



**NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-5078**

**ELECTIVE COURSE 5713
SYLLABUS**

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

ACADEMIC YEAR 2005-2005 (Spring)

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**COLONEL KEVIN KEITH, USAF
Chairman, Department of Military
Strategy and Operations**

**DR. CHARLES A. STEVENSON
Professor of Military Strategy and
Operations
Course Director**

**CAPTAIN TIMOTHY R. HANLEY, USN
Professor of Military Strategy and
Operations
Course Director**

COURSE 5713 (SPRING)

AY 2004-2005

Course Director:

Charles A. Stevenson
(202) 685-3671

Course Director:

Captain Tim Hanley
(202) 685-3654

Department Secretary:

JoAnn Monroe
(202) 685-3638

COURSE ORGANIZATION

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**ADVANCED STUDY 5713
CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS
SPRING 2005**

. . . it may be proper constantly and strongly to impress upon the Army that they are mere agents of Civil power: that out of Camp, they have no other authority than other citizens, that offences against the laws are to be examined, not by a military officer, but by a Magistrate; that they are not exempt from arrests and indictments for violations of the law.

-- Gen. George Washington,
letter to Daniel Morgan, 27 March 1795

INTRODUCTION:

Americans for a long period of time have had sense that one of the fundamental strengths of our Republic has been the evolution of a pattern of civil-military relations based upon the primacy of civilian control that has served us well as a nation and a society and, indeed, has contributed to our national security. Our concept of the appropriate civil-military relationship has allowed the values upon which this nation was founded to flourish and, equally, has allowed a degree of military professionalism to develop that has become, quite simply, a model for democratic societies around the world.

Within the United States, however, patterns of civil-military relations based on the concept of civilian control have not been static. Instead, they have evolved over time -- often in subtle ways -- in response to a variety of complex challenges both within the domestic and international environments. Over the past decade a number of changes have posed new challenges -- and new strains -- for the civil-military relationship within America. On the domestic side, factors such as the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, declining defense budgets, and the ascension of new political leaders with attenuated contacts with the military establishment have served collectively to affect the relationship between the civilian political leadership and the military. Changes in the international environment, especially the increasing salience of new and difficult security challenges in the aftermath of the Cold War, have also affected the civil-military relationship.

At least one commentator, Richard Kohn, has suggested that these many changes have combined to produce a "crisis in civil-military relations" in the United States. While others might argue that Kohn overstates the case, all would seem to agree that important changes have occurred. This course will consider the implications of those changes.

PURPOSE AND APPROACH:

Our purpose in this course is simply to consider in a very pragmatic way contemporary challenges to military professionalism and the concept of civilian control. While we do not intend to ignore theory or history, those subjects will not be our principal focus. Rather we intend to confront in a very direct fashion the sorts of civil-military issues and challenges that students should anticipate as they graduate from the National War College.

Our goals are simple and straightforward:

- To consider the real world challenges and frictions within the realm of civil-military relations that can arise from the principle of civilian control of the military establishment; and
- To consider what approaches best address those challenges within the framework of the legal, political, and social traditions of the United States.

The course is divided roughly into three segments in which we will consider in turn: first, the concept of civilian control within the American context; second, contemporary, concrete challenges to military professionalism and the concept of civilian control; and third, the concept of civilian control beyond simply the relationship within the executive branch of our government.

We will conduct the course as an instructor-led seminar; as such, student participation in seminar will be key. That said, the topics we shall address should be sufficiently stimulating and provocative that the instructors may find it helpful to wear the black-and-white striped shirts of a referee to class.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

Aside from course readings and class participation, the requirement for this course will be a 20 minute presentation or a short paper (5-7 pages) on a designated "Issue for Consideration" for a particular topic. Students will be asked to choose one question from among those issues designated by "♦" symbol, prepare a presentation or write a paper on that issue, and initiate the seminar discussion on that issue on the day that topic will be addressed.

