Supplement to Hauptli's Lectures on Plato's Republic Part III
Copyright © 2015 Bruce W. Hauptli
7. Justice in the Individual [434e-449]:
In this section Plato’s Socrates applies the picture which he has developed of
justice within the state to the individual soul.
He
proves that the soul has “parts,”
and shows what the proper function of the various parts amounts to.
434d Plato reminds us that one reason for “describing” the ideal state was to
“see justice writ large, so that we might more easily recognize it in the soul:
“we thought that, if we first tried to observe justice in some larger thing that
possessed it, this would make it easier to observe in a single individual.
We agreed that this larger thing is a city, and so we established the
best city we could, knowing well that justice would be in one that was good.
So let’s apply what has come to light in the city to the individual....”
-Note the relevance of this passage to the discussion of the “democratic” and
“aristocratic” readings of the Republic—one
could contend that he appears to emphasize here the importance of “justice in
the individual”—that it may be his “main target”—and that talk of “justice in
the state” may be more a means for discovering the former.
436b Plato does not simply assume that, like the state, the soul (or
psyche) is composed of three parts,
however. Instead, he offers a
proof that there are at least three parts to the soul.[1]
“Do we learn with one part, get angry with another, and with some third
part desire the pleasures of food, drink, sex, and others that are closely akin
to them? Or, when we set out after
something, do we act with the whole of our soul, in each case?”
436b (1) “...the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in
the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time.
So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we’ll know that we aren’t
dealing with one thing but many.”
437e-438d (2) There exist the appetites (e.g.,
hunger and thirst), and
(3) when we experience such demands, we have a particular object in view and aim
to attain it to satisfy the appetite—the appetites have objects.
438d (4) Similarly, when we know we know something specific—knowledge has an
object.
439b (5) “...if something pulls [the thirsty person] back when it is thirsting,
wouldn’t that be something different in it from whatever thirsts and drives it
like a beast to drink? It can’t be,
we say, that the same thing, with the same part of itself, in relation to the
same, at the same time, does opposite things.”
439c (6) Reason, of course, holds us back from drinking sometimes.
439d (7) Thus there are at least two parts of the soul: “hence it isn’t
unreasonable for us to claim that they are two, and different from one another.
We’ll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the
rational part and the part with
which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the
irrational appetitive part,
companion of certain indulgences and pleasures.”
--Note:
the “rational” part he “proves” here is one which is concerned with
calculation—for example, it examines
our appetites in light of their expected consequences.
It is not clear that the use of ‘rational’ or ‘reason’ here is the same
as the one which he will go on to discuss.
If it is not, then he has not necessarily succeeded in fully
differentiating the rational part of the soul in the sense he wants from the
appetitive part.
-439e Is the “spirited part” a third part of the soul, or is it the same as one
or the other of the two parts identified so far?
--Sometimes we struggle against our appetites and get angry with ourselves for
having them or for pursuing their objects.
“...anger sometimes wars against the appetites, as one thing against
another.” (440b) sometimes “...when
appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself
and gets angry with that in him that’s doing the forcing, so that of the two
factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with
reason.” Plato’s Socrates goes on
to claim (440b) that one doesn’t find
cases where spirit allies itself with the appetites against reason however.
--440d Moreover, don’t we find that sometimes when someone “...believes that
someone has been unjust to him....the spirit within him [gets] boiling and
angry, fighting for what he believes to be just....[he will] endure hunger,
cold, and the like and keep on till it is victorious, not ceasing from noble
actions until it either wins, dies, or clams down, called to heal by the reason
within him, like a dog by a shepherd?”
-Thus, there is a third element in
the soul—the spirited element. (440e)
“The position of the spirited part seems to be the opposite of what we
thought before. Then we thought of
it as something appetitive, but now we way that is far from being that, for in
the civil war in the soul it aligns itself far more with the rational part.”
441d “...isn’t the individual courageous in the same way and in the same part of
himself as the city? And isn’t
everything else that has to do with virtue the same in both....Moreover...I
suppose we’ll say that a man is just in the same way as a city.”
-441e –“...each one of us in whom each part is doing its own work will himself
be just and do his own.”
-441e-442b The proper order (and role) of the parts of the soul: reason (rules),
spirit (allies itself with reason), and the appetites (are moderate).
-443c-444 “And justice is, it seems, something of this sort.
However, it isn’t concerned with someone’s doing his own externally, but
with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own.
One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of
another part....He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the
three parts of himself like the three limiting notes in a musical scale—high,
low, and middle.”
--As noted above, we generally treat justice as having to do with our
relationships with others—that is, it
has to do with external (rather than internal) actions and phenomena.
--444b Injustice, of course, is the
imbalance of the parts—a civil war between the parts of the soul with the less
fit seeking to rule!
--444c Justice and health of the soul.
