MSC Political Compromise Course

In their Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What Should Be Done About It Gutmann and Thompson maintain that

there are better and worse ways of living with moral disagreements, and among the better is political democracy. Democracy seems a natural and reasonable way since it is a conception of government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each citizen. If we have to disagree morally about public policy, it is better to do so in a democracy that as far as possible respects the moral status of each of us.[1]

…citizens and their accountable representatives owe one another justifications for the laws that collectively bind them. A democracy is deliberative to the extent that citizens and their accountable representatives offer one another morally defensible reasons for mutually binding laws in an ongoing process of mutual justification. To the extent that a democracy is not deliberative, it treats people as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, rather than as citizens who take part in governance by accepting or rejecting the reasons they and their accountable representatives offer for the laws and policies that mutually bind them.

Deliberative democracy underscores the importance of publicly supported education that develops the capacity to deliberate among all children as future free and equal citizens. The most justifiable way of making mutually binding decisions in a representative democracy—including decisions not to deliberate about some matters—is by deliberative decision making, where the decision makers are accountable to the people who are most affected by their decisions.[2]

citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken.[3]

For them making democracy work requires that each citizen must treat every other citizen reciprocally—that is as a political equal worthy of respect. When this attitude is present each “side” in a disagreement can work deliberatively to address, and potentially resolve the issue. Even where this is not successful, it can yield understanding.

the principles of accommodation are based on a value that lies at the core of reciprocity and deliberation in a democracy—mutual respect. It is what makes possible cooperation on fair terms. Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree. But mutual respect demands more than toleration. It requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees. It consists in an excellence of character that permits a democracy to flourish in the face of fundamental moral disagreement. This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character. It is the character of individuals who are morally committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differences between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view.

Mutual respect not only helps sustain a moral community in the face of conflict but also can contribute toward resolving the conflict.[4]

Note the ‘can’ in the above. They don’t claim that reasoning reciprocally guarantees understanding (or agreement), instead they claim it can lead to respect! For them:

the distinctive characteristics of moral argument in politics—most notably reciprocity—support the possibility of resolution. If citizens publicly appeal to reasons that are shard or could be shared, by their fellow citizens, and if they take into account these same kinds of reasons presented by similarly motivated citizens, then they are already engaged in a process that by its nature aims at a justifiable resolution of disagreement.[5]

We reach some resolutions, but they are partial and tentative. The resolutions do not stand outside the process of moral argument prior to it or protected from its provocations. We do not begin with a common morality, a substantial set of principles or values that we assume we have, and then apply it to decisions and policies. Nor, for that matter, do we end with such a morality. Rather, the principles and values with which we live are provisional, formed and continually revised in the process of making and responding to moral claims in public life.[6]

The perspective of deliberative democracy, then, does not require a consensus on public policy or even on constitutional law. At its center stands instead an appreciation of principles that set the conditions of political discussion—reciprocity and its companions publicity and accountability. This shift in focus of what democratic citizens should share is significant, theoretically and practically. Theoretically, a deliberative perspective expresses as complete a conception of a common good as is possible within a morally pluralistic society. Recognizing that politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a common view of how citizens should publicly deliberate when they fundamentally disagree. Practically, this perspective encourages the cultivation of a set of civic virtues that can guide citizens through the maelstroms of moral controversy in a pluralistic society. It can help citizens resolve moral conflict with fairness and, when they cannot resolve it, enables them to work together in a mode of mutual respect. This is the counsel of the principles of accommodation, and ultimately the sense of reciprocity.[7]

So, our authors develop a view of deliberative democracy which requires citizens to reason respectfully with one another regarding political disagreements on moral and religious topics with respect and toleration hopefully producing understanding and some tentative agreements on laws! I began by saying they want do develop a theory which can be applied in our case, but it seems that they could well be further from reality than Plato who recommends that states be ruled by philosophers or Mill who contends that everyone will embrace a political system wherein each will desire the greatest good for the greatest number. How can they bridge the gap between theory and reality which we all recognize (whether or not we yet fully understand their theory?

In this chapter our authors offer a picture of campaigning which associates it with the uncompromising mindset (with both of its core characteristics: tenacity and mistrust); and a picture of governing which associates it with the compromising mindset (with both of its core characteristics (principled prudence and trust). As we discuss their view I want to contrast their view of campaigning with another one which, I hope, might offer much more hope than their view that good governance might be possible.

The model I have in mind is one which conceives of “competition” more along the lines of competitive sports—one which holds that there must be some guard rails if competition isn’t to turn into something akin to “celebrity death match.[8]” Here I encourage you to think of professional tennis or basketball for example. These competitive sports rely upon the presence (and enforcement of specific rules), a shared conception of the nature of the endeavor, and other mutual agreements amongst the players (not all of which have to be explicitly enunciated or enunciated. While some politicians (and, perhaps, groups of the same) may conceive of campaigning as “unbridled Warfare), those who practice this actually undermine democracy!

146-149 Tenaciously standing on principle helps a candidate avoid charges of “flip-flopping” (or inconsistency) and be very appealing to the candidate’s “base.” But this strategy

148 …works in general elections only under special conditions—only if the base is bigger than that of the other party and also near a majority in size. Campaigning does not require appealing only to the base, but it does require directing attention to your most likely supporters….