TOPIC 1

CIVILIAN CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Tuesday
11 January 2005
1535-1730

War is too important to be left to the generals
-- Georges Clemenceau

Our inquiry into the nature and practice of civilian control of the military in the United States begins with the Constitution. We do so out of a conviction that any pragmatic resolution of contemporary issues of civilian control must be shaped by a sound appreciation for the ideological, structural, and legal bases for civilian control in the American context.

Oftentimes, doctrines that have become deeply embedded in our government and institutions are simply taken for granted without any real examination of the underlying purposes they are intended to serve. That certainly seems to be the case with respect to our concept of civil-military relations. Why does our system of government rest on, among other things, the principle of civilian control of the military? What are the alternatives to that doctrine? What does that principle really mean in practice? How does that choice with respect to civil-military relationships shape not only our form of government but our society as a whole?

The answers to these questions are not self-evident and, indeed, we shall find that we return often to such questions as the course progresses. We are more likely to develop the “right” answers to contemporary challenges in the civil-military arena if we base our thinking upon a solid conceptual foundation. And so we begin with the Constitution of the United States of America.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

1. What does the concept of civilian control of the military mean within the context of American government and society?
2. In embedding the ideal of civilian control of the military into the Constitution, what were the framers striving to achieve? What alternatives or historical experiences might have shaped their thinking?
3. What defines the concept of the military as a “profession?”
4. What are the sources of civilian control over the military

establishment?

5. To what extent are controls over the U.S. military establishment external to the armed forces? To what extent are they internally derived?

6. How important is our oath and what does it mean to defend and support the Constitution?

REQUIRED READINGS:

a. Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers," in Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (NY: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 61-94. (Reprint)

b. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (NY: The Free Press, 2002), pp. 208-248. (Student Issue)

c. Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 26, No 1, Fall 1999, pp. 7-26 (Reprint)

TOPIC 2

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday
18 January 2005
1535-1730

The spirit of this country is totally adverse to a large military force.

-- Thomas Jefferson

In military affairs, only military men should be listened to.

-- Theodore Roosevelt

The first advice I am going to give to my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn.

-- John Kennedy

Things were not always the way they are now. During the Revolutionary War, Congress provided at least as much advice as supplies to George Washington. When the Army was expanded in John Adams' administration, Alexander Hamilton made a point of picking only pro-Federalist officers. Thomas Jefferson returned the favor during his presidency by replacing those men with officers sympathetic to his politics.

Congress dominated the small military establishment during the 19th century through its control of resources and promotions. And while Congress tried to hector Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, the president imposed his own tough measure of civilian control directly over the military.

Only in the 20th Century has the U.S. military had the size or weaponry to threaten civilian control, and uniformed leaders have steadfastly resisted all temptations to challenge their political masters. This class explores those distant days of yesteryear and the traditions established then, many of which are no longer recognized or followed today.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ a. What factors encouraged the depoliticization and rise of professionalism in the U.S. military in the 19th Century?
- ◆ b. Was Lincoln a good role model for the commander-in-chief in wartime?

- ◆ c. Was there a gap between civilians and the U.S. military prior to World War I?
- ◆ d. If the military considers itself in a sharper conflict for scarce resources, how likely is a return to the kind of political control the military witnessed in the 19th century?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. Allan R. Millett, "The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier," in Richard H. Kohn, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (NY: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 97-119. (Reprint).
- b. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (NY: The Free Press, 2002), pp. 15-51. (Student Issue)
- c. Russel F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present," in Feaver and Kohn, ed., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 215-246. (Student Issue)
- d. Sam J. Tangredi, "Learn to Love the Gap," *Proceedings*, (May 2002), pp. 36-39. (Reprint)
- e. Charles G. Cooper, "The Day it Became the Longest War," *Proceedings*, (May 1996), pp.77-80. (Reprint)

TOPIC 3

POLITICIANS AND WARRIORS: TWO CULTURES?

Tuesday
25 January 2005
1535-1730

The well-being of the people equally with the well-being of the Army requires a common sympathy and a common interest between them.

Maj. Gen. John Pope, to the veterans of the
Army of the Tennessee

The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.

