Supplement to Hauptli's Lectures on Plato's Euthyphro
Copyright © 2015 Bruce W. Hauptli
Select this link for a more recent version of this file.
1.
Euthyphro Introduction:
While it is often claimed that this dialogue is set on the
steps of the court building as Euthyphro and Socrates are going into their
respective trials, in their “Introduction” to
The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies,
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith maintain that:
…the Euthyphro depicts a conversation Socrates has as he waits at the
office of the King archon to be given his court date….[1]
This dialogue provides us with a picture of the Socratic
process of elenchus (refutation).
A view about piety is advanced
by Euthyphro, and Socrates subjects it to a critical analysis.
Socrates, of course, is willing to accept only justified, reasoned
claims. But Euthyphro advances a
claim to knowledge which he justifies due to his special position (as a
“theologian”). He claims to know
(what piety is) and Socrates shows that he does not know this.
Think of the Apology—Socrates is testing to see if Euthyphro knows....
If Euthyphro doesn’t know, how will Socrates show him that he
doesn’t? Stanley Cavell points out
that:
Socrates gets his antagonists to withdraw their definitions
not because they do not know what their words mean, but because they do know
what they (their words) mean, and therefore know that Socrates has led them into
paradox.[2]
Here we have the problem that Plato’s
Meno is centrally concerned with—how is learning possible?
The Euthyphro comes to
no positive conclusion as to the nature of piety.
Indeed, it does not even reach the second of the three stages of Plato’s
dialectical process (aporia [perplexity, negativity, or inconclusiveness]).
As the dialogue ends, it is clear that Euthyphro is annoyed with
Socrates, but still believes he possesses a special knowledge as regards piety.
Why doesn’t the dialogue go beyond the first stage?
Euthyphro is not a philosopher!
[The name is used to indicate a character trait—not a profession].
Here, then, is a valuable result of the dialogue—it points out the fact
that the process of Socratic dialectic requires
a sincere desire for truth.
Steven Nathanson maintains that we can see something central about
Plato’s commitment to the ideal of rationality in this dialogue:
there are many questions that could be raised about the manner
in which Socrates questions Euthyphro and about the criterion of knowledge that
Socrates assumes. What I want to
focus on, however, is the impression conveyed to the reader about the characters
of the dialogue and the connection between this impression and the ideal of
rationality. Plato suggests that
although Euthyphro holds strong views and is willing to act on them, he is
unable to provide a justification for either his belief or the action based upon
it. Even if he is correct that his
father ought to be prosecuted, his confidence is still misplaced because it
lacks a rational basis. Though
Euthyphro’s belief may be true, he has no reliable grounds for thinking that it
is true. Once Socrates exposes the
lack of a justification for his belief, it is both irrational and
irresponsible for Euthyphro to
continue to hold it.[3]
-Cf., in this regard, Plato’s Socrates’ speech at the end of the
dialogue (15e-16a).
Note that while the dialogue does not reach a satisfactory
dialectical resolution, it is telling that Euthyphro indicates that he is going
to pursue the course of action that he describes to Socrates (even though he
appears to lack a rational justification for doing so).
The dialogue shows that a consequence of not reaching
aporia is that one may act on one’s
ignorance, and the consequences (both for
oneself and for others) may be terrible!
The dialogue also introduces us to Plato’s doctrine of the
Forms—introducing the notion and
making clear what he takes to be the objective character of these “things.”
The distinction between accidental and essential
characteristics is also introduced and its tie to the Forms is made explicit.
For Plato, the Forms are objective, basic, unchanging, and
transcendent.
Another important aspect of the dialogue is that it portrays Socrates on
the verge of his trial and presents his attitude or frame of mind—he is not
affected. Note what he is accused
of—he continues to do it as he prepares to go to court!
Within the dialogue we find a distinction between something
being good because the gods
approve of it and the
gods approving of something because it is
good—remember this whenever
you read of god or gods in Plato!
His forms (their
objectivity) are outside of
the god(s)—tie this to talk
of the forms.[4]
Here a comment from George Sher, in his “The Meaning of Moral Language,”
is worthy of note:
many [now] believe that what makes an act right is just the
fact that God approves of it or commands us to perform it.
However, this theory—the divine
command theory—is often said to be vulnerable to an objection that was first
advanced by Plato. As Plato argues
in [The Euthyphro], if acts like theft and murder are only wrong because
God forbids them then God cannot forbid such acts
because they are wrong.
In that case, God’s commands are simply arbitrary.
Because it is unclear how arbitrary commands could have authority, Plato
concludes that we should reject the divine command theory.[5]
Not all proponents of the Divine Command theory, of course,
believe that Sher is correct here, but I think that he correctly captures
Plato’s concern—and it is important to
note that at the time Plato is writing, the concern is not with the commands of
a single deity, but with those of a large number of such.
