Lecture on
Anselm’s Ontological Argument [~1077-1078]
Copyright © 2015 Bruce W.
Hauptli |
1. Introduction to
the Medieval Period:
As I indicted when I briefly treated this topic earlier,
the best way to understand the Medieval period is by adopting the metaphor
contained in the title of Arthur Lovejoy’s
The Great Chain of Being.[1]
This world-view emphasized a static picture of the universe and of our
place in it. The universe was
viewed as a rational whole where there was a complete agreement of faith and
reason. This view emphasized talk
of heavenly spheres, relied upon Aristotelian science and logic, relied upon
feudal social conditions, and had could easily countenance the uniqueness
condition entailed by the phrase “The
Church.” Each individual knew
his/her place—sons and daughters did not have to worry about what their future
career would be! Latin commentaries
of earlier authors were studied in the universities.
In short, this world-view offered a teleological conception of the
universe where value and fact infused one another.
The medieval conception of nature was largely Aristotelian.
As Michael Matthews says,
central to Aristotle’s thought is
his concept of nature. This was
essentialistic and
teleological.
Nature was not just matter moving around as a result of random pushes and
pulls (materialism), nor was it an unintelligible and imperfect shadow of some
other perfect realm (Platonism).
Nature was differentiated into various species and objects, all of them had
their own internal and essential dynamic
for change....Their alteration was the progressive, teleological
actualization of a preexisting potential.
The universe was finite, closed, hierarchically ordered, and all its
constituents were fixed. Everything
had its own preordained purpose.
In appropriate circumstances, the
acorn would develop through an internally generated process of natural change.
Likewise, when not interfered with, heavy objects would naturally move to their
natural place at the centre of the earth.
Science was largely concerned with the understanding of these natural
changes in the world. The
contrasting violent or chance changes were of little interest to philosophers,
as they did not reveal anything of the object’s nature.[2]
Think of the difference between having the
growth of an acorn and the
falling of a ball-bearing as your
scientific model and you can come to a better understanding of the contrast
between the Aristotelian and Medieval world-views, on the one hand, and the
early modern world view, on the other.
The Aristotelian notion of causation involves a compilation of four
distinct notions:
the material cause—what a thing
is made of,
the formal cause—how a thing is
structured,
the efficient cause—the source of
the thing, and
the final cause—the goal/purpose
of the thing.
As Basil Willey points out, this conception of nature led to views of
science and motion which are unfamiliar to us today:
St. Thomas [Aquinas], following
Aristotle, treats motion as a branch of metaphysics; he is
interested in
why it happens, not
how.
He discusses it in terms of ‘act’ and ‘potency’, quoting Aristotle’s
definition of it as ‘the act of that which is in potentiality, as such.’
Motion exists, then because things in a state of potentiality seek to
actualize themselves, or because they seek the place or direction which is
proper to them....To every body in
respect of its ‘form’, is ‘due’ a ‘proper place’, towards which it tends to move
in a straight line.[3]
For the Medieval philosophers, the Aristotelian picture of
the universe was firmly rooted in a religious context which was absent in
Aristotle’s own thought. For the
Medievals, at the core of the metaphysical picture of the universe was a deity
who was the cause, the reason, and
the provider of purpose and goodness
for everything. This deity is
infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and
all-good (or all moral), and the
uncaused cause of everything.
In a word, this deity was perfect.
2. Introduction to
Anselm: [1033-1109]:
St. Anselm was born in 1033 in Aosta (in Piedmont—now in
Italy).[4]
In 1060 he entered the Benedictine monastery at Bec, in Normandy, which
was then under the mastership of Lanfranc [1005?-1089, Master at Bec from
1042-1063]. Lanfranc was one of the
most noted teachers of the period and his many students came to occupy central
roles throughout Europe. Anselm
spent thirty-three years at the monastery, and when Lanfranc left in 1063, he
became the Prior (an officer in a monastic order just below the level of the
Abbot—who is the head or superior).
In 1078 Anselm became the Abbot of Bec.
Lanfranc was brought to England by William the Conqueror in 1070 as
Archbishop of Canterbury and served thus until his death in 1089.
In 1093 Anselm was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury.
It was hoped, by William II, that he would be a pawn in the hands of the
King and the other bishops. The
issues which surrounded his appointment (and the issue which he disagreed upon
with two British Kings) had to do with the relative authority of the King and
the bishops (over who appointed the Bishops—the King or the Pope), and Anselm
was (briefly) exiled during the reigns of both William II and of Henry I (the
brother of William II) during the sixteen years he served as Archbishop.[5]
Anselm was canonized in 1494.
Sources provide much contradictory information about the man and his
life. I believe the most consistent
picture which emerges shows him to be, first and foremost, a devout monk of the
highest ability. We will see his
philosophic ability shortly, but he was also a most accomplished administrator.
