Lecture Supplement
on Blaise Pascal’s Pensées
[posthumous, 1670]
Copyright
© 2014 Bruce W. Hauptli
1. Introduction:
Thus far we have
been discussing a “continental rationalist” [Descartes].
We will now examine the irrationalists’, or
fideistic, orientation.
Here the appeal to a deity is much different from that which we find in
Descartes (or any other rationalist)!
Since Aquinas, most religiously-minded thinkers believed that the truths
of reason and the truths of religion could not be contrary to one another.[1]
This belief itself (eventually) helped to bring on the Renaissance (it
encouraged individuals to engage in “purely rational” sorts of endeavors).
The rationalists like Descartes pursued a sort of intellectual
perception—they sought truths of reason.
That is, they looked for knowable “necessary truths” which would provide
an indisputable account of, and explanation for, the world.
Blaise Pascal [1623-1662] did not have this “faith in reason.”
Pascal was an accomplished mathematician (he published his
Essai sur les coniques [“Essay on
Conic Sections”] at the age of 17 in 1640), and he invented an adding machine to
assist his father in the assessment of taxes (while his father held a government
post in Rouen). He was also an
accomplished scientist who wrote in detail on the character of the scientific
method. In the preface to his
Tratié du vide [“Treatise on the
Vacuum”—1647] he discusses the new science, and offers a discussion of the
nature of scientific progress. He
claimed that in the study of nature respect for authority should not take
precedence over reasoning or experience.
He summarized a variety of experiments with variously shaped and sized
tubes, and set forth basic laws in regard to atmospheric pressure.
Pascal reasoned as to why there was a vacuum above the column of mercury;
and replying to Father Noel (who claimed that there really was a substance there
since nature abhors a vacuum), Pascal responded that a hypothesis which accorded
with the facts was probable but that one which issued in false predictions was
false (and he argued that there were false consequences in the Aristotelian
hypothesis which Noel employed).
On November 23, 1654 Pascal underwent a profound religious
experience, and he then devoted the rest of his life to religious activities.
A fragment in his Pensées
entitled “Memorial” records his “mystical” experience.[2]
Pascal wrote this fragment on a piece of paper and had it sewn into the
lining of his jacket. Reading it
provides one with an excellent introduction to Pascal’s later thought.
It is also to be noted that a year and a half later, on March 24, 1656,
Pascal’s niece, Marguerite Perier, was “miraculously cured” of an ulcerous
lesion (it was declared such by diocesan authorities on October 22, 1656) after
her eye was touched with what was thought to be a sacred relic (supposedly a
thorn from the crown of Jesus).[3]
This miracle had a profound impression upon Pascal who was at the time
writing his
Lettres provinciales which defended the Jansenist position against
its critics (a Papal Bull condemning five Jansenist propositions had been signed
in Rome on May 31, 1653, and Antoine Arnaud [1612-1694] was stripped of his
doctorate by the Theology Faculty of the Sorbonne on January 29, 1656 for his
defense of Jansenism). Jansenism
was named after Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres [1585-1638].
It was a puritanical version of Catholicism (which Jansenius
claimed to have formulated from the writings of
Pascal’s Pensées was compiled
after his death and published posthumously in 1670.
Pascal had not prepared the work for publication, and may indeed have
given up on his plan to publish a work based upon the collection of notes (or
fragments) which he had compiled.
As Anthony Levi notes:
the
Pensées, a pile of papers concerning
religion, were originally written on mostly large sheets of paper, some of which
were subsequently cut into individual passages, of which again only some were
divided into twenty-seven bundles or
laisse, 414 in all, or just under half of the total were then attached
together by thread running through holes pierced in the top left corner and
knotted after the title had been given to the group.[4]
According to Pascal,
the truths of the Christian faith (reached by revelation) solve the
problems which arise out of the “human situation.”
He contends that “skeptical doubts” are appropriate, and he maintains
that we may overcome the skeptical allure only by recognizing that “first
principles” must come to us through revelation.
In contrast to Descartes, then, Pascal believed
that human reason was wholly unable to
establish “first principles.”[5]
Indeed, though this seems hard to believe, Pascal held that Descartes was
too preoccupied with the material
world, and too little concerned with the deity!