445 Which is preferable—justice or
injustice? Here he turns from
the first (the definitional) question of the
Republic, to the second (valuational)
question. This question is like the
question “Which is preferable: health or disease?”—both questions are really
ridiculous, he contends, but he takes the issue up with a comparison and
contrast argument which occupies most of Books VIII and IX.
-Criticism: Renford Bambrough notes
that: “the physician can learn from other physicians how to preserve and restore
health, and he can teach his art and craft to his successors, because within
well-known limits there are agreed standards for determining whether a body is
healthy or diseased....But the diagnosis and treatment of spiritual ills is not
on such a firm theoretical or experimental basis.
There are no agreed standards for determining whether a soul or a city is
healthy or diseased, just or unjust, and this is not because spiritual medicine
is an under-developed science, but because it is not a science at all.
The lack of agreed standards of justice, which is Plato’s main reason for
pressing the analogy between justice and health, is also the decisive reason
against accepting the analogy.
Plato’s aim is to suggest that he himself
knows what is ultimately and absolutely good.
If we accept this suggestion, then politics and ethics become, for us,
sciences like medicine, learning by experiment and experience how to embody in
law and policy the given standards of justice and virtue.
But we cannot accept the analogy unless we can accept the suggestion, and
we cannot accept the suggestion because Plato can say nothing in its defense
that could not equally be said by a rival claimant to ultimate and absolute
knowledge of the good, in defense of a different set of ‘absolute’ standards.”[2]
-Criticism:
Plato shows that an aristocracy (in his sense) is preferable in regard to
knowledge, virtue, power, and happiness.
But are there
other goals which he ignores
which might tip the balance toward some other sort of state/individual—freedom,
liberty, or moral choice for example?
Consider the following discussion: “often, what is not noticed is the
invalidity of the inference that therefore all power should be given to the wise
benevolent. Thus, if X is selling
his house, even if an outside
observer Y could get a better price for it, it does not follow that X must turn
over the selling to Y. For it is
X’s house and he has the right to
sell it, even if he does not get the best price available.
Similarly, if X were to place his life in Y’s hands and follow Y’s
directives, X might have a happier life than would otherwise be the case.
However, X has the right to run his own life.”[3]
In this regard, note that Plato, in effect, deprives the individuals in
his “ideal state” of the opportunity of
moral choice: the ruled are not free because their desires are controlled by
the philosopher kings and the philosopher kings are not free because they have
knowledge and, thus, can do no wrong!
8. Large segment of the text is omitted [445-503: Role of Women, Life of
Guardians, Introduction to Forms]:
At this point, our editor leaves out an extended discussion in the
Republic [445e-503--students
may view the omitted material on-line
].
In this section of the text Plato’s Socrates first discusses the
status of women in his ideal state.
He utilizes the guard dog metaphor to address the question “What role
should women play?” In addressing
this, he also asks what sorts of differences are relevant in establishing
whether individuals should have different social roles.
Thus, in addition to addressing the question of the status of women, he
is clarifying what sense it is in which individuals differ so greatly that they
are to be assigned differing social roles (and in what sense they are said to be
deserving of different jobs). In
the omitted material, the following passages are important for us:
451d-e The guard dog metaphor and the
role of women [451d-456c]:
-for both the males and females: same role, therefore, same upbringing and
education.
-453b-c Plato’s Socrates has an imaginary questioner ask: “But don’t men and
women have different natures? And,
if they do, doesn’t that mean, give the principle of the division of labor, that
they should have different roles?”
-The key here is to note that we must ask:
“Which differences are relevant when we consider what individuals’ roles should
be?”
--453e-454a Socrates points out that they have agreed that different natures
should have different pursuits and that the natures of men and women are
different, but that they now appear to be arguing that men and women should have
the same pursuits. He says: “What a
grand thing...is the power of the art of contradiction [disputation].
Because...many appear to me to
fall into it against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but
arguing owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions
to the subject under consideration.
They pursue verbal oppositions practicing
eristic,[4]
not dialectic on one another.”
--454b-c Bald men and long-haired men?
Do such differences require different occupations?
--454d But the [male] physician and [male] carpenter are different.
Plato’s Socrates
continues
[455-471c]
by discussing the nature of the family relationships amongst the
guardians. Most of this passage is
of little relevance to the central issues of the
Republic, and the passage does not
bear close scrutiny or reading.
[471c-473c] In additional omitted material Glaucon asks Plato’s Socrates to turn from concerns about the role of women and the family relationships of the guardians back to the more central issues and take up the question “Is this “ideal state” merely “ideal?”:
472c “Then it was in order to have a model that we were trying to discover what
justice itself is like and what the completely just man would be like, if he
came into being, and what kind of man he’d be if he did, and likewise with
regard to injustice and the most unjust man.
We thought that, by looking at how their relationship to happiness and
its opposite seemed to us, we’d also be compelled to agree about ourselves as
well, that the one who was most like them would have a portion of happiness most
like theirs. But we weren’t
trying to discover these things in order to prove that it’s possible for them to
come into being.”
