MSC Political Compromise Course

The excerpt on pp. 63-64 of our book from 2010 60 Minutes interview exchange between Leslie Stahl and Speaker John Boehner exemplifies the uncompromising mindset and its two core characteristics of principled tenacity and mutual mistrust. Last time we continued the discussion of the difficulties in compromising in this current political situation (nationally and in Maine). We discussed how these difficulties can lead to a sense of depression, but that feeling does expose the value many citizens place upon the pursuit of political compromise. We did not, however, address the .authors’ final point that together such tenacity and mistrust can “create a cascade of intransigence” (p. 91). As they note on pp. 92-93, this is what lead to the failure of the Comprehensive Immigration act of 2007:[1]

93 the bill was a classic compromise, and it was deluged with moral criticism from both liberals and conservatives….

95…the compromise was negotiated by a small group of senators operating behind closed doors….This made the need for public explanation greater once the proposal reached the floor. But instead the leaders sought to limit debate, fueling the mistrust….

96 Although the election was more than a year away, the campaign mentality intruded, fomenting discord even among senators who supported the compromise.

This cascading intransigence is something we are all-too-familiar with in today’s politics. So what can be done about it—how can compromise become possible again?

In this chapter our authors argue that the compromising mindset’s core characteristics are “principled prudence” and “willful opposition:”

91 To serve the purpose of governing, the compromise mindset turns the defining characteristics of political compromise—mutual sacrifice and willful opposition—in a more constructive direction than does the uncompromising mindset The compromising mind sees mutual sacrifice as an occasion neither to hold tenaciously to principles nor to abandon them merely to reach agreement. Rather it regards mutual sacrifice as an opportunity to adjust principles in order to improve on the status quo. This is what we have called principled prudence. In the second defining characteristic, willful opposition, the compromising mindset finds not an excuse for mistrust or cynicism about motives, but rather a resource for promoting greater understanding and accommodation among those who disagree.

They begin by discussing the two core characteristics that are important for the compromising mindset, and then continue by discussing how economizing on disagreement can facilitate compromise—especially in an uncompromising time.

101 This characteristic isn’t simply the result of pragmatically taking a necessary element for democratic governance as a virtue “it has a moral component: to fail to compromise in politics is to the privilege the status quo. If a compromise is likely to be an improvement, then a compromising mindset opens up opportunities to promote greater justice.” Of course, this does seem to imply that any compromise must improve upon the status quo.

-102 However the authors point out that rejecting compromise in the hopes that a better compromise may emerge in the future is, itself, an obstacle to future compromises.

-103 Moreover, a background mistrust of the other party’s’ negotiating and motives, can impede efforts at future compromise, and works against efforts to understand the other sides’ views.

--103 Indeed, principled prudence “…sees the incoherence of the [opposing] principles underlying most compromises…as a sign of success. Such incoherence can indicate that the democratic process respects the competing principle sand values. If the process has been fair and the outcome an improvement, then disarray in principles should at least be appreciated, if not celebrated.”

--104-105 Our authors discuss both Teddy Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson saying that they both managed combine principled prudence with a reputation for being strongly principled. Political compromises which all sides can count as improvements over the status quo may lead to promote mutual understanding and lead to further compromises (while not fully meeting the expectations of those in the base on either side).

-106-107 Rather than dwelling upon calling for “compromise,” those who practice principled prudence show those they represent (as well as those they are negotiating with) that what they are supporting is worth supporting on its own merits. They “…use principled considerations as guides both in deciding whether to compromise and in judging compromises.” As discussed in the prior class, they treat their principles as “guide posts.”

107-109 Our authors take some cues from British philosopher John Stuart Mill’s time as a legislator:

-107 “a compromise is morally defensible insofar as the time is not ripe to realize the measure your own side prefers, your opponents’ position contains something worthy, the agreement would not set back progress already made, and it would facilitate future cooperation.” Thus an extension of the voting rights to males who don’t own real estate falls short of gaining voting rights for women, but it is a move in that direction.

-108 Mill kept his eye on “…whether the status quo or the available compromises better recognized human rights, dignity, and other…values.”

Our authors maintain that the compromising mindset must work to maintain mutual respect and to enhance it. “Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree, but goes beyond the “live and let live” attitude that toleration promotes….[it] expresses a constructive attitude toward , and interactions with, the persons with whom one disagrees. It is the mindset of individuals who enter into negotiations in good faith, presuming their adversaries are as well motivated as they are, and are trying to act at least partly on principle to accomplish what they believe is politically good for society” (110).

-111 Of course, the absence of mutual respect encourages cynicism and makes compromise harder because it fosters the “uncompromising mindset.”

114-115 Maintaining mutual respect keeps open the possibility of future compromises even it doesn’t yield compromise in the current situation.

117 “…economizing on disagreement expresses the idea that citizens and their representatives should defend their preferred proposals in a way that minimizes rejecting the positions they oppose….it increases the chances of producing a desirable compromise and thereby creating the conditions for cooperation that lead to future compromises….the approach also affirms a moral commitment to democratic cooperation and manifests the value of mutual respect.”

Of course the technique of separating the issues is most useful and important here (118-121).

Similarly, “defusing the agenda” (121-123) is helpful: here one tries to avoid or undercut the “poison pills,” inclusion of “hot-button” sub-issues or provisions, and other compromise-inhibiting moves. Failure to succeed here encourages the sort of “cascade of intransigence” we discussed above.

In addition, “restraining the rhetoric” (123-125) is of central importance to our authors. The whole idea of promoting a deliberative democracy is to facilitate individuals committing to work to reach rational agreements on political policy matters where they have both political and moral disagreements. Rhetorical moves may score points, but they do not provide a basis for principled prudence or mutual respect.

