Dr Judith Stiehm

Not long ago an Army War College seminar was trying to imagine life fifteen years down the road. One student said, "I guess we'd better start thinking about how we're going to look in purple." Silence ensued; then one of the women said, "Well, I've often thought I looked quite well in purple." At that point, everyone started talking at once. They could, indeed, imagine themselves in purple, and the vision was disconcerting. Even more disturbing, though, may be the prospective force which one might describe as paisley.

"Purple," of course, stands for the now standard "joint" operation of U.S. forces, i.e. an operation in which one or more services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) act as one. "Combined" operations are different. They involve a force drawn from the militaries of more than one country, e.g. the force that opposed Iraq in the Gulf War. "Paisley" is used here to stand for future operations which are likely to involve not just military forces, but a significant number of civilians as well. Paisley is a multi-color, elaborate design composed of curved abstract figures. While intricate, there is a pattern, and it is worth considering just what the pattern or relationship between military and civilian partners may look like.

First, let us be clear that this essay is not about civil-military relations as conventionally construed; i.e., it is not about civilian government control over the military. What it is about is the relationship between the military and a variety of civilian organizations, which are likely to participate in or be loosely associated with future military operations. Some of these civilians will be designated players, but others will be independent; some will be organized, while others will be unorganized; some non-players will seek to become players, but others will assiduously resist cooperation.

This essay will first offer a description of the variety of roles civilians are likely to assume in the future. Some of these roles will not be new, but in the future they may have more saliency (effect) than they have had in the past. Next it will consider the particular cultural conflicts which can be expected between one particular set of civilians, NGO (non-governmental organization) personnel, and military personnel. Finally, it will offer a sketch of "The Civilian Mind."

Efforts to characterize "The Military Mind" have sometimes been judged insightful, but equally often they have been criticized by those sensitive to the damage done by over generalization. Nevertheless, militaries and civilians have very different culture and are very differently positioned. This makes it important to try to describe and understand the differences between them. This is especially important if the U.S. continues:

1. to field a volunteer, professional, mercenary, or, perhaps best (because descriptive but not value-laden,) unconscripted military, and
2. to have a civilian population including elected officials, voters, and even military policy makers with very little military experience or knowledge (and too often with little wish to acquire it.)

Civilians' Varied Roles

Civilians are always around when wars are being fought. During active combat they try to fade into the background, but once combat ceases they reappear. During other kinds of military operations, e.g. during overseas projection for purposes of deterrence or reassurance, during humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping, or even stability maintenance operations civilians are present and often players. Sometimes the military's relationship with them is formally defined and mutually agreed upon. When it is not, informal norms may develop, but sometimes agreement about the relationship is hard to come by.

Let us set aside the relationships between the U.S. military and veterans associations, universities, HMOs, local businessmen and politicians, and even the suppliers of weapons in order to focus on military/civilian relationships which are most likely to affect operations -- particularly operations outside the country.

The media is one important player. While it may be possible to secure a particular environment from reporters, our culture places a high value on an unfettered press. Further, technology frequently outstrips both rules and norms. Since the Vietnam War, the military has had to take "the CNN factor" into account in its planning. But what lies beyond that factor? We have already had live TV reports by a U.S. reporter from the capital of a nation that we were attacking. As media is internationalized and satellite programs are made available from foreign-based equivalents of CNN, will not US citizens begin to receive broadcasts offering differing interpretations of events -- and not just from allies or third parties but from enemies as well? Will not technology make it possible for foreign nations to bypass U.S. governmental structures and directly address the American public?

Profit is a powerful motivator. It seems certain that a set of brilliant programmers will soon design globally popular television channels, which will command attention, and, as a result, influence. While pop culture may precede news, news is a cheap way to gather large audiences, and we should expect more internationalized reporting. Additionally, programmers of the future may design offerings for specialized audiences such as those of exiles, immigrants and refugees. This will create a potential for the mobilization of these groups in a way which could significantly affect U.S. policy particularly because foreign policy has traditionally responded to the passionate concerns of small groups-including groups of noncitizens.

At present we are experiencing the same technological advantage in information that we enjoyed in atomic weaponry in the early 1950s. But how will things differ when the U.S. edge disappears? (Edges inevitably disappear -- and usually sooner than expected.) Further, our concern should not be limited to our edge in the most advanced and expensive technology. We must also consider the effect of the widespread distribution of simpler technology. Remember that it was a video recorder in the hands of a citizen which transformed the arrest of Rodney King into a civil rights and police brutality cause celebre, and it was fax machines in the hands of Chinese students which brought the Beijing uprising of 1989 to world attention.