-Note: this passage is relevant to
the issue of the “aristocratic” vs.
“democratic” readings of the text.
Is his concern with the state, the individual, both, or....
To fully address
the question of whether or not the ideal state is “merely ideal,” however,
Plato’s Socrates must begin to discuss
the role of philosophy in the ideal state.
This, in turn, leads him to discuss the sort of
knowledge which the philosopher
rulers must have [473d-475e]. In
that discussion Plato’s Socrates clarifies the sort of knowledge that the rulers
(or philosopher-kings) must have if they are to successfully rule (either the
ideal states or their own souls).
To clarify the sort of knowledge, he must clarify the
object of knowledge here, and it
becomes clear that what must be known are the
forms (or the essential and eternal
characteristics of things).
475e-476a “The fair and honorable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are
two....And since they are two, each is one....And in respect of the just, the
good, and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in
itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and
bodies, and with one another, they present themselves everywhere as a
multiplicity of aspects.” He
recognizes that it will be difficult to explain the forms: [475e] “it would be
by no means easy to explain it to another...” and then maintains that
-476b “The lovers of sounds and sights...delight in beautiful tones and
colors....but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in
the nature of the beautiful itself.
-476c Someone who thinks that beauty
itself does not exist, but only beautiful things,
is like someone who is in a dream.
Here the distinction between
knowledge and opinion arises (the
individual who can not make the distinction has mere opinion).
-476d On the other hand, the individual who recognizes beauty itself (and who
does not mistake the “participants”[5]
for it, or it for the “participants”) leads a waking life.
And “could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as
knowing, knowledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion?”
-476e “...does the man who has knowledge know something [that is, something
real] or nothing?”
-477a “...that which entirely is is
entirely knowable, and that which in no way
is is in every way unknowable....if a
thing...is so conditioned as to be and not to be, would it not lie between that
which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is?....since
knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is
not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience[6]
and science.” And, of course, that
is opinion.
-477c-478 A response to individuals who deny that knowledge and opinion are
different:
--knowledge is an infallible power,
--opinion is a fallible power,
--“how could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power is the
same as an infallible one?”
-478a-479 The object of opinion is something between being and nonbeing
[or “not being”]:
In summary, then, we have a distinction between triangularity (the unchanging
and eternal form which can be known infallibly—closed three-sided figure which
have exactly 180o), triangular objects in the world (particular
things which change and about which we can have fallible opinions—by, for
example, measuring the number of degrees with a protractor), and nonexistent
“things” (like round squares—things which can not be and about which neither
knowledge nor opinion can be had):
|
Knowledge |
Belief |
Ignorance |
Object: |
What is real. |
What is between. |
What is unreal. |
Mental State: |
Infallible knowledge |
Fallible belief |
Imagination |
Plato’s
Socrates clarifies what the many think of the sort of knowledge the
philosopher-kings would have, and how individuals with the relevant sort of
potential are educated in current states.
He characterizes the philosophers as “lovers of knowledge” who (485c)
“...must be without falsehood—they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it,
and have a love for the truth.”
This, of course, raises a question as to whether they and perpetuate the lies
and noble fiction which they are supposed to perpetuate (cf.,
389b, 415, and 459d). At this point
our editor returns us to the text of the
Republic.
-499b The only ways either good cities or good individuals will come about,
then, is if either “…some chance event compels those few philosophers
who aren’t vicious…to take charge of
a city…or [for]…a god…[to inspire] the present rulers and kings…with
a true erotic love for true philosophy.”
--Note that this passage should be contrasted with the description of the tyrant
at 579b-c as an individual who is “filled with erotic loves.”
9. Analogies and allegories regarding philosophic knowledge [502c-521b]:
In this section Plato’s Socrates uses a number of
analogies and
allegories to further clarify the
sort of knowledge which the true philosophical rulers would have.
Note that given what Plato has said about the importance of rational
knowledge, and of knowledge of the forms, it seems inappropriate for him to
resort to analogies and metaphors at this point—surely, one could say, he should
provide further dialectical clarity regarding the forms and regarding the form
in general (and regarding the particular form of Justice) here.
Given the relative unsatisfactoriness of sight, vision, and nonrational
means, he should not be trying to
advance our understanding here by means of analogies and metaphors!
Why, then, does he do this?
503 b “…let us now dare to say that those who are to be made our guardians in
the most exact sense must be philosophers.”
505-506 “...you’ve often heard it said that
the form of the good is the most
important thing to learn about and that it’s by their relation to it that just
things and the others become useful and beneficial.
You know very well that...we have no adequate knowledge of it [and]....if
we don’t know it, even the fullest possible knowledge of other things is of no
benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any possession without the good of
it.
