Supplement to Hauptli's Lectures on Plato's Republic Part II
Copyright © 2015 Bruce W. Hauptli
There are two more recent files replacing the three on Plato's Republic for this course: Plato's Republic Supplement A and Plato's Republic B
3. Socrates begins developing the ideas
behind the ideal state [368c-373e]:
Plato’s Socrates takes up these challenges by looking for
justice in the state[1]
where it may be more readily seen for what it is.
He contends that once we recognize it there, we will be able to recognize
it within individuals. In this
section he begins to develop the initial ideas behind an ideally just state, or
“Kallipolis.”[2]
Of special import will be his claims that individuals are not
self-sufficient, and that a “division of labor” is called for.
He will also emphasize the importance of each individual fulfilling the
role or task for which she or he is most naturally suited.
As this idea gets developed in later sections of the text, it becomes one
of the central notions of the work.
We can call this idea his “Principle of
Specialization”—that is, he claims that because a division of labor is
necessary, each individual should tend to that trade (or craft) for which she or
he is best suited.
368c Socrates begins his reply to
these continuations of Thrasymachus’ argument by developing an ideal state.
-368e The State and the
individual—justice is the same in each.
--Is it?
For us doesn’t justice, primarily (exclusively?) obtain between and among
individuals? Does it make sense to
talk about justice within an
individual?
-369b
Origin of the State: no individual is
self-sufficient.
--369b “...we aren’t all born
alike, but each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being
suited to one task, another for another.”
His division of labor thesis
here yields, one page lager, a Principle
of Specialization—[370b] each individual should do that [single] task for
which she or he is best suited.
This thesis is not [simply] an economic thesis!
--Note the
social character of dialectic.
When he says that we are not self-sufficient, he is not thinking simply
of biology or economics—or so I contend.
The dialectical process that is to yield knowledge is a social process,
and so if we are to achieve knowledge, we must “be” social!
--Note:
while he is talking about “aptness,” this leads (immediately) to
“singularity”—that is, to the view that each person has
one talent which she or he is
“apt” for, and to the conclusion that one must “do” that job.
If individuals are “apt” for
more than one job, or if they can simultaneously perform several, then we need
to look carefully at what follows.
Moreover, if there is not craft of ruling, then the argument here is
going to break down.
-370d The size of state and
number of tasks grows as we think of the sorts of endeavors necessary—farmers
will not make their own plows, tools, clothes, or shoes.
-372e-373c “It isn’t merely the
origin of a city that we’re considering, it seems, but the origin of a
luxurious city.
And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well
see how justice and injustice grow up in cities.”
Indeed, it is necessary to discuss a luxurious city if we are to deal
with Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ points—if we are to contrast the just and unjust
lives. So he “enlarges” the city
adding many more “crafts.”
--372a Plato’s Socrates
recognizes that a “minimalistic” state won’t satisfy most people (who will want
“...couches, tables and other furniture...all sorts of delicacies, perfumed
oils, incense, prostitutes, and pastries”).
As the sequel will make clear, he thinks that (a) the non-luxurious city
is better, and (b) there are reasons
why he believes that some [or,
better, most] people will not be “satisfied” with the non-luxurious city.
The challenge posed by Adeimantus helps explain why he allows for more
than the “necessary” crafts (why he develops a luxurious city): if he is to show
what justice is and that it is intrinsically valuable, he must allow for both
justice and injustice to arise (and must explain why the latter arises).
--372b “We must no longer provide
them only with the necessities we mentioned at first, houses and clothes and
shoes, but we must call in painting and embroidery; we must acquire gold and
ivory and all such things....That healthy community is no longer adequate, but
it must be swollen in bulk and filled with a multitude of things which are no
longer necessities, as, for example, all kinds of hunters and artists....”
The city is increased in size and filled with a multitude of things that
go beyond what is necessary for a city.
--Note: In Books VIII and IX (which
are not included in our selection), Plato develops a detailed and
extensive comparison-and-contrast argument that is to address the
second of the major questions of the
Republic: “Why is the just life
preferable to the unjust one?” or “How valuable is justice?”
-374c Again he notes the need for
each individual to stick to a single
craft (his “principle of specialization”).
4. The need for
guardians—to protect our valuables and ourselves [374-376d]:
The lack of
self-sufficiency thesis and the
principle of specialization, when coupled with the
development of a luxurious city-state,
make it clear that one important role which will need to be fulfilled is that of
the “guardians.” Without
appropriate guardians, the ideally just state will be impossible.