B.H. Liddell Hart

Sam Huntington concluded his 1957 study of civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, with a paragraph that did much to earn him the enduring ire of his colleagues in academia:

West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls [the small village adjacent to the Military Academy] the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon. Yet is it possible to deny that the military values -- loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication -- are the ones America most needs today? That the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street? Historically, the virtues of West Point have been America's vices, and the vices of the military, America's virtues. Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America. Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a heavy responsibility. The greatest service they can render is to remain true to themselves, to serve with silence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the military spirit, they destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately. If the civilians permit the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may eventually find redemption and security in making that standard their own. (Huntington, p. 465)

Many observers today would argue that the differences between Main Street and the military street are as great today as at any time in our nation's history. If true, many factors can be called to account for this widening social gap between the civilian and military sectors of our society: changing demographics; the end of the draft in the 1970s; the downsizing of our armed forces; the ever declining numbers of civilian officials with military experience; and so on. As a result, some might argue that if America today finds itself in the midst of a "cultural war," many of the battles of that war are being fought along the fault line between the civil and military segments of American society.

Our discussion today will consider the broader implications of this gap for the problem of civilian control of our nation's military establishment.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. How do civilian policymakers in the United States differ in outlook, background and attitudes toward national security policy than their senior military counterparts?
- ◆ 2. Has the U.S. officer corps become more political and partisan? Is that understandable or unacceptable?
- ◆ 3. If there is a difference between civilian and military policymakers' attitudes and outlooks on important national security issues, does that difference help to produce a better policy result, or is the opposite more likely true?
- ◆ 4. How can the civil-military cultural divide be reduced or bridged? Should it be?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. Ole R. Holsti, "Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium," in Feaver and Kohn, ed., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 16-19, 20-94 (scan), 95-99. (Student Issue)
- b. Michael C. Desch, "Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass Army," in Feaver and Kohn, ed., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 289-324. (Student Issue)
- c. Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control in the Military of the United States Today," *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2002), pp. 9-37. (Reprint)

TOPIC 4

THE PROBLEM OF DISSENT

Tuesday
1 February 2005
1535-1730

I didn't fire him (General MacArthur) because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three quarters of them would be in jail.

-- Harry Truman

When you put on a uniform there are certain inhibitions that you accept.

-- Dwight Eisenhower

The broader problems of civil-military relations and civilian control of our military establishment occasionally has become sharply focused on specific policy disagreements. In these circumstances two critical questions come to the fore:

- How should military professionals respond when they have principled disagreements with the policy direction charted by civilian authorities?
- How should civilian policymakers deal with military officers who choose to express dissent either privately or publicly?

Throughout our history, these questions have sometimes been raised in high profile disagreements, such as the Truman-MacArthur controversy, and at other times. Such as the recent debate over policy toward use of landmines, on issues that captured far less public attention. While the substantive policy disagreements have varied, each of these events have raised similar questions regarding the manner in which such disagreements should be resolved in light of our commitment to the principle of civilian control of the military establishment.

This topic will allow us to consider what has been over time one of the most troublesome dimensions of civil-military relations.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. How should military professionals respond when they have principled disagreements with the policy direction charted by civilian authorities?
- ◆ 2. When, if ever, is it appropriate for military officers to express public

disagreement with an administration's policy?

- ◆ 3. How *should* civilian policymakers deal with military officers who choose to express dissent either privately or publicly?

REQUIRED READINGS:

a. Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age" in Richard H. Kohn, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (NY: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 223-267. (Reprint)

b. Richard H. Kohn, "The Early Retirement of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Spring 2001), pp. 1-17.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/chronicles/apj/apj01/spr01/sp01.html

c. A. J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgeway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955," *Journal of American History* (April 1997), pp. 1-18. (Reprint)

d. James Rosen, "Nixon and the Chiefs," *The Atlantic Monthly*, (April 2002), pp. 53-59. (Reprint)

TOPIC 5

USE OF FORCE

Tuesday
8 February 2005
1535-1730

No issue is more sensitive to policymakers – or the public – than sending U.S. military personnel into combat situations. While everyone favors short, successful wars, senior officials know from bitter historical experience that prolonged or unsuccessful engagements undermine political support. The normal fog and friction of warfare can be amplified by attentive media into horrifying pictures and scandalous stories.