-506b Plato’s Socrates is asked whether pleasure or knowledge (or some other
thing) is “good.” He doesn’t take
this up directly, but we are meant to see here and in what follows that
knowledge is far more like the good than is pleasure!
This topic is too “big” for the discussion, and they turn to the smaller
topic of “justice.”
-506c “...opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly things....The best of
them are blind....”
507b There is a single form behind the multiplicity of particulars.
-The forms are intelligible and not visible.
-508b-509d The analogy of the
sun—there is one form (of course, the form of the good) behind the many forms.
--508d “....when [the soul] focuses on something illuminated by truth and what
is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, but when it
focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it
opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft
of understanding.”
--509b the sun [the form of the good] not only makes things visible
[intelligible], but it is ultimately the source of their existence!
509d-511d The divided line passage:
In this passage Plato clarifies the different “cognitive stages” on the road to
understanding or wisdom. Of some
importance (especially when this passage is combined with the Analogy of the Sun
and the Allegory of the Cave, which bracket it) is the fact that he suggests
that the final stage in the process is one which involves “grasping” (or
“insight”) [511b] rather than reasoning (or the use of “hypotheses’).
The visual metaphor of the sun suggests that the final stage (noesis)
involves an “intellectual vision” which consists of a direct and immediate
embracing the truth (though it may have to be preceded by a long process of
dialectical study).
509d “Understand, then, that, as we said, there are these two things, one
sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible....you
have two kinds of thing, visible and intelligible.”
-The “divided line” distinguishes the two stages of the “visible” (pistis
[or opinion] and eikasia
[imagination]) from the two stages of the intelligible (dianoia
[or reasoning] and noesis [or
understanding]).
-510b-511e This long passage needs to be read carefully—it distinguishes between
the two stages of the intelligible and helps clarify the sort on knowledge the
philosopher-kings are supposed to have.
|
Cognitive State: |
Object of the Cognitive State: |
A semi-plausible comparison to early Platonic
views regarding Socratic Knowledge |
Intelligible
Realm |
Noesis
(understanding) |
Forms |
The state of accomplishment—integrated knowledge
of the forms.
|
Intelligible
Realm |
Dianoia
(reasoning/thought) |
Mathematical and scientific objects/laws
|
Similar to the dialectical search for knowledge.
|
Visible
Realm |
Pistis
(opinion/belief) |
Sensible objects |
Similar to the state of those who
could
reach
aporia (the recognition of ignorance).
|
Visible
Realm |
Eikasia
(imagination) |
Images, reflections, and works of art |
Similar to the state of ignorance of Euthyphro
and others.
|
[BOOK VII]
514-520 The allegory of the cave:
Plato’s Socrates has us imagine individuals living in a deep cave and chained so
that they can only view shadows on the wall and hear echoes in the cave.
Their “knowledge” is only at the lowest level on the divided line (eikasia
[imagination])—they see only images!
Were someone able to free him or herself, and look at the fire in the
cave which makes the images possible, pain would immediately be experienced.
In time, however, the individual could see things (albeit rather darkly)
rather than shadows, and would now be at the next higher level (pistis
[opinion]). If this person tried to
tell the others about the illusory character of their “knowledge,” they would
hate him or her.
Were she or he now to move out of the cave and into the sunlight, again the
first experience would be of pain, but in time things would be seen far better
than before—the individual would have moved up one more level and would now be
in the intelligible realm (dianoia
[reasoning]). Finally, if the
individual looked directly at the sun....
518c “...the power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and...the instrument
with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkens
to light without turning the whole body.
This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into
being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and
the brightest thing that is, namely the one we call the [form of the] good.”
Note:
as indicated above, this passage suggests what I call the “democratic” reading
of the Republic.
It seems to indicate that all individuals are capable of becoming
philosophers. If this represents
his view, of course, the passages about the “inferior many” will need to be
“explained away.” Cf., 431b,
479d, 494a, and 518c.
520-521b Plato’s Socrates indicates that individuals who have the requisite
knowledge must be compelled to rule.
They are to take ruling up as a duty, and he believes this is for the
best for all. They will accept this
lot in life because, he contends, (520e) “...we’ll be giving just orders to just
people.” He also contends that
(521a) “...if beggars hungry for private goods go into public life, thinking
that the good is there for the seizing, then the well-governed city is
impossible.”
10. The Tyrannical Life and the Question “Which life is the better one?
[571-592b]:
At this point, our editor leaves out a large portion of the Republic at
this point (521c-571). In these
pages, Plato’s Socrates discusses in greater detail the higher education of the
rulers or philosopher-kings. He
then turns to an extended discussion of various “less than ideal” states and
individuals—offering the same sort of discussion as he offered regarding the
ideal state and individual. That
is, he discusses what happens when the “other” parts of the soul rule a state or
individual. This discussion is
intended to set up the following critical comparison and contrast of the just
state or individual sketched above and the unjust state or individual.