As Frederick Copleston notes:
in a society
impregnated by deistic humanism and by rationalist scepticism and free thought
[Pascal] considered that it was above all the ideas of human corruption and of
the necessity and power of divine grace which should be emphasized and that the
highest Christian ideals should be maintained in their purity without any
compromise or attempt to accommodate them to human weakness.[6]
In his
“Introduction” to a translation of Pascal’s
Pensées, T.S. Eliot maintains that:
to understand the
method which Pascal employs, the reader must be prepared to follow the process
of the mind of the intelligent believer.
The Christian thinker—and I mean the man who is trying consciously and
conscientiously to explain to himself the sequence which culminated in faith,
rather than the public apologist—proceeds by rejection and elimination.
He finds the world to be so and so; he finds its character inexplicable
by any non-religious theory; among the religions he finds Christianity, and
Catholic Christianity, to account most satisfactorily for the world and
especially for the moral world within; and thus, by what Newman calls “powerful
and concurrent” reasons, he finds himself inexorably committed to the dogma of
the Incarnation.[7]
Pascal does not wish to do away with mathematics or with natural science
however. Instead, as Copleston
notes, he merely maintains that:
...reason alone is
unable to establish the science of man.
For without the light of the Christian religion man is
incomprehensible to himself.
Reason has its own sphere, mathematics and the natural sciences or natural
philosophy; but the truths which it is really important for man to know, his
nature and his supernatural destiny, these cannot be discovered by the
philosopher or the scientist. ‘I
had passed a long time in the study of the abstract sciences; and the scant
communication which one can have in them (that is, the comparative fewness of
the people with whom one shares these studies and with whom one can
‘communicate’) had disgusted me.
When I began the study of man, I saw that these abstract sciences are not proper
to man....’[8]
According to Pascal,
philosophy fosters skepticism and we may find happiness only
via the intuitive truths provided by
Christian religion:
...Christian
religion...properly consists in the mystery of the Redeemer, who, uniting in
himself the two natures, human and divine, saved men from corruption and sin in
order to reconcile them with God in his divine person.
So it teaches men both these
truths: that there is a God of whom we are capable, and that there is a
corruption in nature which makes us unworthy of him.
It is equally dangerous for man to know God without knowing his own
wretchedness, and to know his wickedness without knowing the Redeemer who can
cure him of it. Knowledge of only
one of these points leads either to the arrogance of the philosophers, who have
known God and not their wretchedness, or to the despair of the atheists, who
know their wretchedness without knowing the redeemer.[9]
Pascal could not
settle for a deity who necessarily existed and simply started things going and
preserved order. Thus he contrasted
“the personalistic deity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” with the “deity of the
philosophers and scholars.”[10]
The latter was not known a priori
but by the heart (intuition,
revelation, and feeling).
Pascal’s famous “wager argument” is not intended as a substitute for
proofs of Christianity but, rather, as a
preparation for faith for those who are in a state of suspended belief—those
who were neither atheists nor Christians.
As Anthony Levi makes clear in his “Introduction,” Pascal had planned to
write a “Christian Apology.”[11]
Levi contends, however, that:
it now seems clear
that the project to write an apologetic was not abandoned for reasons of health,
as is still often assumed, and even that, on Pascal’s own premisses, the
intended apologetic could have served no purpose, but we have no clear
indication from his pen of why he gave up.[12]
Levi maintains that,
for Pascal, an apologetic argument is pointless given that:
Pascal believed that
without Christian belief and practice the individual’s fate was certainly
eternal damnation, but, if salvation was God’s gratuitous gift[13]
to a minority of chosen souls, how could any moral act, and in particular any
freely chosen commitment of belief or behavior, affect the individual’s eternal
destiny? The alternatives were only
hell or heaven, the never-ending and never-altering experience of either ecstasy
or torment.[14]
Given this “human
condition,” a “defense” becomes rather pointless—the majority of people are
damned anyway, and one’s virtuous acts provide no guarantee, or even positive
prospect, of salvation. While an
“apologetic” may not be called for, however, the
Pensées would still have an important
role to play in motivating us to focus our attention upon the “infinite
concerns” which are central to our being and our good.
Voltaire offers a philosophical and literary critique of Pascal’s
orientation which equals (or exceeds) Pascal’s literary accomplishments.
In his “Voltaire,” Norman Torrey maintains that:
Montaigne, in the
turmoil of civil and religious wars, had sought refuge in meditative cultivation
of individual man through self-knowledge.
Pascal, however, found value in the sufferings of man’s terrestrial
existence as a painful preparation for the glories of the life to come.