The authors also discuss “refining the partisanship” (123-129) where one works to “economize the extreme exaggerations of one’s own (or of one’s opponents’) positions.”

For them, finally, the “mixing of the mindsets” (129-133) may be a useful economizing technique: 129 “the compromising and uncompromising minds may be balanced by a division of labor in the institution, with some members consistently accommodating, and others not. his can work only if he intransigent do no always dominate….A more promising way of achieving a balance is to depend on some members who combine both mindsets.” They discuss Henry Clay[2] (130) who brokered the slavery compromises of the 1820s and 1850 while also maintaining a reputation as a principled politician who helped save the Union. They also discuss Alan Simpson (131-132) and the 1986 Immigration act which President Regan signed into law, and claim: (132) “the political careers of Simpson, Kennedy, Hatch and other legislators with strong partisan credentials testify to both the possibility and desirability of mixing the mindsets….”

Even in the very polarized conditions of December 2010, compromise was possible. The President Obama signed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010.[3] The extended discussion of this compromise on pp. 133-140 shows that bipartisanship can emerge in the most toxic of times:

134 the bipartisanship was not the result of sudden outbreak of holiday cheer. The Democrats had failed to deal with the [Bush] tax cuts before the November midterm elections. As they surveyed the damage from their shattering electoral defeat, they were in no position to insist on getting their way. For anything to be done before the Republicans took over the House in the next session, the democrats would have to compromise.

136 The McConnell-Biden negotiations proved decisive. Because they were meeting in private, they were less tempted to indulge in the partisan rhetoric and engage in the personal attacks that often derail such negotiations.

137 The authors discuss the core compromises in the bill, and on pp. 137-138 they discuss the reservations on both sides.

138-140 Our authors discus the nature of what they call a “classic compromise.” They explain how the compromise exemplified many of the strategies of economizing on disagreement and the compromising mindset.

They follow up the discussion of the 2010 compromise with one which occurred in the ensuing summer (2011) as the US Debt Ceiling needed to be increased by Congress—since 1960, the ceiling had been raised 78 times without debate. As Wikipedia makes clear this time things were different:

the United States debt-ceiling crisis of 2011 was a stage in the ongoing political debate in the United States Congress about the appropriate level of government spending and its effect on the national debt and deficit. The debate centered around the raising of the debt ceiling, which is normally raised without debate. The crisis led to the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011.

The Republican Party, which had retaken the House of Representatives the prior year, demanded that the President negotiate over deficit reduction in exchange for an increase in the debt ceiling, the statutory maximum of money the Treasury is allowed to borrow. The debt ceiling had routinely been raised in the past without partisan debate and without any additional terms or conditions. This reflects the fact that the debt ceiling does not prescribe the amount of spending, but only ensures that the government can pay for the spending to which it has already committed itself. Some use the analogy of an individual “paying their bills.”

If the United States breached its debt ceiling and were unable to resort to other “extraordinary measures,” the Treasury would have to either default on payments to bondholders or immediately curtail payment of funds owed to various companies and individuals that had been mandated but not fully funded by Congress. Both situations would likely have led to a significant international financial crisis.

On July 31, two days prior to when the Treasury estimated the borrowing authority of the United States would be exhausted, Republicans agreed to raise the debt ceiling in exchange for a complex deal of significant future spending cuts. The crisis did not permanently resolve the potential of future use of the debt ceiling in budgetary disputes, as shown by the subsequent debt-ceiling crisis of 2013.

The crisis sparked the most volatile week for financial markets since the 2008 crisis, with the stock market trending significantly downward. Prices of government bonds…rose as investors, anxious over the dismal prospects of the US economic future and the ongoing European sovereign-debt crisis, fled into the still-perceived relative safety of US government bonds. Later that week, the credit-rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded the credit rating of the United States government for the first time in the country’s history, though the other two major credit-rating agencies, Moody's and Fitch, retained America's credit rating at AAA. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the delay in raising the debt ceiling increased government borrowing costs by $1.3 billion in 2011 and also pointed to unestimated higher costs in later years. The Bipartisan Policy Center extended the GAO's estimates and found that delays in raising the debt ceiling would raise borrowing costs by $18.9 billion.[4]

Again, there was a Biden-McConnell compromise which solved the crisis temporarily. However, as our authors note this time the issue was really just kicked down the road. A “super-committee” of 12 Senators and Representatives was deputized to reduce Federal deficits to lessen the need for frequent debt ceiling increases, and it was given extraordinary powers to present a compromise which Congress would be unable to amend, filibuster, or block procedurally. Indeed a simple majority in both houses could approve the Committees’ compromise. Moreover, if the Committee did not come to agreement, there would automatically be a package of across-the-board budget cuts. While there was an immense level of support for the Committee to complete its negotiations, uncompromising partisanship overcame all the “economizing” features.

Our authors end the chapter (143) stating that they believe the election of 2012 (or any other in the near future) will put a single party in control of the Executive and Legislative branches and make compromise more likely.

Notes: [click on the note number to return to the text for a given note]

[1] The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 was a bill discussed in the 110th Congress that would have provided legal status and a path to citizenship for the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States. The bill was portrayed as a compromise between providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants and increased border enforcement: it included funding for 300 miles (480 km) of vehicle barriers, 105 camera and radar towers, and 20,000 more Border Patrol agents, while simultaneously restructuring visa criteria around high-skilled workers. The bill also received heated criticism from both sides of the immigration debate. The bill was introduced in the United States Senate on May 9, 2007, but was never voted on, though a series of votes on amendments and cloture took place. The last vote on cloture failed 34–61 effectively ending the bill's chances.

[2] See the Wikipedia article on Henry Clay.

[3] Link to Wikipedia article on the act.

[4] Wikipedia article “United States Debt-Ceiling Crisis of 2011” accessed on 03/30/19.