Plato’s Socrates presents his comparison and contrast in terms of an
imagined degeneration of the state (or individual) from the just one discussed
thus far through a series of “intermediate” cases:
a “timocracy[7]”
which is ruled by the emotion of civic courage;
an “oligarchy” which is ruled the desire for wealth (one of the necessary
appetites);
a “democracy” which treats everything as equally valuable (in a
democracy, unlike the other states discussed, there is equality, and this means
that all the various parts of the soul are given equal valuation—that is,
reason, the emotions, the necessary appetites, and the unnecessary appetites are
all valued equally), and, finally,
a “tyranny.”
In his discussion, Plato’s Socrates is not trying to sketch an actual
“devolution” (of either the individual or the state); instead, he discusses the
various “logical” types of states and individuals.
His goal is to set up the critical comparison and contrast argument which
follows.
I
have provided a long handout of
Book 8 of
The Republic covers the omitted
material and will be important to our discussion of Plato’s overall argument.[8]
Plato’s Socrates begins by discussing what he calls a
timocracy—a state ruled by the
auxiliaries without the leadership and guidance of the philosopher kings.
Since “…everything which has a beginning has also an end” the ideal
aristocracy “will not last forever,
but will in time be dissolved” [1st page of handout—the website
doesn’t incorporate the standard reference indicators].
As the philosopher kings disappear, and
as the auxiliaries begin to disagree amongst themselves and lose the “civic
courage” which is at the core of their nature in the ideal state, we will see
this state (and the corresponding individuals “devolve.”
Thus we will find “…the spirit of
contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate
or spirited element.” Moreover, the
individuals in this state will become “lovers of power and honor” [3rd
page]. The children of these
individuals will become increasingly divorced from civic courage and the nature
and life-style of the true guardians, and as this occurs we will find the next
stage of the “devolution” arising.
Here arises what Plato’s Socrates refers to as an
oligarchy—the state will come to be ruled by those primarily
motivated by the appetite for wealth.
It is important to note that this sort of state and the corresponding
individual will lead a tightly controlled life seeking wealth alone (and this is
to be considered one of the necessary appetites from Plato’s point of view).
As we will see, it is not anywhere near the ideal, but it is far
preferable to the two remaining types of state or individual!
As Plato’s Socrates says: as “…men become lovers of trade and money, they
honor and look up to the rich man, and dishonor the poor man” [5th
page]. Here, he contends, we will
find the state fixing the qualification for citizenship in terms of an
individual’s wealth. He thinks there
are three basic problems with such a state:
“…just think what would happen if pilots [of ships] were to be chosen
according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer,
even though he were a better pilot” [6th page].
“the inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two states, the
one of poor, and the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and
always conspiring against one another’ [6th page].
“a man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property;
yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part,
being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor,
helpless creature’ [6th page].
The citizens of the state are like the “drones of a hive” who have taken
over the rule of the state though they lack the necessary character and
capacities for ruling [7th page].
While order is maintained by the tight control of a necessary appetite,
as this sort of state “devolves,” the unnecessary appetites make an inevitable
appearance. They arise, first,
because by allowing them in the rulers can gain more wealth; and, secondly,
because the children of the oligarch will seek to fulfill them and will have
access to the funds to do so freely [pages 7-13].
Thus over time the children devolve:
“when a young man who has been brought up as..[an oligarch under the
control of the necessary appetite of wealth]…has tasted drone’s honey and has
come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him
all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may imagine, the
change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the
democratical” [13th page].
This will, then, lead to the next stage of devolution: the emergence of
a democracy—which he characterizes
as:
“after this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on
unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be
fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed,
and the heyday of passion is over…he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort
of equilibrium…” [14th-15th pages].
“…he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and tries
to get thin; lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a
water-drinker, and neglecting
everything, then one more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy
with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his
head; and, if he is emulous of any one who
is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once
more in that. His life is neither
law nor order, and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom;
and so he goes on” [15th page].
Plato contends that democracies are full of
freedom, and just as oligarchies devolve because of their emphasis
on wealth, democracies devolve because of their embrace of freedom.
This leads to the final step, the emergence of
tyranny and the correlative individual—the tyrant [16th page
through end of supplement].
[Returning to our text] Here
we return to our editor’s
selection, and we see that according to Plato’s progression a democracy devolves
into a tyrannical state. The sub-classes
in the democracy (rulers, wealthy, and general citizens) war with
one-another—usually the rulers and general citizens try to prey on the wealthy.
The classes here are not in harmony and, thus, the state (and the
individual’s correspondingly ill soul) is unstable and ill.
This leads to the need for a strong leader: [565d] “and is it not always
the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector
and cherish and magnify him?”
According to Plato’s Socrates, this leader initially appears to be everyone’s
friend, but works to divide and conquer becoming, in time, a
tyrant.
