Gutmann On How Our Democratic Society Should Make Decisions About Education

 

Supplement For Second Class:

 

Copyright © 2026 Bruce W. Hauptli

 

Please read Gutmann’s Preface, Introduction, and Chapter One: States and Education.  You might also find my contrast between “indoctrination “and “education” interesting in “Education, Indoctrination, and Academic Freedom.”

 

We spent most of the first-class discussing democracy and education and didn’t get far into the prepared supplements and the text.  I mentioned some of the things covered in my A Quick Introduction to “Deliberative Democracy “ and Democratic Education and I recommend reading it, but will not cover it in class.  Questions about it are, of course, appropriate! 

 

I. Your questions and concerns from the last class and reading so far? 

 

II. Continue Discussion of Gutmann’s Introduction “Back To Basics:”

 

p. 11 The most distinctive feature of a democratic theory of education is that it makes a democratic virtue out of our inevitable disagreement over educational problems.  The democratic virtue, too simply stated, is that we can publicly debate educational problems in a way much more likely to increase our understanding of education and each other than if we were to leave the management of the schools, as Kant suggests, “to depend entirely upon the judgment of the most enlightened experts.”  The policies that result from our democratic deliberations will not always be the right ones, but they will be more enlightened—by the values and concerns of the many communities that constitute a democracy—than those that would be made by unaccountable educational experts. 

 

What does she mean by “democratic virtue?”  How is it different from moral virtue, religious virtue, cultural virtue.... 

 

The discussion in my “A Quick Introduction to “Delberative Democracy” and “Democratic Education”” further clarifies how “mutual respect (rather than mere toleration), the deliberative spirit, understanding others’ values, anti-discrimination , anti-racism, and “normative understanding” are for the sort of democracy being discussed. 

 

pp. 11-12 [above citation continues:] The primary aim of a democratic theory of education is not to offer solutions to all the problems plaguing our educational institutions, but to consider ways of resolving those problems that are compatible with a commitment to democratic values.  A democratic theory of education provides principles that, in the face of our social disagreements, help us judge (a) who should have authority to make decisions about education, and (b) what the moral boundaries of that authority are. 

  A democratic theory is not a substitute for a moral ideal of education.  In a democratic society, we bring our moral ideals of education to bear on how we raise our children, on who we support for school boards, and on what educational policies we advocate.  But we cannot simply translate our own moral ideals of education, however objective they are, into public policy.  Only in a society in which all other citizens agreed with me would my moral ideal simply translate into a political idea. 

 

Really, she doesn’t want to offer solutions?  What does she mean by “considering ways of resolving problems that are compatible with a commitment to “democratic values”? 

 

Is her commitment to democratic values more “basic,” or fundamental than to her “moral values”?  Does she believe her commitment is one all individuals share?  Does she believe all her fellow citizens share it? 

 

Do you see elements of pragmatism in her view?  Could there be a connection here to John Dewey's A Common Faith? 

 

Going back to the final sentence in the Gutmann cite, would it be enough for all the citizens to agree with her, or would she also want them to have done so deliberatively? 

 

13 A democratic society is responsible for educating not just some but all children for citizenship. 

 

We need to discuss the “all’ and the brief discussion of Nussbaum and the court case she discusses. 

 

But, seriously, couldn’t some of our fellow citizens readily complain that these educators (including me) advocate for indoctrination rather than education? 

 

Of course, this is why I encouraged you to read my “Education, Indoctrination, and Academic Freedom.”  But perhaps we need to discuss this? 

 

In a pluralistic society where, moral disagreements are commonplace the demands faced by democratically inclined citizens are incredibly difficult.  In their Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What Should Be Done About It Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson maintain that

 

there are better and worse ways of living with moral disagreements, and among the better is political democracy.  Democracy seems a natural and reasonable way since it is a conception of government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each citizen.  If we have to disagree morally about public policy, it is better to do so in a democracy that as far as possible respects the moral status of each of us.^[1] 

Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong.  They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken.^[2] 

 

the principles of accommodation are based on a value that lies at the core of reciprocity and deliberation in a democracy—mutual respect.  It is what makes possible cooperation on fair terms.  Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree.  But mutual respect demands more than toleration.  It requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees.  It consists in an excellence of character that permits a democracy to flourish in the face of fundamental moral disagreement.  This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character.  It is the character of individuals who are morally committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differences between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view. 

  Mutual respect not only helps sustain a moral community in the face of conflict but also can contribute toward resolving the conflict.^[3] 

 

Gutmann and Thompson maintain that such deliberative discussions can

 

…reach some resolutions, but they are partial and tentative.  The resolutions do not stand outside the process of moral argument prior to it or protected from its provocations.  We do not begin with a common morality, a substantial set of principles or values that we assume we have, and then apply it to decisions and policies.  Nor, for that matter, do we end with such a morality.  Rather, the principles and values with which we live are provisional, formed and continually revised in the process of making and responding to moral claims in public life.^[4] 

 

They want to develop a theory which can be applied to our current social situation and, so, we need to consider whether their proposed version of democracy could bridge the gap between theory and reality which we all recognize.  Above, in introducing their theory I noted that deliberative democracy requires that each citizen treat every other citizen reciprocally—that is as a political equal worthy of respect.  While this is clearly a theoretical good, is it a practicable requirement?  Could the good deliberative democracy arise if a large proportion of the citizens exemplified the trait?  Could a “simple majority” be sufficient?  Suppose a significant majority had the recommended character trait, might that produce a better democracy that we have at present?  This set of questions needs to be considered both in thinking of “normal political situations” and in considering the education of children.  Here, one suspects “moral disagreements” are going to be much harder to resolve with “toleration,” let alone mutual respect. 

