Hauptli’s Lectures
on Hobbes’ Leviathan
Copyright © 2015 Bruce W. Hauptli
I. Hobbes’ Life:
Thomas Hobbes was born in 1588.
His father was a vicar who, after a brawl in front of his church, left
his children with his wealthy brother and disappeared.
From 1592-1603 Hobbes was a boarding student at a private school; and
then he went on to Magdelen Hall [College],
During his first visit to
During his subsequent trips to
For various reasons, this work antagonized both sides in the coming Civil
War, and Hobbes found it prudent to live in
Near the end of the Civil War in 1646, the young Prince Charles of Wales
(the future Charles II) arrived in Paris seeking safety after the Royalists had
lost the Civil War (while his father remained in England as complex political
intrigues unfolded between Royalists, Parliament, the army, Parliament, the
Scots, and the Welsh), and he invited Hobbes to tutor him in mathematics.
This began a long association which can be, in part explained by the
fact, noted in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, that
...in 1642 [Hobbes] published
De Cive [translated by Hobbes and
published in England in 1651 as
Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society], which expanded
the argument of the second part of The
Elements of Law and concluded with a section on religion that dealt more
fully with the relation between church and state.
A Christian church and a Christian state, he held, were one and the same
body; of that body, the sovereign was the head; he therefore had the right to
interpret Scripture, decide religious disputes, and determine the form of public
worship.[2]
In 1651 Hobbes published his
Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power
of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil.
The first two parts (“Of Man,” and “Of Commonwealth”) developed his
earlier ideas about the nature of human beings and of society; while the second
two (“Of a Christian Commonwealth,” and “Of the Kingdom of Darkness”) contained
his analysis of the Bible and attacked attempts by papists and Presbyterians to
question the rights of sovereigns.
As Edwin A, Burt maintains in his notes to his selections from Hobbes’
Leviathan in his own
The English Philosophers From Bacon to
Mill:
by arguments chiefly based on
citations from the Scriptures, Hobbes attempts to show that the Church is
rightfully under the control of the state, and that, therefore, the sovereign
has supreme power over the practices of his subjects in matters of religion.[3]
In his “Thomas Hobbes,” Bernard Gert provides some helpful
elaboration which puts the third and fourth parts in focus for us:
Hobbes believed that if one were
forced to choose between what God commands and what the sovereign commands, most
would follow God. Thus, he spends
much effort trying to show that Scripture supports his moral and political
views. He also tries hard to
discredit those religious views that lead to disobeying the law.
I find no reason to doubt that Hobbes, like Aquinas, sincerely thought
that reason and the Scriptures must agree, for both came from the same source,
God. But, even if Hobbes held
genuine religious views, God still does not play an essential role in his moral
or political philosophy. He holds
that all rational persons, including atheists and deists, are subject to the
laws of nature and to the laws of the civil state, but he explicitly denies that
atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God.
Since, for Hobbes, reason by itself provides a guide to conduct to be
followed by all men, God as the source of reason is completely dispensable.[4]
While royalists might have generally liked the
Leviathan, it included a discussion
of those circumstances wherein individuals might transfer allegiance from one
sovereign to another, and this they found intolerable.
Moreover, Hobbes’ attacks on the Roman Catholics raised many eyebrows in
Paris, and while this work really offended each side involved the English Civil
War as much as his earlier work had, he found it prudent to return to England in
1652 where he remained for the final twenty-five years of his life.
While Hobbes lived a secure life during this time, it was not one free of
controversy. As the
Encyclopedia Britannica notes, it was
in
...1666, when the House of
Commons prepared a bill against atheism and profaneness…Hobbes felt seriously
endangered; for the committee to which the bill was referred was instructed to
investigate [his] Leviathan. Hobbes,
then verging upon 80, burned such of his papers as he thought might compromise
him....[5]
Hobbes survived all such controversies, however, and was
the most famous English thinker of the day outside England, and well-known
(though highly controversial) within England.
He died in 1679.
In his “Editor’s Introduction” to his edition of Hobbes’
Leviathan, Herbert Schneider argues
that Hobbes was neither a materialist nor an atheist:
...Hobbes was a sober, pious
person, who never broke with the Church of England though he had decided Puritan
leanings. His opposition to
Arminianism and to freewill doctrine indicates his Calvinist leanings and his
departures from Anglican theology.
Because of his independence he was accused by both Roman Catholics and Anglican
High Churchmen of atheism, which was a stock charge brought against
anticlericals. But he was certainly
neither an atheist nor a materialist.
He believed in the essentials of the Christian revelation and in the
doctrine of personal salvation. He
wrote that he would never deny, even at a sovereign’s bidding if ever a
sovereign were foolish enough to ask it, that “Christ died for my sins.”
Believing that all beings are “bodies,” he conceived of the “Body
politic” as an organism, and he thought that God must have a body composed of
some “ethereal” substance. Hence he
believed in “spiritual bodies” and distinguished sharply between corporeality
and materiality. The treatment of
covenant theology in Part III of
Leviathan is thoroughly Puritan, and in general Part II should be regarded
as a secularized version of the English Puritan’s theory of a commonwealth.[6]
On the other hand, in his
A History of Philosophy, Frederick
Copleston maintains that:
Hobbes stresses the practical
purpose of philosophy by citing his
Concerning Body (1, 1, 6): “the end
or scope of philosophy is that we may make use to our benefit of effects
formally seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may produce
the like effects of those we conceive in our mind....The end of knowledge is
power...and the scope of all speculation is the performance of some action or
thing to be done.”[7]
...for Hobbes philosophy is
concerned with causal explanation.