At least one source denies this because as Archbishop he is exiled
several times; but others hold that the actual story here attests to both his
renown as an administrator and his piety. Anselm
was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury.
Anselm was also a very well-known
and popular preacher, and his prayers
were so sought-after that there were many attributed to him that he did not
write, and scholars have had difficulty distinguishing those which are really
his from those which were said to be such.[6]
We get a flavor of this aspect of his writing in the “Prologue” and in
“Chapter 1” of our readings. But we
need to stop discussing his life, and begin to discuss his philosophical
accomplishment.
In discussing the philosophy of religion, it is important to distinguish
the approaches of philosophers and of
theologians to religious questions.
Theologians and philosophers need not differ on the questions that they
ask, nor need they offer differing answers to these questions.
As was noted earlier in this course, the distinguishing characteristic of
the philosophic enterprise is the use of a
dialectical methodology.
This commitment may be evinced in a large number of different ways
however. As Peter Gay notes in his
The Enlightenment: An Interpretation
Anselm’s philosophical orientation near the middle of the Medieval period was
similar to that of St. Augustine [353-403] at the beginning of this period:
...just as Augustine recommended
the gradual replacement of pagan by Christian classics, and the expurgation of
all obnoxious passages from ancient literature, so his very commendation of the
human understanding has a new and unclassical tone.
Ipsum credere nihil aliud est quam
cum assensione cogitare—“to
believe is itself nothing but to cogitate with assent,” might be read
(and has been read by [Christian] apologists)[7]
as the demand that religious faith be tested by rational investigation.
But the statement is antithetical to [the] antique [that is,
ancient]...conception of philosophy: it stresses, not the
will to criticism, but the
will to believe.
Augustine sees man as unhappy; puzzled by himself, his world, and his
destiny. All men want happiness,
and all philosophers seek the way to it, but without divine aid all fail:
“Thou
has made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rest in Thee”—this
famous exclamation from [Augustine’s]...Confessions
is the exclamation of a tormented soul weary of mere thought, weary of autonomy,
yearning for the sheltering security found in dependence on higher powers.
When Augustine speaks of
understanding or reason, these
words have a religious admixture: philosophy to him is touched by the divine.[8]
But Augustine’s dictum
stands the traditional method of classical philosophizing on its head:
God, who to the ancients was the
result of thought, now becomes its
presupposition. Faith is
not the reward of understanding; understanding is the reward of faith.
Man may search for the explanation of his situation by his humble reason;
he may even try to order his moral conduct through the understanding.
But the explanation for the human condition is a myth—the Fall; the guide
to his salvation is a supernatural being—Jesus Christ; the proof text for the
primacy of faith over reason is a divinely inspired book—the
Bible; and the interpreter of this
Book is an infallible authority—the Church.
All four testify to the collapse of [ancient philosophers’] confidence in
man’s unaided intellect.
Hence, nisi credideritis, non
intelligetis: “unless
you believe, you will not understand.”[9]
This injunction is the center of Augustine’s doctrine on the relation of
philosophy to theology, and through its enormous authority, it became the center
of medieval speculation on the same subject, although the Scholastics, as the
philosophers knew, provided intellect with much room for play....But faith [for
Anselm] imposed on the believer the obligation to strive within his limited
means to understand what he believes.
True faith is a kind of love, the highest kind of love, and a true lover
does not love ignorantly: like all other medieval philosophers, Anselm accepted
Aristotle’s dictum that man naturally
strives for knowledge.[10]
We can see Anselm’s adherence to the Augustinian doctrine,
and get a feeling of how different this reading is from the others we have
examined thus far by looking at the end of Chapter 1 of his
Proslogion:
414-415 I acknowledge, Lord, and
I thank you, that you have created in me this image of you so that I may
remember you, think of you, and love you.
Yet this image is so eroded by my vices, so clouded by the smoke of my
sins, that it cannot do what it was created to do unless you renew and refashion
it. I am not trying to scale your
heights, Lord; my understanding is in no way equal to that.
But I do long to understand your truth in some way, your truth which my
heart believes and loves. For I do
not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand.
For I also believe that “Unless I believe, I shall not understand.[11]
There are several things that are important in this passage
and they clearly place him in the Augustinian tradition:
first, Anselm clearly indicates
here, and throughout the selection, his piety;
second, he clearly reminds the
reader, who would need no reminding, of course, of the terrible distance which
lies between us and the transcendent being he is discussing—a distance caused by
our sinful condition, and a distance which, tragically, separates us from our
true good;
third, Anselm clearly indicates
that the transcendent realm is beyond his limited understanding, and
distinguishes his efforts at understanding from extreme human hubris; and
fourth, he indicates how
important understanding, based, of course, upon the rock of faith, is to us.
