MSC Political
Compromise Course Supplement for Week 5
Democracy,
Campaigning, and Governing
Copyright © 2019 Bruce W.
Hauptli
I. Primer on Gutmann and Thompson’s “Deliberative Democracy:”
In their Democracy
and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What
Should Be Done About It Gutmann and Thompson maintain that
there are better and worse ways of
living with moral disagreements, and among the better is political democracy.
Democracy seems a natural and reasonable way since it is a conception of
government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each citizen.
If we have to disagree morally about public policy, it is better to do so
in a democracy that as far as possible respects the moral status of each of us.[1]
As Gutmann says in her Democratic Education:
…citizens and their accountable
representatives owe one another justifications for the laws that collectively
bind them. A democracy is
deliberative to the extent that citizens and their accountable representatives
offer one another morally defensible reasons for mutually binding laws in an
ongoing process of mutual justification.
To the extent that a democracy is not deliberative, it treats people as
objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, rather than as citizens
who take part in governance by accepting or rejecting the reasons they and their
accountable representatives offer for the laws and policies that mutually bind
them.
Deliberative democracy underscores the importance of
publicly supported education that
develops the capacity to deliberate among all children as future free and equal
citizens. The most justifiable
way of making mutually binding decisions in a representative democracy—including
decisions not to deliberate about some matters—is by deliberative decision
making, where the decision makers are accountable to the people who are most
affected by their decisions.[2]
As Gutmann and Thompson see it,
citizens who reason reciprocally can
recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it
morally wrong. They can believe
that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example is morally
respectable even though they think it morally mistaken.[3]
For them making
democracy work requires that each citizen must treat every other citizen
reciprocally—that is as a political
equal worthy of respect. When
this attitude is present each “side” in a disagreement can work deliberatively
to address, and potentially resolve the issue.
Even where this is not successful, it can yield
understanding.
the principles of accommodation are
based on a value that lies at the core of reciprocity and deliberation in a
democracy—mutual respect. It is
what makes possible cooperation on fair terms.
Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree.
But mutual respect demands more than toleration.
It requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction
with, the persons with whom one disagrees.
It consists in an excellence of character that permits a democracy to
flourish in the face of fundamental moral disagreement.
This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character.
It is the character of individuals who are morally committed,
self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differences between
respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to the
possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in
the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of
view.
Mutual respect not only helps sustain a moral community in the face of
conflict but also can contribute toward resolving the conflict.[4]
Note the ‘can’ in
the above. They don’t claim that
reasoning reciprocally guarantees
understanding (or agreement), instead they claim it can lead to
respect!
For them:
the distinctive characteristics of
moral argument in politics—most notably reciprocity—support the possibility of
resolution. If citizens publicly
appeal to reasons that are shard or could be shared, by their fellow citizens,
and if they take into account these same kinds of reasons presented by similarly
motivated citizens, then they are already engaged in a process that by its
nature aims at a justifiable resolution of disagreement.[5]
We reach some resolutions, but they
are partial and tentative. The
resolutions do not stand outside the process of moral argument prior to it or
protected from its provocations. We
do not begin with a common morality, a substantial set of principles or values
that we assume we have, and then apply it to decisions and policies.
Nor, for that matter, do we end with such a morality.
Rather, the principles and values with which we live are provisional,
formed and continually revised in the process of making and responding to moral
claims in public life.[6]
The perspective of deliberative
democracy, then, does not require a consensus on public policy or even on
constitutional law. At its center
stands instead an appreciation of principles that set the conditions of
political discussion—reciprocity and its companions publicity and
accountability. This shift in focus
of what democratic citizens should share is significant, theoretically and
practically. Theoretically, a
deliberative perspective expresses as complete a conception of a common good as
is possible within a morally pluralistic society.
Recognizing that politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a
common view of how citizens should publicly deliberate when they fundamentally
disagree. Practically, this
perspective encourages the cultivation of a set of civic virtues that can guide
citizens through the maelstroms of moral controversy in a pluralistic society.
It can help citizens resolve moral conflict with fairness and, when they
cannot resolve it, enables them to work together in a mode of mutual respect.
