MSC Political
Compromise Course Supplement for Week 4
“Cascading
Intransigence and Seeking Compromise”
Copyright © 2019 Bruce W.
Hauptli
The excerpt on pp. 63-64 of our book from 2010
60 Minutes interview exchange between
Leslie Stahl and Speaker John Boehner exemplifies the
uncompromising mindset and its two
core characteristics of principled
tenacity and mutual mistrust.
Last time we continued the
discussion of the difficulties in compromising in this current political
situation (nationally and in Maine).
We discussed how these difficulties can lead to a sense of depression,
but that feeling does expose the value many citizens place upon the pursuit of
political compromise. We did
not, however, address the .authors’ final point that
together
such tenacity and mistrust can “create a
cascade of intransigence” (p. 91).
As they note on pp. 92-93, this is what lead to the failure of the
Comprehensive Immigration
act of 2007:[1]
93 the bill was a classic
compromise, and it was deluged with moral criticism from both liberals and
conservatives….
95…the compromise was negotiated
by a small group of senators operating behind closed doors….This made the need
for public explanation greater once the proposal reached the floor.
But instead the leaders sought to limit debate, fueling the mistrust….
96 Although the election was more
than a year away, the campaign mentality intruded, fomenting discord even among
senators who supported the compromise.
This cascading intransigence is something we are
all-too-familiar with in today’s politics.
So what can be done about it—how can compromise become possible again?
Chapter Three:
Seeking Compromise:
In this chapter our authors argue that the compromising
mindset’s core characteristics are
“principled prudence” and “willful
opposition:”
91 To serve the purpose of
governing, the compromise mindset turns the defining characteristics of
political compromise—mutual sacrifice and willful opposition—in a more
constructive direction than does the uncompromising mindset
The compromising mind sees mutual
sacrifice as an occasion neither to hold tenaciously to principles nor to
abandon them merely to reach agreement.
Rather it regards mutual sacrifice as an opportunity to adjust principles
in order to improve on the status quo.
This is what we have called
principled prudence. In the
second defining characteristic, willful
opposition, the compromising mindset
finds not an excuse for mistrust or cynicism about motives, but rather a
resource for promoting greater understanding and accommodation among those who
disagree.
They begin by discussing the two core characteristics that
are important for the compromising mindset, and then continue by discussing how
economizing on disagreement can facilitate compromise—especially in an
uncompromising time.
(A) Principled
Prudence:
101 This characteristic isn’t simply the result of
pragmatically taking a necessary element for democratic governance as a virtue
“it has a moral component: to fail
to compromise in politics is to the privilege the status quo.
If a compromise is likely to be an improvement, then a compromising
mindset opens up opportunities to promote greater justice.”
Of course, this does seem to imply that any compromise must
improve upon the status quo.
-102 However the authors point
out that rejecting compromise in the hopes that a better compromise may emerge
in the future is, itself, an obstacle to future compromises.
-103 Moreover, a background
mistrust of the other party’s’ negotiating and motives, can impede efforts at
future compromise, and works against efforts to understand the other sides’
views.
--103 Indeed, principled prudence
“…sees the incoherence of the [opposing] principles underlying most
compromises…as a sign of success.
Such incoherence can indicate that the democratic process respects the competing
principle sand values. If the
process has been fair and the outcome an improvement, then disarray in
principles should at least be appreciated, if not celebrated.”
--104-105 Our authors discuss
both Teddy Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson saying that they both managed combine
principled prudence with a reputation for being strongly principled.
Political compromises which all sides can count as improvements over the
status quo may lead to promote mutual understanding and lead to further
compromises (while not fully meeting the expectations of those in the base on
either side).
-106-107
Rather than dwelling upon calling for
“compromise,” those who practice principled prudence show those they represent
(as well as those they are negotiating with) that what they are supporting is
worth supporting on its own merits.
They “…use principled considerations as guides both in deciding whether to
compromise and in judging compromises.”
As discussed in the prior class, they treat their principles as “guide
posts.”
107-109 Our authors take some cues from British philosopher
John Stuart Mill’s time as a legislator:
-107 “a compromise is morally
defensible insofar as the time is not ripe to realize the measure your own side
prefers, your opponents’ position contains something worthy, the agreement would
not set back progress already made, and it would facilitate future cooperation.”
