Lecture Supplement on Descartes

70 “I am a thing that thinks....these modes of thinking...insofar as they are merely modes of thinking, do exist in me.” Here “...there is nothing but a certain clear and distinct perception of what I affirm. Yet this would hardly be enough to render me certain of the truth of a thing, if it could ever happen that something that I perceived so clearly and distinctly were false. And thus I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true.”

-What ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ mean here: “I term that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear.”^{^[1]}

But, he came to doubt things which he had previously thought to be perceived clearly and distinctly—for example, he believed that besides his ideas, there were “external things” which those ideas represented.

71 Any such doubts he has, however, are founded upon the supposition of the existence of an evil genius, and he has no reason to believe that there is such a creature. He terms this sort of doubt “...very tenuous and, so to speak, metaphysical.”^{^[2]}

-In an extended passage, then, we confront a “conflict” between the “metaphysical doubt,” on the one hand, and the “cogito” and “clear and distinct ideas,” on the other—we might say that we encounter Descartes’ “epistemological schizophrenia.”

-Moreover, we confront a possible serious problem for Descartes here—the potential problem of circularity. He says that to remove the doubt, he “...should at the first opportunity inquire whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether or not he can be a deceiver. For if I am ignorant of this, it appears I am never capable of being completely certain about anything else.” Note that Cress’ translation has Descartes saying “...anything else,” but other translations have Descartes saying, simply, “anything.”^{^[3]} The difference, of course, is significant! The latter engenders what is known as the problem of “circularity.”^{^[4]} Also see my supplement "A Brief Note On Descartes, Eternal Truths, and Rationality" for more on this topic.

71 Ideas alone (without a representational claim) are not false. [Also on, p. 73].

72 Ideas are generally considered to be either innate, adventitious (caused from without), or produced by me (factitious).

-Could the representational claim of my ideas be grounded in the fact that I am taught by nature that my ideas are representations of things? “When I say here “I have been so taught by nature” all I have in mind is that I am driven by a spontaneous impulse to believe this, and not that some light of nature is showing me that it is true.” For more on this, and why he is ultimately willing to assign significant epistemological authority to this sort of “teaching,” see the discussion in Meditation VI (p. 97)—especially his claim that:

--97 and surely there is no doubt that all that I am taught by nature has some truth to it; for by “nature,” taken generally, I understand nothing other than God himself or the ordered network of created things which was instituted by God….

There is nothing that this nature teaches me more explicitly than that I have a body….

-72-73 Could the representational claim be justified by the fact that various of my ideas are not dependent upon my will? “I may have powers I don’t know of....”

-73 “Finally, even if the ideas did proceed from things other than myself, it does not follow that they must resemble those things.”

“...insofar as these ideas are merely modes of thought, I see no inequality among them; they all seem to proceed from me in the same manner. But insofar as one idea represents one thing and another idea another thing, it is obvious that they do differ very greatly from one another. Unquestionably, those ideas that display substances to me are something more and, if I may say so, contain within themselves more objective reality than those which represent only modes or accidents.”

-“Objective reality” refers to the representational capacity of ideas. Consider two different “ideas” (say the plots for an episode of “Married With Children” and a plot for an episode of “Seinfeld”). Insofar as two “ideas” (or “plots”) are considered simply as “ideas,” they are “equal.” When one considers what they represent (the interactions of actors, the motivations for behavior, the very behaviors themselves), however, it is difficult to say they are “equal.” They represent things of greatly varying complexity.

-As noted above, In his “Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,” Descartes maintains that: “everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any property, quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a Substance; neither do we have any other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally or eminently. For by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.”^{^[5]}

-In his “Translator’s Preface” to Spinoza’s Ethics, Samuel Shirley discusses Spinoza’s use of “formal” and “objective” essences maintaining: “these are difficult terms not only to translate but to understand. Here Spinoza takes over a Cartesian distinction which in turn is rooted in Scholastic philosophy. Consider some existing thing, say the planet Saturn. As an existing thing revolving around the sun Saturn has formal essence or reality….The formal essence, or being, of something is its very existence. But in considering this planet we have made it an object of our thought. As such it has objective essence or reality….Clearly, Saturn in the sky and Saturn in our mind are different things, although the latter is supposed to represent to us the former.