While, of course, each role is important, Plato’s Socrates will focus
upon the guardians (and rulers) as it is this role that has not been properly
defined and fulfilled in extant states.
He believes that the sort of role and knowledge necessary for farmers,
iron workers, potters, shoemakers, shepherds, etc., is already well-known and
does not require investigation or discussion.
The fact that we don’t have just states is to be explained by the fact
that our guardians and rulers are not rightly trained (and, in fact, not rightly
characterized). Thus, in this
section, he begins to focus upon what those who would fulfill this task must be
like. The remainder of this book
will largely focus upon this “class” within the state.
373e-374a The need for
guardians—to protect the state:
“then the city must be further enlarged, and not just by a small number, either,
but by a whole army….”
-374e “...to the degree that the
work of the guardians is most important, it requires the most freedom from other
things and the greatest skill and devotion.”
-375b-c The guardians must have a
spirited temperament but be
gentle
to their people.
--375e-376c
Guard dog analogy: “Then do you
think that our future guardian, besides being spirited, must also be by nature
philosophical?....When a dog sees someone it doesn’t know, it gets angry before
anything bad happens to it. But
when it knows someone, it welcomes him, even if it has never received anything
good from him....In what way philosophical?....Because it judges anything it
sees to be either a friend or an enemy, on no other basis than that it knows the
one and doesn’t know the other.”
Thus, the guardians must have a
philosophic element in their nature—they must
know friend from foe!
We must, then, be concerned with the sort of education they will have.
Explain why it is the guardians’ education he is concerned with—if
something is wrong with the cobblers’ education, is it as serious as if the
guardians are miseducated?
Our editor leaves out a section of the
Republic [376e-412] which deals with
the early phases of the education of the
guardians and the sorts of stories and music which will be allowed in the
state. The discussion emphasizes
that:
378e The young cannot distinguish
what is allegorical from what is not, and the beliefs they acquire at that age
are hard to expunge and usually remain unchanged.
That may be the reason why it is most important that the first stories
they hear should be well told and dispose them to virtue.
-The censorship that he
calls for is to have a moral purpose, and it is necessary given the character of
the young and of some of the individuals throughout their lives.
The educational program which he outlines will train both the guardians’
minds and their bodies, and it will aim to establish a harmony in their
characters—it will address both their “spirited” and their “wisdom-loving” parts
(411e).
389b “...truth must also
be highly esteemed....though [untruth is] useful to men as a kind of medicine,
clearly we must allow physicians to use it, but not private citizens....So it is
fitting for the rulers, if for anyone, to use lies for the good of the city
because of certain actions of the enemy or of citizens, but everyone else must
keep away from them. For a private
citizen to lie to such rulers is wrong or worse than for a sick man to lie to
his physician or an athlete to his trainer about his physical condition, or for
a sailor not to tell the navigator the truth about the condition of the ship or
how he himself or a fellow sailor is behaving.”
[Cf., 459d.]
--In his “The Ethicist” column in
The New York Times Magazine, Randy
Cohen maintains that:
informed consent, central to the
doctor patient relationship, requires honest doctors.
A patient…can agree to a course of treatment with only a real
understanding of it—impossible if a doctor simply makes things up.[3]
5. The rulers, the
noble fiction, and the guard dog problem [412c-427]:
In this section Plato’s Socrates distinguishes the overall
group of guardians into two classes: the
auxiliaries and the rulers.
He also deals with several problems that both his characterization of
these classes and his educational program for them seem to pose.
412e “...we must choose from
among our guardians those men who, upon examination, seem most of all to believe
throughout their lives that they must eagerly pursue eagerly what is
advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite.”
-Plato’s Socrates is clearly
saying that in addition to having the
wisdom-loving and spirited parts of their souls well-trained, the rulers of his
ideal state are to have a very highly developed sense of
social concern (throughout their
lives, he says, they are to be tested to see that they don’t put their own
advantage above that of the state).
-413a-e While no person would
surrender true belief willingly, one
may be robbed of such belief by theft, violence, or bewitchment.
One may be persuaded away from the truth here or one may forget it.
So, what we are looking for is the
best of the best—these will be our rulers.
--Here we must distinguish
between and discuss the relative merits of
true belief and
knowledge—what makes the latter
preferable to the former (according to Plato)?