And by causal explanation he means a scientific account of the generative
process by which some effect comes into being.
From this it follows that if there is anything which does not come into
existence through a generative process, it cannot be part of the subject-matter
of philosophy. God, therefore, and
indeed all spiritual reality is excluded from philosophy.
“The subject of Philosophy, or
the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any generation,
and which we may, by any consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or
which is capable of composition and resolution; that is to say, every body of
whose generation or properties we can have any knowledge....Therefore it
excludes theology, I mean the doctrine of God, eternal, ingenerable,
incomprehensible, and in whom there is nothing neither to divide nor compound,
nor any generation to be conceived.”[8]
He does not say that there is no
God; he says that God is not the subject-matter of philosophy.
At the same time it seems to me to be a great mistake to represent Hobbes
as saying no more than that according to his use of the word ‘philosophy’ the
existence and nature of God are not philosophical topics.
Philosophy and reasoning are for him coextensive; and from this it
follows that theology is irrational.[9]
He makes it abundantly clear that
theology, if offered as a science or coherent body of true propositions, is
absurd and irrational. And to say
this is to say very much more than that one proposes to confine one’s attention
in philosophy to the realm of the corporeal.[10]
Your readings will not be sufficient to decide the issue
between these two views of Hobbes, but as you can imagine, his views of the role
of religion in the state were (and are still) a matter of some controversy.
Let us turn now to his views of man and the state.
II. Introduction to
Hobbes’ Social Thought:
As noted above, Hobbes’ model of scientific understanding
was geometry. He believed that
scientists and philosophers would uncover a picture of the world which accords
with Galilean mechanics as they pursued their causal explanations.
The universal cause behind all events in the world (physical,
chemical, biological, psychological, or political), according to him, is
motion. The “secondary
qualities” we are so familiar with (color, sound, and taste) are held (with
Kepler and Galileo) to be appearances of bodies whose real properties are
extension, quantity, and motion.
Every real body has a determinate magnitude and is either at rest or in motion
(and if it is moving, it does so with a determinate velocity).
The various particular sciences are concerned with discovering the laws
of behavior of moving bodies, while “first philosophy” is concerned with the
general theorems which are true of all actual bodies.
There is no room for teleology in this model, of course.
There is no purpose in the world, though there is lots of “endeavor.”
From his point of view, our goals, values, and ends are themselves driven
by our nature (which is, of course, matter in motion).
“First philosophy” for Hobbes, then, is simply the understanding of the
most general properties of bodies.
This area of knowledge would provide the basis for geometry (the study of simple
motions—how figures are generated by motions), the theory of motion (which would
consider the effects of bodies on one another), physics (which would study the
effects of internal and invisible motions and lead to an understanding of
sensible qualities), moral philosophy (the study of the motions in the mind),
and civil philosophy (the study of the artificial state).
Ideally, there would be a hierarchically-ordered system of knowledge
stretching from the nature of the simplest things (the smallest “bodies”) all
the way to the characteristics of the most complicated systems of these simple
things (societies). The
understanding of the simplest things would be arrived at by rationally
“resolving” the more complicated things which we observe into their simplest
constituents and developing an understanding of the laws of their behavior as
simple things. This would, in turn,
lead to an understanding of how they “compose” themselves together into
complexes, and, ultimately, to an understanding of how these complexes
themselves behave.[11]
A thoroughgoing adherence to this methodology would mean that any
understanding of society would have to wait until a thorough
understanding of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, was available.
Hobbes maintains we need not wait for the completion of the whole
“resolutive-compositive” enterprise before we can have knowledge of the
political composites (men and societies) however.
Instead of awaiting a complete understanding in mathematics, physics,
chemistry, biology, and psychology, we could study civil society directly:
the causes of motions of the mind
are known, not only by ratiocination,[12]
but also by the experience of every man that takes the pains to observe
those motions within himself. And,
therefore, not only they that have attained the knowledge of the passions and
perturbations of the mind...from the very first principles of philosophy, may by
proceeding in the same way, come to the causes and necessity of constituting
commonwealths, and to get the knowledge of what is natural right, and what are
civil duties....even they also that have not learned the first part of
philosophy, namely geometry and physics, may, notwithstanding, attain the
principles of civil philosophy by the analytical method....And, therefore, from
hence he may proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the justice or
injustice of any propounded action.[13]
In his The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism, C.B. MacPherson notes that Hobbes held that:
...the resolutive-compositive
method which he so admired in Galileo and which he took over, was to resolve
existing society into its simplest elements and then recompose those elements
into a logical whole. The
resolving, therefore, was of existing society into existing individuals, and of
them in turn into the primary elements of their motion.
Hobbes does not take us through the resolutive part of his thought, but
starts us with the result of that and takes us through only the compositive
part.[14]
According to Hobbes, this direct study of “civil” science
reveals that:
...the appetites of men and the
passions of their minds are such, that, unless they be restrained by some
power, they will always be making war upon one another; which may be known
to be so by any man’s experience, that will but examine his own mind.[15]
His introspective view of man maintains that it is the
individual’s desires which determine what is good and what is bad:
572 ...whatsoever is the object
of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good:
and the object of his hate and aversion, evil, and contemptible, are ever used
with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and
absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature
of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no
commonwealth....[16]
According to Hobbes, when we “resolve” social activities
into the basic constituents we find that individuals seek to satisfy their
own desires and define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in terms of these desires.
