Supplement for
Sixth Class: Extramural Education,
Educating Adults, and
The Primacy of Political Education
Copyright © 2023 Bruce W.
Hauptli
I. Questions From
Last Time.
II. Chapter
Eight: Extramural Education:
Significant
education can occur outside the schools and the families, and, as in the
schools, questions of funding and governance arise.
In the next two Chapters Gutmann discusses possible sources of democratic
education and of “democratic culture” which lie outside the schools and
democratic education of adults. I
believe these discussions are too limited and recognize they are unsatisfactory,
but praise her attempt thee areas which many philosophies of education largely
neglect.
Libraries:
Gutmann discusses public libraries (232-238) contending
that the importance of public libraries seems settled, but
funding and
governance need to be democratically
determined:
238 without access to public
libraries, parents must raise their children in a culture that treats books as
any other commodity, and children must depend on the purchases of their parents.
A community that funds public libraries constrains its citizens in a
different way. Although no one is
forced to use a library, citizens are forced to pay for them and to live in a
society where children have easier access than they otherwise would to books
that some parents may find objectionable.
The choice between communities must by its very nature be made
collectively.
Her discussion here is too
limited, and given the role libraries provide for citizens of all ages, it needs
to be more fulsome. Given what she
has said about the funding and governance of schools, however, we can infer that
her principles of equality of opportunity to use libraries, tolerance, and
“academic freedom,” should inform democratic decisions regarding governance and
funding of public libraries. She
talks exclusively of books, but as we well know libraries provide story times,
activities, study areas, internet access, and so much more.
Television and Democratic Education & Culture:
Whereas libraries are local and can have significant
positive benefits for democratic education and the promotion of democratic
culture, Gutmann’s discussion of television’s role in and democratic education
and in promoting democratic culture (pp. 238-251) notes that while its reach is
much broader, it is far less beneficial.
First, public support for educational programming is more contentious
both in terms of it funding and governance.
Moreover, much of television is
passive and geared toward
entertainment—it is difficult for the medium to promote critical thought or
interaction with others. She does
note that programs like Sesame Street
are of high educational value, but while governments may attempt to encourage
educational offerings by licensing requirements, the move toward deregulation
makes this an increasingly unlikely tactic.
Thus her discussion of the role
television can play in promoting democratic education and culture strongly
parallels her discussion of the democratic education in the primary schools.
In both arenas the focus is not on democracy (in schools on training for
employment and in television on entertainment):
246 television is as closely tied
to democratic culture as schooling is to democratic education.
The analogy…properly suggests that among cultural media, television is
uniquely powerful ad pervasive in our society.
It is probably the most influential, it is certainly the most universal
culture to which children are exposed.
Because television shapes and conveys popular culture,
it should be primarily
publicly rather than privately
controlled. Like public
authority over schools, public authority over television should be constrained
by society as not to be repressive.
She suggests that the British
sort of mix of significant public and private television is a superior model for
promoting democratic culture, but her discussion on pp. 247-251 does not provide
a model for developing this in the case of programming for children (or for
adults). While we can see why she
advocates public control, it is harder to believe it could readily be
implemented, and in the current climate it does not seem to be without danger
for the promotion of either democratic education or the enhancement of
democratic culture.
252-255 New Technology:
Here her discussion is clearly dated.
She discusses cable television, but is unable to successfully
contend for either public funding or control of that medium.
In light of the fact that now the cable networks are “old” technology, it
is clearly apparent that the newer ones (streaming TV, websites, information
platforms, file sharing services, etc.) are even less subject to public control.
III. Chapter Nine:
Educating Adults:
258 Gutmann contends that “a substantial minority of
American citizens are functionally
illiterate. Remember that she
also contends that she contends that 148 “the
main problem with primary schooling today” is not that it does enable
high-school graduates to get good jobs
…but that
it does not prepare students for
democratic citizenship.
