PHI 3300 Epistemology
Dr. Hauptli Fall 2013
Second Paper Topics
Copyright
© 2013 Bruce W. Hauptli
You are to
critically respond to one of the following topics.
Such a critical examination should: (1) indicate the nature of the
position being examined; (2) clarify the argument for and/or against the
position; (3) examine the strength of the argument by considering possible
responses, counter-arguments, or counter-examples; and (4) offer your own
critical assessment of where the arguments for and against the position being
considered leave us—should we accept, reject, or remain neutral regarding this
orientation, view, or position?
As the first paper
assignment indicated, one of my purposes in requiring you to write these papers
is to offer you the opportunity to perfect your ability to describe carefully a
complex position and argument to others.
Another of my purposes is to provide you with the opportunity to push
beyond the level of reading and mastering the required material for the course.
Here my goal is to provide you with an opportunity to engage in critical
reflection upon the readings (or upon related readings and issues), and to
provide you with feed-back on your critical scrutinies.
One of my vehicles
for accomplishing these goals is to require that you write more than one paper.
While your second paper will be on a topic differing from your first one,
many of the comments I made on your first paper could be helpful to you in
perfecting your compositional, expository, and critical skills.
These comments will only be useful if you give them some serious scrutiny
however. I strongly encourage you
to look over both the typed comments and the marginal comments throughout your
first paper. Few students have such
an exceptional ability that they can not benefit from such an examination, and
to encourage you to take the comments seriously, I want you to know that before
I read your second paper I will be reviewing my file with these comments on your
first paper. I expect that your
editing of your drafts of your next paper will be done in light of these
comments. You should seriously
endeavor to avoid any of the sorts of compositional errors I have identified,
and to the extent that it is called for, I also encourage you to work to make
your next exposition and critique yet clearer and more forceful.
Further information including the due date follows the topics.
Topics:
1. Critically consider Alvin Goldman’s criticism of
internalism in his “BonJour’s The
Structure of Empirical Knowledge” (in
The Current State of the Coherence Theory, ed. J. Bender, which is on
reserve in the Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk).
Consider how BonJour’s criticisms of externalism might be undercut by
some of the things Goldman says and indicate, finally, whether you believe
externalism is a viable epistemological position.
2. In his “BonJour’s Coherence Theory of Justification”
Marshall Swain takes BonJour to task for his overly strong accessibility
requirement and, more interestingly, maintains that we need to distinguish
various distinct components of our belief system: the cognitively spontaneous,
the straightforwardly inferential (straightforwardly based upon the cognitively
spontaneous beliefs), the theoretical, and the religious.
Different justificatory desiderata may be appropriate for these different
types of beliefs! Critically
consider Swain’s criticisms of BonJour’s theory.
Swain’s essay is in The Current
State of the Coherence Theory, ed. J. Bender, which is on reserve in the
Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk).
3. Critically consider Alan Goldman’s criticisms of
BonJour’s theory as offered in his “BonJour’s Coherentism” (in
The Current State of the Coherence Theory,
ed. J. Bender, which is on reserve in the Green Library (request it at the
Circulation Desk).
4. Critically consider James Bogen’s criticism of BonJour’s
theory as offered in his “Coherentist Theories of Knowledge Don’t Apply to
Enough Outside of Science and Don’t Give the Right Results When Applied to
Science” (in The Current State of the
Coherence Theory, ed. J. Bender—on reserve in Green Library—go to
Circulation the Desk).
NOTE: BonJour
offers replies to some of the criticisms discussed in topics 1-4 in his “Replies
and Clarifications” (in The Current State
of the Coherence Theory, ed. J. Bender, which is on reserve in the Green
Library (request it at the Circulation Desk).
5. Critically consider Mark Pastin’s “Modest
Foundationalism and Self-Warrant” (in
Essays on Knowledge and Justification, eds. G. Pappas and M. Swain, which is
on reserve in the Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk) and
indicate whether Pastin’s line of argument allows foundationalists to escape the
criticisms which BonJour offers.
6. Critically consider Gilbert Harman’s line of argument in
the selections from his book Thought
(which are reproduced in Essays on
Knowledge and Justification, eds. G. Pappas and M. Swain, which is on
reserve in the Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk).
Does he offer a theory which is either a pure foundationalist or a pure
coherentist theory? Does it avoid
some of the criticisms BonJour offers of foundational theories?
7. Critically consider James Cornman’s “Foundational
versus Nonfoundational Theories of
Empirical Justification (in Essays on
Knowledge and Justification, eds. G. Pappas and M. Swain, which is on
reserve in the Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk).