As we read the Crito, we will
come to see that there is some special obligation which individuals “owe” their
parents in ancient Greece. Richard
Kraut confirms this: “the Laws are relying on the assumption, widespread in
ancient Greece, that although there is no general objection to violence and
killing, attacks upon one’s parents are absolutely forbidden.”[6]
In a footnote Kraut continues: “the special inviolability of parents was
built into the legal system. Whereas
the normal penalty for assault in Athens was a fine, it was far more
serious—disenfranchisement—when the victim was a parent or a grandparent of the
accused.”[7]
This means, of course, that Socrates’ wonder at Euthyphro’s certainty
regarding the rightness of his case is even more understandable.
In thinking about the phrase “what the gods like,” we should consider
what Mark McPherran maintains in his “Does Piety Pay?
Socrates and Plato on Prayer and
Sacrifice:”
…it is important to note that sacrificial activity [in ancient
Greece] was often not so much aimed at obtaining specific goods or evils as
maintaining an ordered relationship with the gods and ensuring their general
good will, a will that (it was generally agreed) could not be
reliably influenced by such activity.[8]
In view of his commitment to the idea that the only real (or
at least the most essential) good is virtue (and that an object’s goodness
hinges on its wise, virtuous use), Socrates must reject the
purely mercantile tendencies of
popular religious practice—namely, those resting on the incorrect assumptions
that sacrificial items are themselves god-valued and that our requests for
particular material gains and physical protection will be given significant
weight by the gods. Rather Socrates’
gods cannot care for any material sacrifice per se, and whether or not any
particular request will be granted depends on whether or not the gods’ doing so
will further the overall good.[9]
In short, it would be wrong to assume that Socrates’ (or
Plato’s, or Plato’s Socrates’) view of piety and “what the gods like” is like
that of Euthyphro’s (or the typical Athenian’s).
2. The Text:[10]
2-4 Euthyphro and Socrates meet and it is established that
Socrates has been indicted while Euthyphro has indicted his father for murder.
[A servant kills a slave in drunken anger and Euthyphro’s father ties the
servant up, throws him in a ditch, and sends for a priest for advice as to what
is to be done with him. In the time
before the answer from the priest arrives, the servant dies.
Euthyphro is now prosecuting his father for murder (against the wishes of
his family).]
4e Euth: “But their (Euth’s father, relatives) ideas of
divine attitude to piety are wrong, Socrates.”
Soc: “Whereas, by Zeus, Euthyphro, you think that your
knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that when
those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in
bringing you father to trial?”
5d Soc: What is piety?
Euth: “...The pious is to do what I am doing now” (accusing his father).
After all, Zeus punished his father.
-6a Soc: I find these things and others (e.g., war among the
gods) hard to believe.
-6d Euth: Such things (and more) happen with the gods!
-Socrates is incredulous, but he continues by asking for the
nature (common characteristic—Form) of piety.
What is the common characteristic or
Form)—in the early dialogues they are
viewed as immanent (later they are
treated as transcendent).
7a Euth: “What is dear to the gods is pious.”
Soc: Excellent, but let us examine what you mean by this so
that we can see whether it is true.
-7b You have stated that the gods war with one another, “what
are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger?”
-7c Surely they don’t war over objective things like the size,
weights and measures of things?
--Note that it is exactly these subjects, of course, which the
philosophers would practice their dialectical activities upon.
Moreover, it is exactly these topics upon which Socrates and the other
Athenians disagree (with the results of anger and hatred on, at least, the
others’ part). It is the claim of
Plato’s Socrates that unless we approach these topics rationally, we will have
no real opportunity of resolving our disagreements except by force.
Euthyphro, on the one hand, and Socrates and Euthyphro’s family (and, as
I have noted, other Athenians), on the other hand, disagree about what piety is
and requires. Note that Euthyphro is
prepared to go to court and “force” the issue, while Plato’s Socrates would
settle the disagreement through the use of reasoned dialectic.
---Does Socrates contradict himself here?
At 6a
above he questions whether the gods have done the sorts of things which
Euthyphro says they have done (war amongst themselves, etc.), but now (7e)
he says that they do so.
Note: an argument which uses an
opponent’s premises or basic notions and comes up with a problem is a stronger
argument against the opponent than is one which relies upon premises which the
opponent might not accept [contrast “internal” and “external” critiques].
8c Euth: On this issue (the piety of accusing my father) no
god would disagree.
9c Soc: Even if we could establish this, we would be no
closer to a definition of piety. We
have merely established so far that what all the gods love is pious, what they
all hate is impious, and what they differ on is neither.
10a “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious
because it is loved by the gods?”
-Here he is distinguishing between
essential and
accidental characteristics.
-10c Various examples are offered which incline us to the
conclusion that piety is loved by the gods because it is pious.
-Cf., Grube’s footnote: “it gives in a nutshell a point of view from
which Plato never departed. Whatever
the gods may be, they must by their very nature love the right because it is
right. They have no choice in the
matter. This separation of the
dynamic power of the gods from the ultimate reality, this setting up of absolute
values above the gods themselves was not as unnatural to a Greek as it would be
to us. The gods who ruled on Olympus
were not creators but created beings.
As in Homer, Zeus must obey the balance of Necessity, so the Platonic
gods must conform to an eternal scale of values.
