Supplement for Seventh Class: Critical
Considerations
Copyright © 2023 Bruce W.
Hauptli
1. Problems with
the democratic standard:
On p. 263 Gutmann contrasts the “democratic”
and the “market” standards:
…like all humanly designed tests,
the market only partially measures what matters to us.
Democratic debate and deliberation are a different test, also a partial
and imperfect one, of whether cultural institutions should be supported.
Because democratic processes ideally complement rather than compete with
the market, the standards of value employed within democratic deliberations need
not and preferably should not be market standards.
Throughout the work she advocates using the “democratic
test or standard” to determine the character, funding, distribution, etc. of
democratic education.
She also contends that we are not succeeding in providing
democratic education to future citizens, and that doing so will require skilled
professional educators—so shouldn’t that mean we need to dramatically increase
funding. But we find citizens
generally willing to maintain (let alone increase) funding for primary
schooling. Does this unwillingness
mean we can’t have a democracy?
Moreover, she contends that the virtue of “democratic
deliberation” is that it allows for us to democratically address significant
differences in our values in a manner that promotes mutual understanding,
toleration, and respect:
47 the distinctive virtue of a
democratic theory of education is that its principles and conclusion are
compatible with our commitment to share the rights and the obligations of
citizenship with people who do not share our complete conception of the good
life. To the extent that Americans
share (or insist on living in a way that requires us to share) this commitment,
a democratic theory of education commands our allegiance.
But are we
actually able (and or willing) to be so understanding, tolerant, and respectful?
2.
Who are her “we?”
39 “We disagree
over the relative value of freedom and virtue, the nature of the good life, and
the elements of moral character.
But our desire to search for a more
inclusive ground presupposes a common commitment that is, broadly speaking,
political.
We are committed to collectively
re-creating the society that we
share. Although
we are not collectively committed to
any particular set of educational aims,
we are committed to arriving at an agreement on our educational aims (an
agreement that could take the form of justifying a diverse set of educational
aims and authorities).”
Who is included in her ‘we’?
She wrote in 1987 and 1999, and I think she clearly believe it applies
today—but is this true of all of us, most of us, a majority of us, …?
The importance of this question needs to be emphasized, as is evidenced
by the current situation in our country.
3.
All, most, or some?
xii-xiii
A democracy is
deliberative to the extent that citizens and their accountable
representatives offer one another morally defensible reasons for mutually
binding laws in an ongoing process of mutual justification.
To the extent that a democracy is not deliberative, it treats people as
objects of legislation, as passive
subjects to be ruled, rather than as citizens who take part in governance by
accepting or rejecting the reasons they and their accountable representatives
offer for the laws and policies that mutually bind them.
Deliberative
democracy underscores the importance of publicly supported education that
develops the capacity to deliberate among
all
children as future free and equal
citizens. The most justifiable
way of making mutually binding decisions in a representative democracy—including
decisions not to deliberate about some matters—is by deliberative decision
making, where the decision makers are accountable to the people who are most
affected by their decisions.
Well, must she insist on
“all students?
“Should she?
Do parents, perhaps even “groups,” “have a right” to offer an
alternative education. Here we will
also have to wonder whether a “competing” [democratic] responsibility outweighs
such a right.
4.
Wholly deliberative, or “to a
degree?”
Also In the above citation Gutmann talks about a democracy
being deliberative “to the extent that,” but the subsequent
“universality “of the requirements for a democratic education for all
children and that all citizens have “a deliberative character” are
seemingly extreme if “deliberative democracy can be a “matter of degree.”
What proportion of the citizens is sufficient for a democracy to be
“deliberative”—all, most, many, a
majority, a sizable minority?
We will also have to ask whether
she is describing “an ideal,” or whether she is offering a “practical proposal.
5.
Is “democratic education” necessary for
citizenship?
Remember that Gutmann said that our compulsory primary
education fails to provide functional
democratic literacy, though it clearly provides functional economic literacy
(147-148).
Democratic education doesn’t
succeed in education most future citizens, but adults can’t be subject to
compulsory education
279 democracy is educationally
demanding, but its first and foremost
demand is that adults be treated as sovereign citizens not a students of
philosophers or the subjects of kings. This
is why we encounter no paradox, only a serious problem, when we acknowledge that
democratic states have the authority to make schooling compulsory for children
but not for adults who fall below the democratic threshold of education.
