity is (the only) causally efficacious force (ultimately speaking).