This is the counsel of the principles of accommodation, and ultimately
the sense of reciprocity.[7]
So, our authors develop a view of deliberative democracy which
requires citizens to reason respectfully with one another regarding political
disagreements on moral and religious topics with respect and toleration
hopefully producing understanding and some tentative agreements on laws!
I began by saying they want do develop a theory which can be applied in
our case, but it seems that they could well be further from reality than Plato
who recommends that states be ruled by philosophers or Mill who contends that
everyone will embrace a political system wherein each will desire the greatest
good for the greatest number. How
can they bridge the gap between theory and reality which we all recognize
(whether or not we yet fully understand their theory?
II. Campaigning
v. Governing:
In this chapter our authors offer a picture of
campaigning which associates it with
the uncompromising mindset (with both of its core characteristics: tenacity and
mistrust); and a picture of governing
which associates it with the compromising mindset (with both of its core
characteristics (principled prudence and trust).
As we discuss their view I want to contrast their view of campaigning
with another one which, I hope, might offer much more hope than their view that
good governance might be possible.
The model I
have in mind is one which conceives of
“competition” more along the lines of competitive sports—one which holds
that there must be some guard rails if competition isn’t to turn into something
akin to “celebrity death match.[8]”
Here I encourage you to think of professional tennis or basketball for
example. These competitive sports
rely upon the presence (and enforcement of specific rules), a shared conception
of the nature of the endeavor, and other mutual agreements amongst the players
(not all of which have to be explicitly enunciated or enunciated.
While some politicians (and, perhaps, groups of the same) may conceive of
campaigning as “unbridled Warfare), those who practice this actually undermine
democracy!
More on this
as we go on!
(A) Requisites of Campaigning:
146-149
Tenaciously standing on principle helps a candidate avoid charges of
“flip-flopping” (or inconsistency) and be very appealing to the candidate’s
“base.” But this strategy
148 …works in general elections only
under special conditions—only if the base is bigger than that of the other party
and also near a majority in size.
Campaigning does not require appealing only to the base, but it does require
directing attention to your most likely supporters….
149-152 Moreover it is not wise to
signal a willingness to compromise (and even less wise to discuss the specific
compromises one might make) while campaigning.
Compromise is predicated on a level of mutual-sacrifice (as well as
reciprocity and trust) which is not compatible with campaigning—compromise is
for the activity of governing:
150 Candidates aim to outmaneuver their
opponents; they inevitably operate in an environment rife with suspicion and
manipulation. Mutual mistrust is
not only understandable but advisable.
Even on the rare occasions when candidates are forced to negotiate
compromises…their managers try to arrange terms that will advantage their
respective candidates….
(B) Two Conceptions of Democracy
[Regarding Campaigning:
The authors
discuss what might be called the
deliberative and the competitive
conceptions of democracy and campaigning contending that
152 Deliberative democrats “…can
recognize that campaigns are not a promising environment for deliberation.
It would be not only unrealistic but also undesirable to try to convert
campaigns into prime sites for deliberation.”
While they accept that discussion and debate can certainly be improved
upon in campaigning, they contend that: 153 “the habits of deliberation need to
be cultivated elsewhere.”
153-156 They discuss the problems which
arise from an “overly-competitive
conception of campaigning” like that championed by the political economist
Joseph Schumpeter:
155 Competitive theorists are critical
of compromise between political partisans, viewing it as a form of duopolistic
power[9]:
[quoting Ian Shapiro] “If competition for power is the lifeblood of democracy,
then the search for bipartisan consensus (along with the ideal of deliberative
agreement that lies behind it) is really anticompetitive collusion in restraint
of democracy.”
-This argument is familiar to those who
have studied “unfettered capitalism”—without some sorts of “market controls,”
such an orientation leads to monopolistic enterprises, short-term viewpoints,
and rampant classism. While many
today try and speak about the tension between economic “capitalism” and
socialism” as if there was (and could be) no intermediate position, our economy
has been one where there are constraints upon businesses, corporations, or
individuals which are intended to protect the public, ensure fair competition,
etc.
-p. 156 Our authors note that some
“competitive theorists” advocate using antitrust laws and ballot initiatives to
break up the anticompetitive power of the two parties in hopes that multi-party
competition would be an improvement.
They note, however, that the increase in the number of parties would make
the need for compromise yet more serious.
