Discussion of
Postmodernism for Dan Alvarez’ Derrida Seminar
on October 31,
2014
Professor Alvarez asked me to lead a discussion of
postmodernism, rationality, truth,
knowledge, and meaning asking
whether it poses a serious threat to modernity and the Enlightenment project and
whether is a fad which has no serious philosophical consequences.
It is hard to take the measure of philosophical orientations within the
century when they originate.
Cartesian Occasionalism and Logical Positivism were all the rage for an extended
period of time but, thankfully died out rather quickly, while Platonism,
Thomism, Rationalism, and Empiricism seem to be going strong.
My view is that a large portion of postmodern thought will come to be of
historical rather than philosophical interest rather quickly.
I don’t believe there is a serious threat to modernity and the
enlightenment project, and I don’t believe that so far the philosophers grouped
under this heading have made substantive contributions to our understanding of
rationality, truth, knowledge, or meaning.
To provide you with some of my reasons for these claims, I
have a presentation and will then have time to have a discussion and take
questions.
First, a
card game, will you
cut the cards?
I said ‘cut’ not ‘cut’—cut a
card.
Deal, are you ready?
No? Card trick.
Are you ready?
Can you play a game if you don’t
know the rules, goals, etc.?
In his “Deconstruction; or. The Mystery of the Mystery of
the Text,” Joseph Margolis endeavors to discover what deconstruction is—or what
it is to deconstruct a text; “or at least
what Jacques Derrida
means by deconstruction.”[1]
He begins by noting that:
…to ask
that threatens to set in motion an
anxiety of infinite regress or an infinite anxiety of regress or, for that
matter, and infinite anxiety (or an infinite prospect) of infinite progress;
for, as everybody knows, Derrida’s notion was bound to invite its own
deconstruction and every would be analysis or interpretation of it was bound to
be subject to the same sort of development (if that’s the right word to use).
Will it be worth
our while to attempt to answer the question?...Derrida, we suppose,
supposes that we will understand him, that is, understand what he says; but in
leading us to understand what he says, he supposes—and we, with at least an
inkling of what he has in mind, suppose—that we understand what he says, by
understanding what is and must be left unsaid in what he says in order
(precisely) to convey his meaning.
Apparently, he has
succeeded all too well, because here we are playing his game with the greatest
of ease. Or is it that he has
really failed, because it’s still so hard to tell the difference between
explaining his notion and only pretending to do so?[2]
The essay continues at length to try and understand what
“this fellow” might be doing, and it is entertaining—frankly much more so than
reading Derrida himself! He
concludes:
deconstruction cannot supply in a
privileged way criteria or grounds on which the supplementation of any
deconstructed system can be justified, and such criteria or grounds can be
identically applied in a nondeconstructive manner.
Deconstruction favors no conceptual or interpretive schemata, though
those we favor it favors deconstructively; and any schema can be favored anti-deconstructively.
Deconstruction is exclusively concerned with deconstructing texts, signs,
concepts, conceptual networks, that is, with linking whatever surd in the name
of which it does so.
Deconstruction…well, perhaps this is as good a place to stop as any.[3]
Thus the card game I alluded to before.
Now let’s look at some “tests:”
a weather report: is it “an
imposition” of modernist presumptive preferences on reality (forcing hot/cold,
windy/still, rainy/sunny” on it?
Socrates in The Apology by C.D.C.
Reeve, p. 5 and “Socratic irony”[4]—views
of Thrasymacus, Quintilian, Vlastos, Kierkegaard, and Reeve.
The Archaeology of Knowledge by Michael
Foucault, p. 21 and a concern with the assumption of continuity in his
efforts to highlight how discontinuity poses questions of procedure and theory
for the history of ideas.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values by Robert Pirsg, p. 389 and the
rhetorician’s attempt to unseat the dialecticians leads to a fool’s mission
Finally several
standard critiques of the postmodernist orientation:
In his The
Philosophical Discourse on Modernity (1987),
Jürgen
Habermas contends that postmodern thinkers, like Derrida, commit
a
performative contradiction
and fall prey to
problems of
self-reference as they advance their critiques of modernity.
He criticizes Derrida’s effort to dislodge the distinction between
philosophy and literature and bring logic and argumentative reason into the
domain or rhetoric contending that: “whoever transposes the radical critique of
reason into the domain of rhetoric in order to blunt the paradox of self-referentiality,
also dulls the sword of the critique of reason itself.”[5]
The Margolis passages can be
interpreted as trying to make manifest Derrida’s deconstructive performative
contradiction. It may also help
understand the alleged problem of self-reference—the deconstruction of
deconstructive activities is “infinitely problematic!”