In his The Awakening of Europe,
Philippe Wolff maintains that Anselm
…shows the measure of his faith
in the Monologion [soliloquy], which
he wrote for some of the monks of Bec who asked him for a
treatise on the existence and essence of
God in which everything would be proved by reason and nothing based on
scriptural authority. It is
true that Anselm began—in contrast to some dialecticians—by stating that it was
first necessary to base oneself firmly on faith, since it was the Revelation and
our faith in it which provided the essential elements for the use of reason.
We do not understand in order to believe, we believe in order to
understand.[12]
Wolff goes on to note that:
St. Anselm’s technical
innovations were no less remarkable than the quality of his work.
Other theologians of the period leaned heavily on the authority of the
Scriptures and the Fathers, and their writings resemble a series of quotations
linked with commentary. Even
Abelard [1079-1142], an innovative and extremely controversial figure of the
period] was still using this method.
Anselm certainly studied his sources, but he had assimilated them to the
point where they became the very flesh of his own thought.
What we find in him is therefore a chain of private reasoning.
His work is a ‘rational exploration of dogma’, far in advance of his
time, and already looking forward to the thirteenth century.[13]
In his Saint Anselm: A Portrait In
A Landscape, R.W. Southern maintains that for Anselm:
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by nature, the goal is prior to
the method, for Man was created in the image of God and the first aim of all
meditation was to revive this obfuscated image.
But in the state of sin, which is the present state of mankind, the
penitential stage of horror at the deformation of the image of God in the soul
must come first: only then can the reaching out to God begin.[14]
Nearly everything of permanent
value in Anselm’s later writings presupposes an initial introspection.
In one direction, introspection
leads to horror of self; in the other direction, it provides
the knowledge of being which leads to
knowledge of God. In his two
great meditations...Monologion and Proslogion, he proceeded to the knowledge of
God. But in the earliest
Prayers and
Meditations, we are only at the first
stage, when the soul is torn between terror and joy, with the former greatly
predominating....[15]
After citing part of Chapter I of Anselm’s
Proslogion [soliloquy], Southern
cites the following passage from the monk Eadmer’s biography of Anselm (Vita
Anselmi [~1124]):
he also wrote a little
book he called Monologion because in
it he alone speaks and argues with himself.
Here, putting aside all authority of Holy Scripture, he inquired and
discovered by reason alone what God is; and he proved by invincible reasoning
that God’s nature is what true faith holds it to be, and moreover that it could
not be other than it is. Then
(after writing it) it came into his mind to try to prove by one single and short
argument the things which are believed and preached about God—that he is
eternal, unchangeable, omnipotent, omnipresent, incomprehensible, just,
merciful, righteous, true, as well as Truth, Goodness, Justice and so on; and to
show how all these qualities are united in him.
And this, as he himself would say, gave him great trouble, partly because
thinking about it took away his desire for food, drink, and sleep, and
partly—and this was more grievous to him—because it disturbed the attention
which he ought to have paid to Matins[16]
and to divine Office. When he was
aware of this, and still could not entirely lay hold on what he sought, he
supposed that this line of thought was a temptation of the devil, and he tried
to banish it from his mind. But the
more vehemently he tried to do this, the more these thoughts crowded in on him.
Then suddenly one night during Matins, the grace of God shone on his
heart, the whole matter became clear to his mind, and a great joy and jubilation
filled his inmost being.[17]
Commenting on this passage, Southern maintains that:
he [Anselm] had already, in his
Monologion, succeeded in showing that
God necessarily had all those qualities that are ascribed to Him in Christian
doctrine. But he had not shown that
all of them are necessarily united in the being of God....he had demonstrated
the necessary existence of the properties of God, but not the necessary
existence of the single Being in whom these properties cohered.
This is what he aimed at doing in his
Proslogion.[18]
The Fool, who has denied that God
exists in any sense of the word, is now reduced to a very pitiable state.
He thought he understood the meaning of the word ‘God’, and of sentences
like ‘God does not exist’. But if
the [ontological] argument is valid, the predicate ‘does not exist’ contradicts
the subject ‘God’, of whom nonexistence cannot be predicated without
contradiction. So the Fool has been
using words without understanding the things to which they refer.[19]
Similarly, Peter Gay maintains that:
Anselm made it plain that his
famous proof for the existence of God...was not designed to demonstrate God to
unbelievers or to strengthen the faith of waverers.
There could be no doubts of the fundamental Christian truths.
But faith imposed on the believer the obligation to strive within his
limited means to understand what he believes.
