Supplement to Hauptli's Lectures on Plato's Apology
Copyright © 2014 Bruce W. Hauptli
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1. Introduction:
This is not an
apology nor (really) a defense
but, rather, an
explanation of his procedure and
an indication of the degree of importance
which he attaches to it. In this
dialogue he practices his therapy attempting to show his judges/accusers the
extent of their ignorance!
Plato is generally disenchanted with the sorts of government which we
find in the Greek city-states. In
one of his letters he writes (325c-326 b):
now as I considered these matters, as well as the sort of men
who were active in politics, and the laws and the customs, the more I examined
them and the more I advanced in years, the harder it appeared to me to
administer the government correctly.
For one thing, nothing could be done without friends and loyal companions, and
such men were not easy to find....Neither could such men be created afresh with
any facility. Furthermore, the
written law and the customs were being corrupted at an astounding rate...finally
I saw clearly in regard to all states now existing that without exception their
system of government is bad. Their
constitutions are almost beyond redemption....Hence I was forced to say in the
praise of the correct philosophy that it affords a vantage point from which we
can discern in all cases what is just for communities and for individuals, and
accordingly the human race will not see better days until either the stock of
those who rightly and genuinely follow philosophy acquire political authority,
or else the class who have political control are led by some dispensation of
providence to become real philosophers.[1]
Such a result he had little hope for.
But it was necessary if there was to be a just or good state.
It is this conviction, I think, that Socrates is also expressing in this
dialogue when he says that what he is doing is of the greatest value to the
state.
But is he “political”—is he
actively pursuing a political agenda?
C.D.C. Reeve maintains that “because he [Socrates] conducts...[his]
examinations, he is...political rather than...apolitical; because such
examinations are a one-on-one affair, he is political
in private.”[2]
That is, while Socrates is indeed political, his form of political
activity consists of the process of the dialectical examination of Athenians’
beliefs—he is concerned with bettering individuals and their souls (psyches)
and, thus, his political activity deviates significantly from the norm.
Why does Plato’s Socrates say
that the philosopher must lead a “private
life?” [32]
Is there a personal danger?
No. [Though this requires
argument and a consideration of the Crito.]
Would the public pick him/her to rule?
No. [Is he in danger of
“losing time” from his inquiries because he would be required to take on the
duties of public life? No.]
Does/could ruling ruin the soul [psyche]?
-Politics and the arts of
persuasion and
compromise.
-Implication for Plato’s
Republic: we must consider the kind
of rule which the “philosopher kings” are to exercise.
Clearly, it can not be normal political ruling (which involves compromise
and persuasion—at least not if he is to be consistent!
In their “Socrates and Political Theory,” Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas
Smith maintain that:
one other extremely important element in Athens’ government
was the jury-court system. Jurors
volunteered for duty, and 6,000 of these volunteers were selected by lot for
service for one year. Specific
juries would be assigned to each case by lot; those that were actually assigned
to a case were paid for service. To
prevent tampering, juries were made large (no fewer than 200 jurors were
assigned to any trial; sometimes as many as 1,000 or even more might be
assigned), though by the beginning of the fourth century various changes were
made precisely because the old system did not always achieve even the minimal
requirements of procedural justice…..[3]
In their “Introduction” to The
Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies, Thomas
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith maintain that:
Socrates’ prosecutor was a younger man named Meletus.
Assisting Meletus in presenting the case against Socrates were two older
men: a well-known and highly respected politician named Anytus and a poet about
whom very little is known named Lycon.
The charge Meletus brought against Socrates was impiety.
Because the law against impiety did not specify all the ways one could be
impious, as part of his indictment, Meletus had to specify precisely how
Socrates was supposed to be guilty of this charge.