Thus an extension of the voting rights to males who don’t own real estate
falls short of gaining voting rights for women, but it is a move in that
direction.
-108 Mill kept his eye on
“…whether the status quo or the available compromises better recognized human
rights, dignity, and other…values.”
-He would sand against the status
quo if it was harmful.
(B) Mutual Respect:
Our authors maintain that the compromising mindset must
work to maintain mutual respect and to enhance it.
“Like toleration, mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree, but
goes beyond the “live and let live” attitude that toleration promotes….[it]
expresses a constructive attitude toward , and interactions with, the persons
with whom one disagrees. It is the
mindset of individuals who enter into negotiations in good faith, presuming
their adversaries are as well motivated as they are, and are trying to act at
least partly on principle to accomplish what they believe is politically good
for society” (110).
-111 Of course, the absence of
mutual respect encourages cynicism and makes compromise harder because it
fosters the “uncompromising mindset.”
114-115 Maintaining mutual respect keeps open the possibility of future
compromises even it doesn’t yield compromise in the current situation.
(C) Economizing on
Disagreement:
117 “…economizing on disagreement expresses the idea that
citizens and their representatives should defend their preferred proposals in a
way that minimizes rejecting the positions they oppose….it increases the chances
of producing a desirable compromise and thereby creating the conditions for
cooperation that lead to future compromises….the approach also affirms a moral
commitment to democratic cooperation and manifests the value of mutual respect.”
Of course the technique of
separating the issues is most useful
and important here (118-121).
Similarly, “defusing
the agenda” (121-123) is helpful: here one tries to avoid or undercut the
“poison pills,” inclusion of “hot-button” sub-issues or provisions, and other
compromise-inhibiting moves.
Failure to succeed here encourages the sort of “cascade of intransigence” we
discussed above.
In addition, “restraining
the rhetoric” (123-125) is of central importance to our authors.
The whole idea of promoting a deliberative democracy is to facilitate
individuals committing to work to reach rational agreements on political policy
matters where they have both political and moral disagreements.
Rhetorical moves may score points, but they do not provide a basis for
principled prudence or mutual respect.
The authors also discuss “refining
the partisanship” (123-129) where one works to “economize the extreme
exaggerations of one’s own (or of one’s opponents’) positions.”
For them, finally, the “mixing
of the mindsets” (129-133) may be a useful economizing technique: 129 “the
compromising and uncompromising minds may be balanced by a division of labor in
the institution, with some members consistently accommodating, and others not.
his can work only if he intransigent do no always dominate….A more
promising way of achieving a balance is to depend on some members who combine
both mindsets.” They discuss Henry
Clay[2]
(130) who brokered the slavery compromises of the 1820s and 1850 while also
maintaining a reputation as a principled politician who helped save the Union.
They also discuss Alan Simpson (131-132) and the 1986 Immigration act
which President Regan signed into law, and claim: (132) “the political careers
of Simpson, Kennedy, Hatch and other legislators with strong partisan
credentials testify to both the possibility and desirability of mixing the
mindsets….”
(D) A Moment of
Compromise:
Even in the very polarized conditions of December 2010,
compromise was possible. The
President Obama signed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
and Job Creation Act of 2010.[3]
The extended discussion of this
compromise on pp. 133-140 shows that bipartisanship can emerge in the most toxic
of times:
134 the bipartisanship was not
the result of sudden outbreak of holiday cheer.
The Democrats had failed to deal with the [Bush] tax cuts before the
November midterm elections. As they
surveyed the damage from their shattering electoral defeat, they were in no
position to insist on getting their way.
For anything to be done before the Republicans took over the House in the
next session, the democrats would have to compromise.
136 The McConnell-Biden
negotiations proved decisive.
Because they were meeting in private, they were less tempted to indulge in the
partisan rhetoric and engage in the personal attacks that often derail such
negotiations.
137 The authors discuss the core
compromises in the bill, and on pp. 137-138 they discuss the reservations on
both sides.
138-140 Our authors discus the
nature of what they call a “classic compromise.”
They explain how the compromise exemplified many of the strategies of
economizing on disagreement and the compromising mindset.