True faith is a kind of love, the highest kind of love, and a true lover
does not love ignorantly: like all other medieval philosophers, Anselm accepted
Aristotle’s dictum that man naturally strives for knowledge.
[20]
The fundamental theological belief which motivated Anselm’s thought was
the belief that the universe is completely dependent upon a deity’s creative
power and that the nature and purpose of the universe are determined by this
deity’s nature and reason. Given
the importance attached to such a deity, he finds it important to be able to
rationally understand that there is
such a being. Moreover, this deity
can not
simply be, it must
exist
necessarily according to him.
In his ontological argument, Anselm does not claim that his deity
has the characteristics of wisdom,
goodness, etc.—to claim this would be to put “universals” over and above this
deity. Instead, he claims that when
you speak of his deity saying “God
is good”
(unlike saying “Socrates is good”), you are using the ‘is’
of identity (instead of the ‘is’ of
predication).
Whereas Socrates may have the
characteristic of being good, Anselm’s deity literally is goodness.
To try and put this point another way, when he says that “our” view of
this deity is that he/she/it is something perfect, Anselm is not saying that we
have an idea of each of the perfections and of that which is all of these
things. Instead,
all we need is the idea of perfection
itself.
Here, then we need to distinguish:
-the
“ís” of predication (the paper is white, the man is dangerous), which
attributes a property of something;
-the
“is” identity (2+2 is 4, Clark Kent is
Superman), which says one thing is identical with another one; and
-the
“is” of existence (the Higgs Boson exists, there are unicorns), and here
we will have to distinguish between
necessary and contingent
existence! To understand this
concept of “necessary existence,” we should first consider how we can answer
this question: “How do we know that there are no round squares?”
Note that while it is generally difficult to
prove the nonexistence of a type of thing, but where there are
contradictory properties attributed to something this task becomes significantly
less onerous. Note, also, that the
normal way of proving the existence of something is to produce it.
In the case of necessary existence, however, something “logical” is again
called for.
T Y P E S |
Necessary Things (their nonexistence is not
possible—they can not not be) |
Contingent Actual Things (they really are,
were, or will be) |
Contingent Possible Things (they could be
[could have been], but are not [were not, will
not be] |
Impossible Things (their existence is
not
possible—they have contradictory properties)
|
|
Status |
Must
exist |
Do
exist |
Could
exist |
Can not
exist |
|
E X A M P L E S |
Anselm’s Deity (there are
no other things in this category according to
Anselm) |
Empire State Building, the
Planet Mars, dogs, St. Anselm |
Living dinosaurs in Miami
in 2014, a socialist utopia, a different
instructor for this section |
Round squares, married
bachelors |
|
L O C A T I O N |
This thing
exists
in reality, and
might
also exist in the understanding—its existence is
independent of “thought;” though some of us
may
also have it in our understanding.
|
These things
exist in
reality, and
might
also exist in the understanding—their existence
is independent of “thought;” though some of them
may
also exist in our human understanding.
|
These things
don’t
exist in reality, but
may
exist in
thought.
The “possible things,” of course,
could
exist in reality, but they don’t.
|
They are “impossible things”—they
can not
exist in reality because they are
contradictory.
|
|
Some philosophers hold that they
might
exist in thought.
That is we can have “conceptual knowledge
here.
|
Some philosophers hold that they
can’t
exist in thought.
That is their existence is ruled out in
all categories of existence.
|
||||
◄═Direction
of increasing [absolute] “reality” or “greatness”
|
Zero
degree of absolute greatness
|
Note that the “degree of reality” of “impossible things” is
“zero”—they are
absolutely unreal.
Because they “can not be,” they
have no degree of greatness—the idea of “greater” can only apply in first
three columns—they are all “possible” (and, thus, differ in that “possible
contingent things” could be “actual
contingent things;” and “actual contingent things” could be “better”
could be “necessary things.”
The “impossible things” can not be better because they “can
not be” (to any degree, and what can not be, can not be “better”).
An important component of Anselm’s proof (in whatever version one
considers) is the notion of “being better.”
As Copleston notes:
...to be gold is better for gold
than to be lead, but it would not be better for a man to be made of gold.
To be corporeal is better than to be nothing at all, but it would not be
better for a spirit to be corporeal rather than incorporeal.
To be gold is better than not to
be gold only relatively, and to be corporeal rather than non-corporeal is
better only relatively. But it is
absolutely better to be wise than not to be wise, living than non-living, just
than not-just. We must, then
predicate wisdom, life, justice, of the supreme Being, but we cannot predicate
corporeality or gold of the supreme Being.[22]
In discussing his use of
“greater,” note that it
really doesn’t apply to the
impossible things.
The only things that can
be greater are the possible,
actual, and, I guess, necessary
things.
The “impossible things”
can’t be greater because they
are impossible.