-414b “...isn’t it truly most
correct to call these people complete
guardians, since they will guard against external enemies and internal
friends, so that one will lack the power and the other the desire to harm the
city? The young people we’ve
hitherto called guardians we’ll now call
auxiliaries and supporters of the guardians’ convictions.”
In effect, the educational process which Plato’s Socrates outlines is
supposed to develop individuals who have been properly educated (wisdom and high
spirit), who care for the state rather than for themselves (simply).
Their appetites, of course, will be controlled.
In short, these individuals will have a
harmony.
But will they want to rule, and will the other citizens accept them as
rulers?
The noble fiction:
-415 Gold, Silver, Iron & Bronze:
the why of this must be
discussed—does the telling of the story amount to a contradiction for Plato?
Can an “ideal” [just] state be
founded upon a lie? Is the
noble fiction a lie?
-Think about the following line
of argument regarding the “myth of the metals.”
Given his definition of justice, such “lying” is just because:
--justice is doing one’s job,
--the ruler’s job is maintaining
the right social order,
--“the myth of the metals” is
necessary for social order,
--therefore telling the “myth” is
just—telling it is the right thing to do.
The guard dog problem:
416 “The most terrible and most
shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to rear dogs as auxiliaries to help with
his flocks in such a way that through licentiousness, hunger, or some other bad
trait of character, they do evil to the sheep and become like wolves instead of
dogs.”
-416b “Isn’t it necessary...to
guard in every way against our auxiliaries doing anything like that to the
citizens because they are stronger, therefore becoming savage masters instead of
kindly allies?”
-416b-417b “And wouldn’t a really
good education endow them with the greatest caution in this regard?
But surely they have had an education like that.
Perhaps we shouldn’t assert this
dogmatically, Glaucon. What we
can assert in what we were saying just now, that they must have the right
education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will most make them gentle
to one another and to those they are guarding.
....Now, someone with some understanding might say that,
besides this education, they must
also have the kind of housing and other property what will neither prevent them
from being the best guardians nor encourage them to do evil to the other
citizens.” Thus, Plato’s Socrates
places a number of “restrictions” upon their “life-style:”
--no material wealth,
--a life where all is shared in
common,
--Spartan existence (explain
“Sparta” and contrast Plato’s ideal state with the Spartan one).
--Relevant
Consideration: it could well be suggested that the “restrictions” which
Plato’s Socrates places upon the life-style of the guardians may best be
considered as a mechanism for instituting the continuing testing process which
these individuals must undergo as we check to see that they always care for the
good of the state (rather than for their own good)—cf.,
412e.
Our editor leaves off a section of the text from 417c-427d
wherein Plato considers an objection from Adeimantus that Plato’s Socrates is
not making the rulers of the city happy, since he is depriving them of the
requirements for a good life (wealth, children, etc.).
Plato’s Socrates replies that this isn’t really true, they are being
provided with what really is valuable, rather than with the things people
believe to be valuable. In this
omitted material Plato offers an objection to what he has just asserted:
419
Adeimantus’ objection:
“...you aren’t making
these men very happy and...it’s their own fault....The city really belongs to
them, yet they derive no good from it.
Others own land, build fine houses, acquire furnishings to go along with
them, make their own private sacrifices to the gods, entertain guests, and also,
of course, possess...gold and silver and all the things that are thought to
belong to people who are blessedly happy.
But one well say that your guardians are simply settled in the city like
mercenaries and that all they do is watch over it.”
-420b “...it wouldn’t be
surprising if these people were very happiest just as they are, but...in
establishing our city, we aren’t aiming to make any one group outstandingly
happy but to make the whole city so, as far as possible.
We thought that we’d find justice most easily in such a city, and
injustice, by contrast, in one that is governed worst and that, by observing
both cities, we’d be able to judge the question we’ve been inquiring about for
so long.”
--Note:
given the challenges offered by Glaucon and Adeimantus (as well as
Thrasymachus), Plato’s Socrates can not simply try to make the rulers wealthy,
wise, and happy. He must show how
their possession of justice is good
independent of whatever extrinsic rewards it offers.
For this reason, amongst others, he can not simply set out to provide
them with either advantage or happiness.
He must show what justice is and show that it is
intrinsically valuable.
Thus, in fact (as the sequel will show), he does believe that these
individuals are “outstandingly happy,” but he must show what their happiness
consists in, and why all should want it (if they can attain it).