To understand this individual (and the tyranny), we must pay attention to
Plato’s characterization of the
unnecessary appetites: [571] “...some of our unnecessary pleasures and
desires seem to me lawless. They
are probably present in everyone, but they are held in check by the laws and by
the better desires with the help of reason....Those that are aroused during
sleep....”
[572d] The character of the dictatorial man:
-573b “...purged him[self] of moderation and filled him[self] with imported
madness.”
-573c-d “Then a man becomes tyrannical in the precise sense of the term when
either his nature or his way of life or both of them together make him drunk,
filled with erotic desires, and mad....
...many terrible desires grow up
day and night besides the tyrannical one, needing many things to satisfy
them....
--574a-575a The tyrant will try to “outdo” his parents, and will sacrifice and
harm them, and “...erotic love lives like a tyrant within him, in
complete anarchy and lawlessness as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if he
were a city, to dare anything that will provide sustenance for himself and the
unruly mob around it (some of whose members have come in from the outside as a
result of his keeping bad company, while others have come from within, freed and
let loose by his own bad habits).”[9]
Here Plato describes the tyrant as someone fully characterized by
pleonexia.”
The discussion of the different individuals and states (the aristocracy,
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny) leads to Plato’s proofs:
First proof: comparison/contrast of aristocracy and tyranny [576d-580d]:
-576d tyranny and aristocracy are direct opposites,
-there is no more miserable state than the tyranny,
-there is no happier state than the aristocracy,
-577c the state under a dictator is enslaved,
-the best elements in the tyranny are without civic rights.
577d As with the state, so with the individual:
-the souls of tyrants are full of servitude,
-best elements are enslaved,
-soul is not free.
--Critical comment: now, really, is
Plato a “fan” of freedom?
Is there freedom in an aristocracy?
-577e-578b The tyrannical city (and soul) is poor, full of fear, and wretched.
-578d-579a Consider the individual who owns many slaves.
Does this person fear the slaves?
No! Why not?
Because the whole state would come to the rescue if the slaves revolted.
Now consider what would happen if the individual and the slaves were all
moved away from the protection afforded by the city.
The slave owner would be (rightly) frightened and would turn into a
flatterer of servants/slaves!
-579b-c “...he’d be surrounded by nothing but vigilant enemies.
And isn’t this the kind of prison
in which the tyrant is held—the one...filled with fears and erotic loves of all
kinds....he’s the only one in the whole city who can’t travel abroad or see the
sights that other free people want to see.
Instead, he lives like a woman, mostly confined to his own house, and
envying any other citizen who happens to travel abroad and see something
worthwhile.
....He’s just like an exhausted
body without any self-control, which, instead of living privately, is compelled
to compete and fight with other bodies all its life.”
--Note that this passage should be
contrasted with the one at 499b (not
included in our selection) “the
Philosopher is filled with a true erotic love for true philosophy.”
There he contends that the only way either good cities or good
individuals will come about, then, is if either “…some chance event compels
those few philosophers who aren’t vicious…to
take charge of a city…or [for]…a god…[to inspire] the present rulers and
kings…with a true erotic love for true
philosophy.”
In the context of a “comparison and contrast” between the sort of “erotic love”
of the tyrant and that of the philosopher, I should perhaps revisit my earlier
remarks upon Plato’s view of love.
In discussing the family relationships of the rulers and auxiliaries, I noted
that he would take the children away from the parents and would not allow the
ruling males and females to form “husband and wife” relationships.
The claim there was that “erotic love” would not foster the requisite
character for ruling (they would care more for specific individuals than for the
whole state if they were allowed to cultivate this trait, or have such
parent-child, husband-wife relationships).
In short, I said, Plato seems to be no fan of
love.
This is only partially true however.
In his
Symposium
(many consider this to be Plato’s “second-greatest” dialogue after the
Republic), Plato offers a number of
speeches given at a supper party regarding the nature of love.
Of course, Socrates’ speech (199c-212c) is the highlight of the dialogue.
Within this speech Plato’s Socrates imagines Diotima [a wise woman of
Mantinea who “instructs him” regarding true love much as the “laws” instruct him
in the Crito].
The speech from 210a-212c sketches an “assent” from love of transient
individuals to love of the form of the Beautiful itself and clearly indicates
that Plato feels there is a “good” form of erotic attachment (though it is to
what is eternal rather than what is changing, and it is the sort of love which
many can share in). The famous
passage is too long to replicate here, but one portion of it goes as follows:
And so, when his prescribed devotion to boyish beauties has carried our
candidate so far that the universal beauty dawns upon his inward sight, he is
almost within reach of the final revelation.
And this is the way, the only way, he must approaching, or be led toward
the sanctuary of Love. Starting
from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever
mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung—that is, from one to
two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of
institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the
special love that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself—until at last he
comes to know what beauty is.