What makes this terminology confusing is that in current usage the term ‘subjective’ is often employed to express what the Scholastics meant by ‘objective.’ But the reader of Descartes and Spinoza should realize that when these philosophers use the term ‘objective’ they are talking about a mental representation of a thing, the thing as an object of thought.”^{^[6]}

-Dependency of attributes and modes on substances; dependence of finite substances upon infinite substance: Everything which exists has a cause, or ex nihilo nihil fit.

--the “formal cause” is the cause of character (or nature) of an effect. The contrasting notion of a “formal or eminent cause” is clarified by Jean-Marie Beyssade in her “The Idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence” when she refers to the Second Replies: “who can give three coins to a beggar? Either a poor man who has [formally] the coins in his purse, or a rich banker who has [eminently] far greater assets in his account....If I dream of three coins, they have only an “objective” reality (in my mind); if I wake up and either find them in my purse or their equivalent in my bank account, they also have “formal” reality (outside my mind); the three coins that existed “objectively” in my mind will now also exist “formally” (in my purse) or “eminently” (in my account).”^{^[8]} One might also think of the difference between “being infected with a disease” (correlated with “formal reality”) and “carrying a disease” (correlated with “eminent reality”).

--the “objective reality” of an idea is its representational capacity (‘objectif’ in French may be translated as “intentive” and designates an idea’s capacity of referring to something other than or more than itself); and

--the “formal reality” of a thing is its “non-ideational reality”. All ideas, as ideas (and not at representations of something else) have the same degree (or level) of reality—they are dependent upon minds (or thinking substances).

In his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams maintains that in this principle, “Descartes is in fact making two logically distinct assumptions: not only that the cause of any idea must have as much reality as the idea has objectively, but also, and more basically, that ideas must have causes at all. Descartes does not in fact think that there are two different principles at work here. He thinks that everything must have a cause, and he supposes that this is entailed by the causal principle...which states that the cause must contain as much reality as the effect; from which ‘it follows...that something cannot proceed from nothing’. Descartes regarded it as self-evident that if the cause must have as much reality as the effect, then no real thing can proceed from ‘something’ that has no reality at all. This reasoning indeed did appear self-evident to very many thinkers for a very long time; it was Hume who detected that the argument is circular.”^{^[9]}

-The causal principle asserts that the cause of an idea must be at least real enough to cause this sort of idea—e.g., one which has this sort of objective reality (or representational capacity).

-Our ideas have formal reality as modes of thought—as such, of course, they are neither true nor false however. It is their objective reality which is in question, then, when we are discussing truth and falsity.

--“It is a first principle that the whole of the reality or perfection that exists only objectively [representationally] in ideas must exist in them formally or in a superior manner in their causes.”^{^[10]}

--Anthropology Example: find a tribe which has a picture of a pile of stones and a picture of a complex machine.^{^[11]} The latter tells us something about the level of development of the tribe. They must have such machines (or the imagination necessary to conceive of them). “Higher order understanding” is exhibited by the second picture.

74 If some idea is such that I can’t cause it—then I am not alone. Dark Pool Analogy: if you are swimming alone in a dark pool and you feel something brush your leg, it is natural to reach the (alarming) conclusion that you are not alone.

75 I have ideas of “...other men, animals, or angels” which I could have caused.

-Note the reasons offered and the strength of the conclusion! Is the argument strong enough to legitimate the claim that “I must conclude that God necessarily exists?”^{^[12]}

--Note that Descartes here says that “something can not come from nothing,” suggesting that “everything has a cause.” Of course, he can not actually maintain this—his deity is not to be caused by anything!

--Note that additional (and more powerful reasons are offered after the conclusion—both as the sentence continues and in the following pages:

-77 “Nor can it be said that this idea of God is perhaps materially false, and thus can originate from nothing....On the contrary, because it is most clear and distinct and because it contains more objective reality than any other idea, no idea is in and of itself truer and has less of a basis for being suspected of falsehood. I maintain that this idea of a being that is supremely perfect and infinite is true in the highest degree true. For although I could perhaps pretend that such a being does not exist, nevertheless I could not pretend that the idea of such a being discloses to me nothing real, as was the case with the idea of cold which I referred to earlier.”

-Perhaps I am (potentially) this deity? No—not even potentially! Were I so, I would have made me different (no doubts)! He says that: “...the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being, that is merely potentially existent, which, properly speaking is nothing, but only by a being existing formally or actually.”

-78 Indeed, there is nothing in all these things that is not manifest by the light of nature to one who is conscientious and attentive. But when I am less attentive, and the images of sensible things blind the mind’s eye, I do not so easily recall why the idea of a being more perfect than me necessarily proceeds from a being that really is more perfect.