They did not create them, cannot alter them, cannot indeed wish to do
so.”
--While I think that Grube is correct in part of what he
contends here, I think he overemphasizes the extent to which fellow Athenians
would find what Plato is saying to be comprehensible.
While we have little trouble accepting the idea of eternal, unchanging,
objective laws of nature, this was not something they would have found clear or
acceptable. They did attribute to
the deities superior powers over those of men, but their conception of the
deities was distinctly anthropomorphic—their gods behaved as human beings do,
and did not obey eternal, unchanging laws of nature.
Plato’s suggestion that the gods would be good only if they measured up
to some independent, objective, unchanging standard would have leas most to
believe he did, indeed, worship something other than the gods of his city.
11a-b Soc: But, then, Euthyphro, you have not defined piety
for me. Its being loved by the gods
is an accidental and additional characteristic—wave not been given the form or
common characteristic. Next Plato
does something unusual (at least for the Plato of the early dialogues—the Euthyphro,
Apology, and Crito, for example),
he offers the beginning point for a definition rather than (simply) criticizing
the definitions offered by others.
This shows us something about what (the early) Plato takes the nature of “piety”
to be!
11e Soc: “Is all that is pious necessarily just?
Yes.”
“Is all that is just pious?
No.”
Thus, the pious is a part of the just[11]—what part?
-12e Euth: The godly and pious is
the part of the just which is concerned
with the care of the gods; while that concerned with the care of men is the
remaining part of justice.
-13a-d Soc: What kind of care?
-14-15 Euth: Slaves to masters, sacrifice and prayer, honor,
reference, gratitude. These things
are most dear to the gods.
15b Soc: We’ve come full circle.
Now you say that the pious is what the gods love.
But we have already agreed that the fact that the gods love the pious is
an accidental characteristic and what we want is the form.
Let’s start again.
15e Euth: “Some other time Socrates!”
15e-16a Note the
irony in the final statement by Plato’s Socrates—it is relevant to the
Apology, and to Meletus’ charge
against him:
-“What a thing to do, my friend!
By going [now] you have cast me down from a great hope I had, that I
would learn from you the nature of the pious and the impious and so escape
Meletus’ indictment by showing that I had acquired wisdom in divine matters from
Euthyphro, and my ignorance would no longer cause me to be careless and
inventive about such things, and that I would be better for the rest of my
life.”
(end)
3. Final Comments on
the Euthyphro:
In her Cultivating
Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform In Liberal Education, Martha
Nussbaum maintains that:
Socrates questions generals about courage [Laches],
friends about friendship [Lysis],
politicians about self-restraint [Charmides],
religious people about piety [Euthyphro].
In every case he demands to know whether they can give good and coherent
reasons for what they do, and in every case they prove to have been
insufficiently reflective. Socrates
shows them[12]
that the demand for reasons has a bearing on what they will actually choose.
This demand now begins to seem not an idle luxury in the midst of
struggles for power, but an urgent practical necessity.[13]
In her
Plato At The Googleplex: Why Philosophy Won’t Go Away,
Rebecca
Goldstein maintains that:
[1] Thomas
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “Introduction” to
The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies
(N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 2002), pp. 1-13, p. 11.
[2] Stanley Cavell,
“Must We Mean What We Say?”, in
his Must
We Mean What We Say?
A Book of Essays (Cambridge:
Cambridge U.P., 1969), pp. 1-43, p. 39.
[3] Steven
Nathanson,
The Ideal of Rationality (Atlantic Heights:
Humanities, 1985), p. 4.
[4] Also note that
when you confront the singular (‘god’), as
opposed to the plural (‘gods’), you can not
presume that the deity being mentioned is any of
the ones you may generally be familiar with.
The deity of the religions of Abraham
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) was not one
of the ones commonly worshiped in ancient
Greece!
[5] George Sher,
“The Meaning of Moral Language,” in his
Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Philosophy (Third Edition) (N.Y.
Routledge, under review for publication in
2011).
[6] Richard Kraut,
Socrates
and the State (Princeton: Princeton U.P.,
1984), pp. 48-49.
[7]
Ibid.,
p. 49.
[8] Mark McPherran,
“Does Piety Pay?
Socrates and Plato on Prayer and
Sacrifice,” in
The Trial
and Execution of Socrates: Sources and
Controversies, eds. Thomas Brickhouse and
Nicholas Smith (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 2002), pp.
162-190, p. 171.
The article originally appeared in
Reason and
Religion in Socratic Philosophy, eds.
Nicholas Smith and Paul Woodruff (N.Y.: Oxford
U.P., 2000), pp. 89-114.
[9]
Ibid.
[10] The marginal
page references in the text refer to a
collection of Plato’s works (Platonis
Opera [Geneva: 1578]) edited by a famed
printer and humanist of the time named Henri
Estienne (1528-1598), also known by the
Latinized version of his name: Stephanus.
This edition’s pagination has become the
standard way of identifying and referring to
Plato.
[11] In his
Gorgias
(507a5-b4) Plato also claims that piety is a
part of justice.
[12] Better, I
believe, he shows
us.
File revised on .