In short, then, educating adults for democratic citizenship
is essential!
Adults and Democratic Culture, Democratic
Perfectionism, Influence Over Culture, Access to Culture, and
Cultural Freedom:
256-263 Gutmann begins this
discussion by advocating for public funding for cultural education for adults
as long as it is democratically approved (260).
Here she focuses on what might be called
high culture (especially the arts).
She considers views of Rousseau, Rawls (and many others who believe such
support is unwarranted and that taxation for such purposes is unwarranted)
contending that
262 a democratic justification
for subsidizing culture does not undercut the urgency of providing for the basic
needs of citizens, but neither does the urgency of providing for basic needs
undercut a democratic justification for subsidizing culture….
263 like all humanly designed
tests, the market only partially measures what matters to us.
Democratic debate and deliberation are a different test, also a partial
and imperfect one, of whether cultural institutions should be supported.
Because democratic processes ideally complement rather than compete with
the market, the standards of value employed within democratic deliberations need
not and preferably should not be market standards.
She goes on to contend (263-267)
that public support of culture must be constrained by the nondiscrimination and
nonrepression constraints. While
she makes a good case, I believe her conception of “culture” may constrain her
discussion here. Her argument
can easily be turned to public support of the “sports,” “recreational,” and
“parks” cultures. Unless she can
make a particular case that education in the arts is uniquely supportive of
democratic citizenship and virtues, the discussion here must the diversity of
cultural conceptions in a pluralistic society.
Adults and Primary and Higher Education Illiteracy:
270-281 Gutmann next considers the importance of supporting
adults who wish to pursue higher
education.
217-273 She believes they present
no particular problem regarding either public support or control over the
earlier discussion of higher education except for the costs associated with
extending higher education. She
also draws attention to private, corporate, union, and civilly supported adult
educational programs.
273-2 Illiteracy in adults
presents a more important problem for democracy however.
Available programs (jointly financed by federal, state, and local
sources) have limited success, and suffer from significant attendance and
drop-out problems. Moreover, it
seems, at least at first glance, to be inappropriate to suggest
compulsory democratic education for
such adults. So she begins her
discussion of adult democratic literacy by trying to characterize its core
elements:
276-277 (1) understanding the
help-wanted ads in a local newspaper;
(2) knowing how to fill out a
check and address an envelope;
(3) completing sixth grade;
(4) understanding a brief
passage describing the function of the Supreme Court;
(5) giving a reasonable
interpretation of any section of one’s state constitution.
277 She notes, however, that “…90
percent of seventeen-year-olds can read and describe a help-wanted ad in the
newspaper, but less than 60 percent are able to understand a brief passage
describing the role of the Supreme Court.
Unless we radically narrow our ideal of democratic citizenship—to include
only he ability to get a job and not the ability to participate effectively in
democratic politics—we cannot count the first three accomplishments, or any
longer list of similarly economically oriented accomplishments, a sufficient
measure of functional [democratic] literacy.”
Remember that Gutmann said that
our compulsory primary education fails to provide functional
democratic literacy, though it
clearly provides functional economic literacy (147-148).
She contended that it is necessary for
democracy that primary education provide future democratic citizens with the
former not just the latter.
However, here (278-279) she notes that many capable citizens do not seem to
be able to meet conditions (4) and (5).
She also contends that adults who cannot read or write can stay informed
and be politically active. She concludes
this speaks against the wisdom of trying to come up with a simple
characterization of the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a democratic
education:
279 democracy is educationally
demanding, but its first and foremost demand is that adults be treated as
sovereign citizens not a students of philosophers or the subjects of kings.
This is why we encounter no paradox,
only a serious problem, when we acknowledge that democratic states have the
authority to make schooling compulsory for children but not for adults who fall
below the democratic threshold of education.
Since the threshold defines not a fully but an adequately educated
citizen, this constraint on democratic authority may leave many adults less that
adequately educated. A stricter
constraint—mandating the maxim education—is ruled out by our recognition of the
primacy of treating adults as sovereign citizens.