The U.S. Constitution clearly gives civilian authorities control over the power to engage in war, but divides that power between a Congress with legal and resource authority and a President with command authority. For most of our history, U.S. military leaders accepted, sometimes grudgingly, civilian and especially presidential control over combat operations. Indeed, they often welcomed the President as a buffer against congressional meddling. Some Presidents were more intrusive than others. The Vietnam War led to greater assertiveness by the Congress through the War Powers Resolution and by the uniformed military through doctrine and criteria on the use of force. We have now reached a stage where, some analysts argue, the U.S. military has an implicit veto over the use of force because their acquiescence is necessary to gain public support and avoid political embarrassment.

This class explores the limits and proper roles for military and civilian officials in matters involving the use of force. We want you to compare and contrast George Marshall's dealings with Franklin Roosevelt with those between Colin Powell and Dick Cheney and George Bush. We also want you to consider the role of civilians in the planning process for possible use of force.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. What role should civilians have in the development and execution of plans for the combat use of military forces?
- ◆ 2. At what point does civilian involvement in operational planning become inappropriate interference?
- ◆ 3. Are there any differences between civilian and military views on what should be the criteria for the use of force?

4. What significant lessons can you draw from the historical examples?

REQUIRED READINGS:

a. Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press Morningside Edition, 1991), pp. 3-15, 208-236. (Reprint)

b. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (NY: The Free Press, 2002), pp. 173-207. (Student Issue)

c. Louis Fisher, "Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 94/95, Vol 109, Issue 5, p 739, 24 pgs (Reprint)

TOPIC 6

DOMESTIC MISSIONS

Tuesday
15 February 2005
1535-1730

During our first century, U.S. military forces were frequently involved in domestic activities, from water projects to strike-breaking and law enforcement to occupation of the Confederate States after the Civil War. In reaction to what were seen as abuses during Reconstruction, however, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act forbidding the use of troops for domestic law enforcement unless specifically authorized by law.

Exceptions have been enacted over the years: for the Coast Guard; for counter-drug activities; for insurrections and natural disasters; and for specific and limited purposes. But the basic law has remained essentially unchanged, with additional language barring the use of armed forces to make arrests or conduct searches and seizures.

In recent years there have been increased pressures to assign more domestic missions to the Pentagon. Homeland security is the new buzz word. The recent establishment of U.S. Northern Command raises the visibility even more. Advocates stress the ready and effective capabilities of U.S. forces as well as the greater resources still available to the Department of Defense compared with domestic agencies. Opponents argue that such activities degrade combat readiness and undermine the warrior ethos. The debate has become emotional and almost theological at times.

This class confronts the debate and asks you to weigh the competing views. One of the readings even poses a scenario for a breakdown in civilian control as a likely consequence of expanded domestic missions.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. What are the consequences of using U.S. military personnel in domestic operations, including law enforcement?
- ◆ 2. Are there any domestic missions which should be curtailed or abandoned because of their adverse impacts?
- ◆ 3. Are there any domestic missions that should be undertaken or expanded?

- ◆ 4. Do domestic missions preserve force structure in an era of budgetary cutbacks? Do they siphon off resources needed to maintain combat readiness?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in Richard H. Kohn, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (NY: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 120-150. (Reprint)
- b. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* (Winter 1992-3), pp. 2-21. (Reprint)
- c. Adam Liptak, "Posse Comitatus Act Limits Armed Services at Home," *The New York Times*, (July 21 2002), 1 pp. (Reprint)
- d. Eric Schmitt, "Wider Military Role in U.S. is Urged," *The New York Times*, (July 21 2002), 3 pps. (Reprint)
- e. Donald J. Currier, "The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic from the Post-Reconstruction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation?," *Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sep 2003. 20 pgs. (Reprint)

SUPPLEMENTARY REFERENCE READING:

Charles Doyle, "The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law," *CRS Report to Congress*, (September 12, 1996).