Hobbes maintains that these terms have no significance when separated
from individuals’ desires, and this means that the only constraints upon
individuals’ actions are those provided by their lack of power to fulfill their
desires.
In short, for Hobbes there are certain primary forces which work their
effect on man and upon civil society: egoism, fear of death, and
the need for security. These
basic forces are the foundation of both prudence and civilization.
Here we need to be careful in characterizing his view however.
There are two distinct types of egoistic theory which we must both
distinguish and discuss.
Psychological egoism
is a descriptive thesis—it
claims that human beings
are egoists.
That is, it claims that this description is a correct description of how
we, in fact, act.
Ethical egoism, on the other hand,
is a prescriptive thesis—it claims
that human beings should behave as
egoists. That is, it claims
that while we don’t always behave this way, we
should do so. Hobbes offers
the latter sort of theory. In the
final chapter of his Leviathan,
Hobbes maintains that:
from the contrariety of
some of the Natural Faculties of the Mind, one to another, as also of one
Passion to another, and from their reference to Conversation, there has been an
argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be
sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty.
The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censoroius and unapt to
pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the other side,
Celerity [swiftness] of Fancy makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary, to discern exactly
between Right and Wrong. Again, in
all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is
necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences
unjust: and yet if there be not powerful Eloquence, which procureth attention
and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little.
But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon the
principles of Truth; and the other upon Opinions already received, true or
false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and
mutable.
And amongst the Passions, Courage, (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavor the unsettling of the Publique Peace: And Timorousnesse, many times disposed to the desertion of the Publique Defense. But these they say cannot stand together in the same person.[17]
To which I answer, that these are
indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: For by Education, and
Discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled.
Judgement, and Fancy may have place in the same man; but by turnes, as
the end which he aimeth at requireth.[18]
He points to a natural “contrariety” between reason and the
passions, and to one between the passions themselves.
It is such conflicts that call out for a rational egoism.
If one simply pursues one’s desires, one’s life may be “nasty, brutish,
and short,” and this result is not in one’s interest.
Thus egoists need to (that is, should) expose their
passions and desires to critical reflection.
Here, first, it will be important to take a “long-run” perspective.
While the fulfillment of an immediate desire may be “good,” successfully
concluding one’s endeavors to achieve such fulfillment might lead to death, and
that would be terrible according to him.
Thus where there is such conflict, the egoist needs to be “rational”—she
needs to assess which desires should be pursued.
Similarly, fulfillment of some of one’s desires may help (or harm) others
without advantaging oneself, and in such cases the rational egoist should
carefully consider the activity before endeavoring fulfillment of the desire.
According to Hobbes’ view, we find the egoists fearful and highly
desirous of security because conflict is inevitable where
individuals desire the same things.
While his account may seem to depend upon a scarcity of the goods desired, and
while Hobbes believed that the goods we desire are indeed scarce; it is
important to note that even where there is a plenitude of the desired goods,
conflict amongst egoistic individuals may result.[19]
Of course, undisguised and unrestrained self-seeking leads to total
social war: a condition which Hobbes calls the
state of nature.[20]
It is the fear of this “condition” which leads individuals to adopt
constraints upon their egoistic
activities.[21]
Thus we form states and place constraints upon our egoistic natures for
protection—we don’t want to be wronged.
How, then, do we form states?
Hobbes contends that the individual egoists will have to
contract with one another to
constrain their behavior. Clearly,
however, contracts between egoists will not be valid unless there is
sufficient
authority and
power to hold the egoists to their
promises; according to Hobbes, however, there will need to be unlimited (or
absolute) power if egoists are to be held to their contracts.
International politics
provides a useful metaphor here, if the powers are to be held to their word, a
super-power will have to be available to ensure compliance.
Why won’t treaties be sufficient in and of themselves?
As C.B. MacPherson notes, Hobbes’ views of our obligations
were radically new:
in...deriving
right and obligation from fact, Hobbes was taking a radically new position.
He was assuming that right did not have to be brought in from outside the
realm of fact, but that it was there already; that, unless the contrary could be
shown, one could assume that equal right was entailed in equal need for
continued motion.
This is a leap in political theory as radical as Galileo’s formulation of
the law of uniform motion was in natural science, and not unrelated to it.
In each case a revolutionary change was initiated by a simple shift in
assumption. Before Galileo, it was
assumed that an object at rest would stay there for ever unless some other thing
moved it, and would only go on moving as long as some outside force was
applied....
Hobbes’ reversal of assumptions was similar.
While it may be said that, from Plato on, rights and obligations had
always been inferred from men’s capacities and wants, the inference had always
been indirect; from men’s capacities and wants to some supposed purposes of
Nature or will of God, and thence to human obligations and rights.
Men’s capacities and wants were treated as effects of the purposes of
Nature of will of God; and the latter being treated as the cause of men’s
capacities and wants, were assumed also to be the source of moral right and
obligation....Instead of finding rights and obligations only in some outside
force, he assumed they were entailed in the need of each human mechanism to
maintain its motion. And since each
human mechanism, to do so, must assess its own requirements, there could be no
question of imposing a system of values from outside or from above.[22]
To assess this radically new view, of course, we must
examine it, and we now turn to the text.
III. Selections
from Part I of The Leviathan: Of Man:[23]
While I have not assigned the introductory selections from
this Part, the following three remarks help us put Hobbes’ theory into
perspective:
562
…by art is created that great
LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin CIVITAS), which is but an
artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for
whose protection and defence it s intended; and in which the
sovereignty is an artificial soul, as
giving life and motion to the whole body….