279-281 While illiteracy amongst
adults can lead them into dependency and humiliation,
compulsory education for adults is
not justified. Of course,
voluntary publicly (and privately)
supported adult educational opportunities are both appropriate and advisable.
IV. Conclusion: The
Primacy of Political Education:
282 Gutmann begins her conclusion by noting that laws which
violate the principles of nondiscrimination or nonrepression may arise in any
democracy, and educational laws may fail to institute practices which educate
children to become responsible citizens.
The fact that education or citizenship is very demanding makes such
lapses understandable.
282-287 Discretion In Work and Participation In Politics:
282-285 The aims of democratic
education will not be fully realized until citizens have additional
opportunities to exercise discretion in their daily work.
Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and many others recognize that industrial
employment can work against democratic engagement of citizens.
287-288 Political Education:
288
Democratic politics puts a high premium
on citizens being both knowledgeable and articulate, and democratic
education must be a shared trust between parents, citizens, teachers, and public
officials—it thrives when all these
participants are responsible democratic deliberators.
Democratic Education and Democratic Theory:
In this section Gutmann emphasizes that democratic
education provides the foundation upon which democratic society.
But the “dependency is reciprocal.”
If the participants in the education of future citizens are not
democratically inclined, the education provided may not yield citizens who are
democratic.
288-289 ...our concern for
democratic education lies at the core of our commitments to democracy.
The ideal of democracy is often said to be collective self-determination.
But is there a “collective self” to be determined?
Are there not just so many individual selves that must find a fair way of
sharing the goods of a society together?
It would be dangerous (as critics often charge) to assume that the
democratic state constitutes the “collective self” of a society, and that its
policies in turn define the best interests of its individual members.
We need no such metaphysical assumption, however, to defend an ideal
closely related to that of collective self-determination—an ideal of citizens
sharing in deliberatively determining the future shape of their society.
If democratic society is the “self” that citizens determine, it is a self
that does not define their best interests.
There remain independent standards for defining the best interests of
individuals and reasons for thinking that individuals, rather than
collectivities, are often the best judges of their own interests.
To avoid the misleading
metaphysical connotations of the concept of collective self-determination, we
might better understand the democratic ideal as that of conscious social
reproduction, the same ideal that guided democratic education.
289
The dependency is reciprocal.
But doesn’t this raise “the
chicken and egg problem”: if deliberative democratic citizens are needed for
democratic education, and democratic education is necessary if we are to have
democratic education, isn’t democracy impossible?
289-290 Similarly, families are
not democratic, yet they play an important role in democratic education, which
may promote increased democracy in families.
(end of chapter)
So, then how may
the air of paradox be dispelled here?
Well, let’s look at American History:
were the English Colonies
democratic?
were all “Americans”
revolutionaries?
was the initial US Government
under the Articles of Confederation democratic?
Was it approved by a vote of “the people” or by a vote “the
colonies/states?” Was there broad
public discussion of the Articles?
When that government was replaced
by a Federal Constitution, was it approved by “the people” or “the States?”
Was there broad public discussion of the proposed Constitution?
Did such discussion yield changes in the Constitution?
Were all “white” males able to
vote at first? When were women
allowed to vote, “black” Americans, indigenous people?
Did most citizens receive a
“democratic education” initially?
How did that change over the past 247 years?
While it wasn’t, in any way, guaranteed that a democracy
would arise, did democratically-inclined (and educated) individuals successfully
lead the way toward our imperfect democracy?
Were there always antidemocratically-inclined citizens?
So, is there a paradox here, or a tender plant in need of
careful care and cultivation?
Are the histories of other democracies [England/United
Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Germany, Japan, India….) much different?
Go to Seventh Class Supplement
Midcoast Senior College Website
Email: hauptli@fiu.edu
Last revised on 04/04/23