What if every citizen in a conflict area were provided with a mini videocam? Human rights groups might distribute them en masse; or commercial TV might distribute them retaining the right to purchase footage at a set price. 20/20 could find itself using mostly "home videos." Many countries and private organizations, too, could have access to good footage of widely scattered events. Technology spreads quickly, widely, and vertically.

The largest and most politically powerful civilian organizations are for-profit corporations. A number of these have larger budgets and assets than most countries. Corporations expect nation states to advance their interests. However, a corporation's interests may or may not coincide with those of its nation and/or of that nation's citizens. Indeed, as U.S. investments are globalized, it seems more and more likely that some investors' interests will come into conflict with U.S. policy. Angola is a recent example. There the U.S. government believed a government supported by Cuban troops was unacceptable, but those managing U.S. oil investments in Angola believed that getting along with that government was possible, important and appropriate.1

In significantly unstable situations corporations may simply purchase the services of foreign, armies. This has been done recently in Colombia. 2 It is to be hoped that wise heads will prevent any encounters between U.S. troops and foreign troops salaried by U.S. corporations, but a globalized economy composed of civilian corporations whose purpose is making money is certain to run into conflict with the interests of national governments whose purpose tends toward maintaining, or increasing power, and the interests of both may conflict with the desires of citizens who are likely to be highly varied, poorly informed, and sometimes unrealistic.

At some point the pendulum of political ideology will swing back toward the promotion of cooperation, fairness and the use of government to benefit society. At present, though, market ideology rides high, and self-interest and competition are assumed to result in both the efficient and the good. Still, as long as the enthusiasm for privatization continues, contracting organizations like Root and Brown, which hold millions of dollars worth of contracts with the Pentagon, will continue to multiply, and more and more functions essential to the military, e.g. maintenance, mail delivery, will be contracted out.

At present Root and Brown are very active in Bosnia. If warfare were to break out again, would legal commitments keep civilian workers in place? And would new contracts for essential work be accepted? Could the military quickly enough replace civilian workers with troops? Similar questions apply to the many technicians upon which today's military relies. Again, Full Spectrum Dominance (and its segments: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics) cannot be achieved without civilians. The question is: "Will they be there when and as long as they are needed?"

In the last several decades a great deal of time and energy have gone into the smooth accomplishment of joint service operations. A whole new and even more complex arena for necessary cooperation involves coordinating the military with a variety of other governmental units. This has led to the famed "inter-agency" process. Successful civilian bureaucrats hone a set of skills to make them effective in federal, bureaucratic politics. These politics and the acquired skills are quite different from those practiced in military. Since it must be expected that Full Spectrum Dominance will involve operations including the military and the State Department, but also organizations like the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Office for Disaster Assistance (ODA), the Justice Department (which has responsibility for training international police), the Agriculture Department, the Commerce Department (Note Ron Brown's ill-fated mission to Bosnia), and others as well, military personnel are going to need additional skills. In particular they will need to learn the art of persuasion and negotiation. Leadership and command will not suffice. 4

In the future U.S. military personnel will find themselves working not just with U.S. civilians but with foreign civilians too. This will be particularly true of operations sponsored by regional organizations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, an organization of fifty six members which resulted from the 1975 Helsinki Accords and which managed the recent elections in Bosnia), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Again, more and more future operations are likely to require the unified efforts of not just the different U.S. services, but of the services of different countries (see the Partnership for Peace), and of civilians; including many from other countries. The dreaded inter-agency process will be writ huge and in many languages.

The U.S. Military now has a number of disaster and humanitarian relief operations under its belt. In these situations "success" is desired by all, but no one is "in charge." 5 These operations require a different kind of leadership than that developed for military service. In particular, "consensus building" skills are useful, and can be taught. Still, in such complex operations soldiers must expect regularly to be caught in that Catch 22 where, on the one hand, they are required to deal with ambiguity, change, and lack of structure, and, on the other hand, they are told that they, because they hold and use weapons on behalf of others, must act only under direction -- and are told also that they must accept direction unquestioningly -- even when it seems unwise, political, or needlessly sacrificial.