-Hobbes sees the civil
society as nothing but a composite of the atomic individuals.
For him the nature of the social (and its behavior) is a rational
consequence of the nature of the “parts” (individuals).
The self-evident truth of egoism:
“...whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth when he does
think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby
read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon like
occasions.”
572 Hobbes’ view of good: “but
whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he
for his part calleth good...these
words of good, evil...are ever used with relation to the person that useth them:
there being nothing simply and absolutely so....”
576 For there is no such
Finis ultimus nor
Summum Bonum as is spoken of in the
books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires
are at an end, than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand.
Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to
another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter.
The cause whereof is that the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once
only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future
desire. And therefore the voluntary
actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to the procuring, but also to
the assuring of a contented life….
Chapter 13. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind As
Concerning Their Felicity and Misery:
In this Chapter Hobbes clarifies the nature of the atomic
elements of civil and social entities—individual men (as they are outside any
social or civil setting).
577 Men are equal in nature.
This equality of ability yields
an equality of hope and makes men enemies to one another.
578 State of war—the lives of
individuals are nasty, brutish, and short.
579 In this state
nothing is unjust.
Chapter 14. Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of
Contracts:
In this Chapter Hobbes clarifies the two fundamental
laws of nature which he believes
each rational egoist can come to recognize as applying to human behavior.
It is important that we recognize that, for Hobbes, these natural laws
are arise from our nature, that they are not “externally imposed upon us, and
that they are “binding” upon us (obligatory) because, as we can rationally
recognize, the behavior they recommend is in our self-interest.
579 In the state of nature
“...every man has a right to everything; even to one another’s body.”
-In such a condition, there is
no security!
First Law: “...and consequently it
is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavor peace,
as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may
seek and use all the helps and advantages of war.”
-Note that this passage clearly
indicates that Hobbes is offering an ethical egoism (rather than a
psychological egoism)—he speaks of how people ought to behave (what
they should endeavor to obtain) rather than how they do, as a matter of fact,
behave. He also indicates what
people should do when they have no hope of obtaining the peace which they
seek—we should accept, then, no constraints upon our actions as we aim to
satisfy our desires (and should recognize that “the best defense is a good
offence”)! Now I believe that any
reasonable moral theory must provide an account of
why people do not do what they
“ought” to. Hobbes’ egoistic answer
to this question has to do with what he takes to be our “thirst for power.”
Given our egoistic nature, we are sorely tempted to take a “short run
view” which assigns primacy to fulfilling the “desires of the moment,” but this
sort of behavior, when generally pursued, leads go the condition of a “state of
nature,” which is not conducive to the satisfaction of our egoistic desires.
For this reason, as egoists, he contends, we
should accept the constraints
recommended by the laws of nature.
Rational egoists will accept the
constraints, where others do so also, in order to increase the possibilities of
satisfying their egoistic desires.
They do not do so as a matter of course (in the way that falling material bodies
“obey the laws of gravity,” because of the strong and immediate pull of their
desires and their “lust for power” (which is necessary for fulfillment of these
egoistic desires).
-Also note that his use of
‘rational’ can not be similar to Plato’s use of the term.
579-580
Second Law: “from this fundamental
law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this
second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for
peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he
would allow other men against himself.”
580 On the renouncing and
transferring rights.
-the mutual transferring
is called contract. There are some
rights one can not give away.
-“Whensoever a man transferreth
his right or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right
reciprocally transferred to himself of for some other good he hopeth for
thereby. For it is a voluntary act,
and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some
good to himself[24]...the
motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is
introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and
in the means of so preserving life....And therefore if a man by words, or other
signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended;
he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that
he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.”
-582 the bonds of words are too
weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the
fear of some coercive power; which in
the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the
justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.
And therefore, he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his
enemy; contrary to right, he can never abandon, of defending his life, and means
of living.”
--Contrast his views
here with Plato’s!
582-584 Power and contracts.
Chapter 15. Of Other Laws of Nature:
In this Chapter Hobbes describes additional laws which
rational egoists would all recognize.
584
Third Law: “…men perform their
covenants made….”
-Justice and injustice
arise in the social context: “…where
there is no commonwealth, there is nothing unjust.”
588
Tenth Law: “…at the entrance into
conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is
not content should be reserved to every one of the rest.”
589 The upshot of these natural
laws:
-Hobbes: “Do not that to another,
which thou wouldest not have done to thyself.”
--How does this differ from the
Christian version of the “golden rule?”
The latter says: “whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them; for this is the law and the prophets.”
The text leading up to this in the
Revised Standard Version is reproduced in
Appendix I below.
The two maxims are radically different.
The former implies an obligation to
refrain from certain action because
one wouldn’t like to be on the receiving end.
The latter requires positive
action because one is to do things because one would like to be on the
receiving end!
IV. Selections from
Part II: Of Commonwealth:
Chapter 17. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of
a Commonwealth:
In this Chapter Hobbes explains
why and
how individuals join together in
civil states (or commonwealths).
590 Men join together and
restrain themselves for “preservation:”
“For the laws of nature,
as justice, equality, modesty, mercy, and in sum, doing to others as we would
have done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to
be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality,
pride, revenge, and the like. And
covenants, without the swords, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man
at all.”
-Note that when he says that the
“laws of nature” are
contrary to our natural passions,
he can’t mean this literally—both
our love of power (unbridled and unbounded)
and “laws of nature” (which lead us
to civil society) are
of
our nature.