In a similar vein, in his “The Sleep of Reason,”
Thomas Nagel maintains that elements
of the postmodern theories are
self-refuting:
...the
denial of objective truth on the ground that all systems of belief are
determined by social forces is
self-refuting if
we take it seriously, since it appeals to a sociological or historical claim
that would not establish the conclusion unless it were objectively correct.
Moreover, it promotes one discipline, such as sociology or history, over
the others whose objectivity it purports to debunk, such as physics and
mathematics.[6]
In their Why
Deliberative Democracy? Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson maintain that the postmodern attempt to move logic and
argumentative reason into rhetoric is
anti-democratic:
a critique that reduces reasons
to power politics can succeed only by deception.
The critic’s listeners will be convinced by his arguments only to the
extent that they misunderstand him to be presenting reasonable arguments, which
he must deny if he is being truthful.
On the one hand, if he is being deceptive, no one has any acceptable
reason to give his arguments any credence.
On the other hand, if he is being truthful, then no one has any
acceptable reason to think his arguments are anything more than covers for
asserting his self-interest. Once
people recognize that his rules of argument authorize him to say anything that
helps him win, and that winning is merely a matter of causing people to accept
his views (whatever they happen to be), his arguments dissolve into
self-assertion. This kind of
self-assertion may be common enough in politics, but it is not the kind of
politics that most democrats [meaning here those who are committed to
democracy—or, better, deliberative democracy] wish to encourage.
Anyone who would defend this kind of politics would need to present
arguments that could be accepted by his fellow citizens.
If he does so, he enters willy-nilly into the forums of deliberative
democracy, and falls under its obligations for reasonable argument.[7]
Additional criticisms which, in their own way, point to the
problems commonly identified with the postmodern viewpoint include:
In his Renewing
Philosophy, Hilary Putnam maintains that:
but why should one suppose that
reality can be described independent of our descriptions?
And why should the fact that reality cannot be described independent of
our descriptions lead us to suppose that there are only the descriptions?
After all, according to our descriptions themselves, the word “quark” is
one thing and a quark is quite a different thing.[8]
For deconstructionists, metaphysics
was the basis of our entire culture,
the pedestal on which it all rested; if the pedestal has broken, the entire
culture must have collapsed—indeed, our whole language must lie in ruins.
But of course we can and do make sense of the idea of a reality we did
not make, even though we cannot make sense of the idea of a reality that is
“present” in the metaphysical sense of dictating its own unique description.
As we saw, seemingly incompatible words may actually describe the same
situation or event or the same physical system.[9]
The problem is that notwithstanding
certain moments of argument, the thrust of Derrida’s writing is that the notions
of “justification,” “good reason,” “warrant,” and the like are primarily
repressive gestures. And
that view is dangerous because it
provides aid and comfort to extremists (especially extremists of a romantic
bent) of all kinds, both left and right.
The twentieth century has witnessed horrible events, and the extreme left
and extreme right are both responsible for its horrors.
Today, as we face the twenty-first century, our task it not to repeat the
mistakes of the twentieth century.
Thinking of reason as just a repressive notion is certainly not going to help us
do that.
Derrida, I repeat, is not an extremist.
His own political pronouncements are, in my view, generally admirable.
But the philosophical irresponsibility of one decade can become the
real-world political tragedy of a few decades later.
And deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility.[10]
The following passage from Martha Nussbaum’s
Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense
of Reform In Liberal Education is also instructive:
we should, then, agree with
several important claims that postmodernist thinkers have recently stressed.
The search for truth is a human activity, carried on with human faculties
in a world in which human beings struggle, often greedily, for power.
But we should not agree that these facts undermine the very project of
pursuing truth and objectivity. The
insights of the Kantian tradition…yield not a radical assault on truth and
reason, but a new articulation of these goals.
Acknowledging the contributions of language and the human mind
invalidates a simpleminded type of empiricism but leaves Socrates on his feet.
We need not forgo the aspiration to truth and objectivity; we need only
conceive of these goals in a nuanced way, taking account of the shaping role of
our categories. Socrates himself
made no appeal to truths that transcend human experience, and yet he held that
the pursuit of ethical truth is essential to full humanity.[11]
In his “Afterword: Pragmatism, Pluralism and
Postmodernism,” Richard Rorty offers a pragmatist’s critique maintaining that:
but perhaps the transvaluation of
traditional philosophical values to which I have referred—the shift from unity
to plurality—was simply an attempt by philosophers to climb on an economic and
military bandwagon? Perhaps
philosophy was simply following the flag?