This is why he needs,
really, to show, first, that his
deity is at least a possible
thing before he can go on to use
the notion of “greater” in his
proof!
|
One of the “reasons” for maintaining that there must be “something” in
the category of Necessary Things is that the question “What explains (or causes)
“it all”?” seems to need an answer.
But, clearly, the answer can not be any “ordinary [or contingent] thing” (as
it would, then, need an explanation
or cause), and this provides a powerful motive for believing in the existence of
such a [necessary] thing. But, as
noted above, Anselm wants not only to believe, he wants to
rationally understand.
Bertrand Russell and the “turtle” episode.
To fully digest
the Ontological Argument, we need to return to the above chart and talk about
kinds of “truths” as well as kinds of “existence.”
The two opposite ends of the chart characterize two very different, but
related, truths:
Necessary Things |
Actual Things |
Possible Things |
Impossible Things |
|
|
|
|
Necessary Truths |
Contingent Truths |
Contingent Falsehoods |
Necessary Falsehoods |
Denial: a necessary falsehood—that is, a
contradiction.
|
Denial: a contingent falsehood.
|
Denial: a contingent
truth.
|
Denial: a necessary truth.
|
▲
▲
▲
▲
│
│ contraries (if one is
true, then the other is │ │
│
│ false
(but they cannot both be true)
│
│
│
└───────────────────────┘
│
│
“logical”
opposites (contradictories)
│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The denial of a “necessary falsehood” (a contradiction) is
a “necessary truth” (or “logical truth”).
For example if I deny the contradictory statement that “squares have four
sides (“It is not the case that squares don’t have four sides”), that is
equivalent to stating the logical or necessary truth that “squares have four
sides. The importance of this
relationship is that the denial of a necessary falsehood is not simply true, it
is necessarily true.
This is important in this context because Anselm doesn’t simply want to
“prove” that his deity exists, he wants to establish
necessary existence.
Thus he wants to establish the fool’s contradiction (when the fool
asserts that the deity doesn’t exist) so that the denial of this contradiction
(the assertion that the deity exists) is necessarily true—which would mean that
the deity doesn’t simply “exist,” but exists
necessarily.
Anselm’s proof goes like this:
1. God
is perfect [STWNGCBT].[23]
2. “The fool”
denies god’s existence.[24]
3. To do so,
“the fool” must have an idea of god.
4. This idea
must be understood; that is, this idea must be “in
the understanding.”
5. The fool
contends that the idea is in
the understanding alone—that it is
not “in
reality.”
6. But this
can not be true.
If the idea were in the understanding
alone (or simply), there could be
something “greater” (or “better”) than perfection [STWNGCBT].
That is, there could be
something else which existed both
in reality and
in the understanding,
and it would be SGTSTWNGCBT!
7. But, of
course, this is
contradictory.
8. Therefore,
God
necessarily
exists.
In discussing “in the
understanding” question whether
all of the following are “in the
understanding” in
the same way: round squares,
non-actualized possible things,
actually existing things, and
necessary truths.
Might it not well be the
case that what we “have” in the
first case is only an
understanding of the
incompatibility of the concepts?
Understanding and
investigating this is very
important given that when tied
with “greater” this notion is
doing a lot of the “work” of the
proof.
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In discussing his use of “greater,” note that it really doesn’t apply to the impossible things. The only things that can be greater are the possible, actual, and, I guess, necessary things. The “impossible things” can’t be greater because they are impossible. This is why he needs, really, to show, first, that his deity is at least a possible thing before he can go on to use the notion of “greater” in his proof!
|
Another hierarchical Another hierarchical sequence may be of assistance in understanding his view of “greatness:” one could assert that Anselm believes that something that exists and has a beginning and end is good [much better than something that does not, or could not, exist]. Moreover, something that exists that has a beginning and no end is greater still. And, finally, something that has neither beginning nor end is yet greater
Regarding “the fool:” in his “Introduction: The Life and Times of
Erasmus,” W.T. H. Jackson maintains that:
for the Middle ages, folly was
inevitably connected with sin.
Behavior was judged not so much from its social aspects as for the ultimate
effect on the destiny of the immortal soul.
Foolish acts were sinful acts, even if the sin was minor, for all of them
could be categorized as outward manifestations of inward vices.[25]
To fully digest the Ontological
Argument, we need to return to the above chart and talk about kinds of “truths”
as well as kinds of “existence.”