It is here that we find both the “cure” to our afflictions in the state
of nature, and the conflict which leads us to sometimes not do our (rationally
egoistic)
duty.
-Note
how different a reason for the state this is from Plato’s reason!
-“For if we could suppose a great
multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of
nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose
all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need be any
civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without
subjection.”
--Why does this seem unlikely to
him?
591 “The
only way to erect such a common
power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the
injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that, by
their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves
and live contentedly; is to confer all
their power and strength upon one man, or upon some assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will....”
-Thus we have Hobbes’ version of
the “social contract:” “I authorize
and give up my right of governing myself to this man...on this condition, that
thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.”
-Question:
why not a restricted sovereignty?
In his A History of Western Philosophy:
Philosophy From the Renaissance to the Romantic Age, A. Robert Caponigri
maintains that the sovereign’s power is: “...in principle absolute and without
intrinsic limit.
To recognize any limit in principle,
would be to reduce the state to one among the contestants whose interests it is
supposed to mediate. At the
same time, there is, due to the fact that the social compact by no means works a
transformation of the constitutive egoism of men,
a constant pattern of centrifugal forces,
individuals seeking to evade the power of the state.
To realize the absoluteness which is proper to it in principle, the state
must constantly seek to bring that centrifugal pattern firmly within the orbit
of its actual power. Similarly, the
monarch, who stands at the center of the governmental structure of the state and
embodies it must constantly seek the actual extension and insure the actual
inclusiveness of his power. It must
have the sole power to resolve all contests between subjects; it cannot tolerate
any contest of interest between itself and its subjects, individually or in any
pattern of collectivity. The state,
in its idea, and the absolute monarch are completely and organically related and
expressive of each other.”[25]
Additional material
as a Class Handout:[26]
Chapter 20. Of Domination Paternal and Despotical:
In this Chapter Hobbes distinguishes sovereignty which is
established by “acquisition by force” (conquest and force) from that established
by “institution” (contracts and agreements), points out that the rights of the
sovereign are not affected by the method by which sovereignty is established,
and describes the rights of parents to rule their children:
1-2
For as to the Generation,
God hath ordained to man a helper;
and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore over
the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both,
which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters. Hobbes goes on to
say that in civil states the civil laws determine which parent has authority,
while in the state of nature it is up to what the egoists decide.
Hobbes notes that in most societies patriarchy is the norm, but he
mentions that the Amazonians would have a different rule.
-2 Hobbes discusses the
“authority” [or dominion] positions in families first in the Civil State saying
that the matter: “…is decided by the Civill law;” then saying that “in
this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of
the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all..”
He goes on to say that “where there is no contract” it is the female who
has authority over the child; and that this is the case unless the woman is the
subject of the man.
--Here we need to discuss how he
could think there could be meaningful
contracts in the state of nature, and could be
families in a state of nature--why
would egoists take on the role of parents.
If the only form of love he allows for is self-love, why would there be
parents?
-In her “Hobbes,
Patriarchy and Conjugal Right,” Carole Pateman maintains that: “his picture of
natural, atomized individuals, who “spring up like mushrooms”—[Hobbes says:] “consider
men as if even now [they] sprung up out of the earth, and suddenly, like
mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other”[27]—denies
any significance to the mother-child relationship and the dependence on the
mother that provides the first intersubjective context for the development of
human capacities. Di Stefano claims
that there is no room for nurture within the family in Hobbes’ state of nature;
“men are not born of, much less nurtured by, women, or anyone else for that
matter.””[28]
3-4 Hobbes discusses the
difference between families and civil states.
The former do not have sufficient power to be fully like the latter, but
his discussion throughout the chapter of “paternal dominion” makes it clear that
he feels that families are important.
Of course, given what I noted above, Hobbes seems to rely upon rational
egoists to “contract family responsibilities amongst themselves,” or for the
civil state to assign them these responsibilities.”
But it is not clear that he can do this given the role of “nurturing”
which seems to be involved in such activities.
4-5 Hobbes discusses how
Scripture also assigns absolute power to the civil sovereign: assigning to the
sovereign the right “to reign,” “to take sons and daughters,” “to be the sole
judge of rules regarding good and evil,” in short, it commands us to “render
unto Caesar what is Caesar’.”
5 Thus he says: “so
it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that
the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one
Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great,
as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And
though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the
consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against
his neighbour, are much worse.”
4-5 As R.S. Peters notes, “it is
seldom realized that over half of
Leviathan deals with religious matters.
One of Hobbes’ main preoccupations was to establish that there are
general grounds [that is grounds of reason] as well as scriptural authority for
his conviction that the sovereign is the best interpreter of God’s will.
Religion, on his view, was a system of law, not a system of truth.
To establish this Hobbes made some illuminating remarks about the
distinction between knowledge and faith.
He maintained vehemently that we could
know nothing of the attributes of
God; for demonstration was impossible in such matters.
The adjectives which we used to describe God were expressions of our
adoration not products of reason.”[29]
5. Hobbes contends that: “…it
appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture,
that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one
Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great,
as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”
Chapter 21. Of The
In this Chapter Hobbes discusses the “liberty” which is to
be allotted to the subjects of his civil states.
6 “Liberty,
or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I
mean externall Impediments of motion;)....”
7 “But
as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have
made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made
Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall
covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to
whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own
Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to
hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.”
“...in
all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted[30],
men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the
most profitable to themselves.