The U.S. military and public tend to assume that armed conflicts are between nations. Accordingly, military plans usually assume our forces will fight the militaries of other (aggressor) nations. However, many recent conflicts have been conflicts over secession not aggression. The international rules, which forbid aggression, enjoy some legitimacy. However, rules concerning secession (which might, for instance, set minimal territorial and population size for new states, or which might require a 60 percent majority in referenda to be conducted both in the whole and in the portion seeking separation) have not been developed. Further, since the antagonists in a proposed secession are likely to be citizens of a recognized state, a secession conflict is likely to be defined as a (mere) civil war and outside intervention as inappropriate.

Indeed, what is most likely to provoke foreign intervention in a civil war is not acts of secession or slaughter, but refugees -- persons crossing borders into other countries. Refugee-receiving countries are anxious to avoid both the destabilization and the economic drain caused by refugees. Thus, receiving countries typically provide only minimal relief, and to try to make things "back home" good enough that refugees will go there, or at least good enough that no more refugees will come. Recent interventions in northern Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia were all driven by the desire of receiving countries to end the flow of incoming refugees. In the future we may be faced with recessionary movements in China, India, even Mexico, and Canada and Italy. Again, our military has and will find itself working with civilian refugees, with civilian relief workers, and with civilian politicians. Intervention may not be seen as "winning the nation's wars," but it can be a form of deterrence and quite protective of national interests.

Our national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement" 6 has a focus on the encouragement of political democracy and free market economies. This policy involves a clear commitment to the free movement of money and of goods throughout the globe. But there is no commitment to the free movement of the other factor essential to production -- labor. The very rich do enjoy nearly free movement, for their wealth is in demand everywhere; the wretched also move -- in desperation and usually close by, and without great concern for legality. In fact, it is only those with an economic stake who are really confined to their nation state. It is unlikely that this contradiction (free movement for money and goods but not people) will soon be resolved either in theory or in the policies of the champions of the free market. We must expect continued illegal immigration and also that the creation of large numbers of refugees will be a catalyst for intervention. We should also expect that military troops will be those most equipped, most ready for, and most used in interventions even if there is no war tn he fought, or killing to be done.

Sometimes military troops act directly under UN direction (as in the Sinai Peacekeeping Operation) or with Security Council authorization (as have NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina.) In either case authorization comes from the UN's political aim. In the field and especially in humanitarian relief missions, though, troops are likely to find themselves working with UN personnel who are not under the direction of the UN's political arm. This is because much of the UN's most important work is done by semiautonomous agencies like the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (IBRO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF.) These organizations may feel some pressure to cooperate with a U.N. authorized military force, since they must raise their budgets from the same nation states which support the militaries. However, they are also closely linked to NGOs for letting contracts to NGOs does much of their work. For example, WHO has three-year renewable contracts with about 180 NGOs and the UNHCR has contracts with some 300 NGOs. 7 In non-combat interventions troops are likely to encounter many United Nations and NGO personnel as well as citizens of the country to which they have been deployed. These different groups of civilians will be considered in order.

NGOs are distinct from both government and for-profit corporations. They seek neither to exercise power nor to make money. Those the military are likely to encounter in the field have been roughly categorized as:

1. Humanitarian NGOs (with both relief and economic development agendas);
2. Human rights NGOs;
3. Democracy-building NGOs;
4. Conflict-resolution NGOs.

They range in size from modest projects supported entirely by volunteer funding and staffing, to multi-million dollar operations with very professional staff (some of them retired military.) In any one setting up to 200 NGOs may be active. All told, there are as many as 4,000 western NGOs working in a host of developing countries. 8 While the military has seen the importance of coordinating its efforts with them by including them in its "Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations," that coordination has met with varying levels of success.9 This is probably inevitable given the different purposes, structure, and recruitment pools of these two kinds of organizations.

Since these differences are unlikely to change in the near future, it may be worth trying to develop a scheme to explain the two cultures to each other. One approach would be to emphasize the way participants in the two kinds of organizations are like each other. For example, one could argue about both military and NGO personnel that:

In spite of these strong (and positive) similarities members of the two groups often hold negative stereotypes of each other. While such stereotypes do not deserve reinforcement, it can be useful to know how one may be seen by others. With this knowledge one has a better chance of explaining oneself and one's organization. Thus, military personnel are wise to remember that they are sometimes described as:

In turn, NGOs might profit from remembering that they sometimes appear to be:

Many factors help to explain these perceptions and stereotypes. For instance, planning, a Chain of command, and unit cohesion are considered essential to the performance of any military operation, yet these very factors can make that organization appear rigid, authoritarian and conformist. Similarly, while the military often shuns publicity, NGOs may value it highly. This is because they must raise funds through public appeal. Further, flexibility and the giving away of authority to members of a local population may be the best way to provide relief, but to outsiders such policies can appear undisciplined and permissive.

