Supplement for Second Week of Class: Introducing Deliberative Democracy and "Valuing Compromise "
“Introduction to Deliberative Democracy,” Introduction To Our
Book,” “Questions,” and “Valuing Compromise”
Copyright © 2019 Bruce W.
Hauptli
This supplement was rewritten after the class—we
did mention most of the below as I tried to weave these points into a fulsome
discussion of the current political situation (nationally and in Maine), the
difficulties in compromising in this context, and the importance of “political
action and activism.”
Our authors begin their First Chapter (p. 25) by noting
that Americans are ambivalent about compromise—many say they want leaders who
compromise, but they also praise those who “stick to their positions or
principles.” Moreover (p. 26 and
quoting the Pew Research Center), “on most issues…openness to compromise is
inversely linked to the importance people place on the issue.”
Of course
opposition to compromise fades in the face of a genuine crisis (which is why the
2011 Debt Ceiling Compromise of 2011 was successful—note, also that the topic
had not been something either side had
campaigned on! Moreover we seem to
prefer that our politicians be the ones to devise the compromises which we often
need, but do not want to negotiate (or approve of):
29 nothing is more common in political negotiation than praise
for the idea of compromise coupled
with resistance to [actions needed to] realize it.”
If compromise is going to be more than an “attractive idea
in principle,” we need to understand how citizens and their representatives can
come to value it as they address particular situations.
In this Chapter they will help us understand why “valuing compromise” is
important. They will advance this in
three sections: (A) The Cost of Not Compromising, (B) The Vulnerabilities of
Compromise, and (C) The Limit of Compromise.
A. The Costs of Not Compromise
30 First…the greater the resistance to compromise, the greater the bias in favor
of the status quo.
The status quo
offers no assurance even of stability, let alone of progress by anyone’s
standards.
32 A general resistance to compromise implausibly presumes
that the status quo is always more defensible than a compromise, or that it is
always a mistake to yield something to one’s political adversaries even when
they are willing to yield something to you.
A strong psychological resistance to compromise flows from the
fact that the costs of not compromising are never equal for everyone in
democratic politics. The costs
depend on the difference between what credibly can be achieved by compromise and
what the status quo offers without compromise.
33 Another source of general opposition to compromise is the
perpetual hope that there is more to be gained (or less to be lost) in the
future by not compromising now.
34 Second …resistance to compromise undermines practices of
mutual respect that are essential for a robust democratic process.
Mutual respect expresses a constructive attitude toward, and willingness
to engage in good faith with one’s political opponents.
It is based on a principle of reciprocity, which is at the core of many
different conceptions of democracy.
So two values of compromising are that it enables mutually
beneficial improvements over the status quo, and that it promotes mutually
respectful politics.
B. Vulnerabilities of Compromise:
35 …even if people recognize the costs of not compromising,
they will find that all compromises by their nature are perpetually vulnerable
to criticisms from all sides.
36 There seems to be a
sense of surrender in compromises which arises from a concern that the other
side got the better deal which arises from the fact that their motives are
opaque to us.
37 There is, also, a
sense of confusion in compromises arising from the fact that they do not
flow naturally from one’s principles!
38 Of course this need not be the case, sometimes there can be
an “overlapping consensus” where
individuals with divergent moral views can agree on legislation for differing
reasons. Our authors mention
2008 housing legislation
and 2011 farm subsidy
legislation where liberals (who wanted to help financially-troubled
bowers and ending some over-farming) and conservatives (who wanted to stabilize
the housing market and cut back on some government intrusions into the free
market). Here there can even be”
consensus without compromise” as there may be no departure from principles (p.
39).
40-41 Brief discussion of three “compromises:”
Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Affordable Care Act of 2010,
and The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (welfare reform—all
compromises which significantly improved the previously existing situation.
C. The Limits of
Compromise:
41 The limits to compromise apply to its
domain, process, and
content:
41-42 The uncompromising mindset should not dominate governing, but it is
well-suited to the domain of
campaigning, social movements, political protests, demonstrations, and activist
activities.
Moreover, “with the uncompromising at their flanks, compromisers gain bargaining
power.”
42-43 Amongst the most uncompromising recent activists are the
Tea Party activists. I would add, on
the other end of the spectrum to avowed socialists!
44 The evolution of the Tea Party activists showed that the
uncompromising mindset has limits also: “the limits became apparent as the
representatives sent to Congress faced a dilemma—a choice between legislating or
protesting.
45 The choice to protest rather than legislate doesn’t bring
about legislative change, and the status quo is generally not acceptable to such
activists, and this frustrates the very base which elected these legislators.
So while the uncompromising mindset can limit the domain where
compromise is possible, if it is pushed too far I can decrease the domain of the
uncompromising mindset.
46 Secondly, the
process of compromising imposes a limit upon compromise.
If the compromises are pursued without
minimal
mutual respect (or
via
manipulation) people may not be prone
to accept the compromises.
48 Finally, the content
of compromises provide another limitation (48-49 and
Senator Nelson of Nebraska
with a $100 M of extra Medicaid funding for a vote on Obama Care—too
unfair even for Nelson!
49 Legislative compromises have many moving parts and this
itself poses limits to the compromises.
49-51 Moreover, one can’t effect a legislative compromise if
one is unwilling to modify initial principled stances:
Dan Rostenkowski in the
House on Tax Reform and the Senate lowering the top rate to 27%, he closes
loopholes and is able to settle ultimately for 28%; Bob Casey, Democratic
Senator and not wanting to let government funds pay for any abortions, and a
ultimate vote for insurers in government plans to pay for abortions with private
funds collected.
52-53 In the compromising process legislators will not be
prone to indicate their negotiating parameters, and this means each side must
work with estimates of where compromise might be possible.
Given the fact that the negotiations themselves change some of the
circumstances, this means flexibility is necessary.
D. Limits of History:
54-57 History can be suggestive, but it is not a great
guide to compromise. In our
Constitutional history
there are several important compromises and our authors discuss “the
equal representation of
states” and “the
three-fifths representation of slaves.”
The first case led to the different representational models in the House
and Senate. The second a compromise
between slaves should count at all for representation in the House and for
purposes of distributing taxes and the view that they should count equally.
Brief mention of the
compromise of 1877 which
effectively ended Reconstruction (by the removal of Federal troops from the
South) which garnered the support of Southern Democrats for Republican
Rutherford B. Hayes’ winning the Presidency in 1876.
58 Just as we should not use the morality of widely accepted compromises of
the past to reassure us about compromises we might make now, so we should not
invoke the ignoble compromises of the past to move us to resist compromises we
need to make now.
Nevertheless, historical examples can suggest some important
lessons about the process of compromising….Assume what almost all historians
agree on: at least some (even if no all) parts of the constitutional compromises
were necessary to improve upon the status quo and preserve the union.
Set aside any more definitive judgments about the content of the
particular compromises in order to ask: what conditions encouraged delegates to
make these compromises?
59-61 Lessons to be learned from the Constitutional
Convention:
The “conciliatory habits of mind that most of the delegates possessed made compromises possible.
That temper of mind could be maintained because the
proceedings were not in public.
Larger (or more significant) compromises were facilitated by
many smaller procedural ones. For
example, on the second day it was agreed to mutual respect and to listening to
one-another.
During ratification by the States no amendments were
allowed.
Next: “Resisting Compromise.”
Return to Hauptli's MSC Spring 2019 Course Website
Last revised on 03/29/19.