Does his theory offer either a pure foundationalist or a pure coherentist
theory? Is it a viable orientation?
Does it avoid some of the criticisms BonJour offers against foundational
theories?
8. On pp. 24-25 of his
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,
BonJour offers a short version of the standard criticisms of coherence theories
of epistemological justification.
How well does he avoid these sorts of criticism as he develops his coherence
theory in Part II? Is the coherence
theory he develops a viable epistemological theory?
Please note that since this topic covers three objections, and a
significant portion of his theory, it is not one which can be handled well by a
simple gloss of the three problems and his general response for each.
This requires extensive exposition of both his theory and the objections,
as well as careful critical consideration of the adequacy of his responses to
each objection. Individuals may
want to consider writing on his response to only one (or two of these standard
objections).
9. Critically consider the claim that BonJour’s
“Observation Requirement” amounts to an adoption of externalism or
foundationalism, and, thus, his coherentism is inconsistent.
I discuss several such critiques in the lecture supplement to this
portion of the text.
10. Critically consider the claim that maintains that
BonJour’s demand for a “Meta-Justificatory Argument” reintroduces the regress
problem.
11. Critically consider the adequacy of BonJour’s
characterization of “coherence,” his “Doxastic Presumption,” his “coherentistic
conception of observation beliefs,” his “observation requirement,” or his
“Metajustificatory argument” [do not try to write on
all of these topics—you would be able
to give only a surface level treatment if you take all this on!].
12. In his
Pyrrhonian Reflections On Knowledge and Justification, Robert Fogelin
criticizes BonJour’s claim that part of one’s epistemic duty is to reflect
critically upon one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing
things to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic
access.[1]
Fogelin also claims that it is dubious that any human belief systems meet
BonJour’s criteria for coherence (pp. 149-151) that BonJour doesn’t meet one
form of the skeptical challenge (p.153), and he questions BonJour’s “Doxastic
Presumption” (pp. 153-154), which is on reserve in the Green Library (request it
at the Circulation Desk).
13. In his
Contemporary Epistemology, Ralph Baergen maintains that BonJour’s
requirement that coherence be such over the “long-run” is inadequate:
consider a system of beliefs that
remains stable and coherent over a very long time and that meets the observation
requirement by having nothing more than a visual impression of a flashing light.
This would meet all of BonJour’s requirements for justification...but
surely prolonged stability and coherence are interesting only if the input with
which it must cope is considerably more interesting than this....[2]
On the same page, Baergen wonders, “is he right in his
assumption that coherence is fragile and would be upset by input from the world
that did not fit with existing beliefs....an inaccurate system might turn out to
be stable....”
14. Critically consider Alvin Goldman’s causal theory of
knowledge. In addressing his
orientation, consider the criticisms offered by BonJour and consider how Goldman
might reply to these criticisms of his view.
Goldman’s “BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (in
The Current State of the Coherence Theory, ed. J. Bender, which is on
reserve in the Green Library (request it at the Circulation Desk) and “The
Internalist Conception of Justification” (in
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed. P.
French) may both be helpful in developing Goldman’s responses to these
criticisms. Consider how BonJour’s
criticisms of externalism might be undercut by some of the things Goldman says
and indicate, finally, whether you believe externalism is a viable
epistemological position.
15. You may write
a paper on any of the first paper topics which you did not write your first
paper on. For your convenience,
these topics are available on the course
web-site.
If you wish to write on another topic, you must clear the choice with me first.
Your papers should
be approximately 2000 words long (eight double-spaced typewritten pages of 250
words per page). This indication of
length is meant as a guide to the student—papers much shorter than the indicated
length are unlikely to have adequately addressed one of the assigned topics.
Papers may, of course, be longer than the indicated length.
I will be happy to read rough drafts and to discuss your ideas for your
papers with you provided you give them prior to 3:30 on
Wednesday, November 27.
The papers should be typed and are due by 4:15 P.M. on
Monday, December 2.
I am giving you the paper topics now so that you have at least two
weekends to work on the paper. If
you plan to wait till the last moment to write your paper, I recommend you
review the Course Syllabus regarding penalties for late papers.
Please review my policy on extensions, late papers, and plagiarism
(contained in the course syllabus).
Please also review my supplement
Guide to
Writing Philosophy Papers which is available on the class web-site.
[1]
Cf.,
Robert Fogelin,
Pyrrhonistic Reflections On Knowledge and
Justification (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1994), pp.
45-46.
[2] Ralph
Baergen,
Contemporary Epistemology (Fort Worth:
Harcourt, 1995), p. 80.
File revised on 11/19/2013.