Voltaire wished to present a program of social action for the betterment
of man’s lot on earth, and in the 25th philosophical letter [of his
Lettres philosophiques
(1734)] he attacked Pascal as the giant across this path.
(The attack also served as a sop to the official censors of the Jesuit
order, to which Pascal had been far from kind.)
Pascal, who was virtually obsessed with the misery of the human
condition, believes that the doctrine of original sin was psychologically the
most satisfactory interpretation of human nature that had ever been devised.
He explained human existence in terms of divine purpose through the
theological doctrines of the Fall and the redemption, predestination, and grace.
In Voltaire’s mind it was false and dangerous to reduce religion to
metaphysics; he argued that Pascal was not a true philosopher, that he had
neither an enlightened mind nor a humanitarian heart, and that his views
encouraged fanaticism.
“Inconceivable” man could be rendered no more conceivable through inconceivable
doctrines. Such doctrines can be
accepted only as revealed truths, not as reasoned truths.
Voltaire’s whole career was a devoted effort to emancipate man and
reconcile him to his fate:
I dare take the side
of humanity against this sublime misanthropist [Pascal] and affirm that we are
neither so wicked nor so unhappy as he thinks....Why try to make us disgusted
with life?....To look upon the universe as a prison cell and all men as
criminals about to be executed is a fanatic’s idea.
To believe that the world is a land of bliss...is the dream of a
Sybarite.[15]
To think that earth, man, and animals are what they are created to be, is
the opinion of a sage.[16]
In his “The Hidden Lesson
of Montaigne,” Mark Lilla maintains that:
by telling the story of one man, Augustine showed that no one is sufficient; to
truly become ourselves we must, paradoxically, surrender ourselves.[17]
For fifteen hundred years, Christian civilization had been built on the
assumption that we can and must become other than we are.
The “Essays” propose the most sweeping revaluation of Western values
since the Confessions, and succeeded
because they meet Augustine on his own psychological terrain.
In essay after essay Montaigne uses Christian interiority against itself,
entrancing us with what he finds within and getting us to laugh at our pretense
of self-mastery.[18]
Pascal, Montaigne’s greatest reader and most formidable critic, took the full
measure of his challenge to Christianity, and the
Pensées are largely a maniac attempt
to refute him. The Church had early
on devised ways to cope with Greek philosophy, first by rejecting it and later
by domesticating it. But how in the
world could it respond to this shameless, slippery defender of
amour sui?
Montaigne was different from his Renaissance predecessors, the
philosophers who placed humans at the center of the cosmos, or the artists whose
figures, all bulging muscles and twisting torsos, had a Promethean air.
He actually agreed with Augustine, and Pascal, that Prometheanism was
the human problem.
But his chosen adversaries were the popes and Protestant divines who
pretended to speak for God, and the scholastic theologians who pretended that
their syllogisms could unlock metaphysical truths about Him and His creation.
These people were the source of our troubles, Montaigne thought, and
especially of the religious wars, then tearing France apart.
The antidote to their fanaticism lay not in loathing and surrender of the
self, or in humanistic self-perfection.
It lay in reconciliation with the imperfect selves we already are.
No one before Montaigne had dared to say that.[19]
With these thoughts
in mind, let’s turn to the readings.
2. Reading
Assignment from Pascal’s Pensées:[20]
[posthumous, 1670]
Fragments |
Pages in Levi translation |
Concordance Fragments |
141-164 |
35-43 |
109-131 |
181 |
51-52 |
148 |
199-225 |
60-64 |
168-192 |
230-240 |
66-75 |
199-208 |
680-682 |
152-166 |
559-561 |
688-690 |
168-173 |
567-569 |
“The Memorial” |
178 |
DNA |
There are two significantly divergent scholarly versions Pensées [C1 and C2] and I concur with the analysis of Levi in his "Notes on the Text" (pp. xxxviii-xxxix), and have selected his translation and organization of C2 version. The two versions differ significantly in the ordering and numbering of the textual materials. If students choose another edition, they may find it very difficult to follow along if their text is based upon C1! The "concordance fragments" above are the correlate fragments in C1 for the C2 fragments. There are English translations which follow neither of the two versions, and a fast way to check if you are using C1 or C2 (or some other version) is to turn to fragment 141 and see if it matches up with the discussion which follows immediately (or turn to 109 and see if it does).
3. Reason, First
Principles, and the Heart:
141 Pascal contends
that the effort to “define” basic notions renders them “more obscure.”
While we assume others accept the same basic notions which we do, this
assumption is not sustainable.