Meletus, accordingly, provided three specifications: Socrates was guilty
of not recognizing the gods recognized by the city; Socrates invented new divine
things; and Socrates corrupted the youth.[4]
In Plato’s version [of the trial], Socrates claims to be
surprised that he was convicted by a fairly narrow margin: had only thirty more
jurors voted in his favor, rather than against him, he would have been found
innocent. If indeed there were 500
jurors, as we have said, this means that the vote to convict Socrates was 280 to
220, since a tie vote of 250 for each side would have counted in Socrates’
favor. In a much later (c. 250 C.E.
or so) account, Diogenes Laertius says that the vote to convict was by the much
larger margin of 281 votes.[5]
2. The Text:
17-19 In reality I have two types of accusers:
Those who have accused me over the years |
Anytus
and Meletus (who brought the suit) |
These accusers I fear the
most,[6]
they maintain that I “make the worse arguments
appear the stronger.
|
These accusers maintain
that I corrupt the youth and don’t believe in
the City’s gods.[7]
|
Soc replies to the first sort of accusers first:
-19d I did not converse on any of the silly subjects they
allege. Note the discussion of the
difference between Socrates and the Greek
physologoi (or natural philosophers) in my lecture supplement introducing
Plato—whereas these thinkers did discuss abstruse metaphysical, cosmological,
and scientific topics, Socrates was more concerned with what we would call
moral philosophy (with virtue,
justice, human nature, etc.).
-I did not charge any fee.
-20c I have no knowledge (nor did I claim to have such).
--21a Oracle at Delphi: “No man is
wiser than Socrates.”[8]
The Oracle speaks for the god Apollo (the Greek god of youth, manly
beauty, music, song, and prophecy), and Apollo commands that one should: “Know
thyself”—indeed, “Know Thyself” was inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi
in the time of Socrates.[9]
--In his Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Gregory Vlastos discusses
the “Delphic precedents” of this sort of pronouncement.
For example: “Upon crossing the Halys a great power will Croesus
destroy.”[10]
Vlastos maintains that in such statements: “...the god is making fools of
those who earnestly seek his help.
He allows his mouthpiece to utter sentences which are meant to be true only in a
sense their hearers are virtually sure to miss.
Not so in Socrates’ complex ironies.
Here everything is open; there is no sly concealment.”[11]
--So it isn’t accidental that this particular god is “picked”
here, the audience (and we) are aware that we need to
interpret the pronouncements—their
“ironic” character is understood.
-21c I went looking for wise men: “I went to one of those
reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and
say to it: “This man is wiser than I, but you said I was.”
Then, when I examined this man...my experience was something like this:
I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he
was not. I then tried to show
him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not.
As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders.
So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I
am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither knows anything worthwhile, but
he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know,
neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser to this small extent, that
I do not think I know what I do not know.”
--Note that if Socrates is engaged in
the pursuit of a divine mission, if he is following the god(s) rather than
simply pursuing philosophy, his pursuit of this divine mission is unusual—he
appears to set out to refute the god’s statement!
Perhaps, however, he is best interpreted here as trying to find out what
the god means by the statement.[13]
Note also that it is likely that Socrates engaged in his examination
activities before the oracle
spoke—only in this way would there be any reason for the oracle to mention
Socrates (if he wasn’t well known for this sort of activity, the oracle wouldn’t
have answered the question “Who knows the most” by speaking of him).
--Also note that even if Plato’s Socrates is a pious follower
of Apollo, the fact that he allows that the Oracle (and, perhaps, the deity) is
fallible (that the pronouncements
might be incorrect) indicates that he
attaches great weight to uncovering the truth (rather, say, than simply
accepting, or obeying, divine pronouncements).
Given that the Oracle’s statements where treated as enigmatic by the
Greeks, it is not surprising that interpretation would be called for, but note
that Plato’s Socrates doesn’t simply propose to “interpret” the Oracle’s
statement here. He seems to be
sketching out a life-plan, and it does not seem to have been “dictated by the
god!”
-23b The oracle meant that “human wisdom amounts to little.”
Discuss “Socratic Ignorance.”
--All human knowledge?
Including the making of cabinets and saddles?
No, it is “worthwhile” knowledge which is in question!
-23c The young who hear me follow me of their own free will;
and they too engage in the questioning process I engage in—this makes many still
more angry.