The two opposite ends of the chart characterize two very different, but related,
truths:
R.W. Southern maintains that:
...there is a fundamental
difficulty, already perceptible in the
Proslogion [Anselm’s earlier book] and now more than ever disturbing [that
is, in his later discussion of “the Incarnation”]: in speaking about the
activity of God in relation to created beings, some of the words which must be
used, like ‘cannot’ and ‘ought not’, seem to suggest a limit to God’s
omnipotence. What Anselm intends to
suggest, but has no words which will accurately convey, is that there are some
acts—such as acts of injustice—which would be a diminishing of God’s absolute
Being, and therefore must be excluded from consideration, not because of any
limitation in god, but because of defects inherent in the acts themselves.[26]
Frederick Copleston offers a “syllogistic” version of Anselm’s argument:
God is that than which no greater
can be thought.
But that than which no greater
can be thought must exist not only mentally, in idea, but also extra-mentally.
Therefore God exists, not only in idea, mentally, but also
extra-mentally.
The Major Premise [the first one above] simply gives the idea of God, the
idea which a man has of God, even if he denies His existence.
The Minor Premise [the second one above] is clear, since if that than
which no greater can be thought existed only in the mind, it would not be that
than which no greater can be thought.
A greater could be thought, i.e., a being that existed in extra-mental
reality as well as in idea.[27]
In his “Big-Bang Theology, God Makes A Cosmological Comeback,” Jim Holt
offers a succinct summary of Anselm’s argument:
the ontological argument says
that God exists by his very nature, for he possesses all perfections, and it is
more perfect to exist than not to exist.”[28]
3. The
Text—Proslogion [Discourse] [~1077-1078]:
Prologue:
430 His goal: he wants to
demonstrate that his deity truly exists; that he requires nothing but himself to
be; and that he is supremely good.
Chapter I:
430-431 In this chapter Anselm
makes the reader aware of our wretchedness (because of original sin), of how far
we are removed from the deity and from our “good,” and of the need for an
understanding of that which we take on faith.
-431-432 “I acknowledge,
Lord, and I thank you, that you have created in me this image of you so that I
may remember you, think of you, and love you.
Yet this image is so eroded by my vices, so clouded by the smoke of my
sins, that it cannot do what it was created to do unless you renew and refashion
it. I am not trying to scale your
heights, Lord: my understanding is in no way equal to that.
But I do long to understand your truth in some way, your truth that my
heart believes and loves. For I do
not seek to understand in order to believe, I believe in order to understand.
For I also believe that “unless I believe, I shall not understand.”
Chapter II:
432 “...we believe You to be
something than which nothing greater could be thought.”
(STWNGBT)
-‘Greater’ = ‘more perfect’ or
‘better’.
Even the fool, who denies god
exists, “...understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his
understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists [in reality].”[29]
“So, even the fool must admit
that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists at least in his
understanding, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is
understood exists in the understanding.
And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist only
in the understanding. For if it
exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as well,
which is greater. So if that than
which a greater cannot be thought
exists only in the understanding, then that than which a greater cannot be
thought it is that than which a greater
can be thought. But that is
clearly impossible. Therefore,
there is no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists
both in the understanding and in reality.”
Chapter III:
Here Anselm revisits the argument of Chapter II and cuts it
to its core elements:
“This [being] exists so truly
that it cannot be thought not to exist.
For it is possible to think that something exists that
cannot be thought not to exist, and
such a being is greater than one that can be thought not to exist.
Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought not to exist,
then that than which a greater cannot be thought is
not that than which a greater cannot
be thought; and this is a contradiction.
So that than which a greater
cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to exist.
And this is you, O Lord our God.”
-Note that mountains and
valleys go together—one can’t have the one without the other.
Of course one can have neither.
-Note, similarly, that
convex and concave surfaces go together, though one could have neither.
-Now note that the notion
of an all-perfect being and existence similarly, he contends, must go together.
Here, however, it doesn’t make sense to say that “one could have
neither”—the pair involve existence.
-Just as the “essence” of
the deity precludes immorality,
ignorance, or
impotence, so it precludes
nonexistence.
Whereas in the case of
everything else (all other essences), it is possible to separate the “thing’s
character” and its existence, here this is not possible.
Of course the “impossibility”
referred to here is the strongest sort—the assertion that the all-perfect
being does not exist entails a
contradiction!
If you wish to delve further in to the argument, and the
attempts to formulate it carefully, I recommend the
article on
the argument in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Chapter IV:
How does the fool make his
mistake?
432-433 “...there must
be more than one way in which something is ‘said in one’s heart’ or ‘thought’.
In one sense of the word, to think a thing is to think the word that
signifies that thing. But in
another sense, it is to understand what exactly the thing is.
God can be thought not to exist in the first sense, but not in the second
sense.”