-79 Something must have created (and must “conserve”) me. It couldn’t be myself!

-Could I have been created by a lesser deity—there would, then, be the need for a (“perfect”) deity to cause this positive idea in that other being!

-A cause—why not many? Not a committee because of the simplicity and relatedness of the various conceptions contained in the idea of his deity. [A camel is a horse made by a committee].

80 “Thus the only option remaining is that this idea is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me. Recall the earlier distinction (p. 72) between innate ideas, adventitious (caused by something external) ideas, and ideas which are caused by oneself.

Another appeal to the natural light “establishes” that this deity is not a deceiver.

-Criticism: In his Working Without A Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, Richard Foley maintains that:

…even were we to grant to Descartes his proof, his attempt to use God as an epistemic guarantee would still be problematic. For even granting that there is a God who is by nature benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient, it does not follow that God would not allow us to be deceived about what is clear and distinct. To get this conclusion we would need detailed assurances about God’s ultimate aims and methods. But, of course, it is no simple matter to get such assurances. After all, for some reason that is beyond our ken, allow us to be deceived for our own good? Might not God even allow us to be regularly deceived?^{^[13]} Parents and physicians, for example, can be considered "good" (or, even, "moral") when they lie paternalistically!

--This is especially true given the limited extent of Descartes' knowledge at this point in his deliberations. Accepting all he has claimed to know before he makes this "appeal to the natural light of reason," he knows (a) that he exists, (b) is a "thinking thing," (c) is limited (much less than perfect), (d) has an idea which is infinite and perfect, and (e) knows there must be as much reality in an idea as there is in its cause (including that the degree "objective reality" in the idea requires there be "...some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as there is [the degree of] objective reality contained in the idea" [p. 74, emphasis added twice].

As Foley notes, "…regardless of how we marshal our cognitive resources, there can be no non-question-begging assurances that the resulting inquiry is even reliable, much less flawless. This applies to metaphysical inquiry as much as it does to any other kind of inquiry. A fortiori it applies to any metaphysical inquiry that purports to rule out the possibility of extensive error. Any such metaphysics is likely to strike us as implausible, but even if it did not, even if were wholly convinced of its truth, it cannot provide us with a non-question-begging guarantee of its own truth. Nor can it provide us with a non-question-begging guarantee of its likely truth. And nothing else can either".^{^[14]}

Foley’s title is indicative of a more recent (we shouldn’t say “modern” here) scientific orientation which replaces the Cartesian (and early modern) demand for certainty with a acceptance of human fallibility; and the search for a priori “foundations” for our beliefs, theories, or knowledge claims with a commitment to revise and modify these whenever situations call for this.

First, here is a “quick” summary of the core argument for the existence of a deity in Meditation Three:

1. He relies upon his knowledge of himself and his ideas, and upon the fact that he knows he is not perfect (he has, for example, doubts). This knowledge is guaranteed by the cogito.

2. He relies upon the ideas (which he has). The mere “having” of them makes any doubt about them (as ideas) irrelevant. Note that in this sense, however, the ideas are “merely had,” and are not “true or false.”

3. He accepts the “causal principle” as guaranteed by the natural light of reason—that is, as clearly true, and as true as the cogito. This is “new” (not established by earlier “meditations”).

4. He accepts that (as it applies to “ideas”) this principle indicates that we must discuss both the “formal” and “objective” (that is, representational) reality of our ideas. It is the latter sense which is relevant as the proof continues—individual ideas are distinguished in terms of their representational capacity (or “degree of objective reality).

5. He relies upon his idea of the deity—a perfect, infinite, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-moral being. The idea, as an idea, needs no justification. As the most complex idea (speaking in terms of its representational reality), it is important that his “description” (characterization, depiction, etc.) of the idea be right.

6. He contends that this idea is infinite in the “positive” sense. Given this, it is unlikely he, a finite substance could have caused such an idea.

8. He contends that he is not even potentially infinite, but if he were, that would not assign him sufficient objective reality to be able to cause an actually infinite idea.