24c They say I (1) corrupt the young, and
(2) don’t worship the city’s gods.
Regarding (1):
-24d Soc: What improves the young?
--Mel: The laws, the jurymen, the citizens.
-25a-26c Soc: And where all these improve, one can corrupt?
--To make one’s neighbors bad is to harm oneself!
--Why didn’t you improve me?
Regarding (2):
-26d-27e Soc catches Meletus in a series of
contradictions—Socrates doesn’t believe in the city’s gods, Soc doesn’t believe
in gods...
-Note here the final passage from the
Euthyphro (15e-16a).
28b Soc: “My real accusers are the first sort.”
-I don’t fear death.
-Why not?
-29d “If you said to me in this regard: “Socrates, we do not
believe Anytus now; we acquit you, but only on condition that you spend no more
time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy, and if you are caught
doing so you will die;” if, as I say, you were to acquit me on these terms, I
would say to you: “Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend,
but I will obey the god rather than you,
and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice
philosophy....””
-30a “I think there is no greater blessing for a city than my
service to the god”—that is, no greater service than his philosophizing.
--We need to dig behind the metaphor here!
Compare this passage with 29d and 38a.
-30d I shan’t be harmed by you.
--Note the “irony” here!
Three Ironic Passages:
-32 “A man who really fights for justice must lead a private life, not a
public life, if he is to survive for even a short time.”
Again, “irony.”
--As much as Socrates enjoyed the public scene in the Agora,
he made it clear, according to Plato that he was not a “public” person, that is,
he was not interested in politics.
This was a scandalous opinion to hold in Athens, where the real work of every
Athenian citizen was just that—being a citizen.[14]
-33a “I am not a teacher.”
Again, “irony.”
-33c-d “To do this has…been enjoined upon me by the god, by
means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation
has ever ordered a man to do anything.
This is true, gentleman, and can easily be established.
--Contrast this with
Crito 46b!
34a-35c Regarding the “appeal to pity:” in her
Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of
Plato’s Crito, Roslyn Weiss maintains that: “...Socrates will not beg and
supplicate his judges and induce his children to do the same [because he
believes that] in a court of law judges ought to acquit a man not out of pity—as
a favor...but because they judge the man innocent “according to the
laws”....Socrates identifies two ways in which a defendant might seek to
“persuade” the judges [either by use of emotional and rhetorical tricks, or
through philosophical dialectic], but he approves of only one of these ways as
constituting appropriate conduct in court: only one of these ways helps the
judges judge as they ought [and, of course, that way is the latter].”[15]
The jury finds him guilty.
36 What penalty? According
to the Athenian procedures, Socrates may propose an
alternative punishment, since his accusers ask for death:
-I don’t know what death is, so I don’t fear it;
-Olympic honors;
-imprisonment;
-banishment;
-a fine.
-37b-e “What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty
Meletus has assessed against me, of which I say I do not know whether it is good
or bad? Am I then to choose in
preference to this something that I know very well to be an evil and assess the
penalty at that? Imprisonment?
Why should I live in prison, always subject to the ruling magistrates?
A fine, and imprisonment until I pay it?
That would be the same thing for me, as I have no money.
Exile? For perhaps you might
accept that assessment.
38a “The unexamined life is not worth living for a man.”
-Note that this passage ties together (somewhat) the
importance he attaches to virtue, to the soul, and to philosophizing.
“Examination” is not (by itself) the end.
But this doesn’t mean that a just soul is (by itself) the end either.
Instead, these are connected for Plato.
-Contrast this passage with 29d and 30a!
-Roslyn Weiss maintains that “for Socrates, the injustice of
proposing imprisonment or exile is
related to the following two facts: (1) that he would be proposing—not merely
submitting to—these punishments and (2) that these punishments are “bad.””[17]
She also contends that while “scholars have sought to explain Socrates’
reluctance to choose imprisonment or exile by suggesting that these penalties
would have interfered with Socrates’ divine mission of practicing philosophy.