Regarding the
Remaining Chapters V-XXVI:
In these Chapters Anselm
clarifies other “attributes” (or “perfections” or characteristics”) of this
being which necessarily exists. In
his A History of Philosophy,
Frederick Copleston notes that for Anselm all of these characteristics or
attributes are “contained implicitly” in the ideal of “a perfect being” [“a
being [thing] than which no greater can be thought”]:
St. Anselm wanted his
argument to be a demonstration of all that we believe concerning the divine
Nature, and, since the [ontological]
argument concerns the absolutely perfect Being, the attributes of God are
contained implicitly in the conclusion of the argument.
We have only to ask ourselves what is implied by the idea of a Being than
which no greater can be thought, in order to see that God
must be omnipotent, omniscient, supremely just, and so on.
Moreover, when deducing these attributes…St. Anselm gives some attention
to the clarification of the notions in question.
For example, God cannot lie: is not this a sign of lack of omnipotence?
No, he answers, to be able to lie
should be called impotence rather than power, imperfection rather than
perfection. If God could act in
a manner inconsistent with His essence, that would be a lack of power on His
part. Of course, it might be
objected that this presupposes that
we already know what God’s essence is or involves, whereas what God’s essence
is, is precisely the point to be shown; but St. Anselm would presumably reply
that he has already established that God is all-perfect and so that He is both
omnipotent and truthful: it is merely a question of showing what the omnipotence
of perfection really means and of exposing the falsity of a wrong idea of
omnipotence.[30]
Anselm maintains that we
can know that this deity:
-is
missing no kind of goodness (Ch 5):
--433 “…and so, you are just, truthful, happy, and whatever it is better to be
than not to be. For it is better to
be just than unjust, and better to be happy than unhappy.”
-can
“perceive”
(that is have knowledge)
without having a body (Ch 6),
-is
omnipotent though there are
things it can not do (cannot be
corrupted, cannot lie, cannot cause the true to be false, etc.)—because these
“activities” are actually “weaknesses” (or “imperfections”)—being “unable” to do
them, is not a weakness:
--433 “so whoever can do these things can do them, not in virtue of his power,
but in virtue of his weakness.
So when we say that he [the person who can do them, unlike the deity]
“can” do these things, it is not because he has the power to do them, but
because his weakness gives something else power over him” (Ch 7),
-can
be
merciful and yet impassible
[unaffected by emotions]:
--434 “…you are merciful, because you save the sorrowful and spare those who sin
against you; but you are also not merciful, because you are not afflicted with
any feeling of compassion for sorrow” (Ch 8),
-can
be
completely just and yet spare the wicked
(Ch 9),
-is
not a place nor a time, though all things are “in” him:
--438 “…it is not even the case that yesterday, today, and tomorrow you
are; rather,, you are simply outside
time altogether. Yesterday, today,
and tomorrow are merely in time.
But you, although nothing exists without you, do not exist in a place or a time;
rather all things exist in you. For
nothing contains you, but you contain all things” (Ch 19),
-439
alone
is what it is and who it is:
--“…you alone, Lord, are what you are; and you are who you are.
For whatever is one thing as a whole and something else in its parts, and
whatever has in it something changeable, is not entirely what it is.
And whatever began to exist out of nonexistence and can be thought not to
exist, and returns to nonexistence unless it subsists through some other being;
and whatever has a past that no longer exists and a future that does not yet
exist: that thing does not exist in a strict and absolute sense.
But you are what you are, since whatever you are in any way or at any
time, you are wholly and always that.
And you are the one who exists in
a strict and absolute sense, because you have no past and no future but only a
present, and you cannot be thought not to exist at any time” (Ch 22), and
-is
triune—that is it is one being and
three beings:
--439 “thus, whatever each of you is individually, that is what the whole
Trinity is all at once, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; for each of you
individually is nothing other than the supremely simple unity and supremely
united simplicity, which cannot be multiplied or different from itself” (Ch 23).
(end)
[1]
Cf.,
Arthur Lovejoy,
The Great
Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard U.P.,
1936).
[2] Michael
Matthews,
The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 6--emphasis is
mine.
[3] Basil
Willey,
The Seventeenth Century Background (New
York: Columbia U.P., 1967), p. 16.
[4]
Obviously, but importantly, we should no more
think of him as Italian (or French, or British),
than we should think of Plato as Greek.
We use these phrases to refer to current
political and cultural “organizations,” and
these did not exist (or did not exist in their
current form) at the time of these thinkers.
Anselm, in fact, could be better
considered as a pious monk (or as a Bishop)
whose primary “allegiance” was to a religious
rather than any political organization.
[5] The
conflict between Anselm and Kings William II and
Henry I is, in many respects, similar to the
sort of conflict which students may be familiar
with from the (later) story of Sir (and Saint)
Thomas Moore (1487-1535) and his conflict with
Henry VIII.
[6] An
excellent initial source for some of his prayers
is The Marian Spirituality of Saint Anselm,
http://campus.udayton.edu/mary/anselm.html ,
which I last accessed on July 6, 2009.