Since the threshold defines not a fully but an adequately educated
citizen, this constraint on democratic authority may leave many adults less that
adequately educated.
However, on pp. 278-279 she notes
that many capable citizens do not seem to be able to meet conditions (4) and
(5). She also contends that
adults who cannot read or write can stay
informed and be politically active. She
concludes this speaks against the wisdom of trying to come up with a simple
characterization of the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a democratic
education, but this does seem to leave us in a serious situation.
So, how do some adults become
functionally adequate citizens without receiving a successful democratic
education?
6. A “reciprocal
relation” or a paradox?
Her discussion throughout focuses upon democracy as
concerned with developing future citizens who can be appropriately deliberative
in order to continue as a democracy:
289 …an ideal of citizens sharing
in deliberatively determining the future shape of their society.
If democratic society is the “self” that citizens determine, it is a self
that does not define their best interests.
There remain independent standards for defining the best interests of
individuals and reasons for thinking that individuals, rather than
collectivities, are often the best judges of their own interests.
To avoid the misleading
metaphysical connotations of the concept of collective self-determination, we
might better understand the democratic ideal as that of conscious social
reproduction, the same ideal that guided democratic education.
Gutmann emphasizes that democratic education provides the
foundation upon which democratic society.
But the “dependency is reciprocal.”
If the participants in the education of future citizens are not
democratically inclined, the education provided may not yield citizens who are
democratic. But doesn’t this raise
“the chicken and egg problem”: if deliberative democratic citizens are needed
for democratic education, and democratic education is necessary if we are to
have democratic education, isn’t democracy impossible?
7. Solutions, or
what?
11 The primary aim of a democratic theory of education is
not to offer solutions to all the problems plaguing our educational
institutions, but to consider ways of resolving those problems that are
compatible with a commitment to democratic values….
…we
cannot simply translate our own moral ideals of education, however objective
they are, in to public policy.
Only in a society in which all other citizens agreed with me would my
moral ideal simply translate into a political idea.
Really, she doesn’t want to
offer solutions?
What does she mean by “considering ways of resolving problems that are
compatible with a commitment to “democratic values?”
Is her commitment to
democratic values more “basic,” or
fundamental than to her “moral values?”
Does she believe her commitment is one all individuals share?
Does she believe all her fellow citizens share it?
8. Does
multiculturalism imply that differing cultural values equal?
In The epilogue Gutmann defends multiculturalism.
She contends:
307 When public school texts and
teachers present narratives of moral choices in politics, they set the stage for
students to think about these choices as democratic citizens.
A multicultural history should not imply…that competing cultural beliefs
and practice are equally valuable.
There would be little point to understanding competing beliefs and
practices if their equal value would simply be assumed.
308 …[an]
important response of democratic
education in a multi-cultural context is to help students understand the merits
(and limits) of tolerating competing conceptions of the good life, and thereby
respecting the rights of all individuals to pursue their conception of the good
life to the extent that these conceptions are consistent with respecting the
equal rights of other individuals.
Agreeing to disagree about conceptions of the good life is essential to securing
the basic liberty of all individuals.
Religious differences have long been among the most salient cultural
differences in democratic societies.
Deliberative democracy is committed to protecting religious freedom along
with other basic liberties, such as freedom of speech.
On matters of basic liberty, a democratic education teaches toleration of
cultural differences on grounds of reciprocity: mutual respect for the personal
integrity of all persons.
But are we sufficiently tolerant to be able to live up to
this? All of us, most of us, many
of us….
Suggestions for
Further Study:
Additional Gutmann Books:
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What Should
Be Done About It (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996).
Why Deliberative
Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton
UP., 2004)
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning
Undermines It (Princeton: Princeton UP., 2012).
On My Webpage:
Education, Indoctrination, and Academic Freedom
My View of The Nature of A Liberal Arts
Education
Hate Speech and Democratic Responsibility: Rights,
Civility, and Dignity
Additional Resources:
Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in
Political Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt; 1927).
Reprinted, Melvin L. Rogers (ed.) (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2012).
Go to Seventh Class Supplement
Midcoast Senior College Website
Email: hauptli@fiu.edu
Last revised on 04/04/23