Pyrrhonists (skeptics) delight in the philosophers’ problems here—Pyrrho of Elis
[~360-275 B.C.E.] is the classical skeptic referred to here.
142 “We know the
truth not only by means of the reason but also by means of the heart.
It is through the heart that we know the first principles, and reason
which has no part in this knowledge vainly tries to contest them.
The Pyrrhonists who have only reason as the object of their attack are
working ineffectually. We know
that we are not dreaming, however powerless we are to prove it by reason.
This powerlessness proves only the weakness of our reason, not the
uncertainty of our entire knowledge as they claim.”
-Note that he is
clearly referring to Descartes here!
-“The principles are
felt, and the propositions are proved, both conclusively, although by different
ways, and it is as useless and stupid for the heart to demand of reason a
feeling of all the propositions it proves, before accepting them.
So this powerlessness ought to be
used only to humble reason....”
-“That is why those
to whom God has granted faith through the heart are blessed and quite properly
convinced of it. But to those to
whom it has not been granted we can only give it through reason, until God
grants it through the heart.
Without that, faith is simply human, and worthless for salvation.”
--Thus, Pascal
maintains that there are two “ways” to the truth—reason and the heart.
He holds, however, that these are not equivalent (unlike Aquinas).
4. Human
Wretchedness and Greatness:
146 “Man’s greatness
lies in his capacity to recognize his wretchedness.
A tree does not recognize its
wretchedness.”
-What sort of
wretchedness does he have in mind here?
What is the cause of our wretchedness, is it one which affects us
all? Are we all (sufficiently)
aware of it? Why does he contend
that we need to be aware of it?
-149 “...[man’s]
nature now being like that of the animals, he has fallen from a better nature
which previously was his.
For who can be wretched at not
being a king except a dethroned king?”
--It is the
wretchedness we inherit from Adam and Eve which he speaks of here!
What was their sin, how does it apply to the age in which Pascal wrote,
and how does it apply in our own?
-155 Pascal
maintains that we are both wretched and great, and that we know
that we are both.
-164 “The main
strengths of the Pyrrhonists...are that we can be in no way sure of the truths
of these principles, apart from faith and revelation, except that we feel them
to be natural to us.”
-“I shall pause at
the single strength of the dogmatists’ argument, which is that, speaking in good
faith and in all sincerity, we cannot doubt natural principles.”
5. The Human
Condition:
164 (continues)
“What a figment of the imagination human beings are!
What a novelty, what monsters!
Chaotic, contradictory, prodigious, judging everything, mindless worm of
the earth, storehouse of truth, cesspool of uncertainty and error, glory and
reject of the universe.
Who will unravel this tangle?
<It is certainly beyond dogmatism and Pyrrhonism and the whole of human
philosophy. Man is beyond man.
Let us allow the Pyrrhonists what they have so often claimed, that truth
is neither within our grasp nor is it our target.
It does not reside on earth but belongs in heaven, in God’s bosom, and we
know it only as much as he is pleased to reveal.
Let us then learn our true nature from the uncreated and incarnate truth.
You cannot be a Pyrrhonist without
stifling nature, nor a dogmatist without repudiating reason.>
Nature confounds Pyrrhonists and reason confounds dogmatists.
What will then become of you, men who are looking for your true condition
through your natural reason? You
cannot avoid one of these sects nor survive in either.
Be aware then, proud man, what a
paradox you are to yourselves!
Humble yourself, powerless reason!
Be silent, foolish nature! Learn
that humanity infinitely transcends humanity and hear from your Master your true
condition of which you are unaware.
Listen to God.”[21]
-This passage needs
careful consideration. Note first
that we need to understand what Pascal is attempting to tell his reader.
Clearly, he wants the reader to be neither a skeptic nor a dogmatist.
What is the alternative?
Does human faith on its own guarantee salvation for him?
Note fragment 142 above: “that is why those to whom God has granted faith
through the heart are blessed and quite properly convinced of it.
But to those to whom it has not been granted we can only give it
through reason, until God grants it through the heart.
Without that, faith is simply human, and worthless for salvation.”
Clearly, Pascal contends that our salvation is not within our control.
-It is our “fallen”
status which constitutes our plight!
“Because there can be no doubt that nothing shocks our reason more than
to say that the sin of the first man made guilty those who, so far from that
source, seem incapable of having taken part in it.
This contamination seems not only impossible to us, but also quite
unjust....Nevertheless without this most incomprehensible of all mysteries we
are incomprehensible to ourselves.