TOPIC 7

THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA

Tuesday
22 February 2005
1330-1525

“Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets”

-- Napoleon

“Vietnam was the first war ever fought without any censorship. Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the public mind”

-- General William Westmoreland

“In war, truth is the first casualty”

-- Aeschylus

Secrecy and deception are endemic to military operations, but anathema to public relations. Especially in the United States, with our First Amendment guarantees of a free press, political leaders are obligated to inform the public about national security policy and military activities.

Elected officials are usually experienced and comfortable dealing with the media, but career officers are not. These differences can create tense situations for which there are no easy answers. Even if military personnel and their civilian superiors agree on the need for secrecy or for a particular spin to be put on a certain topic, those in uniform may feel uncomfortable contributing to misleading comments.

This class examines some of the common dilemmas which military personnel may face in dealing with the media and some of the suggestions offered for resolving them.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. What limits, if any, can military leaders impose on the freedom of the press?
- ◆ 2. Did embedding of reporters in Iraq help or hurt the conduct of the war and U.S. public support for it?
- ◆ 3. Should officers ever knowingly mislead the press or public?

- ◆ 4. What is the best way to handle bad news about something in your area of responsibility?

REQUIRED READINGS:

a. Bernard Trainor, "The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace," *Parameters* (December 1990), pp. 2-11. (Reprint)

b. Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team; The Odd Couple – A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*, (Nashville TN: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), pp. 23-28, 35-40, 63-69. (Reprint)

c. James Lacey, "Who's Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Oct 2004, pg. 37 (Reprint)

d. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Media and the Military," *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov 2004, pg 38 (Reprint)

TOPIC 8

PROMOTIONS AND THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Tuesday
1 March 2005
1330-1525

An admiral has to be put to death now and then to encourage the others.

-- Voltaire

Since the Constitution, article II, section 2, empowers the President to appoint Ambassadors, Judges and “all other officers of the United States” only with “the advice and consent of the Senate,” even the lowliest ensign or lieutenant is subject to the confirmation process. At times in the past, military commissions were granted almost like political patronage. In the modern professional armed forces, however, civilians are largely removed from all but the most senior promotions and assignments.

In recent years, the confirmation process has been occasionally politicized by Senators seeking information from or about nominees, often on subjects embarrassing to the Pentagon. Even routine promotions have been caught in the crossfire between the White House and Capitol Hill. In response, some argue that the Services have become excessively gun-shy to the point of refusing to nominate otherwise highly qualified officers whose names might provoke controversy.

This class considers the challenges to civilians and officers alike from the nature of the promotion and confirmation process.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. What role should civilians have in the promotion and assignment process?
- ◆ 2. How can officers avoid politicization of their nominations?
- ◆ 3. Should civilians take nonmilitary and nonprofessional factors into account when reviewing officer promotions?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. Douglas Kinnard, *The Certain Trumpet* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 37-83. (Reprint)
- b. Theodore Rochwell, *The Rickover Effect* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 145-157. (Reprint)
- c. George L. Vistica, *Fall From Glory—The Men Who Sank The U.S. Navy* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 138-152, and pp. 247-252. (Reprint)
- d. Daniel R. Coats and Kay Bailey Hutchinson, "Letters to the Editor: The 'Cruel' Test of Leadership," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 24, 1996, pp. A15. (Reprint)

TOPIC 9

CONGRESS AND THE U.S. MILITARY

Tuesday
8 March
1330-1525

Civilian control is not limited to the President and Secretary of Defense. Congress provides a second source through its power over resources, basic military law, declarations of war, and nominations. Indeed, until the 1950s the Services worked directly with the leaders of the military committees on the Hill to determine their force structure, equipment, and installations. Even the White House was largely excluded from the process.

President Eisenhower changed that, and supported reform legislation strengthening the power of the Secretary of Defense, power which Robert McNamara used to dominate the defense policy process despite opposition from the Chiefs of Staff. Today the pendulum has swung partly back because of enhanced powers of the Chairman of the JCS and the strengthened Joint Staff. There is still civilian control within the Pentagon, but uniformed personnel have much greater influence than in the recent past.

