Supplement for Second Week of Class: Introducing Deliberative Democracy and "Valuing Compromise "

“Introduction to Deliberative Democracy,” Introduction To Our Book,” “Questions,” and “Valuing Compromise”

Copyright © 2019 Bruce W. Hauptli

This supplement was rewritten after the class—we did mention most of the below as I tried to weave these points into a fulsome discussion of the current political situation (nationally and in Maine), the difficulties in compromising in this context, and the importance of “political action and activism.” 

Our authors begin their First Chapter (p. 25) by noting that Americans are ambivalent about compromise—many say they want leaders who compromise, but they also praise those who “stick to their positions or principles.”  Moreover (p. 26 and quoting the Pew Research Center), “on most issues…openness to compromise is inversely linked to the importance people place on the issue.” 

  Of course opposition to compromise fades in the face of a genuine crisis (which is why the 2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise of 2011 was successful—note, also that the topic had not been something either side had campaigned on!  Moreover we seem to prefer that our politicians be the ones to devise the compromises which we often need, but do not want to negotiate (or approve of):

29 nothing is more common in political negotiation than praise for the idea of compromise coupled with resistance to [actions needed to] realize it.” 

If compromise is going to be more than an “attractive idea in principle,” we need to understand how citizens and their representatives can come to value it as they address particular situations.  In this Chapter they will help us understand why “valuing compromise” is important.  They will advance this in three sections: (A) The Cost of Not Compromising, (B) The Vulnerabilities of Compromise, and (C) The Limit of Compromise. 

A. The Costs of Not Compromise

30 First…the greater the resistance to compromise, the greater the bias in favor of the status quo. 

  The status quo offers no assurance even of stability, let alone of progress by anyone’s standards.   

32 A general resistance to compromise implausibly presumes that the status quo is always more defensible than a compromise, or that it is always a mistake to yield something to one’s political adversaries even when they are willing to yield something to you. 

A strong psychological resistance to compromise flows from the fact that the costs of not compromising are never equal for everyone in democratic politics.  The costs depend on the difference between what credibly can be achieved by compromise and what the status quo offers without compromise. 

33 Another source of general opposition to compromise is the perpetual hope that there is more to be gained (or less to be lost) in the future by not compromising now. 

34 Second …resistance to compromise undermines practices of mutual respect that are essential for a robust democratic process.  Mutual respect expresses a constructive attitude toward, and willingness to engage in good faith with one’s political opponents.  It is based on a principle of reciprocity, which is at the core of many different conceptions of democracy. 

So two values of compromising are that it enables mutually beneficial improvements over the status quo, and that it promotes mutually respectful politics.                        

B. Vulnerabilities of Compromise:

35 …even if people recognize the costs of not compromising, they will find that all compromises by their nature are perpetually vulnerable to criticisms from all sides. 

36 There seems to be a sense of surrender in compromises which arises from a concern that the other side got the better deal which arises from the fact that their motives are opaque to us. 

37 There is, also, a sense of confusion in compromises arising from the fact that they do not flow naturally from one’s principles! 

38 Of course this need not be the case, sometimes there can be an “overlapping consensus” where individuals with divergent moral views can agree on legislation for differing reasons.  Our authors mention 2008 housing legislation and 2011 farm subsidy legislation where liberals (who wanted to help financially-troubled bowers and ending some over-farming) and conservatives (who wanted to stabilize the housing market and cut back on some government intrusions into the free market).  Here there can even be” consensus without compromise” as there may be no departure from principles (p. 39). 

40-41 Brief discussion of three “compromises:” Tax Reform Act of 1986, Affordable Care Act of 2010, and The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (welfare reform—all compromises which significantly improved the previously existing situation.   

C. The Limits of Compromise:

41 The limits to compromise apply to its domain, process, and content:

41-42 The uncompromising mindset should not dominate governing, but it is well-suited to the domain of campaigning, social movements, political protests, demonstrations, and activist activities. 

Moreover, “with the uncompromising at their flanks, compromisers gain bargaining power.” 

42-43 Amongst the most uncompromising recent activists are the Tea Party activists.  I would add, on the other end of the spectrum to avowed socialists! 

44 The evolution of the Tea Party activists showed that the uncompromising mindset has limits also: “the limits became apparent as the representatives sent to Congress faced a dilemma—a choice between legislating or protesting. 

45 The choice to protest rather than legislate doesn’t bring about legislative change, and the status quo is generally not acceptable to such activists, and this frustrates the very base which elected these legislators. 

So while the uncompromising mindset can limit the domain where compromise is possible, if it is pushed too far I can decrease the domain of the uncompromising mindset. 

46 Secondly, the process of compromising imposes a limit upon compromise.  If the compromises are pursued without minimal mutual respect (or via manipulation) people may not be prone to accept the compromises.  

48 Finally, the content of compromises provide another limitation (48-49 and Senator Nelson of Nebraska with a $100 M of extra Medicaid funding for a vote on Obama Caretoo unfair even for Nelson! 

49 Legislative compromises have many moving parts and this itself poses limits to the compromises. 

49-51 Moreover, one can’t effect a legislative compromise if one is unwilling to modify initial principled stances: Dan Rostenkowski in the House on Tax Reform and the Senate lowering the top rate to 27%, he closes loopholes and is able to settle ultimately for 28%; Bob Casey, Democratic Senator and not wanting to let government funds pay for any abortions, and a ultimate vote for insurers in government plans to pay for abortions with private funds collected. 

52-53 In the compromising process legislators will not be prone to indicate their negotiating parameters, and this means each side must work with estimates of where compromise might be possible.  Given the fact that the negotiations themselves change some of the circumstances, this means flexibility is necessary. 

D. Limits of History:

54-57 History can be suggestive, but it is not a great guide to compromise.  In our Constitutional history there are several important compromises and our authors discuss “the equal representation of states” and “the three-fifths representation of slaves.”  The first case led to the different representational models in the House and Senate.  The second a compromise between slaves should count at all for representation in the House and for purposes of distributing taxes and the view that they should count equally. 

Brief mention of the compromise of 1877 which effectively ended Reconstruction (by the removal of Federal troops from the South) which garnered the support of Southern Democrats for Republican Rutherford B. Hayes’ winning the Presidency in 1876. 

58 Just as we should not use the morality of widely accepted compromises of the past to reassure us about compromises we might make now, so we should not invoke the ignoble compromises of the past to move us to resist compromises we need to make now. 
 
Nevertheless, historical examples can suggest some important lessons about the process of compromising….Assume what almost all historians agree on: at least some (even if no all) parts of the constitutional compromises were necessary to improve upon the status quo and preserve the union.  Set aside any more definitive judgments about the content of the particular compromises in order to ask: what conditions encouraged delegates to make these compromises? 

59-61 Lessons to be learned from the Constitutional Convention:

The “conciliatory habits of mind that most of the delegates possessed made compromises possible.

That temper of mind could be maintained because the proceedings were not in public. 

Larger (or more significant) compromises were facilitated by many smaller procedural ones.  For example, on the second day it was agreed to mutual respect and to listening to one-another.  

During ratification by the States no amendments were allowed. 

Next: “Resisting Compromise.” 

Go to the Supplement for the Third Week. 

Return to Hauptli's MSC Spring 2019 Course Website

Last revised on 03/29/19.