9
In the act of our submission lies both
our obligation and our liberty.
-The sovereign power
over life and death is explicitly recognized, and the sovereign may even put an
innocent subject to death and do no wrong!
-“First
therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to
every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the
Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty
in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred.”
Subjects can’t be forced to kill
themselves or deprive themselves of life’s necessities.
9-10 “No man is bound by the words
themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that
the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to
execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of
our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End
thereof. When therefore our refusall to
obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is
no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.”
-Here a potentially
serious problem emerges. The
sovereign will require “henchmen” or enforcers, and these individuals will have
to engage in dangerous duties. But
can it be in one’s self-interest to act in such a dangerous capacity?
Our other liberties depend upon
the silence of the law.
11 “The
Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.
For the right men have by Nature to
protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be
relinquished. The Soveraignty is the
Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe
no more receive their motion from it. The
end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his
own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his
endeavour to maintaine it. And though
Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in
its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also
through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.”
(end)
V.
Appendix I. The Revised Standard
Version of Sermon on the Mount (abbreviated):
Blessed are the poor in spirit,
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are the meek, for they
shall inherit the earth.
Blessed are those who morn, for
they shall be comforted.
…
Whoever then relaxes one of the
least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the
kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great
in the kingdom of heaven....
So if you are offering your gift
at the alter, and there remember that your brother has something against you,
leave your gift there before the alter and go; first be reconciled to your
brother, and then come and offer your gift….
If your right eye causes you to
sin, pluck it out and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your
members than that your whole body be thrown into hell.
Do not resist one who is evil.
But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other
also; and if an one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as
well; and if an one forces you to go one mile go with him two miles.
Give to him who begs from you, and do not refuse him who would borrow
from you.
Love your enemies and pray for
those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father....
Beware of practicing your
piety before men in order to be seen by them for then you will have no reward
from your Father who is in heaven.
Thus when you give alms, sound no trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do....
Lord’s Prayer.
Therefore be not anxious about
tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself.
Let the day’s own trouble be sufficient for the day….
So whatever you wish that men
would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law of the prophets.[31]
VI. Appendix II:
Morality and Prudence:
John Locke maintains that we give up power to the state to
better ourselves. Will Hobbes’
subjects better themselves? In his
Moral Knowledge, Alan Goldman makes
this point as follows:
the standard objection to his
political philosophy at least since Locke is that his cure is worse than the
disease of anarchy. Our problem
here is that the self-interest of citizens would not be served by making the
police powerful enough to threaten and impose punishments sufficient to render
it never in a prospective criminal’s interest to act wrongly, even were this
possible. The costs in terms of
resources, loss of privacy, and increased probability of wrongful conviction
would outweigh any gain from crime reduction.
This would make it imprudent, hence irrational, to try to solve the
problem of the rationality of wrongful behavior in this way.
....We trade social order for privacy and liberty, reducing the costs of
the former by tolerating some costs of the latter.
But this reasonable compromise defeats the appeal to prospective
punishment in the argument in support of the claim that the risk of wrongdoing
can never be worth the projected benefit from the point of view of
self-interest.[32]
Moreover, Goldman notes that:
there appear to be situations in
which individuals can maximize their own benefits by free riding on or
exploiting others, situations in which others are behaving properly, in which
exploiters can violate the rights of these others and hence act wrongly, but can
benefit themselves, can better satisfy their self-interested desires, by doing
so. If it can be reasonable or
prudential to break a valid covenant, then the third law of nature is not a rule
of reason, or reason cannot be equated with prudence.[33]
If one knows that a
particular encounter will be the last, then one will not be deterred by the
thought of future sanctions for present behavior, and it will not pay to
co-operate. But then if one knows
that co-operation cannot pay on the last encounter, and one knows that others
know this, then one also knows that co-operation cannot pay on the next to last
encounter....[34]
…the rationality of moral
restraint according to the self-interest maximizing conception depends on the
likelihood of retaliation in the future for present misconduct, or upon one’s
inability to predict escaping retaliation..
The truth of the claim that one cannot reliably make this prediction in
turn depends on a host of empirical factors.
If further interaction with particular individuals or groups is unlikely,
if your present behavior is unlikely to be recognized so as to affect your
reputation or future opportunities, if the psychology of present potential
victims renders them unlikely to retaliate, if you can profitably take advantage
now without restraint and not being penalized for doing so, if you can be
reasonably certain that any or all of these conditions obtain, then you can
profit from wrongdoing.[35]
Goldman’s overall rejection of Hobbes’ moral theory (in
Chapter I of his Moral Knowledge)
hinges upon the idea that while there is much to recommend the equation of moral
obligation and rational prudence (especially the idea that “moral rules exist to
make peaceful social relations and co-operative interactions among individuals
possible”), “what is implausible is that these reasons always override others
that a self-interested agent may have, that it can never be profitable for her
to break the rules that generally are to guide her behavior toward others if she
is prudent....Where these exceptions exist, the reduction of rightness to
rational prudence fails.”[36]
In his “Hobbes on Obligation,” Thomas Nagel maintains that:
moral obligation is something
that plays a part in deliberations, and it has an influence in situations in
which a person might not perform an action if he considered only his own
benefit, whereas the consideration of a moral obligation, to help others, for
example, leads him to do it anyway.
Nothing could be called a moral obligation which in principle never conflicted
with self-interest. But according
to the theory of motivation...[of] Hobbes, the only thing by which men are ever
motivated is the consideration of self-interest.