(E) Compromising In
An Uncompromising Time:
They follow up the discussion of the 2010 compromise with
one which occurred in the ensuing summer (2011) as the US Debt Ceiling needed to
be increased by Congress—since 1960, the ceiling had been raised 78 times
without debate. As Wikipedia
makes clear this time things were different:
the United States debt-ceiling
crisis of 2011 was a stage in the ongoing political debate in the United States
Congress about the appropriate level of government spending and its effect on
the national debt and deficit. The
debate centered around the raising of the debt ceiling, which is normally raised
without debate. The crisis led to
the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011.
The Republican Party, which had retaken the House of Representatives the
prior year, demanded that the President negotiate over deficit reduction in
exchange for an increase in the debt ceiling, the statutory maximum of money the
Treasury is allowed to borrow. The
debt ceiling had routinely been raised in the past without partisan debate and
without any additional terms or conditions.
This reflects the fact that the debt ceiling does not prescribe the
amount of spending, but only ensures that the government can pay for the
spending to which it has already committed itself.
Some use the analogy of an individual “paying their bills.”
If the United States breached its debt ceiling and were unable to resort
to other “extraordinary measures,” the Treasury would have to either default on
payments to bondholders or immediately curtail payment of funds owed to various
companies and individuals that had been mandated but not fully funded by
Congress. Both situations would likely
have led to a significant international financial crisis.
On July 31, two days prior to when the Treasury estimated the borrowing
authority of the United States would be exhausted, Republicans agreed to raise
the debt ceiling in exchange for a complex deal of significant future spending
cuts. The crisis did not
permanently resolve the potential of future use of the debt ceiling in budgetary
disputes, as shown by the subsequent debt-ceiling crisis of 2013.
The crisis sparked the most volatile week for financial markets since the
2008 crisis, with the stock market trending significantly downward.
Prices of government bonds…rose as investors, anxious over the dismal
prospects of the US economic future and the ongoing European sovereign-debt
crisis, fled into the still-perceived relative safety of US government bonds.
Later that week, the credit-rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded
the credit rating of the United States government for the first time in the
country’s history, though the other two major credit-rating agencies, Moody's
and Fitch, retained America's credit rating at AAA.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the delay in
raising the debt ceiling increased government borrowing costs by $1.3 billion in
2011 and also pointed to unestimated higher costs in later years.
The Bipartisan Policy Center extended the GAO's estimates and found that
delays in raising the debt ceiling would raise borrowing costs by $18.9 billion.[4]
Again, there was a Biden-McConnell compromise which solved
the crisis temporarily. However, as
our authors note this time the issue was really just kicked down the road.
A “super-committee” of 12 Senators and Representatives was deputized to
reduce Federal deficits to lessen the need for frequent debt ceiling increases,
and it was given extraordinary powers to present a compromise which Congress
would be unable to amend, filibuster, or block procedurally.
Indeed a simple majority in both houses could approve the Committees’
compromise. Moreover, if the
Committee did not come to agreement, there would automatically be a package of
across-the-board budget cuts. While
there was an immense level of support for the Committee to complete its
negotiations, uncompromising partisanship overcame all the “economizing”
features.
Our authors
end the chapter (143) stating that they believe the election of 2012 (or any
other in the near future) will put a single party in control of the Executive
and Legislative branches and make compromise more likely.
Next we turn to “Campaigning vs Governing.”
[1]
The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007
was a bill discussed in the 110th Congress that
would have provided legal status and a path to
citizenship for the approximately 12 million
undocumented immigrants residing in the United
States.
The bill was portrayed as a compromise
between providing a path to citizenship for
illegal immigrants and increased border
enforcement: it included funding for 300 miles
(480 km) of vehicle barriers, 105 camera and
radar towers, and 20,000 more Border Patrol
agents, while simultaneously restructuring visa
criteria around high-skilled workers.
The bill also received heated criticism
from both sides of the immigration debate.
The bill was introduced in the United
States Senate on May 9, 2007, but was never
voted on, though a series of votes on amendments
and cloture took place.
The last vote on cloture failed 34–61
effectively ending the bill's chances.
[2] See the
Wikipedia article on
Henry Clay.
[4] Wikipedia
article “United
States Debt-Ceiling Crisis of 2011” accessed
on 03/30/19.
Go to the Supplement for Week 5
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Last revised on 04/07/19.