9. Thus, he concludes, he must conclude that his deity exists. Only it could cause the idea he has.

Secondly, here are a number of points we need to consider critically as we reflect on this Meditation:

(A). Is it always an imperfection to deceive? Doctor-patient cases; Plato’s “noble lie;” Kant’s problem regarding the innocent individual who is being hunted by a vicious person; parents telling their children about Santa Claus and the tooth-fairy; etc.

an idea, even when viewed from the point of view of its objective reality, is still an idea, and hence, in Descartes’ metaphysical classification, is a mode, a mode of the attribute of thought. It must, therefore, by an ontological ordering, possess less reality than a substance, (in particular, than himself). To bring about this mode (and it is after all the existence of the idea that is at issue) surely cannot demand quite as much reality or perfection as is required by, or possessed by, its object.^{^[15]}

(D). In his David Hume, Anthony Flew offers a succinct criticism of the sort of argument offered by Descartes in this Meditation:

the form of these arguments is egregiously unsound in as much as the desired conclusions, not merely do not follow from, but are also actually incompatible with, the proffered premises….[for example] arguing that, since everything must have a cause, and since the chain of causes allegedly cannot extend indefinitely backwards in time, therefore there must have been, in the beginning, a First Cause!^{^[16]}

(E) When Descartes says that he needs to establish that his deity exists and is not a deceiver if he is to be certain of anything other than the cogito (and suggests that even that might be in doubt without such knowledge), and when he speaks of his deity’s power as utterly unlimited and beyond our scope of understanding, he almost seems to allow for what he explicitly postulates at other times—that the deity is not necessarily limited by logic (or anything else). This suggests that his “epistemological schizophrenia” runs very deep in his view—he both wants to found his theory upon what is [absolutely] clear and distinct and revealed by the “light of nature,” and he wants to allow that these deliverances are truthful only if guaranteed by his deity. He can’t have it both ways, however. I discuss this conflict further in a supplement on the course website: A Brief Note On Descartes, Eternal Truths, and Rationality.

Notes: [click on note number to return to the text for the note]. This supplement, and the others for Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, reference the pages in Donald A. Cress’ translation in René Descartes: Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Fourth Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). They were developed over 40 years of teaching, however, and the citations are sometimes to other translations. In addition emphasis (italics, underlines, and bolding are regularly added to citations to help direct your attention.

[1] Descartes, Principles of First Philosophy, I 45, op. cit., p. 237.

[2] This is why it makes sense to speak about a level of certainty beyond the “psychological” and the “logical”—he needs certainty which is greater than that provided by logical truths, certainty which “survives” such “metaphysical doubts.”

[3] Cf., Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy [1641], trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, in their edition of The Philosophical Works of Descartes v. 1, op. cit., p. 159 and pp. 183-184. Cf., also “Reply to Objections II,” op. cit., pp. 38- 39. Most telling here, where there is a question raised by Cress’ translation, is a long paragraph from “Meditation Five” on p. 91 of Cress’ translation. Whichever translation is correct, the supporting citations from Descartes show that his “epistemological paranoia” is extensive.

[4] Cf., Alan Gewirth, “The Cartesian Circle,” Philosophical Review v. 50 (1941), pp. 368-395; and Edwin B. Allaire, “The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of the Meditations,” Dialogue v. 2 (1966), pp. 131-153.

[5] Rene Descartes, “Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Soul and Body, Drawn Up In Geometrical Fashion,” op. cit., p. 53.

[6] Samuel Shirley, “Translator’s Preface” to his translation of Baurach Spinoza’s Ethics, Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect, and Selected Letters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), pp. 21-29, pp. 26-27.

[7] Cf., John Morris, “Descartes’ Natural Light,” op. cit.

[8] Jean-Marie Beyssade, “The Idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence,” trans. James Cottingham, in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. James Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1992), pp. 174-199, p. 197, footnotes 13 and 14.

[9] Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit., p. 141. Cf., Comment (D) near the end of this supplement for an elaboration of Williams’ discussion of Hume’s claim.

[10] Descartes, “Replies to Second Objections,” The Philosophical Works of Descartes v. II, op. cit., p. 35.

[11] As noted above, this example is discussed in Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 138-142.

[12] Note that Descartes clearly overstates what he has demonstrated here. He has not established the necessary existence of his deity—his proof begins with the contingent facts of his [Descartes’] existence, the existence of his idea [of a deity], and the contingent fact of his limitations. No proof of necessary existence is possible given such contingent foundations! What Descartes may claim (I will not say “legitimately claim,” since the proof may have serious problems) is that “we must conclude that God exists”—here the ‘must’ (or ‘necessarily’) modifies the concluding, not the deity’s existence!

[13] Richard Foley, Working Without A Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1993), p 74.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, op. cit., p. 143.

[16] Anthony Flew, David Hume (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 33.