Sometimes outsiders bring support to a nation in crisis but with a legitimate government in place, e.g. in Bangladesh following a devastating hurricane. In such cases outsiders work through the local government, hopefully in such a way as to reinforce it. In other cases, though, there is no credible government, and.outsiders are expected to act without official sanction. Actions in the absence of a legitimate government have consequences, and some of them are negative. For example, there has long been a discussion about the danger of making (local) aid recipients dependent. Now there are more sophisticated discussions about how peace efforts can actually impede the peace process. Let us examine some of them.

First, it is important to note that chaos and war do serve some individuals' interests. The Local Capacities for Peace Project identifies some of those individuals as:

1. Thugs...young men who join militia and take up war as a way of life. They claim to "enjoy" war, and use their weapons for their own enrichment or simply for the pleasure of exerting power over others;

2. Irreconcilables ...among these are purists who fight for an unrealizable ideal or for complete victory. Also included are war criminals who would be endangered if the war were to end;

3. Arms merchants and other profiteers...individuals who have acquired money, power and prestige through supplying needs during war. Sometimes called entrepreneurs, sometimes criminals, sometimes war lords, these individuals may have the capacity to translate the standing they have gained in war to political support, and, thus, emerge as accepted leaders even though their past is distinctly unsavory;

4. Aid and relief workers...local employees whose work and professional opportunities have been destroyed are often among, the most competent employees of relief agencies (a medical doctor for instance, may find work supervising road construction and a teacher as a driver.) Thus they, too, end by having a stake in continued conflict.12

Just as relief workers have grasped that their work may have significant unintended consequences including the freeing up of resources for armies; the giving of power and control to one faction as opposed to others; and the distorting of the local economy, NGOs whose work is reconciliation (rather than relief) need to consider the second and third order consequences of their projects. Even such simple things as whether describing their work as being "anti-war" or "pro- peace" can have an unintended and negative impact.

Again, aid givers have developed some sophistication about the effects of aid giving. In particular, they have considered the effects that aid may have on the continuation or cessation of conflict. A similar analysis of the effects of military intervention has not yet evolved; during the next decade military planners need to develop the same sophistication in analyzing the effects of different kinds of military intervention. Some things we may know are:

1. Even in civil wars much of the population does not feel committed to the cause for which the war is avowedly fought.

2. There is a cycle of low commitment, higher commitment and, finally war weariness.

3. The issue may not be one of overthrowing bad leaders or of permitting elections, but simply of enabling people to disengage from an ongoing conflict.

Often disengagement means helping civilians to stop thinking about winning. Yet any time military uniforms are present the implicit message is that winning is all. A better understanding of "the civilian mind" could be helpful.

The Civilian Mind

In this country the military's commander in Chief is not only a civilian, he is a highly successful politician (if only by dint of winning election.) Further, the control over military funding is held by a civilian, elected Congress most of whose members are elected for reasons quite unrelated to the military. Indeed, a majority of the voters who sent them there are women, most of whom have had little experience with the military. It should be useful, then, for the military to consider just how civilians think.

It should be useful, then, for the military to consider just how civilians think. A few civilians have tried to explain how the military thinks. Among them are Samuel Huntington, Bernard Brodie and others who have tried to describe what they call "the military mind." Brodie, for example, described it as one "eager and able to accept discipline" and also "able to command" especially in the chaos of combat.13 He added that military personnel accept a separation, a distinction from civilian society, cherish loyalty as a primary value, believe in the efficacy of force, and give assurance beyond their capacity to know, i.e. have an aggressive stance with, perhaps, a touch of braggadocio. He adds that they have been trained for battle and victory, i.e. to impose their will.

It is not enough simply to think of the civilian mind as the opposite of the military mind. Yet how to describe the civilian mind is something of a puzzle. This is not because it is so rare; but because it is so coming, so diffuse and so unselfconscious.

First, let us tease out the position of the pacifist. A pacifist finds violence always unacceptable, although for a variety of reasons. One variety of pacifist includes one whose position is rooted in individual conscience. Such individuals find violence always wrong and unnecessary. 14 A second variety, whose views are considered pragmatic, forswears violence as always uneconomic. The civilian mind differs from both types of pacifism because, like the military, it considers violence to (at least sometimes) be necessary and effective. Civilians are different from the military, however, because they do not do violence themselves. Further, the civilian mind is different from the military mind in three other ways. These involve its willful ignorance, its innocence about innocents, and its disarmed trustfulness. 15 Let me elaborate each of these concepts.