Within this gnarled chasm lie the twists and turns of our condition.
So, humanity is more inconceivable without this mystery than this mystery
is conceivable to humanity.”
-“These basic
truths, solidly based on the inviolable authority of religion, tell us that
there are two equally and constant truths of faith: one is that man in the
state of creation or of grace is on a level above all nature, as if godlike
and participating in the divinity.
The other is that, corrupt and sinful, he has fallen from this state and
been put on the level of the beasts.”
-As the final
sentence of the fragment makes clear, grace is of fundamental importance
for Pascal. What is it, and is it
within our control? Is it something
everyone has? In his The Art of
Persuasion, Pascal contends that he knows that God wanted the divine truths
“...to enter from the heart into the mind, and not from the mind into the heart,
in order to humiliate that proud power of reasoning which claims it ought to be
the judge of what is chosen by the will....”[22]
181 “That man
without faith can know neither true good, nor justice.”
-“Man tries
unsuccessfully to fill this void with everything that surrounds him, seeking in
absent things the help he cannot find in those that are present, but all are
incapable of it. This infinite
abyss can be filled only with an infinite, immutable object, that is to say, God
himself.”
6. On Submission:
199 In this section
of fragments, Pascal speaks of the importance of submission:
-201 "We must <have
three qualities, Pyrrhonist, mathematician, Christian.
Submission. Doubt. They all
interlink.> know where to doubt, where to affirm and where to submit when
necessary. Whoever does not do this
does not understand the force of reason.”
--Does Descartes
adhere to this dictum?
-203 “The way of
God...is to implant religion into our mind through reason and into our heart
through grace. But to want to
implant it into our mind and hear with force and threats is to implant not
religion, but terror....”
-208 “Contradiction
is not an indication of falsehood and the absence of contradiction is not a sign
of truth.”
--Notice that
anyone who accepts this (at least the first clause) can not be a “continental
rationalist,” and, indeed, is surely close from deviating from the core views of
Western philosophy as I have sketched them!
---Explain carefully
why the Western philosophical tradition abhors contradiction: “what is real is
rational, and what is rational is real;” and a derivation of
anything from a contradiction!
7. The Importance of
Christianity:
221 “We only know
God through Jesus Christ....All those who claimed to know God and to prove him
without Jesus Christ only had impotent proofs.”
Note that this means that he clearly rejects the two other “religions of
Abraham” (Judaism and Islam). A
reading of the passages indexed under “Jews” and “Muhammad” makes this clear
(especially when contrasted with those passages indexed under “Jesus Christ”).
-221-225 According
to Pascal, it is the sin of pride to think that one can know God
otherwise. Knowing our wretchedness
without knowing God, on the other hand, leads to despair.
230-240 One of the
things which Pascal wants to show his readers is that they focus on the wrong
sorts of things—they attach extreme importance to the finite world which they
only temporarily inhabit, and they ignore, often completely, the infinite world
and concerns. In fragment 230 he
asks “What is man in infinity?” He
also maintains that:
-“...what is
humanity in nature? A nothingness
compared to the infinite, everything compared to a nothingness, a mid-point
between nothing and everything....”
-“Our intelligence
holds the same rank in the order of intelligible things as does our body in the
whole vastness of nature. Limited
in every respect, this state in the mid-point...is apparent in all our
faculties.”
-“So let us not look
for certainty and stability. Our
reason is always disappointed by the inconstant nature of appearances; noting
can fix the finite between the two infinites which both enclose and escape it.”
-Other religions,
Pascal holds, are false; and without true religion, we are lost.
-240 In this section
Pascal points out the twin evils of pride and sloth.
As the footnote (on pp. 235-236) indicates, sloth [paresse] is
“...the vice which results in unconcern about the state of original sin in which
we are born, which makes it one of the sources of vice.”
According to Pascal, “the Christian religion alone has been able to cure
these two vices....it teaches the just, whom it exalts even to participation in
the divinity, that in this sublime state they still carry the source of all
corruption...and it cries out to the most ungodly that they are capable of
receiving their Redeemer’s grace.
Making those that it justifies tremble, and consoling those that it condemns, it
tempers fear with hope so judiciously through this double potentiality for grace
and sin, common to all, that it abases infinitely more than reason can do, but
without despair, and raises up infinitely more than natural pride, but without
excess, making it thereby obvious that, alone free form error and vice, the
right to teach and correct men belongs only to the Christian religion.”