--Here we should reflect
again on the passage at 347b regarding Plato’s Socrates’ response to the
question: “Why rule if one doesn’t benefit [in the sense that Thrasymachus
intends the word]?” Of course the
response is that one does it because one
cares for the city and one’s fellow citizens, and because one would suffer
if a less qualified individual rules.
In short, the wise will rule because it is their responsibility to do so.
6. The four virtues
in the city [427e-434e]:
In this section of the text, Plato’s Socrates characterizes
the four main virtues which the ideal state exemplifies.
He is introducing us to the
wisdom, courage (or bravery),
moderation, and
justice which are essential if a
state is to be well-ordered. The
next section will introduce the same concepts within the soul.
Later discussions clarify, elaborate upon, and further develop the ideas
introduced here. With these two
sections we have the initial answer to the two main questions of the
Republic—both the nature and the
value of justice have been sketched.
427e Plato’s Socrates claims that
the ideal state sketched so far has four important virtues: wisdom, bravery,
moderation, and justice:
-428c
Wisdom: “Is it because of the
knowledge possessed by its carpenters, then, that the city is to be called wise
and sound in judgment?”
--429 “...a whole city
established according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class and
part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one.
And to this class which seems to be by nature the smallest, belongs a
share of the knowledge that alone among all the other kinds of knowledge is to
be called wisdom.”
--Question:
Why does he say that this class will be, “by nature” the “smallest
one?” Is his claim here a
“logical” or an “empirical” one?
While, it may seem natural within the state that there be fewer “rulers” than
“auxiliaries” or “workers,” why should this be so in the ideal state?
Suppose all the “work” (including the protection work) could be done by
slaves or machines, could everyone (else), then, be rulers?
Note, also that when we speak, in the next section, about the individual,
we can again ask “Why is this “part” of the soul the “smallest?”
-429b
Civic Courage and the soldiers (or
auxiliaries):
--429c Plato’s “definition” of ‘civic
courage’: “...the power to preserve
through everything its belief about what things are to be feared, namely, that
they are the things and the kinds of things that the lawgiver declared to be
such in the course of educating it.”
Clearly what he is speaking of here is not (at least not simply) what we
normally call courage (just as the wisdom he speaks of is not what that word
might normally connote). The
“virtue” he is speaking here he called “high-spiritedness” when using the guard
dog metaphor. What he has in mind
is more than “intestinal fortitude,” and at 430c the definition is said to apply
to something called “civic courage.”
As we shall see even more clearly in the next section, what Plato has in
mind here is not one of the appetites but, rather, a particular sort of
passion (or emotion).
--In her
The Therapy of Desire, Martha
Nussbaum helps us see what sort of thing is being discussed here when she says
that: “emotions” is the more common modern generic term, while “passions”
is both etymologically closer to the most common Greek and Latin terms and more
firmly entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition....what I mean to
designate by these terms is a genus of which experiences such as fear, love,
grief, anger, envy, jealousy, and other relatives—but not bodily appetites such
as hunger and thirst—are the species....This family of experience, which we call
emotions as opposed to appetites, is grouped together by many Greek thinkers,
beginning at least with Plato, and his account of the soul’s middle part.[4]
--In his
Varieties of Moral Personality, Owen
Flanagan maintains that the six basic emotions are: anger, fear, disgust,
happiness, sadness, and surprise.[5]
-430e
Moderation “...a mastery of
certain kinds of pleasures and desires.”[6]
--431 Self-control and the rule
of the better part of the soul over the worse.
--431c-d Plato’s Socrates talks
of finding “...all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in
children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority who are
called free.” He contrasts this
with “...the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in
accordance with understanding and correct belief [which are found] only in the
few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education.”
In the ideal state, “...the
desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the
superior few”.
--These passages suggest what I
will call the “aristocratic reading”
of the text. They suggest that the
inferior many are constitutionally incapable of self-control (and, thus, must
have control imposed externally upon them).
These passages should be contrasted with 518c: “...the power to learn is
present in everyone’s soul...the instrument with which each learns is like an
eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the
whole body.” The latter passage
suggests what I will call the “democratic
reading” of the text which suggests that even the inferior many are capable
of self-control (though to be believable, this reading will have to allow that
it is unlikely that they can impose this self-control unless they receive
significant assistance). Critically
considering the text and trying to decide which reading is the right one helps
one understand the whole text better.
--Note, also, that in
this passage women are compared with children and household slaves in terms of
the role of the appetites in their souls.
Plato explicitly takes up the role of women in his ideal state in a
section omitted by our editor [451d-456c], and a study of his remarks there
shows that he explicitly allows that women could be rulers (could do any of the
jobs, trades, or crafts in the state).