149-152 Moreover it is not wise to signal a willingness to compromise (and even less wise to discuss the specific compromises one might make) while campaigning. Compromise is predicated on a level of mutual-sacrifice (as well as reciprocity and trust) which is not compatible with campaigning—compromise is for the activity of governing:

150 Candidates aim to outmaneuver their opponents; they inevitably operate in an environment rife with suspicion and manipulation. Mutual mistrust is not only understandable but advisable. Even on the rare occasions when candidates are forced to negotiate compromises…their managers try to arrange terms that will advantage their respective candidates….

The authors discuss what might be called the deliberative and the competitive conceptions of democracy and campaigning contending that

152 Deliberative democrats “…can recognize that campaigns are not a promising environment for deliberation. It would be not only unrealistic but also undesirable to try to convert campaigns into prime sites for deliberation.” While they accept that discussion and debate can certainly be improved upon in campaigning, they contend that: 153 “the habits of deliberation need to be cultivated elsewhere.”

153-156 They discuss the problems which arise from an “overly-competitive conception of campaigning” like that championed by the political economist Joseph Schumpeter:

155 Competitive theorists are critical of compromise between political partisans, viewing it as a form of duopolistic power[9]: [quoting Ian Shapiro] “If competition for power is the lifeblood of democracy, then the search for bipartisan consensus (along with the ideal of deliberative agreement that lies behind it) is really anticompetitive collusion in restraint of democracy.”

-This argument is familiar to those who have studied “unfettered capitalism”—without some sorts of “market controls,” such an orientation leads to monopolistic enterprises, short-term viewpoints, and rampant classism. While many today try and speak about the tension between economic “capitalism” and socialism” as if there was (and could be) no intermediate position, our economy has been one where there are constraints upon businesses, corporations, or individuals which are intended to protect the public, ensure fair competition, etc.

-p. 156 Our authors note that some “competitive theorists” advocate using antitrust laws and ballot initiatives to break up the anticompetitive power of the two parties in hopes that multi-party competition would be an improvement. They note, however, that the increase in the number of parties would make the need for compromise yet more serious.

-Thus, practically speaking it seems that in if compromise is ruled out in regard to campaigning “the only alternative…at the national level is the equivalent of monopolistic governing power by one party for an extended period of time, which would mean combining control of the executive with supermajorities in Congress [they neglect to mention control of the Courts]. That alternative hardly seems a desirable long-term solution, even if it were possible.

157 “neither a deliberative nor a competitive conception of democracy can be a complete guide to the role of compromise if its core ideal is taken to rule all parts of the democratic process. The competitive idea has to be restrained in governing in order to reach compromises, and the deliberative ideal has to be tempered in campaigning in order to provide choices…Both competition and deliberation have a place throughout the democratic process. Any adequate conception of democracy should make room for both ideals.”

158-160 Our authors contend that their view doesn’t require either compromise or deliberation in both the areas of governing and campaigning

158 “…but it does require that all practices be justified deliberatively at some point, and that they remain open to deliberative challenge at any point. Deliberative democracy requires mutual reason-giving. Citizens and their representatives are expected to justify to one another the laws they adopt and the lawmaking practices by which they adopt them. The mutual justifications are to take the form of reasons that they could be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation….

They say their deliberative view “…would acknowledge that competitive campaigns are a desirable and probably the best feasible practice for enabling fee and equal citizens to choose their representatives. It would also recognize that an uncompromising mindset is necessary to sustain this competitive practice. But the form of competitive practices must be justified to and by citizens, which means that deliberation ultimately determines the limits of competition. An aim of such limits would be to keep the competition appropriate in campaigning from overwhelming the deliberation necessary for governing.

In this section our authors note that primary elections make candidates campaign uncompromisingly to the base of their party; that as campaigns become permanent, there is little room left for the compromising mindset necessary for governing; and the rigors of continual campaigning make elective office unattractive to those who want to legislate!

In the next chapter they will address how we might make space for governing while allowing for campaigning.

Unfortunately, if it wasn’t clear when the book was published in 2012, it is surely clear now that campaigning has “overwhelmed governing!” I think my appeal to athletic competition at the beginning of this supplement is relevant here and I appeal to it in the spirit of deliberative democracy.

However fierce the competition between the Dolphins and the Patriots, they do not carry weapons on the field, bribe food-servers to poison the other side, or kidnap the families of the referees. Indeed, it should be noted, athletic competition (indeed almost all) is predicated upon the existence of “referees,” and likewise in our economic system the government plays an important role as a referee in the economy instead of letting unfettered capitalism run free.

I believe two questions emerge as we consider the most competitive aspect of our politics: what sorts of rules or guidelines should we put in place so that competitive campaigning can lead to democratic governance rather than the cage-match, and who should the referees be? The second one is easy: the courts (the third branch of our governing system) should be the referees—they are the least partisan part of our government, and (at least at the Federal level) don’t have to campaign.

As for the guardrails, I think that Congress is going to have to be the source of these….

Notes: [click on the note number to return to the text for a given note]

[1] Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What Should Be Done About It (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996), p. 26.

[2] Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton U.P., [1987] 1999), p. xii. Emphasis (bold) added to passage.

[3] Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[4] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[5] Ibid., p. 25.

[6] Ibid., p. 26.

[7] Ibid., pp. 93-94.

[8] This animated MTV cartoon series involves a “cage match” between claymation versions of popular celebrities-- though these are not your matches. Most of them with the death of one of the participants.

[9] Duopoly: a situation in which control of a commodity, service, or the reins of political power is lodged in just two producers, suppliers, or parties.