But Socrates states quite plainly his objections to these potential
penalties, and in the case of neither of them does he object to the penalty
because it would render him unable to philosophize.
Prison is objectionable because he would be enslaved.
In exile he would be driven constantly from city to city.
The reason Socrates fully expects foreign cities to be inhospitable to
him in this way is that he has every intention of continuing to practice there
the kind of philosophy he practices in Athens....Socrates’ point...is not that
as a wanderer he could not carry out his philosophical mission; on the contrary,
it is just because he will carry out
his philosophical mission that he will be a wanderer.
Had Socrates wished to say that prison and exile were unacceptable to him
because they would interfere with his practice of philosophy, he could have; he
cites just that reason for his refusal to go into exile and
remain quiet)....”[18]
While I think she has a point, I am of the “school” which believes that
he rejects these penalties because they would interfere which his “mission”
(with his philosophizing which is practiced both to “learn,” and to “improve
Athens”). Of course, for exactly the
reason immediately below, he can not propose as a penalty that he cease
philosophizing!
The jury finds for death and Socrates addresses the jury:
To those who voted to kill me: [39a-c]
--39a “It is not difficult to avoid death, gentlemen of the
jury, it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than
death.”
To those who voted to acquit me: [39c-42a]
-40d There is a good hope that death is a positive blessing (cf.
Plato's dialogue Phaedo).
-41d A good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death.
-42 Encourage my sons to act as gadflies too!
Final Statement [42a]: “Now the hour to part has
come. I go to die, you [all members
of the jury] go to live. Which of us
goes to the better lot is unknown to no one, except the god.”
(end)
3. Final Comments:
1. Note that the
Euthyphro is supposed to show us the importance of not acting without
knowledge (Euthyphro continues to act on his “understanding” of what piety
dictates when he clearly demonstrates that he lacks such understanding).
But in this dialogue, Socrates contends that he has no (worthwhile)
knowledge, yet he continues to try and
change the state! Is there a problem
here?
2. Roslyn Weiss notes that:
we may compare Socrates’ actual experience in court as
described in the Apology with the
experience he imagines in the Gorgias.
In the Gorgias, at 521d-e, we
find Socrates saying the following: “This is because the speeches I make on each
occasion do not aim at gratification but at what’s best.
They don’t aim as what’s most pleasant.
And because I’m not willing to do those clever things you recommend, I
won’t know what to say in court....For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would be
judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusations against
him. Think about what a man like
that, taken captive among these people, could say in his defense, if somebody
were to accuse him and say, ‘Children, this man has worked many great evils on
you, yes, on you. He destroys the
youngest among you by cutting and burning them, and by slimming them down and
choking them he confuses them. He
gives them the most bitter potions to drink and forces hunger and thirst on
them. He doesn’t feast you on a
grand variety of sweets the way I do.’
What do you think a doctor, caught in such an evil predicament, could
say? Or if he should tell them the
truth and say, ‘Yes, children, I was doing all those things in the interest of
health’, how big an uproar do you think such ‘judges’ would make?
Wouldn’t it be a loud one?”[19]
3. In their “Socratic Religion,” Thomas Brickhouse and
Nicholas Smith maintain that:
one product of Socrates’ revisions [his view that the gods
were morally perfect], we are told, is that he ends up actually being guilty of
the charges—he disbelieves in “the gods of the state,” and “invents new gods,”
gods of a thoroughly moral nature.
As Vlastos puts it:
what would be left of her [Aphrodite] and of the other
Olympians if they were required to observe the stringent norms of Socratic
virtue which require every moral agent, human or divine, to act only to cause
good to others, never evil, regardless of the provocation?