And if, my dear Socrates, Diotima
went on, man’s life is ever worth living, it is when he has attained this vision
of the very soul of beauty. And
once you have seen it, you will never be seduced again by the charm of gold, of
dress, of comely boys, or lads just ripening to manhood; you will care nothing
for the beauties that used to take your breath away and kindle such a longing in
you, and many others like you, Socrates, to be always at the side of the beloved
and feasting your eyes upon him, so that you would be content, if it were
possible to deny yourself the grosser necessities of meat and drink, so long as
you were with him.
But if it were given to man to
gaze on beauty’s very self—unsullied, unalloyed, and freed from the mortal taint
that haunts the frailer loveliness of flesh and blood—if, I say, it were given
to man to see the heavenly beauty face to face, would you call
his, she asked me, an unenviable
life, whose eyes had been opened to the vision, and who had gazed upon it in
true contemplation until it had become his own forever?[10]
Of course, many may feel that the sort of love Plato commends here is not what
they fee to be intrinsically valuable—it may seem “Platonic” rather than “real”
love.[11]
580b Which individual, then, (the aristocrat, timocrat, oligarch, democrat, or
tyrant) is first in happiness? That
is an easy question once one has set the comparison and contrast.
Additional Critical Comments:
Plato’s “first argument” contends that the good for human beings is to have a
tightly-ordered soul governed by philosophical reason and live in a civil
society which is similarly controlled by reason.
Pleasures, loves, freedoms, choices, and any other goods are to be
rigidly controlled by the “higher” parts.
In his Reasons and Persons,
Derek Parfit suggests that:
we might…claim that what is best for people is a composite.
It is not just their being in the conscious states [e.g.,
pleasure and pain] that they want to be in.
Nor is it just their having knowledge, engaging in rational activity,
being aware of true beauty, and the like.
What is good for someone is neither what Hedonists claim, nor just what
is claimed by Objective List Theorists.
We might believe that if we had
either of these, without the other,
what we had would have little or no value.
We might claim, for example, that what is good or bad for someone is to
have knowledge, to be engaged in rational activity, to experience mutual love,
and to be aware of beauty, while strongly wanting just these things.
On this view, each side in this disagreement [hedonists and list
theorists] saw only half of the truth.
Each put forward as sufficient something that was only necessary.[12]
We could build on Parfit’s suggestion developing a view (or, even, perhaps, an
alternative reading of Plato’s view) which stresses that the good for human
beings is multi-faceted; and insists on a
balance between love of knowledge, love of others, civic concern,
pleasurable fulfillment, love of beauty, and a host of other intrinsically
valuable ends. While a life which
includes the sort of philosophical knowledge Plato recommends may be “good;”
such a view insists that if it is devoid of the other aspects, it is not a “good
life.” This view would accept the
Socratic claim that “the unexamined life is unworthy living,” without adhering
to the Platonic exclusivity which turns this into the only important aspect of
the good life.
The suggestion of an alternative reading of Plato, rather than a wholly
alternative view, is suggested by the fact that the common move in interpreting
Plato’s “proof” here emphasizes, as he does, the element of “rigid control” and
the absolute emphasis upon philosophical wisdom.
If we look back at Plato’s beginning points in the
Republic, however, and pick up on his
emphasis upon justice as a
harmony of the parts, and note,
as I have emphasized, that the development of his overall argument emphasizes
both philosophical knowledge and
civic concern, then we might come up with a view of Plato which would emphasize
a harmony of various goods. Of
course promoting control and
promoting harmony can be very
different; and the interpretation of Plato I have emphasized has been one which
talks more of the former than of the latter.
This, however, can’t be resolved here by me.
In his “The Case For Far-Out Possibilities,” Freeman Dyson maintains that:
the right question to ask was not “Who are the best rulers?” but “How do we make
sure that rulers can be peacefully replaced when they rule badly?”
Democratic systems of government are designed to answer this latter
question. Elections are held not to
choose the best rulers, but to give us a chance to get rid of the worst without
bloodshed. Constitutional monarchy
is another solution to the same problem….The perennial problem of government is
not to choose the best rulers, but to hold bad rulers responsible for their
failures.[13]
580d A second proof [580d-583b]:
580d Each part of the soul has its
particular form of pleasure and its peculiar desire: knowledge, honor, and
appetites.
-581c-e The three types of people would, of course, each say that their sort of
pleasure is the best! How shall we
judge this issue?
--582a “How are we to judge things if
we want to judge them well?
Isn’t it by experience, reason, and argument?”
--582b-d Which of the three types has the most experience of the three kinds of
pleasure? Which is most adept at
reasoning and argument? The
philosopher!
--583a “Then of the three pleasures, the most pleasant is that of the part of
the soul with which we learn....”
A third proof [583b-592b]:
583c We say pain and pleasure are
opposites, but actually, there is a middle ground between them (that is, the
absence of pain)!
-584 Some confuse true pleasure with
the mere absence of pain!