Well, I said they want to develop a theory which can be applied to our current situation, but their work was written thirty years ago, It seems that in the time since the work was written, many of our fellow citizens have lost any commitment to mutual respect, deliberation, and even to democracy!  Doesn’t this mean democratic education has become increasingly important? 

 

Here let’s pick up Gutmann’s text once more a

 

16 authority over education is the theoretical issue that organizes this book.  The central question posed by democratic education is: Who should have authority to shape the education of future citizens? 

 

III. Chapter One: States and Education:

 

In this chapter Gutmann discusses the educational theories of Plato, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill distinguishing between: “The Family State,” “The State of Families,” “The State of Individuals,” and “A Democratic State.”  

 

22-28 her discussion of The Family State focuses on Plato’s view that the ideal state is one ruled by philosophical experts [philosopher kings]” who exercise absolute paternalistic control over the citizens and the education future citizens.  Plato contends that “the ignorant many” are wholly unsuited for rule, and that the philosophical rulers may tell “noble lies” to the citizens to maintain political control because it is in the interests of the citizens who are incapable of knowledge—and thus cannot rule.  For Plato democracy is a terrible form of government.  Gutmann’s discussion concludes:

 

28 the family sate attempts to constrain our choices among ways of life and educational purposes in a way that is incompatible with our identity as parents and citizens.  In its unsuccessful attempt to do so, it successfully demonstrates that we cannot ground our conception of a good education merely on personal or political preferences.  Plato presents a forceful case for resting educational authority exclusively with a centralized state, a case grounded on the principle that knowledge should be translated into political power.  But even the Platonic case is not sufficiently strong to override the claims of parents and citizens to share in social reproduction, claims which I return in defending a democratic state of education. 

 

28-33 Her discussion of The State of Families characterizes them as ones that place (32) “…educational authority exclusively in the hands of parents, thereby permitting parents to predispose their children, through education, to choose a way of life consistent with their familial heritage.”  She considers John Locke, Thomas Aquinas, and Charles Fried exemplars of this orientation and in the footnote on p. 29 cites the Irish Constitution’s claim that “recognizes the family as he natural primary and fundamental group of Society and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law” as clarification that civil society is a collection of individual families each of which has full authority over the education of future citizens. 

 

32-33 States that abdicate all educational authority to parents sacrifice their most effective and justifiable instrument for securing mutual respect among their citizens. 

  The “pluralism” commonly identified with the state of families is superficial because its internal variety serves as little more than an ornament for onlookers.  Pluralism is an important political value insofar as social diversity enriches our lives by expanding our understanding of differing ways of life.  To reap the benefits of social diversity, children must be exposed to ways of life different from their parents and—in the course of their exposure—must embrace certain values, such as mutual respect among persons, that make social diversity both possible and desirable. 

 

33-41 She discusses John Stuart Mill who embraces The State of Individuals which (34) “…responds to the weakness of both the family state and the state of individuals by championing the dual goals of opportunity for choice and neutrality among conceptions of the good life.  A just educational authority must not bias children’s choices among good lives, but it must provide every child with an opportunity to choose freely and rationally among the widest range of lives.” 

 

35 Her criticism of this orientation builds on the claim that “…the capacity for rational choice requires that we place some prior limitations on children’s choices.  To have a rational sense of what we want to become, we need to know who we are; otherwise our choices will be endless and meaningless.” 

 

37 She contends that “the same argument that holds against the family state holds against the state of individuals: being right is not a necessary or sufficient condition because parents and citizens have a legitimate interest (independent of their “rightness”) in passing some of their most salient values on to their children.”  Going on to say in the next paragraph, “why must freedom be the sole end of education, given that most of us value things that conflict with freedom?  We value, for example, the moral sensibility that enables us to discriminate between good and bad lives.  A well-cultivated moral character constrains choice among lives at least as much as it expands choice.” 

 

39 We disagree over the relative value of freedom and virtue, the nature of the good life, and the elements of moral character.  But our desire to search for a more inclusive ground presupposes a common commitment that is, broadly speaking, political.  We are committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share.  Although we are not collectively committed to any particular set of educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an agreement on our educational aims (an agreement that could take the form of justifying a diverse set of educational aims and authorities). 

 

Who is included in her ‘we’?  She wrote in 1987 and 1999, and I think she clearly believe it applies today—but is this true of all of us, most of us, a majority of us, …?  The importance of this question needs to be emphasized, as is evidenced by the current situation in Florida.  Of course, in February of 2023 any discussion of “states and education “is going to suggest a discussion of the situation in Florida. 

 

41-47 Finally, she advances A Democratic State of Education in contrast to the other three conceptions:

 

I greatly appreciate comments and corrections--typos and infelicities are all too common and the curse of "auto-correct" plagues me! 

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Last revised on 03/21/26