So a genuine feeling of moral obligation can never play a part in their
deliberations.[37]
VII.
Appendix III. On The “Resolutive-Compositive”
Methodology:”[38]
According to C.B. MacPherson,
...the resolutive-compositive
method which he so admired in Galileo and which he took over, was to resolve
existing society into its simplest elements and then recompose those elements
into a logical whole. The
resolving, therefore, was of existing society into existing individuals, and of
them in turn into the primary elements of their motion.
Hobbes does not take us through the resolutive part of his thought, but
starts us with the result of that and takes us through only the compositive
part.[39]
The Royal Society of Hobbes’ day followed the inductive
methodology championed by Bacon which held that knowledge was gleaned from
experience (where experience is the remembrance of what antecedents have been
followed by what consequents).
Hobbes held little regard for such “knowledge.”
He does not completely exclude experience however.
His model of reason is a complex one allowing for two methodologies:
the first beginnings, therefore,
of knowledge, are the phantasms of sense and imagination, and that there be such
phantasms we know well enough by nature; but to know why they be, or from what
causes they proceed, is the work of division or resolution....It is easier known
concerning singular than universal things, that they are; and contrarily it is
easier known concerning universal than singular things, why they are, or what
are their causes....in knowledge by sense, the whole object is more known, than
any part thereof; as when we see a man, the conception or whole idea of that man
is first or more known, than the particular ideas of his being figurate,
animate, and rational; that is, we first see the whole man, and take notice of
his being, before we observe in him those other particulars.
And therefore in any knowledge...that any thing is, the beginning of our
search is from the whole idea; and contrarily, in our knowledge...of the causes
of anything, that is in the sciences, we have more knowledge of the causes of
the parts than of the whole. For
the cause of the whole is compounded of the causes of the parts; but it is
necessary that we know the things that are to be compounded, before we can know
the whole compound.[40]
According to him the resolutive (or analytical) method can
discover principles:
...to those who search after
science...it is necessary that they know the causes of universal things, or of
such accidents are common to all bodies, that is, to all matter, before they can
know the causes of singular things....seeing universal things are contained in
the nature of singular things, the knowledge of them is to be acquired by
reason, that is by resolution....by resolving continually, we may come to know
what those things are, whose causes being known first severally, and afterwards
compounded, bring us to knowledge of singular things.
I conclude, therefore, that the method of attaining to the universal
knowledge of things, is purely analytical.[41]
Once individuals have such knowledge of the laws governing
the basic particles, they are to proceed by “composition” from the behavior of
the simplest particles to the behavior of composite things:
by the knowledge therefore of
universals, and of their causes (which are the first principles by which we know
why/cause of things) we have in the first place their definitions (which are
nothing but the explication of our simple conceptions....It remains, that we
inquire what motion begets such and such effects....Now the method of this kind
of inquiry, is compositive.[42]
A general picture of his view, then, has us first use the resolutive (or
analytical) method to move from given effects to their causes (on the simplest
and most general level), and then, second, use the compositive (or synthetical)
method to move from our knowledge of causes to their effects.
As R.S. Peters says:
in this method a typical
phenomenon, such as the rolling of a stone down a slope was taken.
Such properties as color and smell, which were regarded as scientifically
irrelevant, were disregarded, and the situation was resolved into simple
elements that could be quantified—tithe length and angle of the slope, the
weight of the stone, the time the stone takes to fall.
The mathematical relations disclosed were then manipulated until
functional relations between the variables were established.
The situation was then synthesized or “composed” in a rational structure
of mathematical relations....In Galileo’s hands this method was highly
successful because he tested such deductions by observation.
In Hobbes’ hands the method was not so fruitful because it always
remained an imaginary experiment.”[43]
(end)
[1]
Cf.,
“Of Darkness From Vain Philosophy and Fabulous
Traditions,” which is Chapter 46 of Hobbes’
Leviathan
[1651].
This chapter is in Part III (“Of A
Christian Commonwealth”) of the work, which is
rarely reprinted now.
One readily available source for this
chapter, however, is
Leviathan,
ed. Herbert Schneider (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), pp. 3-20.
[2] “Hobbes,
Thomas,”
Britannica Online
(http://www.eb.com:180/cgi-bin/g?DocF=micro/273/17.html,
accessed 15 January 1999.
[3] Edwin A.
Burt, The
English Philosophers From Bacon To Mill
(N.Y.: Modern Library, 1939), p. 220, footnote.
[4] Bernard
Gert, “Hobbes, Thomas,” in
The
Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted
Honderich (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1995), pp.
367-370, p. 370.
[5]
Ibid.
[6] Herbert
Schneider, “Editor’s Introduction,” to
Thomas
Hobbes’ Leviathan [1651] (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), pp. vii-xvi, p. x.
The Arminianists followed Jacobus
Arminius (1560-1609) who held that Jesus died
for all people not only for "the elect."
[7] Frederick
Copleston,
A History
of Philosophy v. 5 (Pt. 1) (Garden City:
Image, 1964), p. 13.
[8]
Ibid.,
p. 15.
The citation from Hobbes is from his
Concerning Body (1, 1, 8).
[9]
Ibid.,
pp. 15-16.
[10]
Ibid., p. 16.
[11] J.W.N.
Watkins does an excellent job of explaining the
“resolutive-compositive” methodology of Galileo,
[12] Meaning
here the application of the “resolving and
composing” method to minds and societies so as
to integrate the physical, chemical, and
biological elements to yield psychological and
political understanding.