-Thus, practically speaking it seems
that in if compromise is ruled out in regard to campaigning “the only
alternative…at the national level is the equivalent of monopolistic governing
power by one party for an extended period of time, which would mean combining
control of the executive with supermajorities in Congress [they neglect to
mention control of the Courts].
That alternative hardly seems a desirable long-term solution, even if it were
possible.
Our authors
conclude from all of this that:
157 “neither a deliberative nor a
competitive conception of democracy can be a complete guide to the role of
compromise if its core ideal is taken to rule all parts of the democratic
process. The competitive idea has
to be restrained in governing in order to reach compromises, and the
deliberative ideal has to be tempered in campaigning in order to provide
choices…Both competition and deliberation have a place throughout the democratic
process. Any adequate conception of
democracy should make room for both ideals.”
158-160 Our
authors contend that their view doesn’t require either compromise or
deliberation in both the areas of governing and campaigning
158 “…but it does require that all
practices be justified deliberatively at some point, and that they remain open
to deliberative challenge at any point.
Deliberative democracy requires mutual reason-giving.
Citizens and their representatives are expected to justify to one another
the laws they adopt and the lawmaking practices by which they adopt them.
The mutual justifications are to take the form of reasons that they could
be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation….
They say their deliberative view
“…would acknowledge that competitive campaigns are a desirable and probably the
best feasible practice for enabling fee and equal citizens to choose their
representatives. It would also
recognize that an uncompromising mindset is necessary to sustain this
competitive practice. But the form
of competitive practices must be justified to and by citizens, which means that
deliberation ultimately determines the limits of competition.
An aim of such limits would be to keep the competition appropriate in
campaigning from overwhelming the deliberation necessary for governing.
(C) Campaigns Without End:
In this section
our authors note that primary elections make candidates campaign
uncompromisingly to the base of their party; that as campaigns become permanent,
there is little room left for the compromising mindset necessary for governing;
and the rigors of continual campaigning make elective office unattractive to
those who want to legislate!
In the next
chapter they will address how we might make space for governing while allowing
for campaigning.
(D) An Interruption Before Taking Up
Our Author’s Resolution Proposals:
Unfortunately, if
it wasn’t clear when the book was published in 2012, it is surely clear now that
campaigning has “overwhelmed governing!”
I think my appeal to athletic competition at the beginning of this
supplement is relevant here and I appeal to it in the spirit of deliberative
democracy.
However fierce the competition
between the Dolphins and the Patriots, they do not carry weapons on the field,
bribe food-servers to poison the other side, or kidnap the families of the
referees. Indeed, it should be
noted, athletic competition (indeed almost all) is predicated upon the existence
of “referees,” and likewise in our economic system the government plays an
important role as a referee in the economy instead of letting unfettered
capitalism run free.
I believe two questions emerge as
we consider the most competitive aspect of our politics: what sorts of rules or
guidelines should we put in place so that competitive campaigning can lead to
democratic governance rather than the cage-match, and who should the referees
be? The second one is easy: the
courts (the third branch of our governing system) should be the referees—they
are the least partisan part of our government, and (at least at the Federal
level) don’t have to campaign.
As for the guardrails, I think
that Congress is going to have to be the source of these….
Next:
“Governing Versus and With Campaigning”
[1]
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
Democracy
and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be
Avoided In Politics, and What Should Be Done
About It (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996), p.
26.
[2]
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education
(Princeton: Princeton U.P., [1987] 1999), p.
xii.
Emphasis (bold) added to passage.
[3]
Gutmann and Thompson,
Democracy
and Disagreement,
op. cit.,
pp. 2-3.
[4]
Ibid.,
pp. 79-80.
[5]
Ibid.,
p. 25.
[6]
Ibid.,
p. 26.
[7]
Ibid.,
pp. 93-94.
[8] This
animated MTV cartoon series involves a “cage
match” between claymation versions of popular
celebrities-- though these are not your matches.
Most of
them with the death of one of the participants.
[9] Duopoly:
a situation in which control of a commodity,
service, or the reins of political power is
lodged in just two producers, suppliers, or
parties.
Return to Hauptli's MSC Spring 2019 Course Website
Last revised on: 04/14/19