A Deweyan response to such a postcolonial sceptic would go something like
this: Sure, pragmatism and utilitarianism might never have gotten off the ground
without a boost from colonialist and imperialist triumphalism.
But so what? The question is
not whether the popularity of these philosophical views was the product of this
or that transitory hold on power, but whether anybody now has any better ideas
or any better utopias. We
pragmatists are not arguing that modern
Insofar as ‘postmodern’
philosophical thinking is identified with a mindless and stupid cultural
relativism—with the idea that any fool thing that calls itself culture is worthy
of respect—then I have no use for such thinking.
But I do not see that what I have called ‘philosophical pluralism’
entails any such stupidity. The
reason to try persuasion rather than force, to do our best to come to terms with
people whose convictions are archaic and ingenerate, is simply that using force,
or mockery, or insult, is likely to decrease human happiness.
We do not need to supplement this
wise utilitarian counsel with the idea that every culture has some sort of
intrinsic worth. We have learned
the futility of trying to assign all cultures and persons places on a
hierarchical scale, but this realization does not impugn the obvious fact that
there are lots of cultures we would be better off without, just as there are
lots of people we would be better off without.
To say that there is no such scale, and that we are simply clever animals
trying to increase our happiness by continually reinventing ourselves, has no
relativistic consequences. The
difference between pluralism and cultural relativism is the difference between
pragmatically justified tolerance and mindless irresponsibility.[13]
And, finally, in his
Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward A Politics of Radical engagement,
Stephen Eric Bronner offers a criticism of postmodernist thinkers which suggests
to me that while the “egocentric predicament” in epistemology may be “wrong,” in
ethics and social/political philosophy it is dangerous!
He maintains that:
from the standpoint of a socially
constructed subjectivity, however, only members of the particular group can have
the appropriate intuition or “experience,” to make judgments about their culture
or their politics. That is the
sense in which Michel Foucault sought to substitute the “specific” for the
“universal” intellectual. This
stance now embraced by so many on the left, however, actually derives from
arguments generated first by the Counter-Enlightenment and then the radical
right during the Dreyfus Affair.
These reactionaries, too, claimed that rather than introduce “grand narratives”
or “totalizing ambitions” or “universal” ideas of justice, intellectuals should
commit themselves to the particular groups with whose unique discourses and
experiences they, as individuals, are intimately and existentially familiar.
The “pure”—or less contaminated—experience of group members was seen as
providing them a privileged insight into a particular form of oppression.
Criticism from the “outsider” loses its value and questions concerning
the adjudication of differences between groups are never faced.[14]
But history has shown the danger of
turning “reason” into an enemy and condemning universal ideals in the name of
some parochial sense of “place” rooted in a particular community.
Or, put another way, where power matters the “pure” experience is never
quite so pure and no “place” is sacrosanct.
Better to be a bit more modest when confronting social reality and begin
the real work of specifying conditions under which each can most freely pursue
his or her existential longing and find a place in the sun.[15]
[1] Joseph
Margolis, “Deconstruction; or The Mystery of the
Mystery of the Text,” in
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction edited by
Hugh Sliverman and Don Idhe
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 138-151).
P. 151.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.,
p. 151.
[4] C.D.C.
Reeve,
Socrates In The Apology (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1989).
[5] Jürgen
Habermas,
The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity,
Frederick Lawrence, trans. (Cambridge:
Cambridge U.P., 1987), p. 210.
Emphasis added to the passage (italics
and bold).
[6] Thomas
Nagel, “The Sleep of Reason,” The New
Republic,
[7] Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
Why
Deliberative Democracy? (
[8] Hilary
Putnam,
Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard
U.P., 1992), p. 122.
[9]
Ibid.,
p. 124.
[10]
Ibid.,
pp. 132-133.
[11] Martha
Nussbaum,
Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of
Reform In Liberal Education, (Cambridge:
Harvard U.P., 1997), p. 40.
[12] Richard
Rorty, “Afterword: Pragmatism, Pluralism and
Postmodernism,” in his Philosophy and Social
Hope (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 262-277,
p. 273.
[13] Ibid.,
p. 276.
[14] Stephen
Eric Bronner Reclaiming the Enlightenment:
Toward A Politics of Radical engagement (NY:
Columbia U.P., 2004), p. ix.
[15]
Ibid.,
pp. 131-132.
Last revised: 10/31/2014.