This class explores where to draw the line between Executive Branch and Legislative Branch control over the military.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. Can officers form coalitions with friendly members of Congress on matters of mutual interest without violating the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense?
- ◆ 2. Can officers avoid being caught up in political controversies while still being responsive to Congress?
- ◆ 3. When military officers are called to testify before Congress, should they express the "Administration's position" on matters, or should they provide their "best professional judgment" as military officers?
- ◆ 4. Should the military resist Congressional attempts to use it a testbed for social issues such as gay rights?

REQUIRED READINGS:

a. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address to the Nation, January 17, 1961," in Russell F. Weigley, *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 153-157. (Reprint)

b. Charles J. G. Griffin, "New Light on Eisenhower's Farewell Address," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Summer 1992), pp. 469-479. (Reprint)

c. Nick Kotz, *Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), Chapters. 7, 10, 11, 14, pp. 67-78, pp. 107-138, and pp. 180-199. (Reprint)

d. Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, "Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness," in Feaver and Kohn, ed., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 361-366, 386-402. (Student Issue)

TOPIC 10

PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS AND PARTISAN POLITICS

Tuesday
15 March 2005
1330-1525

I am convinced that the best service a retired general can perform is to turn in his tongue along with his suit and to mothball his opinion.

-- General Omar Bradley

To many people, the concept of civilian control within the context of American civil-military relations suggests a fairly clear demarcation between what is “civil” (read political) and what is “military” (read apolitical or professional). In reality, the boundary is not so clear and may at times be quite permeable. Where should the line be drawn with respect to military involvement in political activities?

The ambiguities in this issue are apparent. Consider, for example, the cases of retired military officers becoming involved in elective politics; or the political activism of the various military associations that act as interest groups fronting for their respective departments (the Association of the United States Army, the Air Force Association, the Navy League); or the several ways in which active military officers have become involved in contemporary partisan political issues. What is the principle we should adopt to decide where to draw the line?

This topic will allow us to explore how and why we should distinguish between what is appropriate or not regarding the question of military involvement in politics.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. Does political activism on the part of retired military officers run counter to the concept of civilian control of the military establishment? Does an officer cease to become a member of the “military profession” on retirement?
- ◆ 2. Is the concept of civilian control of the military establishment subverted by the lobbying of the various military interest groups (e.g., the Association of the United States Army, the Air Force Association, the Navy League, the Retired Officers Association)?
- ◆ 3. Was it appropriate for a group of retired flag officers to endorse presidential candidates in 1992, 2000 and 2004?

- ◆ 4. Is it appropriate for the CJCS to detail a number of active military officers to serve on the Hill as staff assistants to Members of Congress?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. William B. Skelton, "Officers and Politicians: The Origins of Army Politics in the United States before the Civil War," in Peter Karsten, ed., *The Military in America*, rev. ed. (NY: The Free Press, 1986), 89-110. (Reprint)
- b. Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policymaking: Is There a Civil-Military Gap at the Top? If So, Does it Matter?," in Feaver and Kohn, ed., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 403-428. (Student Issue)
- c. Richard H. Kohn, "General Elections," *Washington Post*, 19 September 2000, pp. 23. (Reprint)
- d. "Military Endorsements," News Hour With Jim Lehrer News Hour, PBS TV, 6:00 PM, September 25, 2000, pp. 1-3. (Reprint)
- e. Philip Gold, "Politics And The Military," *Washington Times*, 6 October 2000, pp. 1-2. (Reprint)
- f. John M. Shalikashvili, "Old Soldiers Don't Have to Fade Away," *Wall Street Journal*, Aug 17 2004, pg A12 (Reprint)
- g. Gordon W. Keiser, "Fracturing Military Professionalism with Politics," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 28 2004 (Reprint)
- h. Brad Knickerbocker, "Military Officer Corps: Too Political?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 28 2004 (Reprint)

TOPIC 11

IMPACT OF CHANGES IN WAR AND DEMOCRACY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Tuesday
22 March 2005
1330-1525

There is a serious debate over what our armed forces should do and how war should be fought. There appears to be a lack of consensus on what we use our military forces for and how we use them. This lack of consensus can drive a wedge between civil and military leaders. In addition, information technologies are changing the nature of both war and civil society. One scholar goes so far as to suggest these changes may require us to reevaluate the laws of war.