8. The Wager
Argument:[23]
680 “We know that
there is an infinite, but do not know its nature....”
“So we can clearly
understand that there is a God without knowing what he is.”
“We therefore know
the existence and nature of the finite, because we too are finite and have no
extension.
We know the existence of the
infinite, and do not know its nature, because it has extent like us, but not the
same limits as us.
But we know neither the existence
nor the nature of God, because he has neither extent nor limits.
------------------------------
But we know of his existence through faith.
In glory we will know his nature.”
“Let us now speak
according to natural lights.”
“...God is, or is
not. But towards which side will we
lean? Reason cannot decide
anything. There is an infinite
chaos separating us. At the far end
of this infinite distance a game is being played and the coin will come down
hears or tails. How will you wager?
Reason cannot make you choose one way or the other, reason cannot make
you defend either of the two choices.
So do not accuse those who have
made a choice of being wrong....
Yes, but you have to wager.
It is not up to you, you are already committed.
Which then will you choose....You have two things to lose: the truth and
the good, and two things to stake: your reason and will, your knowledge and
beatitude; and your nature has two things to avoid: error and
wretchedness....Let us weigh up the gain and the loss by calling heads that God
exists....if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing....”
|
God exists |
God does not exist |
You Believe |
You may win very, very, very big (if you
receive grace) |
You lose the effort of believing and sacrifice
whatever effort you made.
|
You Don’t Believe |
You loose very, very, very big.
|
You win a little—you save the effort of
believing. |
-“But there is an
eternity of life and happiness. And
that being so, even though there were an infinite number of chances of which
only one were in your favor, you would still be right to wager....there is an
infinitely happy infinity of life to be won, one chance of winning against a
finite number of chances of losing, and what you are staking is finite.”
“‘...I am made in
such a way that I cannot believe.
So what do you want me to do?’
‘That is true. But at least you
realize that your inability to believe, since reason urges you to do so and yet
you cannot, arises from your passions.
You want to find faith and you do not know the way?
You want to cure yourself of unbelief and you ask for remedies?
Learn from those who have been bound like you, and who now wager all
they have. They are people who
know the road....take holy water, having masses said, etc.”
“But what harm will
come to you from taking this course?
You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, doing good, a sincere and
true friend.”
In his
“Introduction,” Jeff Jordan maintains that Pascal’s wager is an “apologetic
device:” “...not an argument for the claim that God exists.
That sort of argument, the appeal to evidence, whether empirical or
conceptual, is the domain of the cosmological, the ontological, or other
theistic arguments. Pascal’s wager
is an argument for the claim that a belief in God is pragmatically rational,
that inculcating a belief in God is the response dictated by prudence.”[24]
-a pragmatic
argument is any argument which has premises which are prudentially directed
rather than truth-directed.[25]
-...a Pascalian
wager is a decision situation in which the possible gain or benefit involved in
one of the outcomes swamps all the others.[26]
-
“It is the heart
that feels God, not reason: that is what faith is.
God felt by the heart, not by reason.
The heart has its reasons which
reason itself does not know....”[27]
681 “The immortality
of the soul is of such vital concern to us, which affects us so deeply, that we
would have to have lost all feeling in order to be indifferent to the truth
about it. All our actions and
thoughts must follow such different paths, according to whether there are
eternal blessings to hope for or not, that it is impossible to take a step
sensibly and discerningly except by determining it with this point in mind,
which ought to be our ultimate aim.”
-He contends that it
is wholly monstrous not to evince such a concern!
It is “a supernatural sloth.”
-688-690 Pascal
offers a further “discourse on corruption,” and emphasizes Christianity’s role
in helping us deal with our corruption and wretchedness.
He emphasizes that the sort of religion he is speaking of here is a
personalistic one (thus it is not the “god of the philosophers” which he is
speaking of): “The God of Christians does not consist of a God who is simply the
author of mathematical truths and the order of the elements: that is the job of
the pagans and Epicureans. He does
not consist simply of a God who exerts his providence over the lives and
property of people in order to grant a happy span of years to those who worship
him: that is the allocation of the Jews.
But the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, the God of
the Christians is a God of love and consolation; he is a God who fills the souls
and hearts of those he possesses; he is a God who makes them inwardly aware of
their wretchedness and his infinite mercy, who unites with them in the depths of
their soul, who makes them incapable of any other end but himself.”