The explicit argument he offers there seems to make this sort of passage
we are currently confronted with inexplicable, however, and we are left with an
interpretive problem: what is his real
view of [the capabilities of] women?
--432 Moderation is a kind of
harmony and must infuse the whole state—all of the citizens must have a great
deal of this particular virtue!
-Justice:
-433 “Justice...is exactly what
we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it....We
stated...that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for
which he is naturally best suited.”
--433e “...the power that
consists in everyone’s doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage
in its contribution to the virtue of the city.”
--434 “...the
having and doing of one’s own would be accepted as justice.”
--Injustice and meddling (in
others’ tasks)—attempting to perform a task for which one is not naturally
suited.
--Philosophical
Aside: Plato’s view here implies that we each have one particular
“job” which we are suited for. Is
this something he has successfully argued for?
What he says may make more sense when he speaks, below, about justice
in the individual.
But, according to him, what is true of justice in the individual is also
true of justice in the state (and vice-versa).
Thus, if we don’t accept that there is a single, particular, objective
job which uniquely suits each individual, we must reject some of what he says
here!
--Note:
In his “Plato’s Euthyphro,” Peter
Geach maintains that a “definition” may not be what we need: “the style of
mistaken thinking...may well be called the
Socratic fallacy, for its
locus classicus is the Socratic
dialogues. Its influence has, I
think, been greater than that of the theory of Forms; certainly people can fall
into it independently of any theory of Forms.
I have myself heard a philosopher refuse to allow that a proper name is a
word in a sentence unless a “rigorous definition” of ‘word’ could be produced;
again, if someone remarks that machines are certainly not even alive, still less
able to think and reason, he may be challenged to define ‘alive’.
Both these controversial moves are clear examples of the Socratic
fallacy; and neither originates from any belief in Forms.
Let us be clear that this is a
fallacy, and nothing better. It has
stimulated philosophical enquiry, but still it is a fallacy.
We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which
we express our knowledge. Formal
definitions are only one way of elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a
given case be more useful than a formal definition.”[7]
--Note:
one of John Dewey’s criticisms of Plato is also relevant here: “were it granted
that the rule of the aristoi would
lead to the highest external development of society and the individual, there
would still be a fatal objection.
Humanity cannot be content with a good which is procured from without, however
high and otherwise complete that good.
The aristocratic idea implies that the mass of men are to be inserted by
wisdom, or if necessary, thrust by force, into their proper positions in the
social organism. It is true, indeed
that when an individual has found that place in society for which he is best
fitted and is exercising the function proper to that place, he has obtained his
completest development, but it is also true (and this is the truth omitted by
aristocracy, emphasized by democracy) that he must find this place and assume
this work in the main for himself.”
Robert Westbrook elaborates upon this saying: “for the democrat, the realization
of the ethical ideal must be entrusted to the self-conscious, freely willed
actions of every individual in a society.
A good that an individual did not self-consciously recognize and pursue
for himself was not a good; men could not be forced to be free.”[8]
[1] While our
translator and editor use the word ‘city’, I
will use ‘state’ as it will be more natural for
us—we do not conceive of cities as
self-sufficient political unities, but clearly,
this is what is intended.
In this era of internationalism, perhaps
‘state’ does not carry the relevant connotation
completely either, but clearly Plato intends by
his term a self-sufficient political unity of
individuals.
[2]
Cf.,
C.D.C. Reeve’s “The Naked Old Women in the
Palastra: A Dialogue Between Plato and Lashenia
of Mantinea” in the 1992
Fall
Hackett Catalog (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1992).
[3] Randy
Cohen in his “The Ethicist” column in
The New
York Times Magazine on
[4] Martha
Nussbaum,
The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton
U.P., 1994), p. 319.
[5]
Cf.,
Owen Flanagan,
Varieties
of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological
Realism (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1991), p.
41.
[6] As our
translator and editor note, the Greek word here
(sophrosune)
has a wide meaning carrying the connotations of
“...self-control, good sense, reasonableness,
temperance, and (in some contexts) chastity.
Someone who keeps his head under pressure
or temptation possesses
sophrosune.
[7] Peter
Geach, “Plato’s Euthyphro,”
The
Monist v. 50 (1966), pp. 369-382, p. 371.
[8] Robert B.
Westbrook,
John
Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca:
Cornell U.P., 1991), p. 42.
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