Required to meet these austere standards, the city’s gods would have
become unrecognizable. Their ethical
transformation would be tantamount to the destruction of the old gods, the
creation of new ones—which is precisely what Socrates takes to be the sum and
substance of the accusation at his trial.[20]
The idea that Socrates might not be dangerously critical of
his culture’s religious attitudes—and especially the idea that he might
genuinely believe in dreams and oracles and signs and voices, as we shall argue
later in this chapter—is very troubling to some scholars precisely because
Socrates has for centuries been held up as the hero of reason..[21]
Unlike contemporary philosophers, Socrates saw no need to
investigate religious beliefs per se. As Aristotle
tells us, Socrates confined his philosophical activities to ethics, and so it
should not be surprising to us that Socrates seems to have attended to
theological issues only insofar as they related to ethical concerns.[22]
I have more to say about Socrates and religion in my
“Socratic Voices, Piety, and Rationality” on the course website—while I will
not lecture on this, it is provided as a supplement for those who wish to think
further on this topic.
[1] Plato, “Letter
VII,” trans. L.W. Post, from selection from
Thirteen Epistles of Plato in
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton:
Princeton U.P., 1961), pp. 1575-1576
(325c-326b).
[2] C.D.C. Reeve,
Socrates
and the Apology (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1989), p. 159.
[3] Thomas
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “Socrates and
Political Theory” in
The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies
(N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 2002), pp. 190-223, p. 191.
The essay originally appeared as part of
their Plato’s Socrates (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1994).
[4] Thomas
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “Introduction” to
The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies
(N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 2002), pp. 1-13, p. 2.
[5]
Ibid.,
pp. 2-3.
According to Gary Wills, the vote was 266
to 235 [cf.,
his Certain Trumpets (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 303].
[6] Does he really
“fear” them?
[7]
Cf.,
my lecture supplement
“Socratic Voices, Piety, and Rationality.”
[8] In his
Socrates,
Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca:
Cornell U.P., 1991), p. 82, Gregory Vlastos
translates the passage as: “for I am not aware
of being wise in anything great or small....It
looks as though while neither of us knows
anything worthwhile, he thinks he does; but as
for me, while, as in point of fact, I have no
knowledge, neither do I think I have any.”
In a footnote Vlastos maintains that:
many readers...have misread
this text, taking Socrates to be saying that he
knows he has no knowledge. A
closer reading will show that he says no such
thing...all he says...is that he is not aware of
having any knowledge, and...that he has none.
[9] The phrase
‘Pythian’ refers to the oracle.
More generically it refers to inhabitants
of Delphi.
The ancient Greek Olympic games were
referred to as “the Pythian Games.”
[10] This prediction
was offered by a Delphic Oracle to King
Croesus—note that it may be read two ways (he
interpreted it as predicting a great victory for
himself, only to find defeat on the
battlefield).
[11] Gregory
Vlastos,
Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, op. cit.,
pp. 243.
[12]
Ibid.,
p. 244.
[13]
Cf.,
C.D.C. Reeve,
Socrates and the Apology, op. cit., pp. 21-28.
[14] John
Fleischman, “In Classical Athens, A Market
Trading in the Currency of Ideas,”
Smithsonian v. 24 (1993, July), pp. 38-47,
p. 44.
[15] Roslyn Weiss,
Socrates
Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito
(N.Y.: Oxford U.P. 1998), p. 28.
In a footnote to this passage, Weiss
contends that “the Gorgias makes a similar
distinction between the types of persuasion,
that is between teaching-persuasion and
conviction-persuasion.
See Gorg. 454c-455a” (ibid.).
[16]
Cf.,
C.D.C. Reeve,
Socrates in the Apology, op. cit., p. 173.
[17] Roslyn Weiss,
Socrates
Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito, op.
cit., p. 28.
[18]
Ibid.,
p. 34, footnote.
[19] Roslyn Weiss,
Socrates
Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito, op.
cit., p. 30, footnote.
The passage may be found in Plato’s
Gorgias,
trans. W.D. Woodhead, in
The
Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns,
op. cit.,
pp. 302-303 (521d-e).
[20] Thomas
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “Socratic
Religion,” in their
Plato’s
Socrates (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., pp. 176-212, p.
182.
They are citing Gregory Vlastos,
Socrates:
Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca:
Cornell, 1991],
p. 166.
[21]
Ibid.,
p. 188.
[22]
Ibid.
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