9. “The Memorial:”
p. 178 This passage
is Pascal’s record of his “mystical experience” on November 23, 1654.
It also clarifies the “personalistic”
characterization of the deity he appeals to, and of the need for “total
submission.”
(end of selections)
Appendix: Historical
Background Regarding Catholics and Protestants in France at the Time:
It is helpful to
understand some of the historical background as we look at Pascal’s religious
writing.
1561-1598: Wars of
Religion in
1585-1638: Cornelius
Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres—Jansenism was named after him.
1603: Henri IV of
May 31, 1653: a
Papal Bull condemning five Jansenist propositions signed in
January 29, 1656:
Antoine Arnaud [1612-1694] was stripped of his doctorate by the Theology faculty
of the Sorbonne on for his defense of Jansenism.
In his Cosmopolis,
Stephen Toulmin maintains that:
in the 16th
century, Europe enjoyed a largely unbroken economic expansion, building up its
capital holdings from the silver in the holds of the treasure ships from
As Toulmin notes,
the Thirty Years’ War involved: “...a series of brutal and destructive military
campaigns, [where] shifting alliances of outside powers used the territory of
Germany and Bohemia as a gladiatorial ring in which to fight out their political
rivalries and doctrinal disagreements, most often by proxy, and turned the Czech
and German lands into a charnel house [Cemetery house].[29]
By the 1630s, no one
could see an end to the warfare in Germany, and negotiations for peace
threatened to be as protracted as the fighting itself....Failing any effective
political way of getting the sectarians to stop killing each other, was there no
other possible way ahead?....The eclipse of Montaigne’s philosophical
reputation, and the political consequences of Henri IV’s murder, are linked by a
common thread: the dissatisfaction with skepticism which led people, in turn,
into an unwillingness to suspend the search for provable doctrines, an active
distrust of disbelievers, and finally to belief in belief itself.[30]
1695: Revocation of
the Edict of Nantes—a massive exile of Huguenots from
It is also helpful to have a bit more background regarding Jansenism.
In his “Introduction,” T.S. Eliot maintains that:
it is recognized in
Christian theology...that free-will or the natural effort and ability of the
individual man, and also supernatural grace, a gift accorded we know not
quite how, are both required, in co-operation, for salvation.
Though numerous theologians have set their wits at the problem, it ends
in a mystery which we can perceive but not finally decipher.
At least, it is obvious that, like any doctrine, a slight excess or
deviation to one side or the other will precipitate a heresy.
The Pelagians, who were refuted by
[1] In his
Summa
Contra Gentiles [~1260] (I.7), Aquinas
maintains that: “the natural dictates of reason
must certainly be true; it is impossible to
think of their being otherwise.
Nor again is it permissible to believe
that the tenets of faith are false, being so
evidently confirmed by God.
Since therefore falsehood alone is
contrary to truth, it is impossible for the
truth of faith to be contrary to the principles
known by natural religion.”
[2] Cf.,
the fragment of Pascal’s
Pensées
[1670, posthumously] entitled “The Memorial,” in
Blaise
Pascal,
Pensées
and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levi
(Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1995), p. 178.
Other translations or editions of the
Pensées
will be discussed at some points below, but most
of my remarks will make reference to this
translation and edition, and unless specifically
noted, further references will be to this
translation and edition.
I will sometimes add emphasis to the
passages, but will frequently not provide
notations to such.
There are two significantly divergent
scholarly versions of the Pensées [C1
and C2] and I concur with the
analysis of Levi in his “Notes on the Text” (pp.
xxxviii-xxxix), and have selected his
translation and organization of C2
version.
The two versions differ significantly in
the ordering and numbering of the textual
materials.
If students choose another edition, they
may find it very difficult to follow along if
their text is based upon C1!
In his edition of the Pensées
Roger
Ariew offers a “Concordance” which can be used
to navigate between the differing versions—Cf.,
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. and
trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett,
2005), pp. 313-321.
[3] In his
“Introduction” [1908] to Pascal’s
Pensées,
trans. W.F. Trotter [1908] (N.Y. Dutton, 1958),
pp. vii-xix, cf. p. xiii], T.S. Eliot notes that
while many contemporary religious individuals
base their belief in miracles on biblical
accounts, Pascal was impressed by a
contemporary miracle.
Moreover, his own “luminous experience”
surely helped to make it unnecessary for him to
“base” his belief in miracles on biblical
accounts of them.
[4] Anthony
Levi, “Note on Text,” in
Blaise
Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, trans.