--584e-585a “Is it any surprise, then, if those who are inexperienced in the
truth have unsound opinions about lots of other things as well, or that they are
so disposed to pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state that, when they
descend to the painful, they believe truly and are really in pain, but that,
when they ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they firmly believe
that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure?”
-585b-c Ignorance and pain are “empty” states of the soul, and it is true
belief, knowledge, etc., which are the “fulfilled states” which contrast with
these empty states (rather than the intermediate states).
-586a-b “Therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are
always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to
the middle, as it seems, and wander in this way throughout their lives, never
reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or being
brought up to it, and so they aren’t filled with that which really is and never
taste any stable and pure pleasure.
Instead, they always look down at the ground like cattle, and with their heads
bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate.
To outdo others in these things, they kick and butt them with iron horns
and hoofs, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable.
For the part they are trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes, and
neither it nor the things they are trying to fill it with are among the things
that are.”
--His discussion here should remind us of what he said in the “divided line
passage” [509-511 d] and his “allegory of the cave” [514-520]—if one isn’t
“exposed” to the “better pleasures,” one can’t even know what one is missing
according to Plato’s Socrates here.
Those who are unaware of the “true pleasures” (those of philosophic discussion,
reflection, and knowledge), then are like those in the cave who are content to
live a life of looking at shadows (that is things which are largely unreal—those
items which fit into the lowest category of cognition and reality in the divided
line passage).
-586e “...when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no
civil war in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and
in particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures
possible for it.”
-587a-589b Plato’s Socrates offers both a tortured mathematical evaluation of
how distant the tyrant is from the aristocrat, and a comparison of the tyrant
with various mythological beasts.
Instead of feeding the beasts within us, of course, he maintains we should
domesticate them!
-589d “...can it profit anyone to acquire gold unjustly if, by doing so, he
enslaves the best part of himself to the most vicious?”
-590c-d “...when the best part is
naturally weak in someone, it can’t rule the beasts within him but can only
serve them and learn to flatter them....to ensure that someone like that is
ruled by something similar to what rules the best person,
we say that he ought to be the slave of
that best person who has a divine ruler within himself.
It isn’t to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which is what
Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but
because it is better for everyone to be
ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed
from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed
by the same thing.”
592a-b Plato’s Socrates suggests that this picture of an ideal state may be a
model “...for anyone who wishes to look at it and make himself its citizen on
the strength of what he sees.
It
makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take
part in the practical affairs of that city and of no other.”
[1] It should
go without saying, that one can not assume that
Plato’s concept of the soul (or
psyche)
is largely similar to the modern conception.
The religious conception of the soul in
the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faiths is
influenced by Plato’s conception (rather than
the other way around).
Similarly, of course, one can not try and
analyze his conception along Freudian
lines—though, of course, Freud’s conception of
the
psyche is influenced by Plato’s.
[2] Renford
Bambrough, “Plato’s Political Analogies,” in
Philosophy, Politics, and Society, ed. Peter
Laslett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), p. 108.
The essay is also in
Plato,
Popper, and Politics edited by Renford
Bambrough (Cambridge: Heffer, 1967).
[3] Norman E.
Bowie and Robert Simon,
The
Individual and the Political Order (2nd
edition) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1986), p. 130.
[4] The art
of disputation and polemics.
[5] By
‘participants’ Plato means to speak of the
individual beautiful things.
Thus
Beauty
Itself (the form Beautiful) is one thing and
individual things, like the Mona Lisa, are
different things which are what they are because
they “fall under” (or “participate in”) the
relevant form.
[6] Lack of
science, or ignorance.
[7] Timocracy:
‘timerous’ = ‘fearful’—of course, here, in a
“Platonic” sense!
Remember his discussion of the
“auxiliaries,” and their sort of
civic
courage.
[8] This translation of Plato's Symposiumis from Benjamin Jowett’s translation of The Republic as it appears on The Internet Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html (accessed on September 9, 2014.
[9] See the
note to the passage at 343d-344c regarding the
translation of
pleonexia.
[10] Plato,
Symposium
(211d-212c),
trans. Michael Joyce [1935], in
The
Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton:
Princeton U.P., 1961), pp. 562-563.
The passage, translated by Alexander
Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, may be found in our
text on pp. 119-120.
[11]
Platonic
love is given the following definition by
The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language
(N.Y.: Random House, 1969), p. 1103: “…love of
the idea of beauty, seen as terminating an
evolution from physical desire for an individual
through love of physical beauty and later of
spiritual beauty.
2…an
intimate companionship or relationship between a
man and a woman which is characterized by the
apparent absence of sexual desire; a spiritual
affection.”
[12] Derek
Parfit,
Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,
1984), pp. 501-502.
[13] Freeman
Dyson, “The Case For Far-Out Possibilities,”
The New
York Review of Books v. 58 (November 10,
2011, pp. 27-27, p. 27.
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