Let us set aside the fact that militaries and wars necessarily involve secrets, deception and censorship, and that this creates an inevitable conflict with the winning of the sustained, informed support of the public. A different and equally serious problem exists. That is, the public often does not want to be informed.

One thing in particular the public may not want to know is the means implied by the ends it endorses. Any public official can testify to the frustration of trying to get voters to endorse the means (taxes) to an end they demand, whether that be the provision of health care, better teacher training, or drug treatment programs. Militaries must similarly expect that citizens do not want to know the details about the means they implicitly support -- death and suffering -- when they support ordering troops into combat.

Civilians also seem to prefer to think of wars fought on places called battlefields, places like a giant stadium or arena where militaries engage each other according to agreed upon rules. But a nuclear battlefield would be everywhere, and a terrorist's battlefield, anywhere. When the public is forced to realize that fighting occurs on farms, in suburban gardens, and in city school yards, and that often more civilians die than soldiers, public enthusiasm may wane and the military may then feel betrayed.
Civilians also tend to believe that things will go as planned. The military knows this is not so, but its positive, "can do" value can mislead civilians who know little about fragging, friendly fire, and the inevitability of SNAFUs.

Citizens may believe that having a mighty military means little blood will be shed. If all participants in war practiced rational choice theory, two sides might array their forces, measure each other, and strike a bargain. Unfortunately, rationality is not often the dominant characteristic of leaders (or populations), and some of the worst events are the result of weaker forces challenging stronger ones as a matter of honor. Civilians, then, are often ignorant, and intentionally so. When their ignorance can no longer be sustained, they may then decide they didn't really mean it. A military that took direction in good faith can then find it has made significant sacrifices for an end the public now wishes abandoned.
Civilians are also often innocent about the protection of innocents. There is a general belief that the rules of war define noncombatants as innocent, and that they are protected not only by their own military, but also, more importantly, by the restraint of an opponent's military. Grotius, von Vattel, the fourth Geneva Convention and the Second Protocol all say as much. The problem is that while civilians may believe in these laws (which are greatly in their interest), diplomats negotiate them, military officers implement them in the midst of battle, and no one enforces them. In most wars in this century the majority of deaths have been civilian deaths.

Another problem is that the principles of "necessity" and "proportionality" can work against civilian protection, for strategies which protect one's own troops can be seen as necessary and as proportional (thinking of the military lives saved) even though they are devastating to enemy civilians. This includes both frontal attacks with high tech weapons and more subtle PSYOPs or economic strategies designed to unravel an enemy nation's social and economic structures.

Again, when civilians understand this, they may decide they didn't mean it. Why? In any conflict there are leaders, combatants and noncombatants on both sides. For the most part the leaders, combatants and noncombatants on each side identify with the others on their side. But to some degree each also identifies with their counterparts on the enemy's side. Leaders understand the responsibilities of other leaders. Combatants respect those enemies who, like they, do the actual fighting. Noncombatants who feel little personal responsibility for the war but see themselves primarily as victims, will, at least to some degree, empathize with those similarly positioned on the other side. This is the source of the invocation, "We're not at war with the people!" (Fill in the blank with whomever we are currently fighting.)

Worry about the erosion of civilian enthusiasm is one reason current U.S. military doctrine places much emphasis on rapid and high tech wars. However, it is not at all clear that wars (except maybe the Falklands) can be won with high tech weapons. Indeed, it may be that one cannot truly win a war unless one is both on the ground, and prepared to stay for a long time -- as we were in both Germany and Japan after World War II.

The most beguiling characteristic of the civilian mind may be its disarmed trust. Again, the civilian, like the militarist, is not trusting. The civilian thinks unilateral disarmament foolish; but the civilian then turns around, disarms, and trusts the military to use force altruistically, i.e. on the civilians' behalf. (This is not true of the newly visible citizen militias, of course.)

Interestingly, the other official, armed groups in our society, police forces, do not enjoy such trust. They do not have weapons of mass destruction or even "heavy" weapons; the media and interest groups serve as energetic watch dogs over their activities; while they have authority on the streets, an independent judiciary has the final disposition of actions they initiate; they do not make a lot of money or become a part of society's elite; and there is a healthy realism about what police forces can actually accomplish; citizens know they must contribute to their own security.

Our military is different from the police in the great degree of trust it is given. it is also different from the militaries of many other countries. First, it is not a usual route to political power, to fame, or to great riches. Second, for more than a century it has (almost) exclusively been used against foreigners and abroad.