Other scholars suggest that we are moving to a “postmodern military,” that has an increasingly constabulary role using limited force for limited political objectives. Critics of this approach maintain that war fighting must always remain our primary mission, and that humanitarian missions have a corrosive effect on the military profession. Still others suggest that technology has fundamentally changed warfare and that these changes will shape the use of force and the type of military profession we will need in the future.

While we cannot predict the future, we can try and understand the trends that effect society and the profession of arms so that we can anticipate the challenges to the profession of arms and good civil-military relations.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. Can our armed forces be both peacekeepers and trained warriors? If we have to prioritize the functions of the military, on what basis do we do it?
- ◆ 2. Does modern technology allow civilians to use the military instrument more often? How will information technologies that affect the nature of war and democracy affect civil-military relations?
- ◆ 3. How should civil-military relations change to deal with an ongoing war against terrorism?
- ◆ 4. What, if any, unique strains do the complexities and ambiguities associated with conflict termination impose on civil-military relations?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. Moskos, Charles, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-31. (Reprint)
- b. General John Shalikashvili, "The Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping," *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 2000), pp. 387-411. (Reprint)
- c. Don M. Snider, "America's Postmodern Military," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2000), pp. 47-54. (Reprint)
- d. Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End*, (NY:Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 84-105. (Reprint)

TOPIC 12

MILITARIES AND SOCIETIES

Tuesday
29 march 2005
1330-1525

In recent years, expressions of concern regarding the current state of civil-military relations within the United States perhaps have been more evident than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. Many contradictory trends seem apparent:

- the effectiveness and professionalism of the U.S. armed forces seems to be perhaps at an historic high;
- the social relationship between the armed forces and broader American society seems increasingly attenuated;
- the political influence of the military establishment seems, if anything, to have increased;
- the relationship between civilian and military leaders within our government seems more often to be a difficult one.

Should we be concerned by the current relationship between our civilian leaders and our armed forces, or more generally, between American society and our military establishment?

Our concluding session will look broadly across all of the topics we have considered and will strive to reach some conclusions and derive some recommendations regarding the current state of civil-military relations within the United States.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- ◆ 1. Has the American military become “alienated” from American society?
- ◆ 2. Should we be concerned by the state of civil-military relations in the United States today?
- ◆ 3. Does the military function as a distinct interest group within the American political scene today? Should it?

- ◆ 4. What advice would you give the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on how they should strive to foster a healthy relationship with their civilian political leaders?
- ◆ 5. How much consideration should civilian policy makers give to military advice while attempting to drive transformation?
- ◆ 6. Is the American model of Civ-Mil relations the norm or the exception among democracies?

REQUIRED READINGS:

- a. "A Letter from Samuel Adams" in Peter Karsten, ed., *The Military in America*, rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, (1986), pp. 59-61. (Reprint)
- b. Leonard Wood, "The Civil Obligation of the Army" in Russell F. Weigley, ed., *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, Company, 1969), pp. 41-49. (Reprint)
- c. James A. Barber, Jr., "The Social Effects of Military Service" in Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., *The Military and American Society* (NY: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 151-165. (Reprint)
- d. Mathew M. Oyos, "Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, and the Military: U.S. Civil-Military Relations in the Early Twentieth Century," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Spring 2000), pp. 312-329. (Reprint)
- e. "Rumsfeld's 'Defense Inc' Reasserts Civilian Control," *Washington Times*, 24 April 2001, p. 1-3. (Reprint)
- f. William M. Arkin, "Rumsfeld Stumbles," *Washingtonpost.com*, 26 March 2001, pp.1-3. (Reprint)
- g. R. Jeffery Smith and Josh White, "General's Speech Broke Rules," *The Washington Post*, Aug 19 2004, pg 23 (Reprint)