Honor Levi,
op. cit.,
pp. xxxviii-xli, p. xxxviii.
Cf.,
also, his “Introduction,”
ibid.,
pp. vii-xxvii for a discussion of the status of
the work.
[5] Cf.,
Pascal’s
Pensées, trans. Honor Levi,
op. cit.,
fragment 142, pp. 35-36.
[6] Frederick
Copleston,
A History
of Philosophy v. 4 (Garden City: Doubleday,
1963), p. 164.
Note, of course that Pascal would be even
more concerned with our situation today—the
humanism of today is secular, rather than
deistic.
[7] T.S.
Eliot, “Introduction,”
op. cit.,
p. xii.
[8] Frederick
Copleston,
A History
of Western Philosophy, op. cit., pp.
170-171.
The citation to Pascal is to be found in
his
Pensées, Honor Levi (trans.), op.
cit., fragment 566, p. 130—emphasis has been
added to the citation.
[9] Pascal,
Pensées,
op. cit., fragment 690, pp. 170-171.
[10]
Cf.,
Pascal,
Pensées, op. cit., fragment 690, pp.
169--173.
[11] In this
sense an “apology” is a defense—the use comes
from Christian Apologetics.
Funk and
Wagnalls
New Practical Standard Dictionary [the
Britannica World Language edition (N.Y.:
Funk and Wagnalls, 1956), p. 67] defines
‘Apologetics’ as: “argumentation; especially,
that department of dogmatics which deals with
the defensive facts and proofs of Christianity.”
[12] Anthony
Levi, “Introduction,”
op. cit.,
p. ix.
[13] That is,
one which is given unearned and without
recompense—unmerited divine assistance.
[14] Anthony
Levi, “Introduction,”
op. cit.,
p. ix.
[15] A native
of the ancient city of
[16] Norman
Torrey, “Voltaire,” in
The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy v. 8, ed. Paul
Edwards (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 262-270,
p.263.
Cf., Peter Gray,
The
Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism
(N.Y.: Norton, 1966), p. 389.
[17] Mark
Lilla, “The Hidden Lesson of Montaigne,”
The
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Citations and references are to
Blaise
Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings
[posthumous, 1670], trans. Honor Levi,
op. cit.
Marginal references are to this
translation’s fragment numbers.
Note that the asterisks in the text
indicate that a note to the passage is included
in the back of the book in Anthony Levi’s
“Explanatory Notes,” pp. 227-247.
Passages enclosed by “<” and “>” are
passages which were crossed out by Pascal.
I frequently add emphasis to the
passages, but will not further indicate where
this is the case.
[21] In his
translation of the Pensées, W.F. Trotter
[(N.Y.: Dutton, 1958), fragment 434, p. 121]
translates this line as “Hear God.”
I believe that his translation is
preferable at this point as it gives a resonance
to Pascal’s plea here.
[22] Blaise
Pascal, The Art of Persuasion, in
Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings,
trans. Honor Levi, op. cit., section 3,
p. 193.
[23] As
Anthony Levi notes in his “Introduction” (op.
cit., p. viii), this fragment (which is
amongst the best known of them all): “...was
written on four sides of a single folded sheet
of paper and contains paragraphs crammed into
the text, others written vertically up the
margins, and even upside down at the top of the
page.
There is no certainty that the added
passages were ever intended to belong together,
and some of them are at best either tangential
to the original argument....No matter how the
constitutive pieces are arranged, the four sides
of manuscript cannot be made to yield a single
coherent linear text....”
[24] Jeff
Jordan, “Introduction,” in Gambling On God:
Essays on Pascal’s Wager, ed. Jeff Jordan
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp.
1-10, p. 1.
Emphasis has been added to the passage.
[25] Ibid.,
p. 2.
[26] Ibid.
[27] As
Anthony Levi says in the “Explanatory Notes,” in
Pascal’s Pensées and Other Writings,
trans. Honor Levi, op. cit., pp.
243-244): “...this most famous sentence of all
is written upside-down at the top of the fourth
side, as if Pascal despairingly refuses to
abandon rationality in his quest for religiously
valid and grace-inspired faith.”
Emphasis has been added to the passage.
[28] Stephen
Toulmin, Cosmopolis (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago, 1990), p. 17.
[29] Ibid.,
p. 53.
[30] Ibid.,
p. 55.
[31] T.S.
Eliot, “Introduction,” op. cit., p. xvi.
Last revised on: 09/22/2014.