Does such trust come because our military is, in fact, under "civilian control"? Or, has apparent control derived more from the identity of military and civilian interests? Would not both the military and civilians benefit from trying to better understand the basis of civilian trust and of an armed military's willingness to accept direction from an unarmed government? Will that willingness be breached if the government becomes unpopular, unwise, or apparently willing to sacrifice military lives for political gain? What if the military is asked to use force against its own citizens? Is the "civilian mind" potentially capable of seeing its military as mere mercenaries, as tools, rather than as citizen volunteers?


In thinking about future military operations it would be wise to integrate our thinking about military strategy and technology with our thinking about civilians. First, because except for periods of narrowly defined actual combat, the military will necessarily be interacting with civilians of many kinds and involved with them in a wide range of efforts.

Thus, civilians will be everywhere, but rules for interacting with them may not exist, or, if they do, they may be inappropriate, obscure, or even counterproductive. Already the U.S. military has found that it must take into account many actors that it did not need to consider in the past -- the media corporate leaders, contractors, government officials. I have tried to take one kind of military - civilian intersection and detail how two contrasting cultures (military and NGO) might make achievement of their shared goals easier, if they understood each other's cultures better, and equally important, understood how they are seen by others. As Robert Burns noted it is a gift, indeed, "to see ourselves as others see us."16 In addition, they would do well to appreciate the many positive characteristics they share. Finally, I have undertaken a brief description of "the civilian mind." It is a sketch by a civilian trying to see civilians as the military might see us.

Perhaps now is the time for "the others" (the military) to speak for themselves -- to offer a description of the civilian. It could be a significant contribution to the further analysis of a tricky relationship we must expect to continue, even if the pattern of that relationship were intricate, varied, and colorful, i.e. paisley as well as purple.

Dr. Judith Hicks Stiehm is past Provost and Professor of Political Science at Florida International University in Miami. She is the editor of the new volume IT'S OUR MILITARY TOO! and author of ARMS AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN, BRING ME MEN AND WOMEN: MANDATED CHANGE AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, and NONVIOLENT POWER. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a past member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.

1 Klinghoffer, Jay. The Angolan War. Westview: Connecticut, 198O, p. 86 and Carol Thompson. Challenge to Imperialism. Westview: Connecticut, 1986. p.2.
2 Schemo, Diana Jean. "Oil Companies Buy an Army to Tame Colombia's Rebels." New York
, August 22,1996, p.1.
3 Overall the government spends more on contracts with private companies than it does on salaries and expenses for civilian employees. Sometimes laid-off government workers can end up doing the same task but as contractors. See below works: Donnelly, John "Pentagon Plans to Net $2.5 Billion a year from "Outsourcing" Defense Week, December 9, 1996, p 1. and Gerth, Jeff, "As Payroll Shrinks, Government's Costs for Contracts Rise." New York Times., March 19, 1996, p.l.
4 For an extended discussion, see Metz, Stephen. "Leadership in he RMA Army." (Unpublished) Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996.
5 Seiple, Chris. "The US Military / NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions." Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, P A, 1996. This theme is repeated throughout the volume, in particular on p. 170.
6 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.," The White House, 1996. Official US policy declared by the President.
7 United States Government Accounting Office, Foreign assistance: Private Voluntary Organizations' Contributions and Imitations. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: December, 1995. P.5.
8 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations, 32d ed. K.G. Saur, Munchen, 1995.
9 Seiple provides an extended discussion of several options.
10 Seiple, Chp. 3.
11 Anderson, Maloy B., Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid. Collaborative for Development Action Local Capacities for Peace Project Imbridge, Mass. 1996.
12 Anderson, p.11.
13 Brodie, Bernard, War and Politics, Macmillan: New York, 73, p. 470.
14 Steihm, Judith. Nonviolent Power: Active and Passive resistance in America. D.C. Heath: Lexington, MA. 1972
15 Steihm, Judith. It's Our Military too!. Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1996.
16 From a Burns poem my mother used to recite titled "To a Louse."

Other works consulted but not specifically cited:
Crosette, Barbara, "Globally, Majority Rules." New York Times, August 4, 1996. p. E1.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. Vintage: New York, 1957. (Chp. 3).
"Operations in Troubled States," a series of articles in Volume XXVI, 1996.
Thompson, Carol. Challenge to Imperialism. Westview: CT, 1986, p.2.
Uhitelle, Louis. "Who's Punishing Whom?" New York Times, September 11,1996, p. D1

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