The page states that it is “maintained by The
Marian Library/International Marian Research
Institute, Dayton, Ohio 45469-1390, and created
by Michael P. Duricy,” and its discussion of his
“Three Prayers To [the Virgin] Mary is
informative.
[7] Christian
“apologists” were theologians who endeavored to
offer rational arguments and proofs for
Christianity.
[8] Peter
Gay, The
Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Rise of
Modern Paganism (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1966),
p. 230.
Emphasis added to passage twice.
[9] Gay’s
footnote here reads: “this much-quoted passage
is from the Septuagint version of the Bible,
from Isaiah, VII, 9.
All other versions translate the Hebrew
differently.
The King James Version has, “if you will not
believe, surely ye shall not be established.”
The Septuagint is an ancient Greek
version of the
Old
Testament Scriptures that
was made by between seventy and seventy-two
translators between 208 and 130 B.C.E.
Emphasis is added to the cited passage.
[10]
Ibid.,
pp. 230-231.
[11] St.
Anselm,
Proslogion, trans. Thomas Williams [1996],
in
Classics of Western Philosophy (seventh
edition), ed. Steven M. Cahn Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2006), pp. 413-424, pp. 414-415.
As Anselm notes in the “Prologue,” the
title is meant to indicate “a speech made to
another”--his earlier
Monologion was intended as a “speech to
himself.”
[12] Philippe
Wolff,
The Awakening of Europe, trans. Anne Carter
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), p. 228.
[13]
Ibid.,
p. 229.
[14] R.W.
Southern,
Saint Anselm: A Portrait In A Landscape
(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), p. 104.
[15]
Ibid.
[16] The
first of the seven canonical hours or, the
service at that time (midnight or daybreak),
morning prayer/song.
For Medieval monks, these canonical hours
represented times of mandatory communal prayer.
Matins was frequently accompanied by
lauds (marked especially by psalms/praise).
The other canonical hours are prime,
tierce, sext, nones, vespers, and chompin.
[17] The
passage from Eadmer’s
Vita
Anselmi [1114?] [as it appears in
Patrologia Latina, ed. J.P. Migne (Paris,
1844-1864) v. 158, cols. 49-120 I, xix] is from
The Life
of St. Anselm by Eadmer, trans. R.W.
Southern (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1963), pp. 29-30.
Eadmer was one of Anselm’s monks and
accompanied him from Bec to Canterbury as well
as on his various travels while Anselm was
Archbishop.
[18] R.W.
Southern,
Saint Anselm: A Portrait In A Landscape, op. cit.,
pp. 116-117.
[19]
Ibid.,
p. 130.
[20] Peter
Gay, The
Enlightenment: An Interpretation, op. cit.,
p. 231.
[21]
Cf.,
William Rowe, “The Ontological Argument,” in
Reason
and Responsibility (eighth edition), ed.
Joel Feinberg (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993), pp.
8-17.
Rowe’s article provides a very helpful
clarification of Anselm’s argument as well as a
useful discussion of a number of criticisms of
the argument.
[22]
Ibid., v. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 181-182.
[23] The
abbreviation stands for ‘that than which nothing
greater can be thought.’
[24] The
references here are to
Psalms
14:1 (“The impious fool says in his heart ‘There
is no God.’”) and 53:1 (“The impious fool says
in his heart, ‘There is no God.’”).
Citations from
The New
English Bible (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press,
1971).
[25] W.T. H.
Jackson, “Introduction: The Life and Times of
Erasmus,” in
The
Essential Works of Erasmus, ed. W.T.H.
Jackson (N.Y.: Bantam, 1965), pp. 1-24, p. 22.
[26] R.W.
Southern,
Saint Anselm: A Portrait In A Landscape, op. cit.,
p. 207.
[27]
Frederick Copleston,
History
of Western Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy,
v. 2, Pt. I (Garden City: Image, 1962), p. 183.
A syllogism has two premises, a “major”
one which is listed first, and a “minor” one
which is listed second.
[28] Jim
Holt, “Big-Bang Theology, God Makes A
Cosmological Comeback,”
Wilson
Quarterly Winter 1998, pp. 39-41, p. 41.
[29] Anselm
begins his proof in “Chapter 2” by referring to
Psalm 14:1 which says “The fool says in his
heart, ‘There is no God.’
They are corrupt, they do abominable
deeds, there is none that does good”; and Psalm
53:1 which says the same thing.
The translation here is that of the
Revised
Standard Version (N.Y.: Thomas Nelson and
Sons, 1952).
[30]
Frederick Copleston,
A History
of Philosophy:
Medieval
Philosophy (v. 2, pt. I,
op. cit.,
p. 184.
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