[13] Thomas
Hobbes,
De Corpore [1655] (Chapter 6, section 7),
cited from
The Light
of Reason, ed. Martin Hollis (London:
Fontana/Collins, 1973), pp. 183-184.
[14] C.B.
MacPherson,
The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1962), p. 30.
[15] Thomas
Hobbes,
De Corpore, op. cit.,
p. 184.
[16] Thomas
Hobbes,
Leviathan [1651], from selections in
Classics
of Western Philosophy (eighth edition), ed.
Steven M. Cahn (
[17] Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], “A Review and
Conclusion,” from
Leviathan,
ed. by A.P. Martinich (
[18] Ibid.,
p. 524.
[19] Consider
the behavior of children in a pre-school as they
play with more building blocks than they can all
use.
Such a case should help one see that
conflict can easily arise even in situations
where there is a plenitude of goods.
[20] It is
important to note that Hobbes does not believe
that the “state of nature” is an actual social
condition, or “state.”
In fact, it is the opposite of a civil
society—a condition of anarchy wherein
individuals would not be able to “socialize”
with others because of their fear, lack of
trust, and unbridled egoism.
In such a condition, even “families” are
hard to imagine!
Here we see the effects of Hobbes’
“atomism”—his radical individualism.
For him the social contract constructs an
artificial state.
It is built by atomic individuals for
their own individual protection (and to enhance
their own individual lives).
[21]
According to Hobbes, such constraints are
rationally-dictated by self-interested
considerations: without them we will live in
perpetual fear for our lives, and we will not
satisfy many of our desires.
[22] C.B.
MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism,
op. cit.,
pp. 76-77.
Emphasis added to passage.
[23]
The
Leviathan, or The Matter, Form, and Power of A
Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil is
composed of four parts: “Of Man,” “Of
Commonwealth,” “Of A Christian Commonwealth,”
and “Of the Kingdom of Darkness.”
The third and fourth parts argue that
attempts by papists and Presbyterians to
challenge the rights of ·sovereigns undercut
social peace and stability.
Further citations to the
Leviathan
are to the selection in Cahn’s
Classics
of Western Philosophy, op. cit., and will be
noted with the appropriate page reference.
[24] In this
passage Hobbes seems committed to a view we can
call “psychological
egoism”—this view holds that the object of
one’s actions is always some good for oneself.
Note that he ·initially speaks, however,
of “some good” which one hopes for.
It seems that individuals sometimes seek,
hope for, or strive to attain goods which are
not goods for themselves.
The psychological egoist doesn’t allow
for this.
Cf., Joel Feinberg, “Psychological
Egoism” [1958], in
Reason
and Responsibility (ninth edition), ed. Joel
Feinberg (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1996), pp.
497-508.
Note, also, that Hobbes continues in this
passage by offering a view we might call “ethical
egoism”—a view which says that one should
behave egoistically (he tells us that there are
rights which we may not give up).
On this view
cf.
James Rachels,
The
Elements of Moral Philosophy (N.Y.: Random
House, 1986).
[25] A.
Robert Caponigri,
A History
of Western Philosophy: Philosophy: From the
Renaissance to the Romantic Age (Notre Dame:
Univ. of Notre Dame, 1963), pp. 289-290,
emphasis added to passage twice.
[26]
The selection,
Chapters 20 and 21 of Hobbes’
Leviathan,
is taken from
the Project Guttenberg version of Hobbes’
Leviathan
(http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm
), accessed on 10/23/14.
The page numbers refer to the
supplemental handout.
[27] The
citation from Hobbes here is from his
Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government
and Society [1651] (the English version of
his De
Cive [1642]),
The
English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
(London: John Bohn, 1841) v. 2, ch. 8, p. 109.
Emphasis [bold] has been added to the
passage.
[28] Carole
Pateman, “Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal
Right,” in
Social
and Political Philosophy: Classical Western
Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives,
ed. James Sterba (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), pp.
144-157, p. 144.
The citation from Di Stefano is from
Christine Di Stefano, “Masculinity As Ideology
in Political Theory: Hobbesian Man Considered,”
Women’s
Studies International Forum v. 6 (1983), p.
638.
Emphasis [bold] has been added to the
passage.
[29] R.S.
Peters, “Introduction to the Collier Books
Edition” of Hobbes
Leviathan
(N.Y.: Collier, 1962), pp. 7-19, p. 15.
[30]
‘Pretermit’ means “to let pass.”
[31]
The Bible
(Revised
Standard Version), Matthew 5 through 7.12.
[32] Alan
Goldman,
Moral Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1988),
pp. 36-37.
[33]
Ibid.,
p. 34.
[34]
Ibid.,
p. 43.
[35]
Ibid.,
p. 44.
[36]
Ibid.,
p. 52.
[37] Thomas
Nagel, “Hobbes on Obligation,” the
Philosophical Review v. 68 (1959), pp.
68-83, p. 74-75.
[38] Cf.,
J.W.N. Watkins, “Philosophy and Politics in
Hobbes,”
op cit.
[39] C.B.
MacPherson,
The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism,
op. cit., p. 30.
[40] Thomas
Hobbes,
De Corpore, in
The Light
of Reason, ed. Martin Hollis, op. cit.,
pp. 179.
[41]
Ibid.,
pp. 180-181.
[42]
Ibid.,
pp. 181-182.
[43] R.S.
Peters, “Hobbes,” in
The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy v.·4, ed. Paul
Edwards (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 30-46, p.
35.
File revised on 03/16/2015.